Bhāviveka

And His Buddhist Opponents

by

Malcolm David Eckel

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Commentary
Translated and edited with introduction and notes by
Malcolm David Eckel

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In memory of my father,
the Very Rev. Malcolm William Eckel

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Preface

This book is the culmination of a project that began over thirty years ago in Puṇe, India, when I was doing research for my dissertation on Bhāviveka (then known to the scholarly world as Bhāvaviveka). The focus of that research was the commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses on the Middle Way* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*), but from time to time I was able to spend afternoons with Prof. V. V. Gokhale reading the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of a work by Bhāviveka that was just beginning to spark the curiosity of scholars of Indian Buddhism. V. V. Gokhale had been given Rahula Samkrtyayana's hand-written copy of a Sanskrit manuscript of Bhāviveka's *Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ*). Samkrtyayana had found this manuscript in Zha-lu monastery in Tibet. This transcription made it possible to study Bhāviveka's work in the original language for the first time, without having to peer through the veil of a Tibetan translation. What we saw became a source of deep fascination. Bhāviveka offered not only his own distinctive account of Madhyamaka philosophy, a philosophy that shaped Buddhist thought in India and went on to dominate the Buddhist intellectual tradition in Tibet. He also gave a detailed, idiosyncratic, and carefully reasoned survey of the entire landscape of Indian philosophy as he knew it in sixth-century India. Those quiet afternoons in V. V. Gokhale's austere quarters in Puṇe led me to my book *To See the Buddha*, on Bhāviveka's concept of the Buddha. Now they have led to this book on Bhāviveka's relationship with his Buddhist opponents.

The journey has been a long and circuitous one, and it has involved the help of many generous and thoughtful colleagues and friends. Bhāviveka's *Verses*, with their accompanying commentary, cover so many different aspects of Buddhist literature that it would have been impossible to produce this work in isolation. After I left India in the mid-1970's, Robert A. F. Thurman was kind enough to share a draft of his translation of the verses in chapter 4. He also introduced me to Geshe Lozang Jamspal at Geshe Wangyal's study center in Washington, New Jersey. Geshe Jamspal helped lead me through the arguments against the Yogācāra in Chapter 5. When we finished reading that chapter, Geshe Jamspal said that Mañjuśrī had smiled on us. It certainly felt as if this were true, and the sustaining power of that smile has continued to illuminate the rest of the project.

Eventually the project expanded to include Shotaro Iida, who had produced an English version of Susumu Yamaguchi's pioneering Japanese translation of chapter 5, and also

Christian Lindtner, who had opened up the study of Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. (The disputed authorship of this text is discussed in Part 1 of this book.) Eventually Shotaro Iida's interests turned elsewhere, and Christian Lindtner and I produced a very tentative translation of both chapters. When it was no longer possible to continue that collaboration, I continued alone to resolve the many lingering puzzles in the translation and edition of the text, to provide the explanatory notes, and to introduce the text in Part 1 of this book.

In that painstaking process, I have benefited from the support and encouragement of many fine scholars. For the translation of chapter 4, Jan Nattier and Paul Harrison have generously shared their knowledge of the Mahāyāna sūtras, Peter Skilling has done the same for the Nikāya traditions, Gregory Schopen has commented on some of the philological difficulties of the chapter, and Shayne Clarke has helped identify several references to rules in the Vinaya. The translation of chapter 5 has been greatly enhanced by Parimal Patil's knowledge of the epistemological tradition, especially Bhāviveka's arguments against the Yogācāra interpretation of "mind-only" and Dignāga's theory of language as *apoha* or (as Bhāviveka interpreted it) "exclusion-by-the-other." Zhihua Yao helped gain access to Chinese sources, and Dan Lusthaus has been particularly generous in sharing his knowledge of the Yogācāra tradition, especially the biography of Xuanzang. It has been a pleasure to read the translation of both chapters with the members of Professor Patil's seminar on "Buddhists against Themselves" at Harvard in spring 2008. Their interest and thoughtful attention helped move the work forward toward completion. I am grateful also to Michael Witzel, the editor of the Harvard Oriental Series, for his encouragement and generosity in agreeing to include this book in his series. It is a remarkable honor to present this work in a series that has been shaped by scholars like Henry Clarke Warren, Charles Rockwell Lanman, Masaaki Hattori, and Daniel H. H. Ingalls.

During the process of research and writing that led to the final text, I have benefited from conversations with Leonard van der Kuijp, Janet Gyatso, and Charles Hallisey at Harvard, Akira Saito in Tokyo, Ryusei Takeda in Kyoto, and Olle Qvarnström in Lund. The critical eye of these thoughtful colleagues offered new perspectives on even the most familiar material. In the editorial process, I am grateful to Zachary Bos for his help with technical aspects of the publication process, to Frances Whistler of the Editorial Institute at Boston University for her guidance in the preparation of the text, and to my daughter Leslie Elizabeth Eckel for reading the final proofs with such a careful scholarly eye.

Looking back to the more distant past, I am aware of many others who helped shape this book and are no longer present to receive my thanks. Kendall W. Folkert shared his interest in the Jain compendia when we were in graduate school together at Harvard and has influenced my argument about Bhāviveka's system of classification in Part I of this book. Unfortunately he was lost in an accident in India and was never able to pursue

his interests in these Buddhist sources. Masatoshi Nagatomi, my adviser at Harvard, helped a generation of Buddhist scholars bridge the gap between Buddhist scriptural traditions and Buddhist philosophy. In this respect, he had the same unified and seamless vision of Buddhist thought that we find in Bhāviveka. My analysis of Bhāviveka's logical procedure in Part I of this book has been informed by John Clayton's understanding of comparative philosophy, especially by his concept of "local rationalities." I enjoyed his presence as Chair of the Department of Religion at Boston University, and we mourn his loss. Thanks are due also to Paul Hoornaert, who took an important step in the study of Bhāviveka with his thoughtful translations of *Tarkajvālā* chapter 5 and unfortunately was prevented by illness from continuing his scholarly work.

Finally, I am grateful to my wife Sarah Vance, whose skill and experience as a designer transformed this project from a mass of words into a coherent and appealing vehicle of communication. Without her intelligence, patience, and support, this book would certainly not have been possible, especially in its present form.

The research for this book has been funded in part by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and from the Humanities Foundation at Boston University. They too deserve thanks for its completion.

As a final act of acknowledgment, it is customary to accept responsibility for any errors or omissions, known or unknown, that may remain in the text. No one is more aware of this book's annoying and persistent inadequacies than I, from the work of the mysterious Vararuci to the obscure quotations, odd similes, and unknown place names that still are unexplained. I have taken courage from Lambert Schmithausen's suggestion in the preface to his book on the *ālayavijñāna* (Schmithausen 1987) that it is better to bequeath these unsolved problems to one's readers than to wait forever for their resolution. My hope is that this book will serve as a stimulus to further research on the rich and varied texture of Mahāyāna Buddhism, on its relationship with other traditions of Indian thought, and on the scholar and intellect who has challenged us to decipher this remarkable text. If he were present, I imagine that Bhāviveka might share Mañjuśrī's smile at what he sees.

Malcolm David Eckel
Brookline, Massachusetts
2008

Abbreviations

AAA	*Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra
AM	*Ālokamālā* of Kambala
AN	*Aṅguttaranikāya*
Aṣṭa	*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*
AP	*Ālambanaparīkṣā* of Dignāga
BBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi* of Asaṅga
BCA	*Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva
BEFEO	*Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
DN	*Dīghanikāya*
DPPN	*Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, edited by Malalasekera
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*
JIBS	*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
JPTS	*Journal of the Pali Text Society*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
Kośa	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* of Vasubandhu, edited by P. Pradhan

MA	*Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti
MAV	*Madhyāntavibhāga*, attributed to Maitreya
MAVT	*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* of Sthiramati
MCB	*Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*
MHK	*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ* of Bhāviveka
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* of Nāgārjuna
MN	*Majjhimanikāya*
MPS	*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, edited by Waldschmidt
MRP	*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, attributed to Bhāviveka
MS	*Mahāyānasaṃgraha* of Asaṅga
MSA	*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, attributed to Maitreya
MVT	*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* of Sthiramati
MVY	*Mahāvyutpatti*
PEW	*Philosophy East and West*
PP	*Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti
PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga
PTS	Pali Text Society
RGS	*Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā*
SN	*Saṃyuttanikāya*
SOR	*Serie Orientale Roma*

T	*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*
TJ	*Tarkajvālā* of Bhāviveka
Traité	*Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, translated by Lamotte
VY	*Vyākhyāyukti* of Vasubandhu
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens*

Part 1:
Analysis

Introduction

For anyone who sets out to understand the development of Buddhist philosophy in India, it is hard to imagine a more central text than *The Heart of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakahṛdaya*) by the sixth-century philosopher Bhāviveka.[1] This is not to say that the text was the most influential or even the most brilliant contribution to the development of Indian Buddhist thought. For sheer historical impact one would have to favor the works of Nāgārjuna or Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the founders of the major Mahāyāna traditions. To dig deeply into the intellectual puzzles of Mahāyāna philosophy, some might prefer the works of Candrakīrti or Dharmakīrti. But no Indian Mahāyāna thinker played a more crucial role in mapping the landscape of Indian philosophy and defining the relationships of its different traditions. At a time when major branches of Indian philosophy were still in the process of formation, Bhāviveka provided a model of textual classification (the philosophical compendium or doxography) that became the classic vehicle for the study of Indian philosophy. It would be an exaggeration to say that Bhāviveka was India's first systematic comparative philosopher, but it would not be far from the truth. There were earlier attempts to classify the variety of positions in Indian philosophy, and there were many disputes between individual thinkers and between different schools, but Bhāviveka has given us the first surviving example (and perhaps the first example that ever existed) of a genre that defined the systematic comparison of philosophical schools in India until the present day.

The most distinctive feature of Bhāviveka's text is so simple that it is easy to take for granted. Rather than organizing his text by topic (like "the nature of the self" or "the means of valid knowledge"), Bhāviveka organizes it by tradition or school. The text begins with three chapters on his own philosophy, then it devotes two chapters to his Buddhist opponents (the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras),[2] followed by four chapters on his Hindu opponents (Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā). It concludes with a brief discussion of Jain arguments about omniscience and three verses in praise of the Buddha. As is true of later philosophical compendia, Bhāviveka's text says relatively little about the historical development of these traditions.[3] With the important exception of his account of the eighteen schools of the Śrāvakas, Bhāviveka tells us very little about how these traditions came to be. He simply gives us a picture of the traditions as they were known to him in the middle of the sixth century CE. But the text

has extraordinary historical value, particularly for the study of Bhāviveka's Buddhist opponents. Buddhist literature before the time of Bhāviveka was rife with controversy. Sometimes the opponents were explicitly identified; more often their identities remained obscure. But, as far as we know, Bhāviveka gives the first systematic account of the controversies that divided Indian Buddhist thinkers during the classical period of the Indian Mahāyāna. The purpose of this book is to make Bhāviveka's understanding of these controversies clear.

It is common to begin a Sanskrit commentary with a statement of its subject matter (*abhidheya*), its purpose (*prayojana*), and the connection (*sambandha*) between the two. In a narrow sense, the subject matter of this book is obvious. This is a book about a book. Or, more accurately, it is a book about a portion of a book. It provides an edition, translation, notes, and introductory analysis to the two chapters of Bhāviveka's text that deal with his Buddhist opponents. For some readers, it will be enough simply to gain access to Bhāviveka's text. These two chapters provide an extraordinarily detailed picture of Buddhist thought and practice in what may have been one of the most creative and diverse periods in the history of the Buddhist tradition.[4] Bhāviveka saw the big picture, but he also had an eye for unusual and telling details. As several scholars have noted, Bhāviveka gives one of the most precise and detailed accounts of the function of mantras, *dhāraṇī*s, and *vidyā*s in any Indian text before the arrival of Tantric traditions. For anyone who has wondered whether a Bodhisattva can ever be justified in committing murder, Bhāviveka gives a thorough analysis of the question based on traditional sources. He also explains what happens when a Bodhisattva who commits murder is scorched, however briefly, by the flames of hell. Is it acceptable for a monk to pay homage to a lay person? Bhāviveka has the answer, as he does to other questions about the relationship between the Śrāvakas and the adherents of the Mahāyāna. Are the different canonical collections of the eighteen schools complete? If not, what is the relationship between their canonical literature and the sūtras of the Mahāyāna? Is there anything distinctive about the way Bodhisattvas practice the eightfold path? What is the status of a Bodhisattva vow? In a period when texts seldom seem to come down to earth in the practice of actual Buddhist communities, Bhāviveka gives such a lively account of the arguments that set one Buddhist group against another that it is possible to imagine for a moment how it might have felt to enter a living Buddhist debate.

But the significance of Bhāviveka's text goes beyond these myriad differences to the status of "difference" itself. In this respect, he helps correct one of the most common misconceptions about Buddhist thought. Buddhism is often viewed as a tradition that tolerates differences. In the first chapter of Walpola Rahula's classic introductory text, *What the Buddha Taught*, Rahula says: "the tolerance allowed by the Buddha is astonishing to the student of the history of religion" (4). Rahula illustrates this point with a story about Upāli, a disciple of Mahāvīra the Jina who is sent to the Buddha to engage him in debate. When Upāli and the Buddha finish their discussion, Upāli decides that

the Buddha is right and asks to be accepted as a disciple. The Buddha tells him to slow down, consider his position more deeply, and show respect for his former teacher. Rahula associates this spirit of cautious tolerance with an edict of the Buddhist emperor Aśoka that reads (in Rahula's translation) as follows: "One should not honour only one's own religion and condemn the religions of others, but one should honour others' religions for this or that reason. So doing, one helps one's own religion to grow and renders service to the religions of others too. . . . Let all listen, and be willing to listen to the doctrines professed by others" (Rahula 4-5).

Few readers are likely to be surprised by Rahula's message. Many students of Buddhism come to the tradition expecting a message of tolerance and peace. As many scholars have noted, one of the most pervasive stereotypes of Indian religion in general is that it cultivates tolerance of opposing views.[5] But newcomers to the Buddhist tradition soon discover that there was as much variety and disagreement in the early Buddhist community as there is in other religious communities. And these disagreements only intensified with the appearance of the Mahāyāna. Not only did the Mahāyāna differentiate itself aggressively from earlier traditions, it also generated its own internal process of differentiation and critique. It did not take long for these complex controversies to call for something like a Buddhist theory of difference. When the monastery on the eastern mountain develops views that are different from those that are held by the monastery on the western mountain, which differences are significant? Where do the differences come from? Where do the differences lead? How are the differences classified? Are some kinds of differences more threatening than others? Are some ideas or practices right and others wrong, or are all of them equally valid? If so, what determines their validity? Do some differences go so far beyond the pale that they should be suppressed? And does the process of understanding and analyzing differences have any value? Does it give a person more power or more status? Does it make a person more wise?

In the face of questions like these, mere tolerance is not enough. It may work well if another group of monks dyes its robes the color of copper rather than saffron, and little seems to ride on the difference. But if the monks with copper-colored robes think that nirvāṇa is an absence when others think that nirvāṇa is a presence, it is a different story, especially in a tradition where "right understanding" plays a crucial role in the path to nirvāṇa. Differences about "rightness" pose serious questions. An obvious question is how the two positions are related. Is it possible, for example, that the rightness of one position excludes the rightness of the other? In comparative philosophy, this option would be called an exclusive view of truth. Another possibility might be that both positions are right but one position is better, in the sense that it subsumes or replaces the other. This option is often called an inclusive view of truth. A third possibility might be that both positions are right from certain perspectives or in certain ways. This option might be called a relative view of truth. Of these three options, the only one that seems to correspond to what we generally mean by "tolerance" is the third, in the sense that

it treats other positions as having equal value. But this option also is the most problematic. It is not clear that anyone can hold this position in a thorough or rigorous way. Even the idea of a "rigorous relativism" seems to stretch the limits of language. What is clear, however, is that exclusive and inclusive views of truth fall short of an ideal of tolerance, although each view falls short in a different way.

Some kinds of exclusivism preclude conversation. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which one person finds another's position so deeply mistaken that there is no possibility of further discussion. But it is not impossible for even the most radically exclusive positions to enter into dialogue if they share a common tradition of discourse and a common commitment to truth. Bhāviveka reports, for example, that the Śrāvakas said: "The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching and was taught by Māra to mislead foolish and ignorant people." This is like calling someone else's scripture the work of the devil; it does not seem to leave much room for negotiation. But in this case the appearances are deceptive. Judging from Bhāviveka's account of this dispute, the Śrāvakas gave reasons for their position, cited examples, and entered into a serious discussion of its truth. They may have disagreed about the authenticity of the Mahāyāna, but they did not disagree about the canons of rationality and the formal requirements of a valid argument. For whatever the reason, they also seem to have agreed that it was worthwhile to argue their position in a public setting. Their approach to the Mahāyāna may have been "exclusive," but it was exclusivism with a difference. They shared enough with their opponents to take part in a common discussion of the truth.

The situation appears even more complex when it comes to the various traditions of Indian inclusivism. Paul Hacker has pointed out that the apparent tolerance of Indian religion usually boils down to some type of inclusivism (Halbfass 1988: 403). For example, the Hindu sage Tulsīdās tells a story about how the god Śiva was so impressed by Rāma that he became one of his worshippers. The effect of the story is to incorporate the worship of Śiva into Tulsīdās's worship of Rāma as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. A more contemporary example of this interpretive strategy is Radhakrishnan's modern reconstruction of Vedānta (Halbfass 1988: 405). Radhakrishnan considered other religious traditions to be "equal in their worth or essence or aim," but he understood that "the hidden goal or centre or essence of all religions is the Vedānta." This model acknowledges the value of different traditions, but it places them in a larger interpretive whole and reserves the key to interpretation for itself. Kendall W. Folkert has made a similar point about Jain approaches to other traditions (215-27). The Jain doctrine of *anekānta-vāda* ("non-absolutism") has often been interpreted as the most tolerant of Indian approaches to philosophical diversity, but it too presupposes that the Jain perspective has a unique interpretive authority. In the popular Jain parable of the blind men and the elephant, each of the men may touch a different part of the elephant and grasp part of the truth, but only the Jain perspective, like the perspective of an omniscient observer, encompasses all these truths without distortion or partiality.

When people come to Bhāviveka for the first time, they expect to find a classic Indian inclusivist, and Bhāviveka seems to play the part.[6] One of his most striking statements about the Buddha equates the Buddha's Dharma Body with Brahman, the ultimate reality of the Upaniṣads. Bhāviveka goes on to say that accomplished Bodhisattvas such as Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya pay homage to it.[7] On the surface, this seems identical to the stance Tulsīdās took toward Śiva. What could be more inclusive than to say that great Bodhisattvas worship Brahman? But this is not the whole picture. Bhāviveka says that Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya worship Brahman correctly, and deities like Śiva and Viṣṇu do not. What counts as correct worship? These great Bodhisattvas worship Brahman with the discipline (*yoga*) of no-worship. If this is inclusivism, it is inclusivism with a difference. Bhāviveka may "include" Brahman as an object of worship, but the proper worship of Brahman is <u>not</u> to worship it. Bhāviveka could just as well be saying that the tradition about Brahman is false and his own tradition is true.

Bhāviveka does not single out his Hindu opponents for special punishment. He uses the same approach to deal with the Śrāvakas' argument that the Mahāyāna teaches a different path (MHK 4.3 and commentary). Bhāviveka responds by saying that Mahāyāna practitioners follow the same noble eightfold path, they just follow it differently. Instead of "right vision," Bodhisattvas practice "<u>no</u> vision." Instead of "right thought," Bodhisattvas practice "<u>no</u> thought," and so on. If Bodhisattvas follow the same path, but practice it by not practicing it, what could it possibly mean to say that their path is the "same"? As soon as you ask this question, you have stepped into the landscape of the Mahāyāna as Bhāviveka understood it. More needs to be said about his approach to issues of "identity" and "sameness" before there can be a serious answer to this question, but Bhāviveka's inclusivism seems ironic at best. It seems just as accurate to say that he <u>excludes</u> his opponents' practices by inverting and negating them. But even when he negates them, he does not refuse to engage them. He treats his opponents' arguments as part of a common tradition of analysis, and this tradition allows both Bhāviveka and his opponents to take part in a rational conversation.

To say that Bhāviveka presupposes a common tradition of analysis is hardly surprising. What is language, after all, but a common tradition of discourse? But traditions ramify and become complex very quickly. Bhāviveka's simple gesture of adding a negative particle to his opponents' words invokes a rhetorical tradition of considerable antiquity, going back not only to Nāgārjuna, the founder of Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka tradition, but to the entire corpus of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, the scriptural foundation of the Mahāyāna. The ubiquity of this rhetorical gesture suggests that it is more than a stylistic peculiarity. It involves a relationship betwen different communities. Jonathan Z. Smith has commented on this issue in his study of taxonomy and difference: "Difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter" (2004: 252). When Radhakrishnan said that non-dualistic Vedanta transcended and subsumed all other

religions, he was talking not just about metaphysics and epistemology, but about his vision of India as a political entity in which different communities could be respected for their differences but also subsumed into a single nation. Along with this claim about India came a claim about status and integrity, about a nation that could hold its own among other nations. The challenges of a twentieth-century struggle for nationhood do not have a strong counterpart in sixth-century India, when Bhāviveka attempted to gain the rhetorical upper hand over his Hindu and Buddhist opponents, but there was no shortage of competition for what Jonathan Z. Smith has called "a hierarchy of prestige and the concomitant political ranking of superordinate and subordinate" (253). In the ironic exclusion / inclusion of Bhāviveka's "no" lay a claim to intellectual priority: the presumption that he could appropriate others' words, invert their meaning, and absorb them into his own system of interpretation. Whether this rhetorical practice corresponds to an identifiable social practice remains to be seen. It is enough for the moment simply to note that the rhetoric of Bhāviveka's argument raises a series of practical questions about Bhāviveka's cultural setting, beginning with some of the simplest questions of all: Who were these competing thinkers, and why did they compete the way they did?

We pose these questions as if they were ours, but they also must have occupied the minds of Bhāviveka and his contemporaries. To see others as different and to grasp the difference is also to see ourselves reflected in the face or the words of the other. What did Bhāviveka see in himself when he responded to his Buddhist opponents? We have already seen one possible answer. He articulated a practice of negation, with emphasis on the word "practice" as well as the word "negation." He even referred to it as a form of *yoga*. Does this mean that his philosophical arguments could be used to achieve a salvific goal? If so, how? And how did the "Śrāvakas" and "Yogācāras" go astray? Were their differences defined by texts, by doctrines, by practices, or by their institutional affiliations? Did the terms "Śrāvaka" and "Yogācāra" represent schools, traditions, sects, or nothing more than a series of isolated thinkers? And how did these opponents become so important that they provoked Bhāviveka's refutation? All these questions lead us into the intellectual and social world that lies behind Bhāviveka's text. They also invite us to consider issues that come up throughout the Buddhist world whenever Buddhists differentiate themselves from one another and attempt to set themselves apart as authentic bearers of Buddhist tradition. Bhāviveka's text is a study in Buddhist "difference," but it also is a study of Buddhist identity, with all the paradoxical implications raised by the concept of identity in a tradition that so often asserts that there is no identity at all.

The Author

Bhāviveka and the Culture of Debate

To investigate the problem of Buddhist identity, an obvious way to begin is to consider the identity of Bhāviveka himself. Unfortunately, in this corner of the tradition obvious questions often yield shadowy answers. Bhāviveka's life, like the lives of other Indian scholars, is shrouded in legend. The earliest available account of Bhāviveka comes from *The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions* by Xuanzang, the Chinese scholar-monk who visited India in the early decades of the seventh century.[8] Xuanzang tells us that Bhāviveka lived in south India, in the region that is now Andhra Pradesh, and was a master of scholarly texts. When he heard about the reputation of Dharmapāla, one of the leading Yogācāra philosophers of the sixth century, he decided to travel north to the Ganges Basin to engage him in debate. When Bhāviveka arrived, he sent his students to Dharmapāla to issue the challenge. Xuanzang summarizes Dharmapāla's response in the following way: "The human world is illusory and life is ephemeral. As I practice religion with diligence and sincerity all day long, I am short of time to have a discussion."[9] Frustrated by Dharmapāla's rejection, Bhāviveka returned home and, according to Xuanzang, engaged in a series of practices that were intended to help him stay in this world long enough to greet the arrival of the future Buddha Maitreya.

Like the stories of many Indian scholars, this account of Bhāviveka offers little reliable information, but it does give us a sense of the controversial setting in which Xuanzang placed Bhāviveka. Xuanzang was a student in Dharmapāla's lineage and was sympathetic to Dharmapāla's position. It is likely that the details of the story were meant to cast Bhāviveka in an unflattering light. Not only did Bhāviveka fail to defeat Dharmapāla, he failed even to draw him into debate. The idea that Bhāviveka tried to wait for Maitreya just adds further irony to his fruitless journey. Maitreya was considered the source of the Yogācāra tradition. To wait and study the Dharma with Maitreya would be a good way for Bhāviveka to get a stern tutorial about the views he found objectionable in the works of Dharmapāla, or so Xuanzang might imagine. About most of this we can only guess. But Xuanzang's story is not an isolated legend; it shares important features with other traditions about Indian scholars in Bhāviveka's time and with the well-known works of Bhāviveka himself. When we put all of this evidence together, we get quite a rich picture of the life that would have been lived by a scholar in Bhāviveka's intellectual world.

If Bhāviveka traveled north to debate an opponent, he was not the first southern scholar who was reputed to have made such a journey. One of Bhāviveka's best-known predecessors was Āryadeva, a disciple of Nāgārjuna and a founding figure of Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka tradition. (Āryadeva's dates are obscure, but he seems to have been active in the second or third century CE.) According to the Madhyamaka commentator

Candrakīrti, Āryadeva was born in the island of Siṃhala (the modern Śrī Laṅkā) and came to south India to study with Nāgārjuna (Ruegg 1981: 50). Xuanzang tells us that Āryadeva eventually left Nāgārjuna and traveled north to study and debate his opponents. At one point he came to Prayāga, at the confluence of the Yamunā and the Ganges, joined a monastery, and debated an eloquent but irritating "heretical Brahman," who was fond of leading his opponents in a process of circular reasoning.[10] The most engaging story about Āryadeva, however, is associated with the city of Pāṭaliputra, where he came to the rescue of a Buddhist monastery that had fallen on hard times. A group of scholarly "heretics" (the generic word for a non-Buddhist) arrived at the door of the monastery and asked the monks to ring the bell and defend their views in debate. With the king functioning as judge, the Buddhists were defeated and told that they no longer had the right to call an assembly for debate. When news of the defeat reached Nāgārjuna in South India, Nāgārjuna said that he would go in person to defend the monastery. Āryadeva offered to go instead. The heretics in Pāṭaliputra heard that he was coming and tried to bar him from the city, but Āryadeva entered the city in disguise and spent the night on the terrace that housed the monastery's bell. In the morning he rang the bell, and a boisterous debate ensued. In less than twelve days, Āryadeva refuted the heretics "through analysis" and restored the prestige of the monastery.[11]

These itinerant southern scholars were not limited to members of the Madhyamaka tradition. Plausible traditions locate the birth of Dignāga (known as "the father of medieval logic in India") and of Dharmapāla in the vicinity of Kāñcī in South India.[12] Both scholars were known as powerful debaters and spent significant portions of their careers traveling, studying, and teaching in the north. Xuanzang showed his reverence for Dharmapāla in one of his most intriguing stories about debate.[13] In this story, Xuanzang tells us that there was a king in the city of Kāśapura who supported "heretical" views and tried to humiliate the Buddhists by sponsoring a debate. He invited a talented "Śāstra-master" to compose a text, consisting of a thousand stanzas denouncing the Buddhist Dharma, then he summoned the monks to debate. According to Xuanzang's account, the stakes were high. If the Śāstra-master won, the Dharma would be destroyed; if the Buddhists won, the Śāstra-master would cut out his tongue. The Buddhists were frightened and could not decide what to do. Like managers of a beleaguered boxing team, they could not think of anyone to send into the ring against such a formidable opponent. Dharmapāla was then just a young monk. When no one else volunteered, he offered to accept the challenge. Since he was so young, he said, it would be no disgrace to lose; and if he won, his victory would show that the monastery enjoyed special "spiritual protection."

Dharmapāla situated himself on "the seat of discussion" and listened attentively while the Śāstra-master recited his critique. When he finished, Dharmapāla smiled and said: "I have won. Shall I recite your book backwards, or shall I recite it with the phrases transposed in order?" The master said that he would be happy if Dharmapāla would

simply recite the text in its normal sequence and explain its meaning. Dharmapāla then gave a perfect imitation of the scholar's voice, right down to the rhythm and intonation of his words, recited the text, and explained its meaning. The master was so overwhelmed that he gave up the debate and offered to cut out his tongue. Dharmapāla said that he would rather have the master correct his mistaken views. With a little coaching from Dharmapāla, he complied. To complete the transformation, the king also "gave up the erroneous way" and accepted the Dharma.

With these stories in mind, it is not implausible to think that Bhāviveka was one of many scholars who took to the road, like other itinerant debaters, and tried to confront their opponents in debate. Nor is it implausible to think that one of Bhāviveka's most important controversies took place with the Yogācāra philosophers of the sixth century, represented in Xuanzang's account by the elusive Dharmapāla. Bhāviveka's dispute with the Yogācāra also figures in a much later account of Bhāviveka's life in *The History of Indian Buddhism* (*rgya gar chos 'byung*) by the Tibetan historian Tāranātha (1575-1634).[14] Tāranātha tells us that Bhāviveka (or Bhavya) was born in a princely family in South India, traveled north to study Mahāyāna sūtras and the works of Nāgārjuna, then returned to the south where he became a successful scholar and leader of some fifty monasteries. Tāranātha adds the following comment about his relationship with his Yogācāra opponents:

> Before the arrival of these two masters [Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka], all adherents of the Mahāyāna remained under the same teaching. Then these two masters said: "The approaches of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are different. Asaṅga's approach does not teach the Middle Path; it is just mind-only. We accept Nāgārjuna's approach and do not deviate from it." And they refuted the other position. After the death of Bhāviveka (*legs ldan*), the adherents of the Mahāyāna divided into two schools (*sde*) and began to debate.[15]

Tāranātha goes on to explain that after Bhāviveka's death, his students focused their critique on Sthiramati, a Yogācāra scholar who wrote a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses on the Middle Way* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*). When copies of Sthiramati's work were circulated in south India, Bhāviveka's students took offense and traveled north to challenge their opponents in debate. The journey was similar to the one reported by Xuanzang, but Tāranātha's sources claimed a different outcome: not only did Bhāviveka's students manage to confront their opponents face to face, but they went home victorious.[16]

These stories help us understand at least one of the striking features of Bhāviveka's text. While later Indian compendia function largely as summaries of basic teachings (Haribhadra's *Compendium of Six Views*, for example, distinguishes each view according

to its deity and its principles of reality),[17] Bhāviveka follows the format of a debate. For ten or twenty verses in each chapter, he presents the opponent's position (like the position that Dharmapāla memorized and repeated), then Bhāviveka spends the rest of the chapter refuting the opponent's arguments. His response often takes the form of an imaginary dialogue: "If the opponent (whom he sometimes refers to simply as 'you') says such and such, one (or 'we') should respond as follows." The text gives a useful account of the basic principles of each tradition, but it reads less like a formal treatise and more like a manual of debate. It is as if Bhāviveka were attempting to give us a verbal snapshot of Dharmapāla's encounter with the unruly "heretic." The difference is that Bhāviveka does more than repeat the opponent's position; he gives a full refutation.

Here Jonathan Z. Smith's comment that difference is a "political matter" takes on a local habitation and a name. The location is the conflict for patronage and prestige in sixth- and seventh-century India, and the name is debate. Once the text has been situated in this context, it provokes a whole new set of questions. How did someone like Dharmapāla prepare for debate? Had he already memorized parts of the opponent's position, or did he come to the debate completely cold? What role did kings or wealthy patrons play in sponsoring the debate or adjudicating its outcome? What could be won or lost? Were there any regional differences in the culture of debate? (Was the south Indian origin of many of these debaters merely accidental, or did it reflect a regional variation in scholarly practice?) What issues did the debaters debate? What were the rules? How were the rules enforced? Could the rules be broken? Were there ways to pressure opponents apart from sheer intellectual persuasion? What were the schools, lineages, textual traditions, or modes of affiliation that came most frequently into conflict? Why did they conflict? How were they defined? Answers to many of these questions will emerge in the course of this study. For the moment, it is enough to suggest the complexity of these questions by considering three more stories: one from the closing months of Xuanzang's journey to India, another from the Tamil Buddhist poetic narrative known as the *Maṇimekalai*, and a third from Jain lives of the scholars Haribhadra and Akalaṅka.

In his opening comments about Indian culture, at the beginning of the second fascicle of *The Record of the Western Regions*, Xuanzang explains that debates played a central role in Indian monastic life. This was not a culture where monks listened silently to their teachers and then wrote exams to show how much they understood. They displayed their learning in public debate, and the stakes were high. Xuanzang says:

> Assemblies for discussion are often held to test the intellectual capacity of the monks, in order to distinguish the superior from the inferior, and to reject the dull and promote the bright. Those who can deliberate on the subtle sayings, and glorify the wonderful theories with refined diction and quick eloquence, may ride richly caparisoned elephants with hosts

> of attendants preceding and following behind them. But those to whom the theories are taught in vain, or who have been defeated in a debate, explaining few principles in a verbose way, or distorting the teachings with language that is merely pleasant to the ear, are daubed with ocher or chalk in the face, while dust is scattered over the body, and are expelled to the wilderness, or discarded into ditches. In this way the good and the evil are distinguished, and the wise and the ignorant are disclosed.[18]

Xuanzang's comments about the significance of debate are confirmed as the narrative unfolds, whether it is in the stories about individual scholars, like Āryadeva or Dharmapāla, or in Xuanzang's account of the organization of individual monasteries. Even to enter some of the more important monastic centers required a mastery of basic dialectical skills. In Nālandā, for example, where Xuanzang spent some of his most productive time, scholars visiting from other regions were challenged by the gatekeeper. Only those who showed knowledge of "ancient and contemporary learning" were allowed to enter.[19] Xuanzang reports that when visitors attempted to join in debate, "seven or eight out of ten flee in defeat." The rest risk disgrace when they come under further interrogation. Only a few talented scholars have "the retentive memory and good virtue" to rise in influence and maintain the reputation of the monastery. Among these scholars, it seems, was Xuanzang himself.

The best account of Xuanzang's own scholarly prowess comes not from his own *Record of the Western Regions*, but, understandably enough, from the *Biography of Xuanzang* by his disciple Huili. The story begins with a teacher named Prajñāgupta, who once had been a brahmin in south India and had participated in a royal consecration.[20] After developing expertise in the doctrine of the Buddhist Sāṃmitīya school, he wrote a text in seven hundred stanzas attacking the Mahāyāna. When King Harṣa (known in the story as Śīlāditya) was on an expedition in eastern India, a group of scholars showed him the text and said: "This is our teaching. Could there be any Mahāyāna follower who could refute a single word of it?" As a patron of Nālandā, King Harṣa accepted the challenge and asked the monks at Nālandā for someone to defend the Mahāyāna. Śīlabhadra, the monastery's leading scholar, appointed a committee made up of Sāgaramati, Jñānaprabha, Siṃhaprabha, and the gifted Chinese visitor Xuanzang. The three Indian scholars doubted whether they could meet the challenge, but Xuanzang reassured them. He said that he had studied the Hīnayāna in China and Kashmir and knew that they had nothing to fear.

At this point in the story, Huili digresses and tells us about a Lokāyata (an Indian materialist) who arrived at the door of the monastery, posted fourteen points, and said: "If anybody is able to refute any one point of my argument, I shall cut off my head to apologize!" Xuanzang asked a servant to take the theses down and trample them, then he summoned the Lokāyata and gave him a lecture about the shortcomings of a

series of rival traditions, including Śaiva ascetics and Jains, as well as the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas. Huili pays particular attention to the arguments against the Sāṃkhya view that material nature (*prakṛti*) is made up of three strands: luminosity (*sattva*), passion (*rajas*), and dark inertia (*tamas*). Xuanzang claimed that if material nature is a composite entity, it cannot be ultimately real, and if all things are made up of the same three strands, there cannot be any differences among them. These arguments are relatively commonplace and are not unanswerable, but they were enough, by Huili's account, for the Lokāyata to concede defeat. In a gesture of magnanimity, Xuanzang told his opponent that he did not have to take his own life. All he had to do was act as Xuanzang's servant.

This gesture turned out to be fortuitous. To prepare for Harṣa's debate, Xuanzang asked the Lokāyata whether he had ever studied the Sāṃmitīya text. He said that he had. In fact, he had heard lectures about it on five separate occasions. Xuanzang worked through the text with him and wrote a refutation in sixteen hundred stanzas entitled simply: "The Refutation of Wrong Views."[21] Unfortunately neither this text nor the one that it criticizes seems to have survived. When they finished studying the text, Xuanzang released the Lokāyata from his obligation and sent him on his way.

This act of generosity, too, turned out to be fortuitous. As Huili turns the page and begins a new fascicle of the text, the Lokāyata has made his way to Kāmarūpa in Eastern India and sung the praises of Xuanzang to the king. The king responds by sending a message to Śīlabhadra inviting the Chinese scholar to visit him in Eastern India. After passing messages back and forth, Xuanzang agrees to make the trip and gets caught in a tug of war between two kings: King Kumāra of Kāmarūpa and King Harṣa of Kanyākubja in Magadha. Xuanzang gives a succinct account of their negotiations: "At first I was invited by King Kumāra to proceed from the country of Magadha to the country of Kāmarūpa. At that time King Śīlāditya was making an inspection tour in the country of Kajuṅghira, and he sent an order to King Kumāra, saying, 'It befits you to come promptly with the Śramaṇa, a guest from a distant land, to Nālandā, to attend an assembly.'"[22] The purpose of the assembly was to discuss the "The Refutation of the Mahāyāna," the text to which Xuanzang had already written a reply.

King Harṣa sailed up the Ganges with Xuanzang and called an assembly of eighteen kings, three thousand Buddhist monks, and two thousand brahmins and Jains in a hall specially built for the occasion. When the day came for the debate, King Harṣa and King Kumāra, dressed as the gods Indra and Brahmā, led an immense procession to the debating ground. Behind King Harṣa rode Xuanzang on a royal elephant, surrounded by jewels and flowers. Behind Xuanzang came three hundred more elephants with members of the royal family, chief ministers, and honored guests. At the debating ground, Xuanzang was invited to present his teaching, and opponents were invited to respond. In the face of this display of royal power, it is not surprising that no one rose to the challenge. Huili says that a number of Xuanzang's disgruntled opponents

attempted to assassinate him instead, but they were easily defeated. The story ends with the king offering Xuanzang a large financial reward and declaring that Xuanzang had established the correct doctrine.

Even through the hagiographic haze, it is possible to recognize in this story some of the features that characterized Xuanzang's own acount of monastic debate. Xuanzang had indicated that debate was the key to a successful scholarly career. An effective debater had to be familiar not just with different Buddhist traditions, but also with non-Buddhist rivals, including the Lokāyatas, Jains, Śaivas, Sāṃkhyas, and Vaiśeṣikas. Scholars moved around the country, studying with experts in other traditions and debating with their opponents. Preparation was important. It is conceivable that someone like Dharmapāla could listen to a hundred stanzas and repeat them verbatim, but a more prudent practice would have been to prepare the way Xuanzang did, by studying the arguments in advance. Ideally a debater could rely on someone who already knew the arguments. Debaters also needed the right texts. Scholars used texts to issue challenges, study opponents' positions, and prepare their responses. But in the end, the text yielded to an oral performance, where success depended on eloquence, conciseness, a voracious memory, and careful mastery of the opponents' positions, to say nothing of the ability to sway an audience and mobilize the support of powerful patrons. Huili may not be entirely trustworthy when he attributes such extravagance to these scholarly confrontations, but it is hard not to be impressed by the prestige that he associated with these public performances. It is as if itinerant debaters were the rock stars and sports heroes of classical India. Their debates seem to have drawn enthusiastic audiences, and the winners were showered with adulation and wealth.

Huili's picture of the significance of debate is supported by a text that seems at first to be an unlikely source for the study of scholarly practices: the Tamil Buddhist narrative known as the *Maṇimekalai*.[23] This text is datable, within a certain margin of error, to the sixth century, when Bhāviveka flourished in South India. It tells the story of Maṇimekalai, the illegitimate daughter of a courtesan, who goes through a series of adventures until she finally enters a monastery and takes up the life of a Buddhist ascetic.[24] The early chapters of the text explore the complexity of karma and the vagaries of love; the final chapters shift register and explore the complexity of religious diversity and the rules of debate.

Maṇimekalai's journey begins in the city of Vañci, where her adoptive mother Kaṇṇaki tells her: "Dear child, with your scented hair! The time has now come for you to go and visit the adepts of the various religions, those who use the most skillful arguments. You must try honestly to learn the portion of truth that each religion may include. If it then seems to you that none of them leads to transcendent truth, you may dedicate your life to following unswervingly the rules (*yama*) announced by the Buddha."[25] Maṇimekalai begins with a Mīmāṃsaka who teaches her the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Armed with this basic knowledge, she visits representatives of

nine other traditions: an exponent of Śaivism, a Brahmavādin (who holds that Brahmā is the creator of the world), a worshipper of Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa, an exponent of the Veda, an Ājīvika, a Nirgrantha or Jain, an exponent of the Sāṃkhya, a Vaiśeṣika, and a Bhūtavādin (a variety of Indian materialist). Realizing that none of their doctrines meets the test of truth, she refuses even to engage them in conversation.

Her education takes another step forward when she arrives in Kāñcī and meets Aravaṇan, a Buddhist teacher who offers what she considers the definitive teaching. Like the Mīmāṃsaka, Aravaṇan begins with a discussion of epistemology, but this time the focus is not the means of knowledge in general but the structure of a valid syllogism, the principal tool of debate. Aravaṇan tells Maṇimekalai about the classic five-member syllogism, familiar in Nyāya sources, then explains the Buddhist theory of the three-member syllogism. Whether Aravaṇan's theory of logical procedure is identical to the logical innovations of Dignāga is apparently unclear,[26] but the text certainly reflects the style of argument associated with Dignāga and his followers. Once Aravaṇan has instructed Maṇimekalai about the process of argument, he concludes with an account of the twelve-fold chain of dependent co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and the four noble truths. The text ends by saying that Aravaṇan leads Maṇimekalai to the truth through the stages of hearing (*śruti*), thinking (*cintana*), repeated practice (*bhāvanā*), and vision (*darśana*),[27] and "Maṇimekalai, beautiful as a doll, having put on the monastic habit, henceforth led the life of austerity that is indispensable for attaining wisdom and being free of the faults that bind us to the interminable cycle of birth and death."[28]

For someone who is familar with Indian Buddhism, the most striking aspect of this story is not that Maṇimekalai would set out on a journey in search of wisdom. This is a feature of Buddhist stories throughout the Buddhist world. (The journey of the young man Sudhana in the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra* is an obvious parallel.) What is striking is that this quest for wisdom involves the study of epistemology, the challenge of religious diversity, and the procedures of logical argument. Anne E. Monius sees this aspect of Maṇimekalai's story as a general feature of sixth-century Tamil literary culture, which, in her words, was characterized by "rivalry, or more specifically, by competition among various philosophical or religious worldviews."[29] Monius links this feature of the Tamil tradition to the literary rivalries that were given dramatic expression at the same time in the pages of satirical Sanskrit dramas. With the story of Xuanzang in mind, this aspect of south Indian culture comes as no surprise. Whether we look at south India or the Ganges Basin, the sixth and seventh centuries seem to have been characterized by intense inter- and intra-religious rivalries. The literary and philosophical traditions not only reflected these rivalries, but provided a setting where these rivalries could be played out. Why would Maṇimekalai learn the rules of logic to lay the groundwork for wisdom? One simple answer is that in sixth- and seventh-century Indian culture it was only the rules of logic that allowed one tradition to claim dominance over another in the sphere of public debate. Without mastering these rules, how could anyone be sure

that the so-called "wisdom" being offered by a rival group was not just another form of folly?

When success as a debater depends not just on natural ability but on scholarly preparation, it is no surprise to come across stories of scholars who disguised themselves in order to infiltrate the schools of their rivals. In Phyllis Granoff's study of the Jain lives of Haribhadra, there is a story about two brothers, Akalaṅka and Niṣkalaṅka, who masqueraded as Buddhists to study with a Buddhist teacher at Mahābodhi (Bodh Gayā).[30] One day the teacher discovered that someone had corrected his quotation of a Jain verse. He took this to mean that a Jain imposter had hidden among his students. To expose the imposter, he tried two tricks. One was to make a drawing of the Jina on the floor and ask his students to step on it. Another was to startle them in the middle of the night and find out which deity they called on for help. The second trick was the one that worked. The two brothers were caught off guard and called out the name of the Jina. The teacher then imprisoned them, intending to kill them, but the two brothers managed to escape. Niṣkalaṅka was caught and killed, while Akalaṅka took refuge with a sympathetic Jain queen. Eventually a dispute arose with a Buddhist monk over the conduct of a Jain festival, and Akalaṅka was drawn into debate. At first, with supernatural intervention from Tārā, the Buddhist monk managed to hold his own. But a Jain goddess named Cakreśvarīdevī appeared to Akalaṅka and told him how Tārā could be defeated. The story ends with a resounding defeat for the Buddhist monk and his protective deity.

According to Phyllis Granoff, this story and stories like it circulated widely in Jain and Buddhist communities. Like the *Maṇimekalai* and the story of Xuanzang's triumphant debate, they offer little reliable historical evidence about the lives of the scholars who figure in their pages. But they do help us picture the literary and scholarly practices of the communities that produced them. In this way, they help us understand the significance of the debate culture that formed Bhāviveka's account of the philosophical controversies of sixth-century India. These controversies had serious intellectual, institutional, and personal consequences, and much was at stake in the debate.

THE TEXT

THE PROBLEM OF AUTHENTICITY

One of the perennial problems in the study of Indian Buddhist sources has to do with the authenticity of the text. The chronological relationship of different authors is often uncertain, and textual transmission is obscure. In many cases, it is even unclear what it means to say that a certain person is an "author." As is true of some of the major works in the canon

of Greek philosophy, the Buddhist texts that come down to us may not even be the written work of the masters themselves, but transcriptions of oral presentations, with all of the attendant opportunities for copyists or students to add their own glosses or disrupt the text with their own infelicities or misunderstandings. The "original" texts may then have been supplemented, interpolated, or unwittingly corrupted by the hands of later commentators and copyists. All of these uncertainties are compounded several times over when the original Sanskrit has been lost and we have access only to the Tibetan or Chinese translations. When we attempt to reconstruct Bhāviveka's response to the philosophical challenges of sixth-century India, it is important to know which works he is likely to have written, but it also is important to recognize that any judgment about authenticity is based only on a complex set of probabilities. In the end, especially when it comes to particular passages, there is no substitute for the hard discipline of philology to distinguish spurious readings from readings that seem to reflect the mind and word of the master.

The gold standard for any discussion of Bhāviveka's works is *The Lamp of Wisdom* (*Prajñāpradīpa*), Bhāviveka's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses on the Middle Way* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, abbreviated MMK).[31] This commentary no longer survives in Sanskrit, apart from occasional quotations in other texts, but it was the target of a pointed critique by Bhāviveka's rival, Candrakīrti, and it was the subject of an extensive subcommentary by Avalokitavrata (*spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs*).[32] For anyone who has the perseverance to read Avalokitavrata and Bhāviveka side by side, *The Lamp of Wisdom* is eminently readable and provides one of the most useful resources not only for the interpretation of Madhyamaka thought, but for the study of Madhyamaka approaches to other philosophical traditions.

The second major work that can be ascribed with some certainty to Bhāviveka is *The Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ*, abbreviated MHK). *The Lamp of Wisdom* may be Bhāviveka's most important Madhyamaka work, but *The Heart of the Middle Way* gives the most impressive account of the range and depth of his own philosophical scholarship. Freed from the constraints of commenting on the words of the master, Bhāviveka was able to present Madhyamaka thought in a way that reflected not only the distinctive philosophical practices of the sixth century but also his own vision of the relationship between the Madhyamaka and other traditions of Indian thought.

The text begins with three chapters that represent Bhāviveka's own philosophy:

1. Not Giving Up the Mind of Awakening (*bodhicittāparityāga*)
2. Taking the Vow of an Ascetic (*munivratasamāśraya*)
3. Seeking the Knowledge of Reality (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*)

These three chapters may have functioned as a separate text entitled "Introduction to the Ambrosia of Reality" (*tattvāmṛtāvatāra*).[33] This possibility is supported by the

opening verses of the first chapter, where Bhāviveka states the purpose of the text that follows:

1.4 *mahābodhau kṛtadhiyāṃ parārthodayadīkṣayā /*
tattvāmṛtāvatārāya śaktitaḥ kiṃcid ucyate //
1.5 *bodhicittāparityāgo munivratasamāśrayaḥ /*
tattvajñānaiṣaṇā ceti caryā sarvārthasiddhaye //

> With a vow to bring about the welfare of others and with mind focused on great awakening, I say what I can to introduce the ambrosia of reality. "Not giving up the mind of awakening, taking the vow of an ascetic, and seeking the knowledge of reality" are a practice that is meant to achieve the welfare of all.

Whether these chapters were meant to function as a separate text or not, Bhāviveka clearly thought of them as a unified system. The parts of the text that we are accustomed to calling "philosophy" (including his reflections on the means of knowledge and the nature of reality) are pieces of a larger picture, to be combined with the practice of meditation, devotion, and other forms of moral discipline. Whether the same can be said about Bhāviveka's chapters on the views of his opponents is an issue that will be discussed later in this introduction.

After Bhāviveka has given this account of his own philosophy, he devotes two chapters to his Buddhist opponents:

4. Introduction to the Analysis of Reality According to the Śrāvakas (*śrāvakatattvaviniścayāvatāra*)
5. Introduction to the Analysis of Reality According to the Yogācāras (*yogācāratattvaviniścayāvatāra*)

These chapters are followed by four chapters on his Hindu opponents:

6. Introduction to Reality According to the Sāṃkhyas (*sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra*)
7. Analysis of Reality According to the Vaiśeṣikas (*vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya*)
8. Analysis of Reality According to the Vedānta (*vedāntatattvaviniścaya*)
9. Introduction to the Analysis of Reality According to the Mīmāṃsā (*mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra*).

The longest of these chapters, with 167 verses in the Tibetan translation, is the analysis of the Mīmāṃsā. The text concludes with a brief account of Jain views of omniscience and four verses in praise of the Buddha.

10. Exposition of the Realization of Omniscience (*sarvajñatāsiddhinirdeśa*)
11. Exposition of Praise and Characteristics (*stutilakṣaṇanirdeśa*).

It is the distinctive structure of the latter portion of this text—with each chapter devoted to the position of a different opponent—that gives it such a special place in the history of Indian philosophical compendia. The earliest competing example of this type is Haribhadra's *Compendium of Six Views* (*ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*), and Haribhadra's text was not written until the eighth century. Whether there were precedents for at least some of the key features of Bhāviveka's text is unclear. In *The Collection of the Means of Knowledge* (*pramāṇasamuccaya*), Dignāga (early sixth century) says that a reader should consult his *Nyāya-*, *Vaiśeṣika-*, and *Sāṃkhya-parīkṣā*s for more extensive discussion of these traditions.[34] Since these "investigations" (*parīkṣā*) do not survive, we cannot know whether they anticipated the chapters of Bhāviveka's text. Even if they did, they do not seem to have been collected into a single text. Given the present state of our knowledge of Bhāviveka and his tradition, it seems legitimate to say that Bhāviveka is the source of this distinctive and influential genre of philosophical text.

But to say that Bhāviveka is responsible for the first compendium does not tell us much about what a compendium is or how it functioned in the intellectual context of sixth-century India. Olle Qvarnström has distinguished three types of "doxographical treatises."[35] The first of these is a familiar component of Indian religious and philosophical literature from at least the time of the Upaniṣads and the earliest Jain and Buddhist scriptures. It consists of a running dialogue between a teacher and an opponent: the opponent asks a question or poses a problem, and the teacher responds. This is "doxographical" in the sense that it records important doctrinal positions. What little we know about doctrinal diversity in ancient India comes to us in precisely this narrative form. These philosophical stories do not, however, attempt to present opponents' positions as systematic wholes.

In the second type of doxographical treatise, each tradition is discussed in a separate chapter. Chapters begin with accounts of the opponent's position, in the form of a *pūrvapakṣa* or "preliminary position" (better translated simply as "objection"). Then the author deals with the *pūrvapakṣa* in an *uttarapakṣa* or "response." The distinguishing feature of this doxographical type is that it gives a systematic account of the opponent's views. For a few verses, at least, the opponent gets to take the stage and define the terms of the debate. This type of doxographical writing strives for some degree of completeness, in the sense that it attempts to lay out the major controversial issues that might arise between two schools, and it has a certain kind of intellectual structure. It is not a series of random objections, but a systematic account of alternative philosophical views. By presenting a systematic alternative, it also elicits a systematic response. This second type of doxographical treatise can be called a true "compendium," since it devotes a separate chapter to each philosophical tradition, and, no matter how abbreviated it may

be, it strives for some degree of completeness.

The third type of doxography also presents each system in a separate chapter but does not attempt to refute them. The purpose of this doxography is simply descriptive; it does not probe for the weak points in an opponent's position and it does not develop any kind of controversial response. The classic example of this third type of doxography is Haribhadra's *Compendium of Six Views*, just as the classic example of the second is Bhāviveka's *Heart of the Middle Way*.

In the Tibetan canon, Bhāviveka's verses are accompanied by an "auto-commentary" entitled *The Flame of Reason* (*Tarkajvālā*, abbreviated TJ). Tibetan tradition ascribes this commentary to the same author who wrote the verses, and many features of the text support this judgment. The prose style of the commentary follows the precedent of *The Lamp of Wisdom*, it also does not introduce any obvious philosophical innovations that would associate it with a later period, and it does not seem to diverge in obvious ways from the meaning of the verses. Someone who knows the style of *The Lamp of Wisdom* would get the strong impression that *The Flame of Reason* comes from the hand of the master himself, or at least from a student who has learned to follow the master's commentarial technique.

The most important piece of internal evidence against this impression of authenticity comes from the text's curious practice of referring to the author of the verses as "the Master" (Tib. *slob dpon* / Skt. *ācārya*). The word "Master" is used in this way in the commentary on verse 4.2: "The Master says 'so they say' (*kila*) because he does not agree. He does not want to be defiled by the opponent's opinions, by their alleged altruism, or even by their words."[36] The word "Master" is mirrored by the word "author" (Tib. *bstan bcos byed pa / Skt. śāstrakāra*) in the commentary on 5.2: "'So they say' (*kila*) means that the author himself does not agree." David Seyfort Ruegg and others have pointed out that while Sanskrit commentators frequently refer to themselves in the third person, Buddhist authors seldom refer to themselves as "Master,"[37] leaving us to wonder whether the "Master" is one person and the author of the commentary is another. V. V. Gokhale responded to this problem by suggesting that references to "the Master" were interpolated by the Tibetan assistant who helped Atiśa with the Tibetan translation, or perhaps even by Atiśa himself.[38] Yasunori Ejima has suggested that the word "Master" was the result of a two-stage process of redaction, in which the "Ur-*Tarkajvālā*" was written as an auto-commentary by the author of the verses, then the text was revised by the author of *The Jewel Lamp of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, abbreviated MRP). The word "Master" might very well have been inserted as part of this revision.

More will be said shortly about *The Jewel Lamp of the Middle Way*. For the moment, the question is whether the use of the word "Master" is sufficient to dispute the authorship of *The Flame of Reason*. While the word is rare in Buddhist auto-commentaries, it is not rare in Sanskrit commentarial literature as a whole, as in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*

and various works of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. When a certain point is discussed in the Mīmāṃsā, three views are represented: the *pūrvapakṣa*, the *uttarapakṣa*, and the *siddhānta*. These three positions are presented, respectively, by the "student," the "master in training," and the "master" (*ācārya*). The first gives the naive view, the second refutes it, and the "Master" gives the view that is decisive.[39] We know from Bhāviveka's chapter on the Mīmāṃsā that he was familiar with Mīmāṃsā exegesis, and we know that he adopted terminology and stylistic conventions from other Brahmanical sources. It does not stretch the imagination to think that he would incorporate a version of this stylistic device in his own work. To add further support to this view, the end of *The Flame of Reason* identifies the author of the commentary as the author of the verses. The last verse of *The Heart of the Middle Way* says: "This text has been written in this way as the concise heart of the middle way; it is a mirror in which scholars can see reflected a multitude of sūtras."[40] The commentary on the first half of this verse explains: "'Written' means that it was composed by me, the one who analyzes with wisdom. In other words, I am the Master (Tib. *slob dpon / Skt. ācārya*) who wrote the text (*Tib. bstan bcos byed pa* / Skt. *śāstrakāra*)."[41] While it is possible that this passage is an interpolation, and the Tibetan might be subject to other interpretations, it certainly seems that the author of the commentary thought of himself as the author of the verses.

In his discussion of the authorship of Bhāviveka's works, David Seyfort Ruegg cites the principle of parsimony, that "entities should not be multiplied beyond need" (1990: 65). If we follow his advice, the question is whether there is any <u>need</u> to suppose that *The Flame of Reason* was written by someone other than the sixth-century Bhāviveka. Judging from the evidence I have just outlined, the answer seems to be no, at least with regard to the work as a whole. There is no need to be quite so parsimonious, however, when it comes to the authorship of individual passages. Ejima has suggested that portions of *The Flame of Reason* were revised by later hands. Gokhale made a similar point when he suggested the possibility of interpolation. The truth is that we know much less than we would like about the process of editing, copying, and transmitting a text as complex as *The Flame of Reason*, and what little we do know suggests that such texts often were subject to significant interpolation. Akira Saito's research on the Dunhuang recension of *The Introduction to the Bodhisattva Practice* (*Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*) shows that this important work went through major changes in the process of textual transmission (Saito 2000). Some of the later chapters of the *The Heart of the Middle Way* show significant differences between the Sanskrit version and the version that is preserved in the commentary.[42] It seems only realistic to imagine that the commentary on *The Heart of the Middle Way* was subject to expansion and interpolation. This seems particularly likely in the long prose passage that follows the commentary on verse 4.35. Among other things, this passage discusses a series of "miscellaneous objections" that are introduced after the prose account of the divisions of the eighteen schools and before the resumption of the normal flow of the argument

in verse 4.9. These could very easily have been inserted by a student or a later editor. If *The Heart of the Middle Way* and *The Flame of Reason* together functioned as a debater's manual, as they seem to suggest, it would have been natural for them to be expanded with the addition new arguments. What better place to insert new arguments than in this section of unstructured prose in the middle of the text? It is quite possible that some or all of this prose passage was added by another hand. But a possibility is not a certainty. Rather than multiply authors unnecessarily, it seems best to begin with the assumption that this portion of the text belongs to the author of *The Heart of the Middle Way*, unless there is strong textual and historical evidence to prove otherwise.

The list of works that can be confidently ascribed to the sixth-century Bhāviveka would be incomplete without mentioning *The Jewel in the Hand* (title restored in Sanskrit as **Karatalaratna*).[43] This short text is available only in Xuanzang's Chinese translation (Taishō 1578), but it gives a fascinating glimpse not only of Bhāviveka's logical and rhetorical method but also of Xuanzang's mastery of Madhyamaka thought. The text focuses on only two syllogisms: "conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are ultimately empty, because they arise from conditions, like an illusion," and "unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are ultimately unreal, because they do not arise, like a flower in the sky." The discussion of these two arguments dwells on the standard logical problems associated with Bhāviveka's arguments, such as the way Bhāviveka claims to "accept" the existence of something that he ultimately denies. It also applies these arguments to the basic categories of the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra. It is possible that this discussion of the Yogācāra was the argument that drew Xuanzang to the text, since it gives a preview of the longer argument in chapter 5 of *The Heart of the Middle Way*. At one point, the text says that a particular argument has already been elucidated at length in the "Introduction to the Ambrosia of Reality," suggesting that *The Jewel in the Hand* was written between the first three chapters and the full text of *The Heart of the Middle Way*. The discussion of the Yogācāra contains at least passing references to many of the important points that appear in chapter 5 of *The Heart of the Middle Way*, such as the passage in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that describes a "nihilist" (*nāstika*) as someone who falls into bad rebirths and takes others with him.[44] In sum, the text functions as a useful *point d'appui* for study of the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy, especially for those who approach the controversy through the medium of Chinese.

This discussion of the authenticity of Bhāviveka's works would not be complete without considering the most problematic text in the Bhāviveka corpus: *The Jewel-Lamp of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, abbreviated MRP), ascribed to "Bhavya." This text occupies approximately thirty folios in the sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan canon and is divided into nine chapters:

1. Two Truths (*satyadvaya*)
2. Mistaken Relative Wisdom (*saṃvṛtibhrāntaprajñā*)
3. Correct Interpretable Relative Wisdom (*neyārthatathyasaṃvṛtiprajñā*)
4. Correct Interpretable Relative Wisdom, Part 2
5. Definitive Relative Wisdom (*nītārthatathyasaṃvṛtiprajñā*)
6. Ultimate Wisdom (*paramārthaprajñā*)
7. Stages of Practice (*bhāvanākrama*)
8. Statement of the Greatness of the Teacher (*ācāryapādamāhātmyābhidhāna*)
9. Advantages (*anuśaṃsa*)

Arguments in favor of the authenticity of this text rely on two types of evidence: the text's account of its own authorship and affinities between arguments in this text and other recognized works of Bhāviveka. On the positive side of the ledger are two places where the author seems to name himself as the author of *The Heart of the Middle Way* and *The Flame of Reason*. In one of these passages, the text says: "We have avoided both extremes, so [we] also negate absence in order to teach the middle path."[45] The text then quotes verse 3.259 of *The Heart of the Middle Way*: "'The idea that things do not exist is not considered correct, because it is brought about by concepts, like the idea that a post is a man." The word "we" (Tib. *kho bo*) gives the impression that the author of the *Jewel Lamp* is quoting himself. The connection is stated more explicitly in an earlier chapter: "This point can be examined more extensively in *The Five Aggregates of the Middle Way* by the reverend Candrakīrti and in my (Tib. *bdag gis bkod pa*) *Flame of Reason*."[46] The second type of evidence comes from affinities between *The Jewel Lamp* and other works of Bhāviveka. There are particularly close connections between the argument against the Yogācāra in chapter 4 of *The Jewel Lamp*, chapter 5 of *The Heart of the Middle Way*, and the appendix to chapter 25 of *The Lamp of Wisdom*. The parallels are close enough to at least suggest a common authorship, as Christian Lindtner has pointed out forcefully in a number of publications.[47] But these similarities have to be balanced by a series of troubling historical incongruities and with major differences in style and thought.

David Seyfort Ruegg summarized many of the historical problems in his article "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya." One kind of problem is associated with *The Jewel Lamp*'s use of quotations from texts that come from a period later than the sixth century. In its account of the "prediction" of Nāgārjuna, the text quotes from the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra*, a text that is dated to the reign of King Gopāla, the founder of the Pāla Dynasty, who reigned in the late decades of the eighth century. *The Jewel Lamp* also quotes a verse from Saraha's *Dohākośa*, a text that can be dated on linguistic grounds to the seventh century or thereafter. These chronological considerations place the *The Jewel Lamp* considerably later than the sixth-century date of the so-called "Ur-Bhāviveka."

An even more challenging problem has to do with the the text's presentation of

basic Madhyamaka concepts. From the sixth to the eighth century, there was a discernible sequence in the development of Mahāyāna thought. Starting with a date of 500-560 for Bhāviveka,[48] we can assign Dignāga to the early part of the sixth century, based on his importance as a source for Bhāviveka's logical method and for Bhāviveka's argument against the Yogācāra in chapter 5 of *The Heart of the Middle Way*. Both Dignāga and Bhāviveka were known to Xuanzang, who visited India in the early part of the seventh century. The next stage in the development of the tradition places Dharmakīrti, Dignāga's commentator, and Candrakīrti, who wrote a forceful critique of Bhāviveka's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses*, somewhere in the middle of the seventh century. In the late seventh or early eighth century come two Mādhyamikas, Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha, who accept Bhāviveka's method and extend it by incorporating ideas from Dharmakīrti and perhaps also from Candrakīrti.[49] In the mid-eighth century Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha were followed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, each of whom played a role in the introduction of Indian Buddhism to Tibet.[50]

This period of almost three centuries involved substantial intellectual creativity and cannot easily be distilled into a handful of formulas, but in Bhāviveka's tradition the shift from the sixth to the eighth centuries was associated with at least two major ideas. The first of these had to do with the definition of relative truth (*saṃvṛti*). Madhyamaka works of the late seventh and early eighth centuries define relative truth (*saṃvṛti*) with a three-part formula: relative truth "satisfies when it is not analyzed" (*avicāraramaṇīya* or *avicāramanohara*), "has arisen dependently" (*pratītyasamutpanna*), and "is capable of effective action" (*arthakriyāsamartha*).[51] The earliest known example of this formula is *The Introduction to Reality* (*tattvāvatāra*) by Śrīgupta.[52] This three-part formula reappears in the work of Jñānagarbha, who is said to have been a disciple of Śrīgupta, and then in the work of Śāntarakṣita who lived in the early decades of the eighth century and is said to have been a disciple of Jñānagarbha.[53] Apart from the standard reference to the idea that all conventional entities have arisen dependently, this formula appears to be a distinctive artifact from the end of the seventh century. The phrase "capable of effective action" (*arthakriyāsamartha*) is traceable to Dharmakīrti and shows how eighth-century Mādhyamikas absorbed one of the distinctive features of his philosophical method into their account of the Madhyamaka.[54] The source of the phrase "satisfies without analysis" is more difficult to pin down, but it might be understood as a response to Candrakīrti's critique of Bhāviveka in the first chapter of his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses*.[55] Whatever its origin may have been, it played an important role in a number of eighth-century texts, including Jayarāśi's *Lion that Annihilates Philosophical Principles* (*tattvopaplavasiṃha*), the only surviving text by a Lokāyata or Indian skeptic,[56] and it became a touchstone in later Tibetan accounts of the Madhyamaka approach to relative truth.[57]

The definition of relative truth in *The Jewel Lamp* follows this classic, three-part formula: "As we see it, *saṃvṛti* is like the pith of a banana tree; it satisfies when it is not

analyzed, it arises from causes, and it is capable of effective action."[58] This formula does not appear anywhere in the works of the sixth-century Bhāviveka. If the author of *The Lamp of Wisdom* and *The Heart of the Middle Way* developed this three-part definition of relative truth, incorporating Dharmakīrti's concept of "effective action" and the concept of "no-analysis," and then bequeathed this definition to the Mādhyamikas of the late seventh and eighth centuries, it would squeeze almost two centuries of philosophical development into the lifetime of a single individual. Such a development is conceivable, but it is not very likely.

A second distinctive feature of eighth-century Madhyamaka has to do with arguments in favor of emptiness. To prove that everything is empty, the Bhāviveka of *The Lamp of Wisdom* and *The Heart of the Middle Way* relies largely on arguments drawn from causation. *The Lamp of Wisdom* begins with Nāgārjuna's argument that nothing can arise ultimately from itself, from something else, from both, or from nothing at all. The first substantial argument for emptiness in *The Heart of the Middle Way* also focuses on the process of causation: "Here earth and so forth do not have the identity of the gross elements, because they are created and because they have a cause and so forth, like cognition."[59] In the eighth century, Madhyamaka arguments for emptiness shifted toward the problem of "the one and the many." As Tom Tillemans has pointed out (1984: 357), the "neither one nor many argument" became the central idea around which scholars like Śāntarakṣita structured their presentation of the Madhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita formulates the argument like this: "The things of which we and others speak actually have no identity, because they are neither one nor many, like a reflection."[60] This argument is borrowed almost verbatim from his teacher's teacher, Śrīgupta: "Everything that is internal or external actually has no identity, because it is neither one nor many, like a reflection."[61] Jñānagarbha varies this argument in a way that maintains the reference to "one and many" but reintroduces the idea of causation: "Many do not produce one, many do not produce many, one does not produce many, and one does not produce one."[62] The origin of these two "one and many" arguments is complex, but it is clear from the sources that both arguments represent a rapprochement between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions. The version in Śrīgupta and Śāntarakṣita reflects the Yogācāra argument against the existence of external objects in verse 11 of Vasubandhu's *Twenty Verses* (*Viṃśatikā*). Jñānagarbha's version maintains Bhāviveka's concern for causation, but it has to do with the arising of cognitions rather than with the arising of things. This move is consistent with Jñānagarbha's turn toward Dharmakīrti's epistemology and away from the ontological preoccupations of Bhāviveka's arguments against the Yogācāra.

The Jewel Lamp takes the development of these arguments a step further. Rather than choosing one of these arguments over another, it presents all of them together in what it calls a "general" (Tib. *spyir* / Skt. *sāmānyena*) refutation of Hindu and Jain opponents.[63] In this respect, it mirrors the synthetic process that characterized eleventh-century works like Atiśa's *Lamp for the Path of Awakening* and was developed further in

the Madhyamaka scholarship of Tibet.[64] Where *The Jewel Lamp* stands in this sequence of intellectual development needs further study, but it seems reasonable to suppose, once again, that it represents a late phase in the evolution of Madhyamaka thought, a phase that was characterized as much by summary and synthesis as it was by original philosophical reflection.

This hypothesis is supported by what must be the strangest feature of this odd text. Not only does *The Jewel Lamp* quote Dharmakīrti, a philosopher who normally is identified with the seventh century, it also quotes Candrakīrti, and it quotes him with the same honorific terminology that it uses for Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and the Buddha. There is no evidence at all of the bitter, sometimes mocking critique Candrakīrti leveled at Bhāviveka in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses*. It is hard to believe that the respectful words of this text could have come from the mouth of the sixth-century Bhāviveka, who was nothing if not a debater, ready to engage his opponents at the slightest hint of controversy. Either we are dealing with a very mellow scholar, who had lived long enough to leave these controversies behind, or we have an author who found it useful to attribute his summary of Madhyamaka to the earlier Bhāviveka, hoping perhaps that he could wrap the text in the authority of an ancient master. Without knowing more about the intellectual development in late Madhyamaka thought, and also about the compositional strategies that were popular in Indian monastic communities at this time, all we can do is speculate. But it seems doubtful that any reasonable calculation of the evidence would now place *The Jewel Lamp* in the sixth century.

Along with *The Jewel Lamp* in the category of questionable texts belongs one final work, *A Summary of the Meaning of the Middle Way* (*madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*).[65] This text summarizes the doctrine of the two truths in twelve verses. David Seyfort Ruegg has pointed out that this text shows significant affinities with Jñānagarbha's *Distinction Between the Two Truths*, including the definition of "correct relative truth" (*tathyasaṃvṛti*) as "capable of effective action." This concept shows the influence of Dharmakīrti and locates the text in the eighth century or thereafter.

THE INTELLECTUAL STRUCTURE OF BHĀVIVEKA'S COMPENDIUM

Once we have considered the authorship of *The Heart of the Middle Way* and *The Flame of Reason*, the next important question has to do with its structure as a philosophical compendium. If the design of the text is as original as it seems, why did the author organize it as he did? What qualifies Bhāviveka's opponents as opponents? Are they particular individuals? Are they defined by any particular social or intellectual affiliation? Are they grouped by doctrines, systems of thought, traditions, schools, or by something else altogether? If the text is concerned with doctrines or texts rather than with individuals, how are they related? For someone who has been steeped in the long tradition of Indian

compendia, the answers to most of these questions seem obvious. Indian philosophy today is organized most often into six (or more) systems of thought, known as *darśanas* (literally, "visions" or "views").[66] Less frequently, these systems are designated by terms such as *mata* ("thought") or *siddhānta* ("established position").[67] Regardless of the terminology, these systems differ on a series of standard topics, such as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the nature of the deity (*devatā*), and the categories of reality (*tattva*). When the different systems are gathered together into a single text, they constitute a coherent body of reflection on the central issues of Indian thought.

What seems obvious to us today, however, was not as obvious at the time of Bhāviveka. The "*darśana* system" was just one of several competing models of classification, if it could even be considered a system at all. The best way to understand the innovation in Bhāviveka's text is to set the terminology of the later compendia aside and look closely at the way Bhāviveka thought about the intellectual situation in his own time. If we base our judgment solely on the texts of *The Heart of the Middle Way* and *The Flame of Reason*, Bhāviveka had three important options available to organize his approach to other traditions: a system of sixty-two "wrong views" (Tib. *lta ba ngan pa* / Skt. **kudṛṣṭi*), a system (which is actually little more than a list) of 363 views (*dṛṣṭi*), and an emerging system of multiple *darśanas*.

Of these three options, the most elaborate is the Buddhist system of sixty-two "wrong views." This list is derived from an early canonical text, the *Brahmajāla Sūtra*, and is prominent enough to be mentioned in a number of later Mahāyāna sources, including Dignāga's *Epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom* (*prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*).[68] Bhāviveka gives his own account of the sixty-two views in the commentary on MHK 11.1ab: "Ordinary people are deluded about conventional reality, and they are disturbed by a network of wrong views (*kudṛṣṭi*)."[69] The commentary offers the following explanation:

> Ordinary people are disturbed by a network of 62 wrong views. What are these 62 wrong views? They are explained in the *Brahmajāla Sūtra*: There are eighteen kinds of heretics in the first group: four kinds of eternalists (*sassatavāda*), four kinds of partial eternalists (*ekaccasassatavāda*), four kinds of limitists and unlimitists (*antānantikavāda*), four kinds of evasive disputants (*amarāvikkhepika*), and two kinds of fortuitous originists (*adhiccasamuppanika*). There are forty-four heretics in the second group: sixteen kinds who hold that the soul is conscious after death (*saññivāda*), eight kinds who hold that the soul is not conscious after death (*asaññivāda*), eight kinds who hold that the soul is neither conscious nor unconscious after death (*nevasaññinasaññivāda*), five kinds of theorisers about the attainment of nirvāṇa in this life (*diṭṭthadhammanibbānavāda*), and seven kinds of annihilationists (*ucchedavāda*).[70]

Several scholars have suggested that this list of "views" recalls rival positions that were current in the intellectual environment of early Indian Buddhism, but the historical connection is tenuous at best.[71] The system functions principally as a theoretical model for Buddhist practitioners to avoid errors in their own thinking and to develop a correct understanding of their own doctrinal commitments.

Bhāviveka mentions the number 363 twice in *The Flame of Reason*. In both cases, the number is used to represent differences of tradition (*āgama*) and reflects a quarrel between Bhāviveka and his opponents about the relationship of inference (*anumāna*) to other means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Near the end of chapter 5, Bhāviveka's Yogācāra opponent objects to the idea that inference can be used to know ultimate reality:

5.104 *tattvasyātarkagamyatvāt tadbodho nānumānataḥ /*
nātas tarkeṇa dharmāṇāṃ gamyate dharmateti cet //

The Dharma nature of *dharma*s cannot be known by logical reasoning, because reality is not an object of logical reasoning and is not known by inference.

The opponent's use of the word "logical reasoning" (*tarka*) in this verse has particular force. Not only does it challenge the title of Bhāviveka's own text (*The Flame of Reason*), it also invokes a venerable Buddhist prohibition against the use of reason. Candrakīrti quotes a sūtra that places this prohibition in the life of the Buddha: "Not long after his perfect awakening, the Blessed One thought: 'I have attained a Dharma that appears profound and is profound. It cannot be investigated (*atarkya*) and is not accessible to logical reasoning (*atarkāvacara*). It is subtle and can be known only by the consciousness of a sage.'"[72] Bhāviveka echoes these words in a verse of his own: "[The Dharma Body of the Buddha] is as inaccessible to logicians (*tārkika*) as heaven is to sinners, detachment is to those who are passionate, and the sun is to those who have been born blind."[73]

If the Dharma is not accessible to logical reasoning, what use is the "flame of reason"? Bhāviveka answers this question by invoking a two-stage process of understanding: first, reason is used to remove misconceptions, then it is possible to see things as they are:

5.105 *ihānumānān nirdoṣād āgamānuvidhāyinaḥ /*
kalpitāśeṣavividhavikalpaughanirākṛteḥ //
5.106 *sakalajñeyayāthātmyam ākāśasamacetasaḥ /*
jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt //

Buddhas use faultless inference in a way that is consistent with tradition

> to completely reject many different concepts of imagined things. Then, without seeing, they see all objects of knowledge just as they are, with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space.[74]

Superficially, this verse follows a standard Buddhist sequence, moving from language and concepts to the direct perception of reality. Translated into the language of the *pramāṇa*s, this sequence would mean that inference (*anumāna*) prepares the way for perception (*pratyakṣa*). But Bhāviveka undercuts this process (as he did with the worship of Brahman and the practice of the eightfold path), by saying that true seeing is no seeing. In terms of the *pramāṇa*s, this means that true perception is no perception. If perception cannot provide a safe resting place at the end of this epistemological process, Bhāviveka has no alternative but to involve himself again in the practice of inference. By returning to inference, he returns to the problem that calls forth inference in the first place: the differences in understanding (*buddhi*) that arise from differences in tradition (*āgama*). These differences in tradition call forth his first reference to the number 363.

> 5.107 *ato 'numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvaṃ pratipadyate /*
> *tattvajñānavipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //*
> 5.108 *āgamāntarabhedena bhedāyātāsu buddhiṣu /*
> *abhede 'py āgamasyānyaḥ kaḥ parīkṣākṣamo vidhiḥ //*

> It is impossible to understand reality as an object of inference, but inference rules out the opposite of the knowledge of reality. Differences in other traditions cause differences in understanding; even when there are no differences in tradition, what other method is capable of investigating [these differences]?

> Commentary: Other traditions are traditions that differ from one another. Their differences, which consist of 363 doctrines, give rise to differences of understanding. Those who seek agreement have no way to investigate [these differences] other than by inference (*anumāna*), which consists of theses, reasons, and examples.[75]

There is surprising ambiguity in this passage about the actual reference of the number 363. In the verse, the problem of intellectual diversity is attributed to differences of tradition (*āgama*). In the commentary, these differences are associated with a Tibetan term (*rgol ba*) that I have translated here as "doctrine" (*vāda*). It could also be translated as "dispute" or "argument," or it could be taken as a reference to a person who enters into dispute (*vādin*). In other words, it could refer to a debater.[76] But this

ambiguity does not affect the point of the argument. Whether philosophical differences reside in words, actions, or agents, Bhāviveka is persuaded that they can only be resolved by inference.

Bhāviveka returns to the number 363 in the chapter on Mīmāṃsā as part of his critique of the authority of the Veda. The Mīmāṃsaka begins with an argument in favor of tradition:

9.4cd *saṃpradāyānupacchedād āgamo 'sau tadatyaye //*
9.5 *atyantākṣaparokṣe hi pratipattiḥ kathaṃ bhavet /*
adṛṣṭaliṅgasaṃbandhe svargāpūrvādivastuni //

> The Veda is tradition (*āgama*), because its transmission is unbroken. Without it, how can anyone understand something like heaven or karmic consequences, which are completely beyond the senses and not connected with any visible mark?[77]

Bhāviveka responds with an argument that mirrors his dispute with the Yogācāra. For him, tradition only has authority if it is investigated by reason. Why? For the same reason that inference was necessary in his dispute with the Yogācāra: without inference, there is no way to resolve differences between traditions.[78]

9.18 *tad atrāpi parīkṣante yathābhūtagaveṣiṇaḥ /*
pakṣapātaviṣaṃ hitvā śabdārthanyāyakovidāḥ //
9.19 *saṃpradāyānupacchedād āgamasyāgamatvataḥ /*
sarvasyāgamatāsiddheḥ kim tattvam iti dhāryatām //

> Those who seek the truth and know how to reason about the meanings of words avoid the poison of partiality and carry out the following investigation: If tradition has the status of tradition because it has an unbroken transmission, then everything is tradition, and it is necessary to determine which is true.

The commentary explains that the word "everything" refers to "363 views" (the Tibetan *lta ba* can translate either *dṛṣṭi* or *darśana*). The commentary expands this point with a mind-numbing list of what seem to be followers of different teachers or practices. I use the word "seem" advisedly, since determined investigation has yet to reveal any precedent for this list or identify more than a handful of its terms. Qvarnström has pointed out that the list has affinities with an equally obscure list in the *Rājavārttika*, an eighth-century Jain commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha Sūtra*.[79] But the two are not identical, and the *Rājavārttika* list is no help in deciphering the list in the *The Flame of Reason*.

To make matters worse, the number 363 is attached to a similar list in the second chapter of *The Jewel Lamp*. The two lists start out the same (leading some scholars to assume that they are identical), but they rapidly diverge, until it is clear that the author, copyist, or translator has incorporated radically different ideas of what the list should contain. The list is sufficiently impenetrable that one begins to suspect that impenetrability is precisely the point, as if Bhāviveka were saying that "tradition" in India is a buzzing, bewildering complexity that can yield its secrets only to the clear light of reason.

In effect, that is what happened to the number 363 in Jain philosophical compendia. Kendall W. Folkert has shown that the number 363 appeared as early as the second or third century in Jain literature as a way of designating the variety of philosophical positions (1993: 229-45). The number eventually came to be associated with a list of four categories that could be used to organize reflection about philosophical differences. These categories were *kriyāvāda* (to affirm the existence of the world and the soul), *akriyāvāda* (to deny the existence of the soul), *ajñānavāda* (to profess skepticism about these points), and *vinayavāda* (teaching what commentators refer to as "respectful service"). Over a period of time, these four categories evolved (like the 62 "wrong views" in the *Brahmajāla Sūtra*) into a list of 363 different positions. In its standard form, as outlined by Schrader (1902: 3-4), this list included 180 varieties of *kriyāvāda*, 84 varieties of *akriyāvāda*, 67 varieties of *ajñānavāda*, and 32 varieties of *vinayavāda*. The first Jain scholar to articulate the full system was Haribhadra (eighth century). In its rational coherence and consistency, Haribhadra's account of the 363 doctrines goes far beyond anything Bhāviveka was able to accomplish with his seemingly random list. But the complexity of Haribhadra's account shows the difficulty of the challenge that confronted Bhāviveka and his contemporaries. In the face of such bewildering diversity, not just of philosophical views but even of classification systems, how could a scholar establish any sense of order?

Bhāviveka's response was to divide the field of possibilities into a series of chapters dedicated to what came to be known in later literature as *darśana*s, a word that can be translated as "visions," "views," or simply "philosophies." The classic statement of the *darśana*-system comes at the beginning of Haribhadra's eighth-century *Compendium of Six Views* (*ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*): "Here, with respect to basic differences, there are only six *darśana*s; scholars should understand them according to the differences in their deities and in their principles of reality."[80] Haribhadra's list of six *darśana*s includes the Bauddha (Buddhist), Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā, with a postscript on the Lokāyatas. (In his introduction to the chapter on the Lokāyatas, Haribhadra explains that some scholars group the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika together, leaving room for separate treatment of the Lokāyatas.) Bhāviveka's list also includes six philosophies: Śrāvaka, Yogācāra, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā. The two lists seem to converge on the number six, but Bhāviveka does not treat the number as having any particular significance, and his list differs from Haribhadra's in significant ways.

Bhāviveka devotes separate chapters to two different Buddhist opponents, he omits the Nyāya and Lokāyata, and he includes Vedānta. While Haribhadra lists his own philosophy as one of the six, Bhāviveka begins his text with a separate account of his own philosophy and presents it in a format that differs significantly from the account of his opponents. Finally, his only account of Jainism occurs in the "Exposition of the Realization of Omniscience" in chapter 10.

The reasons for these differences is not immediately clear. It is possible that Bhāviveka, as a Buddhist, took the challenge of intra-Buddhist debates more seriously than Haribhadra. But it also is possible that these intra-Buddhist debates simply receded in importance in the two centuries that separated Bhāviveka from Haribhadra. Why does Bhāviveka say nothing about the Nyāya but devotes a chapter to Vedānta, while Haribhadra includes a chapter on the Nyāya but says nothing about Vedānta? One possibility is that Vedānta simply did not have enough influence in Haribhadra's intellectual environment to deserve a place on the list. But why would Vedānta have posed such a challenge to Bhāviveka? It is tempting to attribute the difference to geography, but we know from Xuanzang that students and scholars, to say nothing of texts, circulated widely across India. It is more likely that Bhāviveka's concern about Vedānta had to do with intellectual rather than geographical proximity. Near the end of the Vedānta chapter, Bhāviveka accuses the Vedāntins of borrowing their approach from the teaching of the Buddha: "Thinking that the Tathāgata's flawless approach is good, the heretics have developed a longing for it and made it their own."[81] Perhaps this is a case of "the proximate 'other,' the near neighbor, who," as Jonathan Z. Smith observes, "is most troublesome" (2004: 245) and deserves the most thorough response. Similar questions apply to Bhāviveka's omission of the Nyāya. Again, it is possible that there just were not enough important Naiyāyikas in Bhāviveka's neighborhood in the sixth century to demand a response.[82] This seems to be the case in the *Maṇimekalai.* For logic and epistemology, that text relies on Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist logic rather than Nyāya. Bhāviveka reflects this priority when he devotes his longest non-Buddhist chapter to Mīmāṃsā. The only point that can be drawn reliably from these different lists is that there was no standard account of significant philosophical traditions. Groups seem to have been included or omitted for reasons that were both practical and intellectual. To be certain about why Bhāviveka or Haribhadra made their choices, we would need to know more about the actual practice of debate in sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-century India than our sources have so far been able to yield.

The trajectory of thought from Bhāviveka to Haribhadra raises further questions, not the least of which has to do with the meaning of the word *darśana* itself. In a strictly etymological sense, *darśana* functions simply as a verbal noun that means to "see." It is common to represent the etymology of *darśana* by using the English words "vision" or "view," as if there were a simple correlation between the metaphor of a philosophical "view" in Sanskrit and English. But this correlation cannot be taken for granted,

if only because of the dense history associated with these terms on both sides of the Indian / European divide. How, then, did a word that has to do with "vision" or "seeing" come to play such a crucial role in the understanding of Indian philosophy? In his study of Jain compendia, Kendall W. Folkert has traced a long process of evolution that led to the use of *darśana* as a chapter heading in Haribhadra's compendium (1993: 113-45). The story begins in early Jain literature, where the word *darśana* appears as one of three elements in the "way to liberation" (*mokṣamārga*). It is customary in Jain circles to translate these elements as "right faith" (*samyagdarśana*), "knowledge" (*jñāna*), and "conduct" (*caritra*). In its original setting, "right faith" had a strong moral meaning: right faith functioned as a way of removing the karma that prevented a soul from seeing the truth. Over time, *darśana* as a verbal noun became associated with the term *tattva* ("reality") as its direct object. This led to the widely-accepted definition of "right faith" as "firm conviction about reality" (*tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam*).[83] As Folkert tells the story, this association with "reality" loosened the karmic significance of *darśana* and made it possible for the word to designate the philosophical "views" of others. Eventually this process of evolution led to Haribhadra's use of the word *darśana* to name a "philosophy" in the sense of a body of doctrine or a system of thought. In later Jain compendia this usage was hardened even further by replacing *darśana* with the term *siddhānta*, which referred initially to the settled conclusion of an argument but came eventually to name a system of thought. An example of this usage is the title of the anonymous Jain compendium *Sarvasiddhāntapraveśaka* ("Introduction to All Systems of Thought"); other examples are common in Tibet.[84] The process of evolution that led from "right faith" to "system of thought" or, as Folkert puts it, "the transformation of 'faith' into 'a faith,'" was a result of many factors, but a key element in the change had to do with the encounter with philosophical diversity. Once it became clear that *darśana* was something "others" could have, the way was open to using the term as the organizing principle for a philosophical compendium.

Other Indian traditions have reflected this process as well. Wilhelm Halbfass has noted that Bhartṛhari, the philosophical grammarian who served as the source for several arguments in Bhāviveka's chapter on the Mīmāṃsā, shows the "doxographic usage" of the word *darśana* "*in statu nascendi*."[85] Bhartṛhari sometimes uses the word *darśana* in a generic sense to refer to different "views" or "ways of thinking." In *Kāṇḍa* 2 of the *Vākyapadīya*, for example, he says: "The way of seeing (*darśana*) a single visible object can be different."[86] In a discussion of universals in *Kāṇḍa* 3, he refers to a perception of identity (*ekatvadarśana*), as well as a perception of connection (*saṃsargadarśana*).[87] Moving into a doxographic mode in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, he refers to the Vaiśeṣika "view" (*vaiśeṣikadarśana*) and the Mīmāṃsā "view" (*mīmāṃsādarśana*). And in a verse that Halbfass rightly notes could serve as a motto for the entire tradition of Indian doxographical literature, Bhartṛhari says:

prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ /
kiyad vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkam anudhāvatā //

Wisdom gains discrimination from different traditional views; how can one lead upward by following one's own reason?[88]

The question here is whether the word *darśana* in the compound "traditional view" (*āgamadarśana*) has made the transition from its status as a verbal noun, meaning "view" or "way of seeing," into the designation of a philosophical system. The commentator Punyarāja does not offer much help. He falls naturally into the later usage by glossing *darśana* as *siddhānta* ("system of thought"), but the word could just as easily be interpreted as a "way of seeing" that is based on traditional authorities (*āgama*). But from Bhāviveka's point of view, the most striking feature of Bhartṛhari's verse is not the ambiguity in the meaning of *darśana*; it is the combination of *darśana* with the concept of "tradition" (*āgama*). This is precisely the issue that Bhāviveka addressed with his awkward list of 363 doctrines. For him it was the diversity of "tradition" that required logical analysis. Here *āgama* and *darśana* go together as the foundation of the doxographical tradition.

Bhāviveka's use of the term *darśana* shares some of Bhartṛhari's ambiguity. While there are places where his terminology reflects Halbfass's "doxographic usage," there are other places where he avoids the term altogether. An example of the doxographic usage occurs in the objections that start chapter 4, where the Śrāvakas say:

4.7 *na buddhoktir mahāyānaṃ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt /*
mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanam //
4.8ab *phalahetvapavādād vā yathā nāstikadarśanam /*

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrānta and so forth, because it teaches another path, like the Vedānta view (*vedāntadarśana*), or because it improperly denies cause and effect, like a nihilistic view (*nāstikadarśana*).

In chapter 9, a similar objection comes from the Mīmāṃsā:

9.17 *apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ trayīdarśanadūṣaṇāt /*
yad yathoktaṃ tathoktaṃ tad yathā nagnāṭadarśanam //

The Buddha's teaching is not a authoritative, because it attacks the view of the Vedas. Whatever is one is also the other, like the Jain view.[89]

In his commentary on both passages, Bhāviveka equates *darśana* with *siddhānta* ("system of thought"), clearly anticipating the practice of the eighth century. But these examples of Bhāviveka's "doxographic usage" are only part of the picture. If we turn the question around, we get a different answer. Instead of asking whether Bhāviveka uses the word *darśana* as Haribhadra did in the eighth century, it is better to ask what Bhāviveka himself thought was the focus of his chapters. Was it a series of *darśana*s, or was it something else? The Buddhist chapters give a surprising answer. According to Bhāviveka, his Buddhist opponents distinguish themselves by rejecting Bhāviveka's "approach" (*nīti* or *naya*) and clinging to an "approach of their own." The Śrāvakas are introduced as "those who have low aspirations and cannot understand this difficult approach" (*nīti*). The commentary glosses "this difficult approach" as "the quest for the knowledge of reality" (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*) that he explained in the previous chapter. In other words, the "difficult approach" is what we would call Bhāviveka's own Madhyamaka philosophy. In chapter 5, Bhāviveka frames his argument against the Yogācāra in a similar way: the Yogācāras are "proud of their own approach (*svanīti*) and claim to give the best 'introduction to the ambrosia of reality' (*tattvāmṛtāvatāra*)." "Introduction to the ambrosia of reality" again refers back to the position Bhāviveka laid out in the opening chapters of his text. Bhāviveka uses the term "approach" (*nīti* or *naya*) again when he starts his response to both opponents. In the case of the Śrāvakas, he says: "According to the approach explained earlier, the opponent's approach has gone wrong. The opponent cannot tolerate this and has spoken out." In the case of the Yogācāras, he promises to lead the opponent to a correct understanding of the Buddha's teaching by following a "rational approach" (*yuktimannayaḥ*).

To understand Bhāviveka's own view of philosophical difference, it is crucial to understand what he means by this seemingly modest word "approach." It should be no surprise that the precedents are rich and varied, beginning with the Jains. Early Jain sources use a system of seven different *naya*s to explain the significance of the *anekāntavāda* (often translated as "relativism," but more accurately represented as "non-absolutism" or "non-exclusivity").[90] By this they mean that reality can be approached seven different ways (although it is understood that these seven *naya*s are abstractions from what Folkert calls an "incalculable number of possible *naya*s"). Each *naya* is valid from its own perspective and only becomes an incorrect *naya* (*durnaya*) when it is taken as true to the exclusion of others, hence the doctrine of non-exclusivity (*anekāntavāda*). The term itself is explained in different ways in Jain sources. Padmanabh Jaini (1979: 93) quotes a passage in the *Syādvādamañjarī* that defines *naya* or *nīti* as "that by which an object (*artha*) is led to (*nīyate*) or ascertained (*paricchidyate*) in a particular respect (*ekadeśaviśiṣṭa*)." Folkert quotes a passage from the auto-commentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* that says *naya*s "lead to, i.e., obtain, cause, enable, bring about, illuminate, grasp, manifest [etc.] the categories of *jīva* and the rest."[91] The nuances of the term are difficult to pin down, as translators have shown by their struggle to find

an acceptable English equivalent. Jaini translates *naya* as "a partial expression of the truth." Folkert prefers "standpoint" or "viewpoint." But the root meaning has less to do with saying, standing, or seeing than with "leading" (*nī*) the mind toward an object. Bhāviveka picks up this meaning in his commentary on MHK 4.1, when he glosses *nīti* as "path" (the Tibetan *lam* is equivalent to the Sanskrit *mārga* or *pratipad*), and elaborates the sense of motion in MHK 5.9, where he promises to "follow a rational approach (*naya*) in order to make the opponent understand." Here the word "follow" comes from the root (*ṃṛg*) that produces the word "path" (*mārga*), and the word "understand" (*pratipatti*) also means to move forward or make progress toward a goal. Whatever else the words *naya* or *nīti* may have meant for Bhāviveka, they clearly were related to his basic understanding of knowledge as movement toward a goal.

Bhāviveka's use of *naya* and *nīti* also has important resonances with the scriptural tradition of the Mahāyāna, particularly the Perfection of Wisdom literature. We read, for example, in *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* 5.2: "To know all *dharma*s with the approach (*naya*) of non-arising and emptiness is to practice the Perfection of Wisdom." *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines* makes a similar point when it says: "According to this kind of approach to *dharma*s (*dharmanayajātyā*), there is no *dharma*."[92] Beyond these early Perfection of Wisdom texts, the terms *naya* and *nīti* lead in two directions, one of which Bhāviveka exploits, the other of which he seems studiously to avoid. *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*) speaks of a "knowledge of one approach (*ekanaya*) without grasping or rejecting any *dharma*."[93] The concept of "one approach" had important resonances for Bhāviveka. In his discussion of the Śrāvakas, Bhāviveka argues that the Mahāyāna teaches "one approach" rather than many, and he equates this "one approach" with the "one vehicle" (*ekayāna*) mentioned in the *Lotus Sūtra* and other Mahāyāna sources.[94] The connection between "one approach" and "one vehicle" has important implications, not only for the relationship between the Śrāvakas and the Mahāyāna, but also for the relationships between different traditions within the Mahāyāna.[95] Obviously the verbal affinity between *naya* and *yāna* makes it easy to treat the two concepts as equivalent, but the affinity is more than skin deep. In its root meaning, the word *yāna* also is a verbal noun that has to do with moving along a path.

Another way to explore the meaning of *naya* and *nīti* as a mode of classification would be to consider the hermeneutical distinction between provisional meaning (*neyārtha*) and definitive meaning (*nītārtha*).[96] This distinction is found quite often in Mahāyāna literature and has particular significance for the Yogācāra. Like the words *naya* and *nīti*, these terms play on the meaning of the root to "lead" (*nī*). To say that a statement is *neyārtha* means that its meaning (*artha*) needs to be "led to" (*neya*).[97] In other words, it requires further interpretation. To say that a statement is *nītārtha* means that its meaning (*artha*) has been "led to" (*nīta*). In other words, its meaning is definitive and requires no further interpretation. Strangely enough for such an inclusive thinker, Bhāviveka makes almost no mention of this distinction, even though it is a key feature

not only in the Mahāyāna tradition more generally but in sources that he mines deeply for other ideas.[98] Why does he ignore it? I will have more to say about this point when I discuss Bhāviveka's arguments against the Śrāvakas. For the moment, the answer seems to be that Bhāviveka was an *ekanaya* thinker: he had a deep conviction about the unity of Buddhist thought. He was not interested in developing multiple approaches; he simply wanted to determine the correct approach and defend it against its critics.

Toward a Theory of Difference

With so many possible ways of conceptualizing philosophical differences, it would be easy to get the impression that Bhāviveka was as confused about his classification system as he was about the actual diversity of philosophical views. He knew about 62 wrong views and 363 doctrines, and he was aware of the "doxographic usage" of the term *darśana*. He even seemed to pick up an old Jain tradition of distinguishing multiple *naya*s and develop it in a distinctively Buddhist way. Could it be that Bhāviveka marked nothing more than a tentative, exploratory stage on the way to the more settled doxographical practice of the eighth century? Certainly it would be no insult to Bhāviveka if this were true. We could think of his text as an early attempt to build something like a philosophical museum, where the collector's mind has gathered a treasure trove of odd doctrines and even a few odd systems of classification, without quite deciding how to put the collection in order. Bhāviveka was indeed an extraordinary collector, and it is not unfair to admire his fascination with odd doctrines and curious details. But it is unfair to think that he did nothing else. He also had an unusually precise mental picture of the practice of philosophy, and with this picture came a precise view of how different intellectual alternatives should be approached and given a place in his mental map. Wittgenstein is well known for saying that "a picture held us captive." The picture he had in mind involved the application of words to things. It would be true to say that a picture also held Bhāviveka captive. But it was a picture about the practice of philosophy as a way to see, with emphasis on both the word "way" and the word "see." If the term "theory" can be taken in its Greek sense as "vision," then Bhāviveka saw philosophy itself as movement toward a theory, not just of difference, but of reality itself.

The metaphor of philosophy as a way to see permeates Bhāviveka's thought, from his choice of words to the architecture of his system as a whole. Perhaps the best way to appreciate the significance of this metaphor is to start at the level of Bhāviveka's language and watch how carefully he chooses words to explore the connection between going and seeing. A good example comes at the beginning of chapter 9, where the Mīmāṃsā objector compares logicians like Bhāviveka to blind men who run along a dangerous road by feeling it with their feet:

9.13 *dūṣayitvā trayīmārgaṃ hetubhir hetuvādinaḥ /*
anumānapradhānatvāt svanayaṃ dyotayanti ye //
9.14 *pādasparśād ivāndhānāṃ viṣame pathi dhāvatām /*
anumānapradhānānāṃ pātas teṣāṃ na durlabhaḥ //

> Logicians who use reasons to criticize the Veda illuminate their own approach by giving priority to inference. Those who give priority to inference are like blind men who run on a dangerous road by touching it with their feet; it is easy for them to fall.

Shinjō Kawasaki pointed out that the second of these verses is a near-quotation of verse 1.42 of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*:

hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā /
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ //

> Someone who gives priority to inference is like a blind man who runs on a dangerous road by touching it with his hands; it is easy for him to fall.[99]

In his expansion of this verse, Bhāviveka has done two striking things: he has changed the word "hands" to "feet," and he has added the image of a blind man attempting to "illuminate" his path. It is possible that Bhartṛhari had in mind a blind man who feels his way along a road by touching it with his cane. Otherwise, it makes no sense to say that a blind man runs and also touches the road with his hands. Bhāviveka seems to be sensitive to this incongruity and changes the image to a blind man who feels the road with his feet. If Bhāviveka were casual about his language or imprecise about his use of imagery, there would be no reason to make the change. But the image is important enough to get just right.

In Bhāviveka's expansion of Bhartṛhari's verse, Bhatṛhari's "road" (*path*) is mirrored by the Bhāviveka's "approach" (*naya*), and the blind man's act of feeling his way along the road is mirrored by the logicians' act of illumination. The Mīmāṃsaka (as pictured by Bhāviveka) claims that logicians are blind and try to shed light (*dyotayanti*) on their "approach" by using inference. For a blind man to "shed light on" something is clearly an act of futility. And futility is exactly what the Mīmāṃsaka thinks of Bhāviveka's preference for inference. Not far in the background lies Bhartṛhari's claim that reason (*tarka*) alone is incapable of providing reliable knowledge:

nāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate /
ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam //

> Without tradition (*āgama*), reason cannot determine what is right. Even the knowledge of the Seers follows tradition.[100]

Bhāviveka also echoes another of Bhartṛhari's verses on the diversity of tradition:

> *prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ /*
> *kiyad vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkam anudhāvatā //*

> Wisdom gains discrimination from different traditional views; how can one lead upward by following one's own reason?[101]

The verb to "follow" (*anu-dhāv*) in this verse comes from the same root (*dhāv*) as the word "run" in the verse quoted by Bhāviveka, and the word translated as "lead upward" (*unnetum*) comes from the same root (*nī*) as Bhāviveka's word "approach." While it is not entirely clear what Bhartṛhari means by "lead upward," at least in this context, there would be little obscurity for Bhāviveka. The path that he illuminates with the "flame of reason" (*tarkajvālā*) does not just lead forward along a road; it also leads upward toward a place where someone can develop a more inclusive view of reality.

What makes Bhāviveka remarkable, both as a thinker and writer, is not simply the presence of these metaphors. It would be easy to multiply examples of Indian philosophers who illustrate or enliven their arguments with metaphorical language. In this respect, Bhāviveka is just one of the crowd. But the metaphors seem to run deeper for him than they do for others. He explores them, develops them, and returns to them again and again as he unfolds the structure of his arguments. They are not just embellishments on the surface of his text; they reflect something much deeper about his vision of the world, and they invite the reader to enter into that world in a way that mere discursive argumentation cannot do. Nietzsche once remarked that "truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal."[102] Bhāviveka rubs the grime off the face of these coins and puts them back in circulation. Or, to borrow a metaphor from Howard Nemerov, he shows that the moribund metaphors of Sanskrit philosophy are not dead but merely sleeping.[103] He wakes them up so that they can walk through his sentences and through the landscape of his thought. As they walk, they start to tell a story about the obstacles they encounter and about the landscape they see.

Bhāviveka's story about moving and seeing starts in earnest in chapter 3, where the philosopher / poet "seeks the knowledge of reality" (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*).

> 3.1 *yasya jñānamayaṃ cakṣuś cakṣus tasyāsti netarat /*
> *yatas tasmād bhaved dhīmāṃs tattvajñānaiṣaṇāparaḥ //*

True vision is the vision that consists of knowledge, nothing else; this is why a scholar should focus on seeking knowledge of reality.[104]

3.2 *paśyaty andho 'pi matimān didṛkṣuviprakṛṭṣṭakān /*
sūkṣmavyavahitān arthāṃs trailokyāhatadarśanaḥ //

Even if a scholar is blind, he sees the three worlds without any obstruction; he sees whatever he wants to see, whether it is far away, subtle, or concealed.

3.3 *sahasreṇāpi netrāṇām anetro buddhivarjitaḥ /*
svargāpavargasadbhūtamārgāmargāsamīkṣaṇāt //

Without intelligence, even [Indra] who has a thousand eyes is blind, because he does not see the right and wrong paths to heaven and liberation.

3.4 *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaviśiṣṭeṣṭaphalāśāviṣakaṇṭake /*
pravartate na dānādau prajñonmīlitalocanaḥ //

When he has opened the eye of wisdom, he does not enter into the perfections as if they were thorns poisoned by desire for visible, invisible, special, or favorable results.

3.5 *trimaṇḍalaviśuddhe hi dānādāv abhiyujyate /*
kāruṇyāt sarvavittvāya tatrāpy asthitamānasaḥ //

He practices the perfections, pure in three ways, with compassion as the motivation and omniscience as the goal, but he does not set his mind on that goal.

3.6 *prajñāmṛtaṃ tṛptikaraṃ dīpo 'pratihataprabhaḥ /*
mokṣaprāsādasopānaṃ kleśendhanahutāśanaḥ //

Wisdom is the ambrosia that brings satisfaction, the lamp whose light cannot be obscured, the steps on the palace of liberation, and the fire that burns the fuel of the defilements.

3.10 *aśeṣakalpanājālapratiṣedhavidhāyinī /*
śāntapratyātmasaṃvedyanirvikalpanirakṣare //
3.11 *vigataikatvanānātve tattve gagananirmale /*
apracārapracārā ca prajñā syāt pāramārthikī //

Ultimate wisdom negates the entire network of concepts, and it moves without moving into the clear sky of reality, which is peaceful, directly known, non-conceptual, non-verbal, and free from unity and diversity.

3.12 *tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇaṃ na hi yujyate /*
tathyasaṃvṛtisopānam antareṇa yatas tataḥ //
3.13 *pūrvaṃ saṃvṛtisatyena praviviktamatir bhavet /*
tato dharmasvasāmānyalakṣaṇe suviniścitaḥ //

Surely it is impossible to climb to the top of the palace of reality without the steps of correct relative [truth]. For that reason, one should first discriminate according to relative truth, then one should analyze the particular and universal characteristics of things.

3.14 *abhiyujyeta medhāvī samādhānāya cetasaḥ /*
tathā śrutamayajñāne tadanyajñānahetutaḥ //

A scholar should practice concentration of the mind and also the knowledge that comes from hearing, because that causes the other forms of knowledge.

3.15 *na paśyati yathā vaktraṃ kauṣapracale jale /*
tathāsamāhite citte tattvaṃ nivaraṇāvṛte //

He cannot see his face in muddy or turbulent water, and he cannot see reality if his mind is distracted and covered with obstructions.

3.16 *nibadhyālambanastambhe smṛtirajjvā manogajam /*
unmārgacāriṇaṃ kuryāt prajñāṃkuśavaśaṃ śanaiḥ //

When his mind strays from the right path like an elephant, he should bind it to the post of the object with the rope of mindfulness and gradually bring it under control with the hook of wisdom.

3.17 *anityatāmanaskārair uddhataṃ śamam ānayet /*
vipulālambanābhyāsāt saṃkṣiptaṃ vipulātmatām //

If [his mind] is arrogant, he should quiet it by thinking about impermanence; if it is timid, he should expand it by practicing something vast.

3.18 *vikṣiptaṃ saṃharet kṣiptanimittādīnavekṣaṇāt /*
vīryānuśaṃsadarśitvāl līnam uttejayed api //

If it is distracted he should concentrate it by considering the suffering that distraction causes; if it is depressed, he should energize it by considering the advantages of courage.

3.19 *rāgadveṣatamaḥpaṅkamalīmasam asaṃyatam /*
kṣālayed aśubhāmaitrīpratītyotpādavāriṇā //

If it is undisciplined and stained by the mud of passion, hatred, and delusion, he should wash it with the water of [meditation on] repulsive things, friendliness, and dependent arising.

3.20 *viviktam acalaṃ śāntam ālambanaparāyaṇam /*
karmaṇyaṃ mṛdu ca jñātvā tatra samyag upekṣayet //

When he knows that it is isolated, immovable, peaceful, intent on its object, skillful, and supple, then he is properly detached.

3.21 *samāhitamatiḥ paścāt prajñayāivaṃ parīkṣayet /*
yo 'yaṃ svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ gṛhyate vyavahārataḥ //
3.22 *vicāryamāṇas tu dhiyā kim ayam paramārthataḥ /*
yadi syāt tattvam evāyam ato 'nyaś cet sa mṛgyate //

After his mind has been concentrated, he should analyze with wisdom: Is the identity of *dharma*s that is grasped conventionally also grasped ultimately? If so, then it is reality. If it is different from this [reality], then it must still be sought.

The images in these verses are difficult to distill into a single story, but on the most basic level, they tell us that the scholar's goal is to see and, by seeing, to avoid various hazards, like the thorns that lie at the side of the path or the risk of straying from the right path altogether. But this path does not just lead in a horizontal direction across the landscape; it also leads upwards to "the clear sky of reality" and "the top of the palace of reality."[104] When the scholar / traveler ascends to this level, vision is not, as it were, merely prudential. It does not just help a person make practical choices about staying on a path. It surveys the landscape in an inclusive way and suggests an experience similar to omniscience. It seems to escape the necessity of sequence ("it moves without moving in the clear sky of reality"), and it is detached from what it sees (it is not "poisoned by desire

for visible, invisible, special, or favorable results" and finally is "properly detached"). These three aspects of the scholar's vision are strongly reminiscent of Hans Jonas's account of "the nobility of sight" in Western philosophical literature.[105] Jonas asks why philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle have pictured *theoría*, the highest and noblest activity of the mind, in a metaphor of vision. His answer is that sight distinguishes itself from other senses in three significant ways. It comprehends many things in a single, simultaneous field of vision; it is dynamically neutral, in the sense that it is not directly affected by the object it sees; and it is distant from what it sees.

Jonas argues that these three aspects of vision are the starting point for some of the most basic concepts in Western philosophy: "Simultaneity of presentation furnishes the idea of an enduring present, the contrast between change and the unchanging, between time and eternity. Dynamic neutralization furnishes form as distinct from matter, essence as distinct from existence, and the difference of theory and practice. Distance furnishes the idea of infinity. Thus the mind has gone where vision pointed."[106] Bhāviveka is not so one-sided that he pictures the scholar's achievement solely in images of vision; he also speaks of wisdom as "the ambrosia that brings satisfaction, the lamp whose light cannot be obscured, the steps on the palace of liberation, and the fire that burns the fuel of the defilements." He even calls it a hook to bring the mind under control when it rages like a wild elephant. But it is clear that Bhāviveka thinks that the philosopher's goal is to reach an elevated vantage point and survey reality in a detached and inclusive way.

At least this is the picture that Bhāviveka conveys at the beginning of the journey. As the chapter unfolds, the character of the vision changes. The process of analysis mentioned in verses 3.21-22 gradually leads to the realization that the "identities" of things are not what they seem, and the structures of reality begin to dissolve.

3.251 *timirāpagame yadvad viśuddhāmalalocanaḥ /*
nekṣate keśamaśakadvicandraśikhicandrakān //

When someone removes an eye disease and his eyes are pure and clear, he does not see spots, hairs, flies, or a double image of the moon.

3.252 *kleśajñeyāvṛtitamastimirāpagame tathā /*
na paśyati budhaḥ kiṃcit samyagjñānāmalekṣaṇaḥ //

Similarly, when a scholar removes the eye disease of defilements and objects of cognition and has the clear eye of true knowledge, he does not see anything at all.

3.253 *yathā prasuptaḥ putrastrīvimānabhavanādikam /*
paśyed middhavaśāt tatra pratibuddho na paśyati //

> When someone feels drowsy and falls asleep, he sees things like young men, young women, and a palace, but he does not see them when he wakes up.
>
> 3.254 *saṃvṛtyādhigatāṃs tadvad unmīlitamatīkṣaṇaḥ /*
> *ajñānanidroparamāt pratibuddho na paśyati //*
>
> Similarly, when someone has opened the eye of wisdom, stopped the sleep of ignorance, and woken up, he does not see things as they are seen conventionally.
>
> 3.255 *niśi bhūtāny abhūtāni yathā tamasi paśyati /*
> *pronmīlitākṣo yady arka udeti ca na paśyati //*
>
> On a dark night, someone may see ghosts that are unreal, but he does not see them when the sun rises and his eyes are opened.
>
> 3.256 *na paśyati tathā vidvāṃś cittacaitasagocaram /*
> *samyagjñānaravidhvastasamastājñānavāsanāḥ //*
>
> Similarly, when a scholar has destroyed all traces of ignorance with the sun of true knowledge, he does not see mind and mental phenomena as objects.

As conventional identities dissolve, the palace also dissolves, and with it dissolves the idea that a scholar can ascend through real stages to reach a vision of real things. It is as if the metaphor of the journey has dissolved into the image of a dream, and the scholar's laborious climb up the steps on the palace has become nothing more than a moment of waking up.

In some accounts of the Mahāyāna path, this moment of awakening constitutes the final stage of the path, but not for Bhāviveka. The image of the dream-palace gives way to a series of images that involve re-engagement with the realm of conventional reality. First the Bodhisattva looks back from the top of the "palace of reality" (here pictured as a "mountain of wisdom") and weeps for the people who have been left behind.

> 3.296 *sa prajñāmeruśeharam ārūḍhaḥ karuṇāvaśāt /*
> *aśokaḥ śokasaṃtaptaṃ prekṣate duḥkhitaṃ jagat //*
>
> When he has climbed the mountain peak of wisdom and is free from grief, he looks with compassion on ordinary people who suffer and are burned by grief.[107]

3.297 *sa tadā karuṇārdeṇa lokam ālokya cakṣuṣā /*
vikalpaśilpasaṃbhūtakalpanājālasaṃvṛtam //

Then, with eyes moist with compassion, he looks at ordinary people who are covered by the network of concepts that come from the art of conceptual thought.

Here Bhāviveka takes advantage of the same rhetorical device that he uses in his quotation from Bhartṛhari in chapter 9: he incorporates the image of a received verse into his own text and expands its meaning. In this case the verse comes from the *Udānavarga*, with a more distant echo of the *Mahābhārata*:[108]

paññāpāsādam āruhya asoko sokiniṃ pajaṃ /
pabbataṭṭho va bhummaṭṭhe dīro bāle avekkhati //

When he has climbed the palace of wisdom, he is steadfast and free from grief; he looks down on people who grieve, as if he were standing on a mountain and looking down on foolish people who stand on the earth.

Bhāviveka's most important intervention in this verse is to transform the image from one of detachment to one of compassion and concern. His "looking at" (*ālokya*) reflects the "looking down" that embodies the compassion of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara ("the lord who looks down").

Bhāviveka's re-engagement with conventional reality is not limited, however, to a compassionate gaze. The image of the palace returns in a discussion of the powers that come to advanced Bodhisattvas in the eighth and ninth stages of the Bodhisattva path.

3.340 *saṃbuddhebhyo vibuddhebhyo jagaddhitavidhau paraḥ /*
pūjāṃ vidhatte bhaktyārdraḥ stutibhiḥ stauti cāsakṛt //

To bring benefit to the world, [the Bodhisattva] worships the perfectly enlightened and awakened Buddhas; weeping with devotion, he praises them continually with hymns.

3.341 *ratnacchattravitānādyair muktājālapariṣkṛtaiḥ /*
apramāṇaiḥ sphuradratnakiraṇāṅkuradanturaiḥ //

He worships them with enormous jewelled parasols and canopies, decorated with nets of pearls and sparkling with jewels, whose rays look like sprouts or teeth.

3.342 *ramyaharmojjvalastambhair muktāhāravilambibhiḥ /*
vicitrodāraratnaughaghaṭitaiś citrakarmabhiḥ //
3.343 *kūṭāgārair jvaladratnaprabhādīpaśatojvalaiḥ /*
abraṃlīhaiś ca kurvadbhiḥ svaprabhāśabalā diśaḥ //

And he worships them with palaces that have pleasant balconies and radiant pillars, that are hung with garlands of pearls, constructed from a mass of different jewels, and decorated with paintings. They shine with hundreds of lamps, whose light comes from radiant jewels; they are as high as the clouds and fill every direction with light.

Here the Bodhisattva's eyes are filled once again with tears, but this time the emotion is not compassion for the suffering of sentient beings; it is devotion (*bhakti*) to the Buddhas. And the palace is no longer a structure to climb or a dream from which to awake, but the active product of the Bodhisattva's own power to shape reality, to bring benefit to the world and pay homage the Buddhas. To take the image of vision and light to its final stage, Bhāviveka describes the moment when the Bodhisattva becomes a Buddha as an act of illumination:

3.346 *bhūtvā saṃbuddhasāvitro bhavyabuddhyambujākaram /*
bodhayaty uktikiraṇair amalair malahāribhiḥ //

[The Bodhisattva] becomes a perfect Buddha and opens the minds of fortunate beings with the pure, cleansing rays of his teaching, just as the sun brings a pond of lotuses to flower.

But here it is not the Bodhisattva who is illuminated; the Bodhisattva turns around and illuminates the world. The Bodhisattva's act of vision is not passive or receptive (and it certainly is not non-existent); it actively illuminates others, and it does so in what seems to be an act of synesthesia. The "rays of teaching" combine the imagery of two senses: the sense of hearing and the sense of sight. They also combine two means of valid knowledge: verbal testimony and perception. The result is an image of suppleness and power that transcends conventional categories and draws them into the salvific project of the Bodhisattva, a project that is as much oriented toward others as it is toward the Bodhisattva himself or herself.

When Bhāviveka objects to his opponents' "approach" (*nīti* or *naya*) and characterizes his opponents' position as a "view" (*darśana*), he clearly has something more in mind than a handful of tired metaphors. These terms function for him as building blocks in a systematic and coherent view of the world. As R. W. B. Lewis said about the image of the "American Adam" in American literature, they tell "a certain habitual

story, an assumed dramatic design for the representative life" (1955: 3). In other words, they function as a myth, not because they are in some way "false" (although Bhāviveka would be as critical of the literal application of these images as he would of any other conventional terminology), but because they provide an imaginative template to guide and interpret experience. In this respect, Bhāviveka's mythic vision of philosophy is not unlike Plato's well-known allegory of the cave in Book 7 of *The Republic*. Socrates begins that book by asking his listeners to "make an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind" (1991: 193). Then he creates a word-picture of human beings as prisoners who are shackled at the bottom of a cave, with their heads locked in place so that they can only see shadows projected on a screen in front of them. These shadows are cast by a fire at the mouth of the cave. Socrates goes on to explain that the purpose of philosophy, in a metaphorical sense, is to untie the shackles, compel the prisoners to turn around, and lead them out of the cave so that they can see the light. Eventually, Socrates says, the released prisoners will return to the cave to help others make the same journey into the light.

The similarites between Plato's image of philosophy and Bhāviveka's account of the philosopher's quest are striking, but so are their differences. Both involve an ascent from darkness to light and from images to reality, both use the sense of sight as a metaphor for knowledge, both treat the sun as the journey's goal, and both talk about the importance of returning into the darkness to lead others to the light. (Some have pointed out that the opening line of *The Republic* represents just this movement: "I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, son of Ariston, to pray to the goddess.") But the two journeys also seem to differ in fundamental ways. Plato emphasizes the elements of struggle and pain, especially when the prisoners are forced to turn around and adjust their eyes to the light. Painful transformations are not unknown in Buddhist tradition (as in Bhāviveka's image of wisdom as the hook that brings the mind under control), but Bhāviveka does not generally choose to stress them.[109] Perhaps the crucial transformation has already taken place before a scholar even starts the journey. There also is nothing in Plato that quite corresponds to the image of the Bodhisattva at the top of the mountain, who first sees reality as empty sky and then turns to weep for those who were left behind. And, while both journeys aim toward the sun, Plato does not suggest that the philosopher actually becomes the sun.

The most intriguing aspect of the comparison, however, has to do not with the myths themselves but with the way they come to life in particular discursive practices. Each *mythos* represents a distinctive *logos*, or rational principle, that guides philosophical practice. Socrates articulates the *logos* in Book 6 of *The Republic* when he gives his account of "the divided line" and charts the intellectual movement from the level of images to the level of the forms, passing through the levels of sensible things and mathematical objects. Each level is associated with a different kind of knowing: images with imagination, sensible things with trust, mathematicals with thought, and the forms with

intellection. Socrates's account of these levels is elliptical and difficult to interpret, but the structure of his cognitive system is clear, as is the significance of the "intellection" that gives access to the forms. In an exchange with Glaucon in Book 7, Socrates says: "isn't this at last the song itself that dialectic performs? It is in the realm of the intelligible, but it is imitated by the power of sight. . . . [W]hen a man tries by discussion—by means of argument without the use of any of the senses—to attain to each thing itself that is and doesn't give up before he grasps by intellection itself that which is good itself, he comes to the very end of the intelligible realm just as that other man was then at the end of the visible" (1991: 211). Dialectic, without the use of the senses, leads a person beyond appearances to the realm of reality. If Socrates could interrogate Bhāviveka the way he interrogates his companions in *The Republic*, his questions would have to do with precisely this cognitive process: How does a philosopher climb the ladder of reality? Does he use the senses, rational argument, or some other means of knowing, and what realities does he find? In what way are they real, and how are they known? Implicit in all these questions is a concern not only about a correct view of philosophy, but also about philosophical disagreement. Given this view of reality and the nature of knowledge, how do some thinkers seem to go wrong, and how can their errors be corrected? Bhāviveka did not answer these questions in a way that Socrates would find persuasive, but he would have recognized the cogency of the questions themselves. They were precisely the questions that drove his encounter with his philosophical opponents.

Bhāviveka's Dialectical Method

For many years Bhāviveka was best known among Buddhist scholars for a point of logical procedure—for holding what Edward Conze called the "well-nigh incredible thesis" that Mādhyamika philosophers should maintain valid, independent (*svatantra*) inferences (1967: 238-39). Bhāviveka thought that it was not enough to respond to opponents by pointing out their errors; he felt that he had an obligation to state Madhyamaka arguments as independent theses (*pratijñā*) and support them with valid reasons and examples.[110] In this way he differed sharply from the practice of his predecessor Buddhapālita. The first substantive verse of Nāgārjuna's MMK says: "Nothing arises from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all." Buddhapālita explains the first part of this verse as follows: "Nothing arises from itself, because its arising would be useless, and because it would lead to an absurd conclusion. There would be no point for things that already exist in their own right to arise again, and, if something arises after it already exists, it would never cease to arise."[111] Bhāviveka reformulates this argument as a positive assertion: "The internal sense media ultimately do not arise from themselves, because they already exist, like consciousness."[112] By making this logical transformation, Bhāviveka takes an argument that reduces the opponent's assertion to

an absurd conclusion (*prasaṅga*) and substitutes an independent (*svatantra*) inference, with a proper thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), and example (*dṛṣṭānta*).[113] From this change grew the well-known distinction between two kinds of Mādhyamikas: Prāsaṅgikas who reduce their opponents' positions to absurd conclusions, and Svātantrikas who formulate arguments in which they hold positions of their own.[114]

The most obvious problem with Bhāviveka's method is that it appears to contradict the words of Nāgārjuna himself. In *The Avoidance of Refutations* (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*), Nāgārjuna's most explicit account of his logical procedure, an opponent accuses Nāgārjuna, in effect, of having nothing to say: "If nothing has any identity of its own, then your statement must have no identity of its own, and it cannot deny that anything has any identity."[115] Nāgārjuna responds by conceding that his statement has no identity, but points out that it can still function to negate the identity of things, just as a cart or pot can carry wood or water, or a cloth can protect from cold and heat.[116] Then he makes a crucial statement: "If I had any thesis (*pratijñā*), this fault would apply to me, but I have no thesis, so this fault does not apply to me."[117] Taken literally, this statement leaves little room for Bhāviveka's claim that Mādhyamikas should construct valid, independent inferences. I will not attempt to give a full account of Bhāviveka's response to this problem, except to say that the form of his response mirrors Nāgārjuna's response to his critic in *The Avoidance of Refutations*.[118] Using the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths, he acknowledges that there ultimately can be no thesis, just as there ultimately can be no identity, but it is still possible to use words conventionally as if they were making assertions, just as a cart can carry wood, or a blanket can keep someone warm. This conventional possibility is enough for Bhāviveka to open the door to a Madhyamaka tradition of syllogistic reasoning.

It did not take long for Mādhyamikas to realize that this procedural dispute turned on a question about the status of conventional reality. If words could be used conventionally to construct meaningful arguments, what were the proper guidelines for their use and what kinds of objects could they "conventionally" designate? For that matter, what is conventional "reality"? Candrakīrti posed these questions in a very forceful way a century or so after Bhāviveka in his own commentary on Nāgārjuna's MMK, and these questions have echoed throughout the development of Tibetan Madhyamaka. A more important question for our purposes, however, is simply "why?" Why would Bhāviveka risk this kind of criticism by introducing a formal style of syllogistic reasoning into Madhyamaka tradition? One possible answer to this question comes from the stories Xuanzang told about the role of debate in sixth- and seventh-century India. For the Lokāyata to walk up to the gate at Nālandā, post a series of propositions, and demand a response, he would have to have a proposition. The same was true in the story of the young Dharmapāla. The debate began when the opponent stated his opening position. Dharmapāla showed his mastery by memorizing his opponent's position and reciting it back to him. To take part in these contests for intellectual status and worldly success (to

say nothing of engaging in debate as a quest for truth), a contestant had to deal in the currency of debate, and that currency involved propositions, reasons, and examples.

Another reason for Bhāviveka's choice comes from traditional Indian rules for debate. In a list of unacceptable forms of reasoning, the *Nyāya Sūtra*s include *vitaṇḍā*. The term *vitaṇḍā* is sometimes translated as "wrangling," but it has no obvious English equivalent. *Vitaṇḍā* is best understood instead through its definition: "that [form of unacceptable reasoning] that lacks the establishment of a counter-position is *vitaṇḍā*."[119] According to the *Nyāya Sūtra*s, debate follows a standard pattern. One person begins by stating a position (*pakṣa*) and supporting it with a proper inference. An opponent then contradicts this position by stating and defending a counter-position (*pratipakṣa*), which is defined as the attribution of a contradictory property to the same subject.[120] The debate consists of a conflict between these two positions, with both parties pointing out faults in the other's argument and defending their own positions against the opponent's critique. A *vaitaṇḍika* is someone who does nothing more than negate his opponent's position and does not establish a position of his own.

On the rare occasions when scholars of Buddhism have discussed the problem of *vitaṇḍā*, they have generally dismissed it as irrelevant to the study of Madhyamaka. Th. Stcherbatsky took Nāgārjuna's refusal to affirm a thesis as evidence that he intended to destroy logic: "For a certain class of Buddhists truth consists of the negation of logic. Truth according to the convention of these men will emerge from the destruction of all logic. The truth is the world of the mystic."[121] Kamaleswar Bhattacharya followed a different approach but reached a similar conclusion.[122] He argued that the *Nyāya Sūtra*s did not define *vitaṇḍā* as the lack of a counter-position but as the lack of the establishment of a counter-position. If the Mādhyamikas did not even have a position, how could they be accused of failing to establish one?

Evidently Bhāviveka had a different idea. In the commentary on MMK 18.9, Bhāviveka relates the problem of *vitaṇḍā* to the problem of defining ultimate reality: If ultimate reality (*tattva*) transcends all conceptual expression, is it enough for Buddhist thinkers simply to reject everyone else's definition of reality, or are they required to state a definition of their own? And if they are required to state a definition, what kind of definition should it be? Can a definition of something undefinable ever be useful or true? Bhāviveka deals with these questions in the following way:

> Some Buddhists, along with other opponents, raise the following objection: If you think that reality (*tattva*) can be known by completely rejecting the identity that others imagine, then you have to state its definition. If you do not, you reject your opponent's position without establishing one of your own, and you are guilty of *vitaṇḍā*.
>
> Reply: This is true. If the definition could be stated, we would state it,

> but it cannot be stated. However, to encourage those who are just beginning, we state [a definition] using conceptual, analytical cognition:
>
> [MMK 18.9] "Not known through anyone else, peaceful, not expressed by discursive ideas, non-conceptual, not diverse—this is the definition of reality."
>
> Here [reality] is not expressed by discursive ideas, because it is non-conceptual. Because it is not expressed by discursive ideas, it is peaceful. Because it is peaceful, it is accessible only to non-conceptual knowledge. Because it is accessible only to non-conceptual knowledge, it is not known through anyone else. In this way, the nature of reality completely transcends the application of words.
>
> However, even though [reality] cannot be expressed, statements that negate the identity and the specific attributes of all things help to produce, by not producing, the non-conceptual cognition that understands the nature of reality. [These statements] come from the application of syllables. So we describe reality with skillful means, even though it can only be known directly. In this way, we do state a definition. Since this is not *vitaṇḍā*, your criticism does not apply.[123]

Bhāviveka's strategy in this passage mirrors the two-part strategy in Nāgārjuna's response to his critic in *The Avoidance of Refutations*. He acknowledges that there cannot really be a definition of reality, but he says that words can still be used as if they were expressing a definition. He does not give a technical designation of these two approaches; all he says is that the second involves "skillful means" (*upāya*). But it would be clear to any Mādhyamika reader that they reflect Nāgārjuna's distinction between ultimate and conventional truth.[124]

Bhāviveka also discusses *vitaṇḍā* in his commentary on the first formal syllogism in MHK chapter 3. The verse reads:

> 3.26 *tatra bhūtasvabhāvaṃ hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ /*
> *kṛtakatvād yathā jñānaṃ hetumatvādito 'pi vā //*
>
> Here earth and so forth do not ultimately have the identity of the gross elements, because they are created and because they have a cause and so forth, like cognition.

An opponent suggests that Bhāviveka's argument is a form of *vitaṇḍā*, because he refutes his opponent's position without establishing a position of his own. Bhāviveka responds

by saying: "This is not *vitaṇḍā*. We have a position, which is emptiness of identity (*svabhāvaśūnyatvam*), and this is the nature of *dharma*s. In this way we establish that our position is free from fault."[125]

Reading these two passages side by side shows how seriously Bhāviveka took his responsibility as a logician. We do not know much about the way he lived. We do not know how much he was involved in debate. We do not know who his patrons were, when he won his greatest victories or suffered his most embarrassing defeats. But we can see from the innovations in his commentary on Nāgārjuna that he was committed to bringing Madhyamaka arguments into the mainstream of Indian debate. By formulating his "independent" syllogisms, he could post his own positions on the gate, figuratively or literally, alongside the positions of his competitors, and he could demand a response. This made him not only an innovator in Madhyamaka tradition but very much a man of his time.

The Standard Three-Part Syllogism

To follow the logic of Bhāviveka's arguments, the most important requirement is simply to understand the rules of the standard three-part syllogism as it was used by Bhāviveka and his contemporaries.[126] We already have seen an example of the standard syllogism in the argument that begins the analytical portion of MHK chapter 3:

> 3.26 *tatra bhūtasvabhāvaṃ hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ /*
> *kṛtakatvād yathā jñānaṃ hetumatvādito 'pi vā //*
>
> Earth and so forth do not ultimately have the identity of gross elements, because they are created and because they have a cause and so forth, like cognition.

In the terminology of Indian logic, "earth and so forth" constitute the "locus" (*pakṣa*) or "property-possessor" (*dharmin*) of the syllogism. "Do not ultimately have the identity of gross elements" constitutes the "inferred property" (*sādhyadharma*). When the "locus" is qualified by the "inferred property," it constitutes a "thesis" (*pratjñā*). Rather than using the Sanskrit terminology of "locus" and "inferred property," I will simplify the terminology and refer to the two parts of the thesis as "subject" and "predicate."[127] In Bhāviveka's syllogism, the terms "are created" and "have a cause" function as the "inferring properties" (*sādhanadharma*). The attribution of an "inferring property" to a subject constitutes a "reason" (*hetu*). "Like cognition" is the "example" (*dṛṣṭānta*). The "thesis," "reason," and "example" serve as the three members of a standard syllogism. In the notes to the translation and in the analysis that follows, I will list these three

members in the following way:

> [Thesis:] Earth and so forth do not ultimately have the identity of gross elements,
> [Reason:] because they are created and because they have a cause and so forth,
> [Example:] like cognition.

The first step in understanding Bhāviveka's arguments is simply to identify the separate parts of the syllogism. This alone is sufficient to clarify many of the apparent obscurities in the text. With the syllogism clearly in mind, the next step for the reader, as for Bhāviveka himself, is to examine the three parts of the argument for possible faults (*doṣa*). Faults can be found in any of the three parts of the syllogism. What follows is a brief summary of the standard faults as they appear in Bhāviveka's arguments against the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras.

The Contradicted or Faulty Thesis

In *The Introduction to Logic* (*Nyāyapraveśa*), a sixth-century guide to the standard syllogism, the author Śaṅkarasvāmin defines a thesis as "an accepted subject" (*prasiddha dharmin*) that is "qualified by an accepted qualifier" (*prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭa*). This definition makes it possible to attack a thesis directly, without reference to the other parts of the syllogism. If either the "subject" or "qualifier" (*viśeṣaṇa*) is not "accepted" (*prasiddha*), the thesis is contradicted (*viruddha*). Bhāviveka follows this approach in MHK 5.15 and the accompanying commentary, in his response to the following Yogācāra syllogism:

> A non-conceptual cognition of material form is false,
> because it has the image of an object,
> like the cognition of a double moon.

He begins by criticizing the reason (on grounds that will be considered shortly), then he criticizes the thesis directly:

> Here the thesis is "a cognition of material form is false," but how can a cognition of material form in this context be false? The falsehood of a cognition of material form is contradicted by perception (*pratyakṣa*), tradition (*āgama*), and common sense (*lokaprasiddha*).

Here Bhāviveka is saying that "falsehood" is not "an accepted qualifier" of the subject, which is "a cognition of material form." If the subject is not qualified by an accepted qualifier, then the thesis itself is contradicted. To give a complete argument, Bhāviveka

would need to explain why the opponent's qualifier ("falsehood") is contradicted by perception, tradition, and common sense, as he does later in the text when he gives his own account of the cognition of external objects. But the point is sufficiently obvious at this stage in the argument to stand without further explanation. Bhāviveka is saying, in effect, that perception, tradition, and common sense all presuppose that at least some cognitions of material form are true.

THE THREE REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID REASON

According to Śaṅkarasvāmin, a valid "reason" (*hetu*) has to satisfy three requirements: (1) the "inferring property" (*sādhanadharma*) has to be present in the subject of the syllogism, (2) it has to be present in another subject that possesses the inferred property (*sādhyadharma*), (3) and it has to be absent in any subject that does not possess the inferred property. (In the logical shorthand of this tradition, a "subject that possesses the inferred property" is called a *sapakṣa* or "similar locus," and a "subject that does not possess the inferred property" is called a *vipakṣa* or "dissimilar locus.") As the logical tradition unfolded after Dignāga and Bhāviveka, it became clear that the second of these three requirements was considerably less important than the third.[128] Bhāviveka observed the need to present a positive example in support of his arguments (to satisfy requirement 2), but the most decisive way to defeat an opponent's syllogism was to show that it did not satisfy requirement 3. A debater could do this by citing an example in which the inferring property is present but the inferred property is not. For example, in the standard illustration of an Indian syllogism, "There is fire on the mountain, because there is smoke on the mountain, as in a kitchen," a debater may be able to cite any number of examples of places where fire is associated with smoke and not decisively prove the argument, but if he can cite even a single counter-example, where smoke is present but fire is not, the syllogism fails. In his attack on opponents' reasons, Bhāviveka generally focuses on requirements 1 and 3.

THE UNACCEPTED REASON

One of the most common ways for Bhāviveka to attack an opponent's reason is to say that the reason is "unaccepted" or "unestablished" (*asiddha*). This amounts to a claim that the opponent violates requirement 1, the requirement that "the inferring property be present in the subject." In the context of an actual debate, the word *asiddha* has useful ambiguity. In a strong sense, it can mean that the presence of the inferred property is "unproven" or "unestablished," but in the process of an actual debate, the word can mean simply that the presence of the inferred property is "not accepted" by one or both of the parties in the argument. When Bhāviveka raises this objection, he usually means that he does not accept the presence of the inferring property in the subject. But he often goes on to support this claim with a valid syllogism, in which he shows that the presence of the inferring property is not established in the subject. He follows this

procedure in verses 5.33-35, as part of his argument against the Yogācāra interpretation of mind-only (*cittamātra*). Verse 5.33 states a Yogācāra syllogism:

> The form of many atoms is not the object of the mind,
> Because it is not substantially real,
> like a double moon.

In verse 5.35 and in the commentary, Bhāviveka explains that he does not accept the Yogācāra reason:

> When the opponent takes the material form of a combination of homogeneous (*tulyajātīya*) atoms as the subject and gives "not substantially real" as the reason, the reason is not accepted by one of the parties to the argument (*anyatarāsiddha*). Why? [We] think that [a combination of homogeneous atoms] is the object when [atoms] are combined or associated with the material forms of other, homogeneous atoms.

This can only mean that Bhāviveka thinks that "the form of many atoms" (the subject of the syllogism) is not "not substantially real" (the inferring property). At first this sounds like an odd position. It is virtually axiomatic for Buddhists to say that combinations like "the form of many atoms" cannot be real. But Bhāviveka explains that he is thinking of "the form of many atoms" in only a relative sense: "We think that a combination of similar atoms, such as a pot, is real in a relative sense (*sāṃvṛta*)." In other words, Bhāviveka does not accept that "not substantially real" is a property of "the form of many atoms." By making this claim, Bhāviveka opens up one of the most intriguing sections of the text. To back it up, he has to show how "the form of many atoms" can function as an object of the mind in a relative sense. This is a major challenge, with enormous consequences for the development of Madhyamaka in India and Tibet.[129] But the argument starts in a simple, almost disarming way. It is as if Bhāviveka the debater simply raised his hand and and told his Yogācāra opponent: "Stop! I don't accept that reason."

The Inconclusive Reason

To satisfy requirements 2 and 3 of a valid reason, the "inferring property" has to be present in the *sapakṣa* (a subject that possesses the "inferred property") and absent in the *vipakṣa* (a subject that does not possess the "inferred property"). When the "inferring property" is present in some of the *sapakṣa* and some of the *vipakṣa*, the reason is "inconclusive" (*anaikāntika*).[130] Bhāviveka again provides a useful illustration. In verse 5.27, as part of the argument against the Yogācāra understanding of mind-only, Bhāviveka considers the following Yogācāra syllogism:

> External objects have the nature of mind,
> because they are objects of cognition,
> like an immediately preceding condition.

In verse 5.28, he argues that the reason ("because they are objects of cognition") is inconclusive. "Being an object of cognition" may mean that something has "the nature of mind," or it may mean that it does not. According to traditional *dharma*-theory, an immediately preceding condition can be either the mind itself (*citta*) or a mental phenomenon (*caitta*).[131] This definition makes the reason ambiguous. To be "an object of cognition like an immediately preceding cognition" can mean that something is the mind, or it can mean that it is a mental phenomenon. Obviously the opponent needs to limit the scope of the reason and example to make the syllogism persuasive, if it can be made persuasive at all. In the meantime Bhāviveka has gained at least a temporary advantage in the argument.

The Contradicted Reason

The "inferring property" is considered "contradicted" (*viruddha*) if it proves the opposite of either the "inferred property," the "subject," or some aspect of the subject. A good illustration of this fault occurs in Bhāviveka's response to the Yogācāra argument for the falsehood of a cognition of material form:

> A non-conceptual cognition of material form is false,
> because it has the image of an object,
> like the cognition of a double moon.

We saw earlier that Bhāviveka considered the thesis in this syllogism to be "unaccepted." The verse and commentary show that he also considered the reason to be "contradicted."

> [Verse 5.15] If [the opponent takes the position that] a cognition of material form is false because it has the image of an object, the reason is mistaken, and the thesis fails.
>
> [Commentary:] "Mistaken"[132] means contradicted (*viruddha*). A cognition of material form cannot have any other nature than to have the image of an object. To infer that "having the image of an object" excludes "truthfulness" is contradictory, because it proves the opposite of the nature of the subject.

A more obscure example of a contradicted reason is found in Bhāviveka's discussion of "dependent identity" (*paratantrasvabhāva*) in verses 5.69-71. The argument begins

with the Yogācāra claim that "imagined (*parikalpita*) things do not exist, but dependent (*paratantra*) things do exist." Bhāviveka anticipates that the objector will support this claim in the following way:

> Things are empty,
> because they are empty of the identity attributed to them by words.

He interprets this reason to mean that "things" (*bhāva*) are <u>only</u> empty of the identity attributed to them by words but not empty in and of themselves. By "thing" he would have in mind something like Dignāga's concept of a "unique particular" (*svalakṣaṇa*).[133] Bhāviveka responds to this Yogācāra claim by saying that the reason is contradicted. Why? If something is "empty of the identity attributed to it by words," then it cannot function as the subject of a syllogism. In other words, the reason proves the opposite of an aspect of the subject.

Faults of the Example

When Bhāviveka objects to an opponent's example, the objections are often closely related to problems in the reason. If the example fails to show that the "inferring property" is present in the *sapakṣa* and absent in the *vipakṣa*, it undermines the validity of the reason itself. A good illustration of this fault is the first Yogācāra argument in favor of mind-only:

> A cognition of material form and so forth has no object,
> because it arises with that kind of image,
> like the cognition of material form and so forth in a dream.

The reason in this syllogism is obscure, but it can be clarified by comparing Bhāviveka's version of the syllogism to its source in verses 1-3 of Vasubandhu's *Twenty Verses* (*Viṃśatikā*): "because it arises with that kind of image" means that it "arises with the image of unreal objects." With this clarification, we can restate the Yogācāra argument in the following form:

> A cognition of material form and so forth has no object,
> because it arises with the image of unreal objects,
> like the cognition of material form and so forth in a dream.

Bhāviveka objects to this syllogism by attacking the example; he argues that dreams often are based on objects that have been seen before, when the dreamers were awake, so it is not true to say that dreams always have unreal objects:

> Dream-consciousness and so forth have objects, because they repeat [objects] that have been seen before, like memory. The traces of things that were seen in previous lives cause a variety of material forms to appear in dreams, with different colors and shapes, even for those who are blind and have lost the use of their eyes. Objects are not absent even in such cognitions. For it is said, "O Bhadrapāla, a blind man sees material form in a dream with his mind's eye; he does not see with physical eyes." Because the mind's eye has a *dharma* as its object, dream-consciousness, and so forth, have objects. Therefore, your argument (*sādhana*) suffers the fault of having no example.

Since the "inferring property" is "arise with the image of unreal objects," this passage could be translated: "For your inferring [property], there is the fault of there being no example." Either way, a flaw in the example points to a flaw in the reason.

A Series of Linked Syllogisms

There is very little about Bhāviveka's use of the standard syllogism that could not be recreated from well-known manuals like Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Introduction to Logic*. But there are surprisingly few accounts in Indian literature about what actually took place when debaters put these rules into play in confrontations with their opponents. In spite of all that has been written about Indian philosophical debates, including Xuanzang's stories and reminiscences, we know very little about what debaters actually said. Simply to leap from the theory of debate to its practice is tempting, but it also is problematic.[134] It would be like assuming that *Robert's Rules of Order* give an accurate account of debate in the houses of Congress. It is not that the rules are irrelevant, but there is much more to the practice of debate than rules for motions, amendments, and votes. One of the many reasons Bhāviveka's text is so valuable is that it takes at least a modest step toward bridging this gap between theory and practice. Bhāviveka does not give us the transcript of an actual debate. He does not say that on such and such an occasion an opponent made the following argument, and that the master responded by pointing out the following errors. But his text does read as if it were preparing a student to confront an actual opponent. First, the opponent presents a syllogism, and Bhāviveka criticizes its errors. Then Bhāviveka presents a syllogism of his own and defends it against the opponent's criticism. In the give and take of argument and counter-argument, we get a picture of how debaters could use the rules of the syllogism to gain victory over their opponents. An example from the chapter on the Śrāvakas will show how this might be true.

Bhāviveka begins the chapter with a simple statement: "The purpose of this chapter is to prove that the Mahāyāna is the teaching of the Buddha." The Śrāvakas' objections

move briefly in other directions, but eventually they come back to this fundamental problem of authenticity. To start the attack, the Śrāvakas formulate the following syllogism:

> 4.7 *na buddhoktir mahāyānaṃ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt /*
> *mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanam //*
>
> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, or because it teaches another path, like the Vedānta view.

Bhāviveka does not respond by pointing out the opponent's errors, as he often does, but immediately states his own counter-position:

> 4.34 *mahāyānaṃ ca no bauddhaṃ nairātmyādiprakāśanāt /*
> *ratnatritayamāhātmyaprathanāc chiṣyayānavat //*
>
> According to us, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's, because it shows that there is no self and so forth, and because it teaches the greatness of the three jewels, like the Śrāvakayāna.

This verse constitutes a contradiction of the opponent's thesis. Rather than merely asserting the contradiction, he supports it with a counter-argument. Once he has given his own position, he gets down to the business of criticizing his opponent's reason ("because it is not included in the the Sūtrāntas and so forth"):

> 4.35 *pratitarkeṇa bādhato hetoś ca syād asiddhatā /*
> *mahāyānoktasatyādisaṃgrahād vinayādiṣu //*
>
> And the reason is not accepted, because it is contradicted by a counter-argument, because the teachings of the Mahāyāna, beginning with the [four] truths, are included in the Vinaya and so forth.

At this point, the burden of the argument shifts to the commentary, where Bhāviveka offers a series of reasons to question the relationship between the opponent's reason ("because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth") and thesis ("the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching"). One reason is that the canonical texts of the eighteen schools contradict one another. Another is that the canonical texts of different schools contain references to teachings of the Buddha that were delivered during his lifetime but were not included in the different versions of the canon. All these arguments show that the opponent's reason is inconclusive, since it is possible for something to be accepted as

the Buddha's teaching and not be included in one of the canonical collections.

Verses 4.36-55 respond to the opponent's second reason, concluding with the following argument:

4.55 *ayam eva yato mārgaḥ samyagdṛṣṭipuraḥsaraḥ /*
mahāyāne 'pi nirdiṣtas tasmād dhetor asiddhatā //

The Mahāyāna teaches the very same path, beginning with right vision, so the reason is unaccepted.

Then Bhāviveka finishes his response to the opponent's initial syllogism with a critique of the example:

4.56 *vedānte ca hi yat sūktaṃ tat sarvaṃ buddhabhāṣitam /*
dṛṣṭāntanyūnatā tasmāt saṃdigdhaṃ vā parīkṣyatām //

Everything that is well spoken in the Vedānta is taught by the Buddha. Therefore, either the example is deficient or one should analyze its ambiguity.

As is true with many of the earlier verses, this gives rise to an interesting exchange in the commentary about the ambiguity of the word "Vedānta." The opponent argues that the example refers to the parts of the Veda that clearly contradict the teaching of the Buddha. Bhāviveka replies that the Mahāyāna has no such teachings, so the example fails to establish a relationship between the thesis and the reason.

Would an actual debate have followed this pattern? We have no way of knowing. With all of the digressions and the twists and turns in the argument, it is clear that a debater could have entered the dispute at just about any point, concentrating, perhaps, on the example or on the second of the two reasons before turning to the first. But Bhāviveka has given us a clear picture not only of how a debater might have worked methodically through an analysis of his opponent's syllogism, but also how a student might build up a battery of arguments to respond to the thrusts and counter-thrusts of an opponent. In this respect, the text comes much closer to real debate than the rules of a logical manual.

The text comes closer in a second respect as well. In his account of the debating practices in Tibetan monasteries, Georges B. J. Dreyfus comments on the psychological pressure when a defender is slow to answer a question or finds the flow of debate turning against him (2003: 257-59). It is easy for a debater to be rattled, to get angry, or to grope for the right words. Victory might not necessarily go to the person who has memorized the most effective arguments, but to the person who can come up with a sharp rejoinder or a clever comparison to mock the opponent and put him on the

defensive. Along with his systematic analysis of syllogisms, Bhāviveka gives us a taste of the rhetorical tricks a debater could use to make the opponent angry or break his concentration. Bhāviveka starts the chapter on the Śrāvakas with a slighting reference to the "inferior aspirations" (*hīnādhimukti*) of his opponents, echoing the distinction between the "inferior vehicle" of the Śrāvakas and the "great vehicle" of the Mahāyāna. In verse 4.11, the Śrāvaka objector calls the Mahāyānists "clowns" (*vidūṣaka*) for saying that the qualifier "in reality" frees them from a particularly egregious fault. If the Mahāyāna argument is correct, the Śrāvaka says, then it would be correct "in reality" to say that a man can have sex with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another woman. Bhāviveka has a sharp rejoinder in verse 4.65: "If you want to refute us, you have to prove that there ultimately can be sex with a woman who is permissible for sex," and so on. At the beginning of the Yogācāra chapter, Bhāviveka refers to his opponents as "scholars" (*dhīra*) who are "proud of their approach" (*svanītāv abhimāninaḥ*). The pride of the Yogācāra seems to have become proverbial, at least for Haribhadra, who begins the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* with a reference to Vasubandhu as "elevated" (we might say "puffed up") with "pride in his knowledge."[135] In verse 5.54, Bhāviveka responds to a Yogācāra claim that a person should use the concept of mind-only to remove the idea of external objects, then use the concept again to remove the idea of a separate subject. Bhāviveka responds with a clever proverb about "washing away mud,"[136] saying that the opponent would be better off seeking the truth from the very beginning, rather than covering himself with mud and then washing it away. In 5.82-83, near the end of the section on "dependent identity," Bhāviveka quotes a passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that accuses an unidentified "nihilist" (*nāstika*) of going straight to hell and taking others with him. Bhāviveka takes this passage to be a reference to the Mādhyamikas, and he throws it back in the Yogācāras' face, saying: "These angry words are like vomit: they show undigested pride." This line picks up the reference to the Yogācāras' pride at the start of the chapter and turns it into an insult that seems crude and at the same time unusually apt. What better way to mock a defeated opponent than to compare his arguments to vomit? It seems that there was more to the rhetorical give and take of these debates than the mere analysis of a string of syllogisms.

The Argument

Bhāviveka's Buddhist Opponents

Once all of this has been said—once we have a sense of who Bhāviveka was, what works can be reliably attributed to him, and how he formed his arguments—who were his Buddhist opponents, and what were the issues that seemed to divide them?

The title of chapter 4 identifies the opponents as "Śrāvakas," a word that often is translated as "disciples" or "listeners," or simply left untranslated. The term "Śrāvaka" is often used in Mahāyāna texts to refer to the adherents of the first of three different "vehicles" (*yāna*): the Śrāvakayāna, the Pratyekabuddhayāna, and the Mahāyāna. In the verses and commentary of chapter 4, Bhāviveka treats the term as sufficiently self-evident to use it not only in his own account of the opponents' position, but in the Śrāvakas' own designation of themselves (as in the commentary on verse 4.4). The term takes on greater historical specificity as the chapter unfolds, when Bhāviveka associates the Śrāvakas not only with a series of doctrinal arguments against the Mahāyāna, but with a particular view of the contents of the Buddhist canon and with the division of the Buddhist community into a series of eighteen schools (*nikāya*). These points emerge in Bhāviveka's discussion of a series of reasons, two of which have already been mentioned:

4.7 *na buddhoktir mahāyānaṃ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt /*
mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanam //
4.8 *phalahetvapavādād vā yathā nāstikadarśanam /*
aṣṭādaśanikāyāntarbhāvābhāvān na niścitam //

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth or because it teaches another path, like the Vedānta view (*vedāntadarśana*), or because it repudiates cause and effect, like a nihilistic view (*nāstikadarśana*). The point is clinched because it is not included in the eighteen schools.

The Śrāvakas who emerge from these objections, and from Bhāviveka's response, are much more than a textual stereotype. Each *nikāya* or "school" has its own distinctive approach to key issues of doctrine or discipline, each has its own history, and each has its own distinctive body of canonical literature. The commentary on verse 4.8 contains Bhāvaviveka's well-known "Explanation of the Divisions of Schools" (*nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*), one of the most important sources for the history of sectarian movements in Indian Buddhism,[137] and Bhāviveka's response to the argument that the Mahāyāna is "not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth" (in verse 4.35 and the following commentary) explores the content of different canonical collections. Bhāviveka begins by arguing that the teachings of the Mahāyāna are found in the canonical collections of the *nikāya*s. In strictly logical terms, this amounts to a claim that the reason is "unaccepted"; Bhāviveka does not accept that the "inferring property" ("not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth") is not a property of the "subject" ("the Mahāyāna"). Bhāviveka then argues that the reason is "inconclusive." To do this, he has to show that it is possible for a text to be "the Buddha's teaching" and "not be included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth." This argument has important implications for

our understanding of the integrity of Buddhist canonical collections. In a passage that he appears to borrow from Vasubandhu's *Logic of Explanation* (*Vyākhyāyukti*), Bhāviveka points out that some canonical texts refer to teachings of the Buddha that were not transmitted in any of the existing canonical collections. He goes on to argue that the canonical texts of different schools contradict one another, so that the teachings that are accepted as authentic by some schools are rejected by others. All of this shows that the Śrāvakas themselves acknowledge greater diversity in the Buddha's teaching than is found in any particular canonical collection. In a wider sense, it shows that the Śrāvakas were a far more varied group than we now can observe with the paucity of our sources.

The term "Yogācāra" in the title of chapter 5 presents a different set of historical issues. In a generic sense, the word can be used to refer simply to a "practitioner of discipline," as in a passage from the *Brahmaparipṛcchā Sūtra* quoted by Bhāviveka in *The Lamp of Wisdom*: "O Blessed One, a practitioner of discipline who has perfect understanding does not cause the arising or cessation of any *dharma*, does not seek to attain any *dharma*, and does not seek understanding."[138] Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Bodhisattva practice as a form of yoga ("discipline") and to Bodhisattvas themselves as yogins ("practitioners of discipline"), as in the commentary on MHK 3.292. This usage follows the standard terminology of the Perfection of Wisdom literature[139] and is mirrored in other important Madhyamaka works, such as Āryadeva's F*our Hundred Verses* (*Catuḥśataka*), whose long title in the Tibetan edition is *Bodhisattva-yogacaryā-śāstra-catuḥśataka-kārikā* (*Four Hundred Verses on the Bodhisattva's Practice of Discipline*).[140] It is clear, however, that the Yogācāra who is named in the title of chapter 5 is not just a generic "practitioner of discipline" but the adherent of a rival tradition, as the Śrāvaka is in chapter 4. Bhāviveka makes this point explicit in the commentary on 5.1, when he identifies the Yogācāras as "Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth." Judging from Bhāviveka's arguments about "mind-only" in verses 5.17-54 and his response to the concept of "exclusion-by-the-other" (*anyāpoha*) in verses 5.60-68, it is clear that Bhāviveka also thought of Dignāga as a Yogācāra. He mentions Dignāga's *Investigation of the Object* (*Ālambanaparīkṣā*) by name in the commentary on 5.39.

There is no scholarly consensus about why Bhāviveka used the word "Yogācāra" to name this particular group of Mahāyāna opponents. The old idea that the Yogācāra tradition was known for its distinctive practice of yoga now has to be discarded. The practice of yoga belonged as much to the Madhyamaka tradition as it did to the Yogācara. For that matter, it belonged as much to Indian religion in general as it did to any particular branch of Buddhist thought. A more likely explanation is that Bhāviveka took the word from the title of Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Stages in the Practice of Yoga*). We know from Huili's biography of Xuanzang that the *Yogācārabhūmi* served as the defining text for Xuanzang's own scholarly identity. Huili tells us that Xuanzang undertook his journey to India specifically to study the *Yogācārabhūmi*, so that he could cut through the sectarian differences that plagued Buddhist teachers in China.[141] When he

finally arrived at Nālandā monastery and was ushered into the presence of the master Śīlabhadra, Xuanzang introduced himself by saying that he had come from China in order to study the *Yogācārabhūmi* under the guidance of a teacher. If we understand the word "Yogācāra" this way, it would refer first to a text, then to the teaching derived from the text and to the scholars who represent that teaching. As the designation of a teaching, it would be similar to Bhartṛhari's word *āgamadarśana* (a "tradition-view"). As the name of a group of scholars, it would be similar to two other Buddhist terms: Vaibhāṣika, which names the scholars who base their teaching on the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and Sautrāntika, which names the scholars who base their teaching on the *Sutrānta*. It is useful to note that Bhāviveka took a similar position about the meaning of the term *madhyamaka* in his commentary on the last verse of the MHK ("This completes the concise heart of the Madhyamaka: for scholars it is a mirror to reflect the meaning of many sūtras"). Bhāviveka explains that the suffix "*ka*" refers to "the act (or means) of teaching and proclaiming the middle path." Then he goes on to say that the word *madhyamaka* can refer to either the "Madhyamaka text" (*madhyamakaśāstra*) or the "Madhyamaka system" (*madhyamakasiddhānta*).[142]

There has been a great deal of discussion about whether it is accurate to call rival text-traditions like the Madhyamaka and Yogācara "schools" in a formal sense. Stanley Weinstein has pointed out that in China full-fledged Buddhist schools only emerged during the latter half of the Tang Dynasty (1993: 485). T. Griffith Foulk has argued that the term "school" should only be used to designate a movement or group "united in a self-conscious manner by a common set of beliefs, practices, and/or social structure" (1992: 18-31). Bhāviveka clearly thought that the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra text-traditions were separated by self-conscious sets of beliefs. To what extent these beliefs were accompanied by differences in practice or social structure is difficult to determine, but there are suggestions in the text that point toward significant institutional divisions. In verses 5.82-83ab, Bhāviveka quotes a passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (a portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*) and takes it to be a critical reference to the Madhyamaka. The passage reads like this:

> When some people hear the difficult and profound Mahāyāna sūtras that deal with emptiness and convey a meaning that needs to be interpreted, they do not discern the correct meaning, they develop false concepts, they have unreasonable views based only on logic (*tarka*), and they say: "All of reality is nothing but a designation; whoever sees it this way, sees correctly." For these people there is no real thing to serve as the basis of designation. This means that there cannot be any designation at all. How can reality be nothing but designation? By saying this they deny both designation and reality. Someone who denies designation and reality should be known as the worst kind of nihilist (*nāstika*). Those who are wise and practice a religious life should not

speak or share living quarters with this kind of nihilist. He causes himself to fall, and those who agree with his false views fall as well.[143]

If the word "nihilist" is meant to include Mādhyamikas, as Bhāviveka thought, this passage means not only that the Yogācāras (who are affiliated with the text-tradition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*) disagree with the Mādhyamikas; they should not speak with them or share living quarters. How this prohibition played out in practice in Bhāviveka's lifetime, we do not know. But the passage suggests that the intellectual rivalry was accompanied by a significant institutional rivalry. Xuanzang's narrative confirms that these two text-traditions were rivals, and Bhāviveka's argument assumes it. This rivalry continued to generate important philosophical controversies in India and later in Tibet, where Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra was a key source of the doctrinal differences that José Ignacio Cabezón has aptly called the "scholia" of Tibetan scholasticism (1994).

Some have argued that Bhāviveka not only chronicled the dispute between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra but also created it. This point goes back at least as far as Tāranātha, who said (in a passage quoted earlier) that, before Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka, "all adherents of the Mahāyāna remained under the same teaching." It was only after the death of Bhāviveka that "the adherents of the Mahāyāna divided into two schools (*sde*) and began to debate." Bhāviveka's chapter on the Yogācāras shows that he understood the situation quite differently. In the opening verse and in the following commentary, Bhāviveka says that "other scholars," beginning with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, have claimed that their approach is superior to the approach of the Mādhyamikas. The Yogācāra claim of superiority is expressed even more sharply in the last verse of the Yogācāra objection:

5.7 *prajñāpāramitānītir iyaṃ sarvajñatāptaye /*
na tūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhaparāyaṇā //

This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is [the means] to attain omniscience; the approach that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not.

The commentary on this verse makes clear who follows these two approaches:

This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom—namely the one that we [the Yogācāras] present—is the means to attain omniscience. The approach that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation—namely the approach of the Mādhyamikas (*madhyamavādin*)—is tantamount to nihilism (*nāstikadṛṣṭi*) and is not the means to attain omniscience.

In verses 5.82-83, Bhāviveka connects this accusation of nihilism to the passage just quoted from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. From these verses and their surrounding commentary, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Bhāviveka himself attributed responsibility for the dispute to the Yogācāras themselves. They were the ones who defended the approach of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, along with its accusation of nihilism. All he was doing was defending his own text-tradition against its critics.

When two traditions are as close as the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, it is tempting to minimize or overlook the differences. But it is often the "proximate others" or the near neighbors who pose the problem of difference in its most acute and troubling form. They challenge a person or group not just to identify what sets the other apart, but to look in the mirror and identify what it is that makes them themselves. In other words, they pose the question of identity. If the language of "identity" or "selfhood" seems strange to Buddhist ears (after all, "selfhood" is precisely what others have and Buddhists do not), it is this strangeness that gives the differences among Buddhist philosophers their intellectual edge. Jonathan Z. Smith has said that difference or otherness "becomes most problematic when it is TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US or when it claims to BE-US" (2004: 245). In the case of these two kindred Mahāyāna traditions, the problem of difference is only sharpened by the fact that Mahāyāna philosophy has to do with the absence of identity—in things, in selves, in others, and, for that matter, even in traditions and schools.

What is it, then, that made these two TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US traditions so different? Bhāviveka has a great deal to say about the signature doctrines of the Yogācāra, including "mind-only" (*cittamātra*) and the "three identities" (*trisvabhāva*), but the core of the dispute mirrors his dispute with the Śrāvakas: it has to do with scripture. The problem is not whether the Mahāyāna sūtras are authentic. About this the Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras agreed. The problem is that the Yogācāras made an exclusive claim about their approach to scripture: "This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is the means to attain omniscience; the approach that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not."[144] Examples of this kind of exclusive claim are rare in Yogācāra sources, but they are not unknown. One clear example is found in Dignāga's *Epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom* (*prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*), verses 27-29: "The teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom is based on three [identities]: imagined, dependent, and absolute. The words 'do not exist' rule out everything that is imagined. Examples such as illusion (*māyā*) teach dependent [identity]. The fourfold purification teaches absolute [identity]. The Buddha has no other teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom." The key words here are *nānyā buddhasya deśanā*: "the Buddha has no other teaching." It is possible that more examples of this exclusive claim would be forthcoming if we could examine the commentaries on the Perfection of Wisdom by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Haribhadra refers to these commentaries in the introduction to his *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, but neither of them survives in their Sanskrit original or in Chinese or Tibetan translation.[145]

Dignāga's verses not only offer an exclusive interpretation of the Perfection of

Wisdom, they also give us an intellectual framework to understand what the interpretation is about. The Yogācāras interpret the Perfection of Wisdom through a doctrine of "three identities" (*trisvabhāva*). While Dignāga does not mention the corresponding Madhyamaka, his readers would know that the "three identities" do the same philosophical work for the Yogācāra that "two truths" (*satyadvaya*) do for the Madhyamaka. At its most basic level, the dispute between these two traditions (as it was formulated in the sixth century) can be understood as a conflict between these two interpretive principles: the Yogācāra doctrine of "three natures" versus the Madhyamaka doctrine of "two truths."

Nāgarjuna once said: "Buddhas teach the Dharma based on two truths: mundane relative truth and ultimate truth. Anyone who misunderstands the distinction between these two truths misunderstands the profound point in the Buddhas' teaching."[146] These two verses have provoked an ocean of commentary and no small amount of misunderstanding. Without getting into the technical details of the two truths, perhaps it is enough to say that Mādhyamikas like Bhāviveka approach the world from two different perspectives. From a conventional or "relative" (*saṃvṛti*) perspective, they accept things as they are designated in ordinary speech and appear in ordinary experience. From an ultimate (*paramārtha*) perspective, they look closely at these things and discover that they have no identity in and of themselves. The two truths together constitute a "middle path" (*madhyamā pratipad*), in the sense that these two perspectives make it possible to say that things both are and are not. From a conventional perspective, the contents of ordinary experience (and the experiences themselves) are; from an ultimate perspective, they are not. In this way, the middle path avoids two extremes: the extreme of "improper denial" (*apavāda*) and the extreme of "improper reification" (*samāropa*). To "deny" something in the technical sense is to deny that it has any reality or moral significance at all. In effect, it is a kind of nihilism. To "reify" something is to atribute so much reality to it that one cannot be free from it. "Reification" functions, in effect, as a kind of fatalism. While these two extremes have to do initially with the reality of things, their greatest significance comes in the realm of ethical practice. To take the requirements of the path seriously, it is important to understand that the things a person does today will have serious consequences tomorrow, as Bhāviveka himself explained: "Someone who is in the habit of denying cause and effect pulls up beneficial roots, enters evil paths, and rejects conventional reality itself. Mādhyamikas do not deny cause and effect, which is like magic or a mirage, and they do not enter evil paths."[147] On the other side, it is important to understand that a person is not bound by the past; a person can change and become something new. These two modes of understanding constitute the middle path. In fact, it would reflect Bhāviveka's approach more accurately to take the word *pratipad* not as "path" but as "way of understanding" (as in Bhāviveka's verse 5.9) and interpret the "middle path" as a balanced way of understanding oneself and one's place in the world.

The Yogācāra approaches the same intellectual problems from a very different

angle. The Chinese monk, traveller, and translator Yijing explained the difference like this: "For Yogācāra the real exists, but the conventional does not exist; and [Yogācāra] takes the three identities as foundational. For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist; and actually the two truths are primary."[148] The difference between the two traditions is more complicated than this, but just barely. The symmetry of the Yogācāra position is evident in the first few verses of *The Distinction between the Middle and the Extremes* (*Madhyāntavibhāga*), a Yogācāra text attributed to Maitreya and transmitted by Asaṅga:

abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate /
śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate //
na śūnyaṃ cāśūnyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate /
sattvād asattvāt sattvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā //

> The imagination of what is unreal exists. Duality does not exist in it, but emptiness does exist in it, and it exists in emptiness.
> This is why it is said that nothing is empty and nothing is non-empty, because of the existence [of the imagination], the non-existence [of duality], and the existence [of emptiness]. This is the middle path.

The categories mentioned in these two verses can be aligned with the three identities in the following way:

duality	imagined identity	does not exist
imagination	dependent identity	exists
emptiness	absolute identity	exists

In later verses, the text complicates the picture slightly by equating the imagination (*parikalpa*) with consciousness (*vijñāna*) and asserting that consciousness both exists and does not exist. This means that it does not exist as it appears, but it is not entirely non-existent, since it arises in the form of deluded awareness.[149] To use a comparison that is common in other Yogācāra texts, consciousness arises like a dream. The objects seen in a dream are not real, but no one can reasonably doubt the dreaming of the dream itself.

This addition changes the Yogācāra picture of reality in a modest but significant way:

duality	imagined identity	does not exist
imagination	dependent identity	exists and does not exist
emptiness	absolute identity	exists

According to this picture, dependent identity (or consciousness) is a direct expression of

the middle path. From one point of view it is, and from another point of view it is not. As was true with the Mādhyamikas, this view of the middle path is directly related to the concerns of Buddhist practice. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* makes this point with cryptic precision: "We think that liberation comes from its destruction" (*tatkṣayān muktir iṣyate*)." In his commentary, Vasubandhu draws out the implications: "Why do we not think that this deluded awareness (*bhrānti*) is non-existent? Because 'we think that liberation comes from its destruction.' Otherwise there would be no bondage and no liberation, and, in that case, there would be the fault of denying (*apavāda*) defilement and purification." Here "deluded awareness" is another word for the imaginative capacity of consciousness. In his subcommentary on this passage, Sthiramati adds further explanation by saying that if deluded awareness exists ultimately, defilement must be permanent, and if deluded awareness does not exist at all, there can be no purification. In both cases, there would be no point in making any effort to achieve liberation.[150] These two problems correspond to the fatalism and nihilism that concerned the Mādhyamikas, but the Yogācāra response turns the response of the Madhyamaka upside down. Instead of affirming things conventionally and denying them ultimately, the Yogācāra denies their imagined identity and affirms their absolute identity, with the intermediate category, dependent identity, sharing elements of both.

The fine points of the Yogācāra position, along with Bhāviveka's response, can be studied in the translation and notes that follow, but the structure of Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra is not difficult to grasp. Yijing understood exactly what was at stake. Bhāviveka maps the two basic existence claims of the Yogācāra onto the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths and asks whether either of them makes sense. If the Yogācāra denial of imagined identity is intended to be ultimate, then the Mādhyamika has no reason to object. But if it is intended to be conventional, the Yogācāra is guilty of an "improper denial" (*apavāda*) of things that ordinary people consider to be real. Bhāviveka makes this point in verses 5.55-56, in response to a Yogācāra argument that "imagined [identity] does not exist, because it is imagined, like a snake." He has in mind the classic Indian comparison of the snake that someone imagines when he walks down a dark road and sees a coiled rope.

5.55 *neṣṭo bhujagavac cāsat kalpitaṃ kalpitatvataḥ /*
rajjvātmanā hy anekāntāt pratītir api bādhikā //
5.56 *tadaṃśadṛṣṭer na bhrāntir anekāṃśā hi sā yataḥ /*
sarvathārthaniṣedhāt te syāc ca vastvapavāditā //

We do not think that imagined [identity] does not exist, because it is imagined, like a snake. This [argument] is inconclusive with regard to the rope and is contradicted by common sense.

Imagined identity is not completely illusory,[151] because we observe that

> this example has more than one part. By negating all objects, you make an improper denial of real things.

Bhāviveka explains that when someone sees a rope as a snake, the cognition has two parts. It is true that the snake is imagined and does not really exist, but the rope is not imagined and actually does exist. He says that there is a general or common sense agreement that there is such a thing as a rope "made by hands and human effort from water, fiber, and other materials." To say that the whole cognition is false "improperly denies" the cognition of the rope.

After he has criticized his opponent's position, Bhāviveka's normal procedure is to offer a positive statement of his own position. In this case, the situation calls for a positive statement about the existence of imagined identity, as Bhāviveka understands it. As it turns out, this simple move had important intellectual implications for the subsequent history of Madhyamaka, especially in Tibet. When the Tibetan philosopher Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) constructed his classification of the varieties of Indian Madhyamaka, he argued that Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra concept of imagined identity implicitly commits him to the opposite position. Since the Yogācāra says that imagined identity is "empty of identity" (*svalakṣaṇaśūnya*), Tsong kha pa interprets this to mean that Bhāviveka implicitly affirms the "identity" (Tib. *rang gi mtshan nyid* / Skt. *svalakṣaṇa*) of imagined identity conventionally. Whether Tsong kha pa is right in drawing this conclusion from Bhāviveka's argument is beyond the scope of this book,[152] but Tsong kha pa's argument suggests that readers should pay particularly close attention to the positive position that Bhāviveka puts forward in place of the Yogācāra negation of imagined identity.

In effect, Bhāviveka responds to the Yogācāra negation in two separate ways. Before he even gets to the doctrine of imagined identity, Bhāviveka has already argued that external objects exist conventionally as "combinations of homogeneous atoms" (verses 5.35-36). This argument is the positive side of Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra interpretation of "mind-only" (*cittamātra*). Bhāviveka took the Yogācāra position to be a denial of "external objects" (Tib. *phyi rol gyi don* / Skt. *bāhyārtha*); his response is to affirm external objects. Some contemporary interpreters of the Yogācāra say that it is a misreading of the Yogācāra to think that they deny the existence of objects outside the mind. Bhāviveka clearly thought otherwise. The argument about "mind-only" in verses 5.17-54 shows that Bhāviveka had strong textual warrant for his interpretation, and he knew the Yogācāra as a living tradition in his own time.[153] Whether later Yogācāra commentators blurred this position is a point that others can decide, but Bhāviveka leaves no doubt that the Yogācara scholars who were his dialog partners in the sixth century took "mind-only" as a denial of objects external to the mind.

In his response to the Yogācāra negation of "imagined identity," Bhāviveka does not need to say anything more about the conventional existence of external objects. He took care of that in the section on "mind-only." He turns instead to a discussion of language

and explains how words can be used to refer to objects conventionally. The argument begins in the introduction to verse 5.57 with a Yogācāra objection: "External objects do not exist, but defilements arise from concepts of the cognitive marks of objects, based on names and conventions." After a brief digression to show that the Yogācāra point cannot account for animals, who can be just as angry as human beings, even though they have no ability to speak, Bhāviveka launches into a critique of Dignāga's view of universals as the "exclusion-by-the-other" (*anyāpoha*). The details of this argument are best understood directly from the translation and the notes. At this point, it is enough to say that Bhāviveka not only identifies a problem with Dignāga's definition that had an important impact on later developments of the concept of *apoha*. He also develops a striking and, as far as anyone has been able to determine, unprecedented account of language as designating the "emptiness of what is dissimilar" (*vijātīyena śūnyatvam*). Taken at face value, this means that the conventional nature of a thing (as an object of language) is emptiness of other, while its ultimate nature is emptiness of self. The symmetry of this formulation is one more sign of the elegance of Bhāviveka's philosophical imagination. Perhaps he also delivered it with the hint of a smile.

When Bhāviveka turns his attention to the concept of dependent identity, he once again interrogates the Yogācāra position from the point of view of two truths. The argument begins with a Yogācāra objection in the introduction to verses 5.69-71, ending with a formula that mirrors the language of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*: "We accept the existence of dependent identity, because 'imagined identity does not exist, but dependent identity does exist.'"[154] In verses 5.69-70, Bhāviveka uses this formula as the basis of a Yogācāra syllogism: "Things are empty, because they are empty of the identity that is attributed to them by words." Bhāvaviveka interprets this syllogism to mean that things are empty of imagined identity, but not of dependent identity. This Yogācāra formula elicits the response that we would expect, given Bhāviveka's understanding of the two truths:

> 5.71 *paratantrāstitoktau ca saṃvṛtyā siddhasādhanam /*
> *tattvataś cen na dṛṣṭānto hetoś cāpi viruddhatā //*
>
> If [the opponents] are saying that dependent [identity] exists in a relative sense, they are proving something that [we] accept. If [they are saying that it exists] in a real sense, there is no example and the reason is contradicted.

There is no example for the simple reason that the objector cannot cite an instance of anything that exists "in reality" (*tattvataḥ*). The reason is contradicted because it asserts only that things are empty of imagined identity, not that they are empty of dependent identity. Bhāviveka continues the argument by exploring the Yogācāra claim that dependent identity "arises" (in various forms of the verb *ut-pad*). His point again

is that this claim can be taken two ways. From the conventional or relative point of view, no Mādhyamika can object, but ultimately the claim cannot make sense: things can arise and cease only if they are not ultimately real. This argument concludes in the most pointed rhetorical exchange of the entire chapter, when Bhāviveka quotes the passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that implicitly accuses the Mādhyamikas of nihilism. Bhāviveka responds to this charge by saying that the words of the Yogācāra (which are the words of the *Yogācārabhūmi*) are like vomit that shows undigested pride.

Bhāviveka's critique of the concept of absolute identity is similar to his critique of dependent identity. He moves back and forth between two positions: If absolute identity exists, as the Yogācāra claims, then it must be conventional, and if it exists ultimately, it cannot have the attributes that the Mahāyāna normally ascribes to ultimate reality. Verses 5.85-86, for example, say that absolute identity (here referred to as *dharma-tattva* or "the Dharma nature") cannot be a real thing and still be "non-conceptual" (*nirvikalpa*) and "inexpressible" (*anabhilāpya*). The argument takes a distinctive turn in verse 5.97, when Bhāviveka focuses on the Buddha's awareness of ultimate reality rather than on ultimate reality as an object of awareness. We know from an earlier passage in the text that Bhāviveka thinks that the primary referent of the word "ultimate" (*paramārtha*) is the cognition whose object is ultimate, rather than the object of an ultimate cognition. (This explanation is found in the commentary on verse 3.26.) He also understands that the words "Buddha" or "Teacher" (*śāstṛ*) refer primarily to a state of awareness. Both of these claims come into play when Bhāviveka says:

> 5.97 *nirālambo na śāstā syāt tathatālambanatvataḥ /*
> *na cāpi samatā bodhis tattvasvābhāsabhedataḥ //*

> The Teacher is not free from objects if he objectifies Thusness, and awakening is not [an understanding of] equality if the image of reality is differentiated.

In other words, the Yogācāra objector cannot account for the non-conceptual character of the Buddha's awareness if he treats absolute identity as a real thing. As far as Bhāviveka is concerned, the Madhyamaka avoids this problem by insisting that there is no reality from the ultimate point of view. If this is the case, the Buddha's awakening has nothing to conceptualize and nothing to objectify. In fact, the Buddha's awareness is no awareness at all.

> 5.99cd *adravyatvānupalabhyatvād yuktaṃ nas tad yathoditam //*
> 5.100 *ajāter nirviśeṣatvāt khatulyaṃ cāpy alipyataḥ /*
> *atyantānabhilāpyaṃ ca sarvathāpy agrahād dhiyā //*

> [Reality] is not a real thing and cannot be apprehended, so for us it can be what [you] have said: it is like space, because it does not arise, it has no particulars, and it is unstained. It also is completely inexpressible, because it cannot be grasped by the mind in any way.

In effect, these verses conclude Bhāviveka's critique of absolute identity. He has shown why he thinks absolute identity cannot ultimately exist; he also has shown how his view of ultimate reality allows the Buddha's awareness to be truly non-conceptual. One crucial question remains: how can a philosopher like Bhāviveka be confident that this view of reality is correct?

In the earlier discussion of Bhāviveka's approach to philosophical diversity, particularly to the diversity expressed in the 363 "doctrines" or "views," I mentioned the ambiguity of Bhāviveka's understanding of *tarka* or "reason." The concept of *tarka* was important to him; he even used it in the title of his commentary (*Tarkajvālā*). But it was a concept about which he was deeply ambivalent. Now it is possible to understand the nature of that ambivalence and put it in the proper context, not only in relation to his dispute with the Yogācāra but in the structure of Indian epistemology more generally. In verse 5.104, Bhāviveka's Yogācāra opponent objects to the idea that inference can be used to know ultimate reality:

> *tattvasyātarkagamyatvāt tadbodho nānumānataḥ /*
> *nātas tarkeṇa dharmāṇāṃ gamyate dharmateti cet //*

> The nature of *dharma*s cannot be known by logical reasoning, because reality is not an object of logical reasoning and is not known by inference.

Why would the Yogācāra raise this objection at this point in the argument? One reason is that Bhāviveka has just used a logical argument to refute the Yogācāra understanding of absolute identity. This is another way of saying that his argument gives a more accurate understanding of ultimate reality than the approach of the Yogācāra. But the argument goes deeper than this. Bhāviveka also has said that there ultimately is no such thing as absolute identity. This means that the Yogācāra has no epistemological refuge other than the logical procedure that leads to Bhāviveka's negation. Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāra point of view in the objection that introduces verse 5.104. Here the Yogācāra objector says:

> When it says in a sūtra that "the ultimate cannot be analyzed (*atarkya*) and is not an object of reason (*tarkagocara*)," it means that [the ultimate] is an object of perception (*pratyakṣa*). You contradict tradition when you say that [the ultimate] is an object of logical reasoning.

If absolute identity ultimately does not exist, then there ultimately is no non-conceptual awareness. Translated into the language of the *pramāṇa*s (the means of valid knowledge), this means that there ultimately is no perception, non-dual or otherwise, by which ultimate reality can be known. Without perception, what other authority can there be but inference?

This argument puts Bhāviveka in the anomalous position of saying that ultimate reality is not an object of inference (as the sūtra says), but that there is no decisive way to know this state of affairs apart from reason itself. He makes this point in verses 5.104-6:

> *ihānumānān nirdoṣād āgamānuvidhāyinaḥ /*
> *kalpitāśeṣavividhavikalpaughanirākṛteḥ //*
> *sakalajñeyayāthātmyam ākāśasamacetasaḥ /*
> *jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt //*
> *ato 'numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvaṃ pratipadyate /*
> *tattvajñānavipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //*

> Buddhas[155] use faultless inference in a way that is consistent with tradition
> to completely reject many different concepts of imagined things.
> Then, without seeing, they see all objects of knowledge, just as they are,
> with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space.
> It is impossible to understand reality as an object of inference, but inference rules out the opposite of the knowledge of reality.

On the surface, these three verses seem to outline a two-stage cognitive process leading from conceptual thought to the non-conceptual experience of awakening. Since inference is conceptual, it can only prepare the way; it cannot give direct access to ultimate reality. But if reality is not an object of knowledge—if, in fact, it is not anything at all—the final epistemic authority lies with reason, and the so-called "experience" of awakening is only experience in a conventional or metaphorical sense. Ultimately, what we call "experience" is no experience. Bhāviveka makes this point in his commentary on verse 5.06: "[The Buddhas' awareness] is a single moment of non-conceptual, perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*). The word 'see' is only metaphorical; [Buddhas] see by the discipline of no-seeing (Tib. *gzigs pa med pa'i tshul gyis* / Skt. *adarśanayogena*)."[156] From a conventional point of view, Buddhas see reality (where the word "see" indicates a form of direct perception), but ultimately there is no seeing and nothing to see. Buddhas see reality by a yoga or "discipline" of no seeing.[157]

Some might say that the formula "see without seeing" implies an intellectual convergence with the Yogācāra, as if Bhāviveka carried his negation almost to the bitter end and then affirmed a form of non-conceptual awareness that could only be named

paradoxically as "no-seeing." But this interpretation makes nonsense of the structure of Bhāviveka's argument. If reality is anywhere for Bhaviveka, it must be in the conventional realm, as Yijing clearly understood when he said: "For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist."[158] The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* reflected Yijing's point when it said: "When some people hear the difficult and profound Mahāyāna sūtras that deal with Emptiness. . . , they develop false concepts and have unreasonable views based only on logic (*tarka*), and they say: 'All of reality is nothing but a designation; whoever sees it this way, sees correctly.'" When Bhāviveka's argument is understood this way, his apparent convergence with the Yogācāra seems more like his ironic claim that great Bodhisattvas such as Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya worship Brahman by the discipline of no-worship. Bhāviveka "includes" the Yogācāra view of perception, but it does this in a way that inverts and negates it. In the process he also inverts the Yogācāra ranking of perception and inference. For Bhāviveka, it is not perception that transcends inference, but inference that gives the proper rational criterion to understand the nature and limits of perception.

Dan Arnold has called attention to this aspect of the Madhyamaka method in his account of Candrakīrti's "transcendental" critique of Dignāga's view of perception. Candrakīrti's critique was based on the logical requirements of reason itself, rather than on the perceptual content of experience (Arnold 2005: 117-42). It is possible to make the same point in the Mādhyamikas' own language by considering how Bhāviveka's successors in the so-called "Svātantrika" tradition drew out the implications of his understanding of reason. Jñānagarbha, the eighth-century predecessor of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, defines conventional truth as "consistent with what one sees" (*yathādarśana*)—in other words, consistent with perception. He defines ultimate truth as "consistent with reason" (*nyāyānusāra*).[159] This formulation of the two truths turns the conventional Yogācāra definition upside down. For Dignāga, there were only two means of valid knowledge: perception and inference. Perception was non-conceptual and gave access to ultimate reality; inference was subject to words and concepts and could give access only to conventional reality. As strange as it may seem, these two Mahāyāna traditions, which shared the same scriptures and the same view of the Bodhisattva path, took radically different approaches to this fundamental question: What does it mean to know reality and, by implication, what does it mean to have the knowledge of a Buddha? Bhāviveka thought that the decisive means of knowledge was inference, while the Yogācāra thought that it was perception.

It would take us beyond the scope of this book, but it would be possible to extend this comparison to the other major non-dualistic tradition in Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara (eighth century) and his disciples struggled with the same problem of how to know a reality that is beyond the distinctions of language and beyond the ordinary subject-object dualities of perception. Their strategy was to use a rational process of inference to strip away misconceptions about the nature of the self and persuade a

student that the self cannot be identified with anything that is limited or impermanent.[160] Then it is possible for a teacher to pronounce one of the authoritative statements of the Veda, like "That art thou" or "I am Brahman," and identify the self with Brahman. While this awareness of identity is not, in a sense, new knowledge, since Brahman is always aware of itself, it comes as a moment of revelation to the person who seeks it, and it functions as a counterpart to the Buddhist moment of awakening. When Śaṅkara's approach is set side by side with the approaches of the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, it creates a remarkable picture. These three traditions, which share so many presuppositions and common influences, take radically different approaches to the epistemology of awakening. The Yogācāra favors perception, the Madhyamaka favors inference, and the Vedānta favors scriptural revelation. This is a case where traditions that are SO-MUCH-LIKE-US yield some of the most striking and problematic differences.

Finally, what should we make of Bhāviveka's relationship with the Śrāvakas, a loosely affiliated group of Buddhist practitioners who rejected not only the scriptural sources of the Mahāyāna but also its view of the path to Buddhahood? On the face of it, the gap between Bhāviveka and the Śrāvakas seems unbridgeable. But Bhāviveka continues to surprise. His approach to the Śrāvakas is almost the mirror image of his approach to the Yogācāras. Instead of discerning differences in apparent similarity, he finds similarities in the midst of difference. One of these differences has to do, of course, with the authority of the Mahayāna scriptures. This point has already been mentioned and does not need to be repeated. But the Śrāvakas carry their criticism a step further. Not only do they claim that the Mahāyāna has the wrong scriptures; it also has the wrong path. This argument is expressed as the second reason in verse 4.7:

> *na buddhoktir mahāyānaṃ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt /*
> *mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanam //*

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, or because it teaches another path, like the Vedānta view.

What does it mean for the Śrāvakas to say that the Mahāyāna teaches "another path" (*mārgāntara*)? The commentary on verse 4.7 elaborates this claim by listing a series of questionable practices normally associated with brahmanical traditions: "[The Vedānta] says that one [removes] impurities and attains liberation by bathing at pilgrimage places on rivers such as the Gaṅgā, by fasting, and by reciting mantras in three ways. The adherents of the Mahāyāna also bathe in four rivers called Gaṅgā, Sindhu, Pakṣu, and Sītā, drink from them, and, while standing in them, initiate and repeat *dhāraṇī*s and mantras to remove impurities and increase merit." Bhāviveka responds to this argument in the commentary on verse 4.36 and makes some fascinating points about Mahāyāna

pilgrimage practices and the use of fasting to purify the body for the practice of magical chants (*vidyā*). He quotes the *Anavatapta Sūtra*, for example, to show that the benefits of bathing in these four sacred rivers do not come from the power of the rivers themselves, but from the Bodhisattva vow of the Nāga king Anavatapta. Since they come from the help of a "spiritual friend" (*kalyāṇamitra*), they are consistent with the benefits that come from religious teachers in more conventional forms of Buddhist practice. But these points are not central to the argument. The key question is whether the Mahāyāna view of the path differs from the traditional eightfold path of the Buddha.

Bhāviveka introduces the Śrāvakas' objection in verses 4.3-6:

> 4.3 *samyagdṛṣṭyādimārgeṇa pratītena pratīyate /*
> *saṃbuddhānāṃ mahābodhir bodhitvāc chiṣyabodhivat //*
>
> The great awakening of the Buddhas is achieved by following the eightfold path, because it is awakening, like the awakening of a student.
>
> 4.4 *indriyātiśayāc chāstuḥ sarvajñajñānasaṃbhavaḥ /*
> *mārgābhede yathābhīṣṭāḥ kasyacit pratisaṃvidaḥ //*
>
> A Teacher can be omniscient because of the excellence of his faculties, just as [we] think that someone can have [different] analytical insights, even though there is no difference in the path.
>
> 4.5 *etenaiva ca mārgeṇa jñeyāvaraṇasaṃkṣayaḥ /*
> *caitasatve sati vṛteḥ kleśāvṛtivad iṣyate //*
>
> [We] think that the obstacles to knowledge are removed by this same path, because they are mental obstacles, like the obstacles that consist of defilements.
>
> 4.6 *mahāyāne 'py ayaṃ mārgaḥ sarvavittvāptaye muneḥ /*
> *yānāntaratvāt pratyekabuddhayāne yatheṣyate //*
>
> [We] think that this path also leads to the omniscience of a Sage in the Mahāyāna, because the Mahāyāna is a different vehicle, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna.

The text of the commentary on these verses is obscure, but the meaning is clear. The Śrāvakas admit that Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas achieve different types of awakening, but they insist that these different types of awakening are achieved by

following the same noble eightfold path. In the commentary that introduces verse 4.4, an objector raises a question: if the path to awakening is the same, how can the results be so different? This objector is not identified, but we can assume that the objection comes from the Mahāyāna. The Śrāvakas respond by saying that the different types of awakening are due to differences in the "faculties" (*indriya*) of the different practitioners, not to differences in their path. In the commentary that precedes verse 4.5, the Śrāvakas attribute another objection to the Mahāyāna opponent. According to the Śrāvakas' account of the Mahāyāna, the Mahāyāna distinguishes between two kind of "obstacles" (*āvaraṇa*): obstacles that consist of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).[161] Of these, the eightfold path removes only the obstacles that consist of defilements. Obstacles to knowledge have to be removed by the vision (*darśana*) of emptiness. In verse 4.5, the Śrāvakas respond to this Mahāyāna objection with a syllogism, arguing that both obstacles are removed by the same path. The Śrāvaka then concludes the argument in verse 4.6 by playing on the meaning of the word *yāna* ("vehicle"). The Mahāyāna may be a different vehicle, but there is no reason why it has to follow a different path. The terms of this argument are not surprising. The distinctions between the two kinds of obstacles and between different kinds of awakening are well known in Mahāyāna sources. What is surprising is Bhāviveka's response.

Instead of rejecting the Śrāvakas' argument, he agrees with it. He is happy to accept that there is only one path, but he insists that the path should be practiced with the correct approach. This point appears in the commentary on verse 4.20cd:

> [Śrāvakas' objection:] According to the [Buddha's] teaching, full, perfect awakening is attained by the eightfold path (lit. the path that begins with right vision).
>
> [Bhāviveka's reply:] This is true, but one attains full, perfect awakening by practicing this path with the approach of no-apprehension (*anupalambhanaya*) and without habitual attachment to things (*vastvabhiniveśa*). What is the practice of no-apprehension?
>
> 4. 20cd *samyagdṛṣṭyādimārgaṃ ca bhavaty abhyasyato yadā //*
> 4.21 *adarśanam asaṃkalpo vāgavyāhṛtir akriyā /*
> *anājīvo 'samārambho 'saṃpramoṣo 'sthitis tathā //*
> 4.22 *tadānenaiva mārgeṇa buddhabodhir matā hi naḥ /*
> *siddhasādhanadoṣo 'to bhāvanā vā parīkṣyatām //*
>
> Someone who practices the path that begins with right vision as no vision, no thought, no speech, no action, no livelihood, no effort, no mindfulness, and no concentration, achieves the awakening of a Buddha. Since

> this is our position, either there is the fault of proving something that we have already accepted, or one should investigate the practice.

The "approach of no-apprehension" (*anupalambhanaya*) is directly related to the "discipline of no-seeing" (*adarśanayoga*) in Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra. Both involve the ability to see things (like the individual practices of the eightfold path) without treating them as ultimately real. The underlying meaning of "no-apprehension" (*anupalambha*) and "no-objectification" (*anālambana*) is the same. Both terms have to do with not "grasping" at things in a way that treats them as real objects.

This long and circuitous journey through Bhāviveka's controversy with his Buddhist opponents makes it possible to return to a question that was raised earlier and answer it with much greater precision. Did Bhāviveka take an inclusive approach to his fellow Buddhists, or did he hold an exclusive view of truth? The answer to this question depends on what Bhāviveka is being asked to include. Bhāviveka resists the Śrāvakas' attempt to treat the Mahāyāna as a separate path. As far as he is concerned, the noble eightfold path is as authoritative for the Mahāyāna as it is for the Śrāvakas. He makes a similar point about other apparent doctrinal innovations in the Mahāyāna. When the Śrāvakas object, for example, to the idea that the Buddha is "eternal," that Śākyamuni is a manifestation (*nirmāṇa*), or that mantras can be used to remove defilements, he argues that these points are not as distinctive as they seem. As far as he is concerned, they are consistent with the basic doctrinal commitments of the Śrāvaka tradition. Bhāviveka also has an inclusive attitude toward the authority of scripture. He makes this approach explicit in verse 5.8, when he says: "All of the Tathāgatas' teachings are authoritative for us" (*pramāṇaṃ nah sarvaṃ tāthāgataṃ vacaḥ*). One measure of his commitment to the unity of Buddhist tradition lies in the absence of any substantive reference to the distinction between *nītārtha* and *neyārtha* (definitive and interpretable meanings).[162] If there is a truth to be sought, why be distracted by any partial or provisional truths? Bhāviveka's commitment to the unity of tradition also informs his response to the Śrāvakas' objections about the authenticity of the Mahāyāna. As far as he is concerned, the Mahāyāna is not a separate canon of scripture; it is just one part of a larger scriptural whole.

His problem with the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras is not that they rely on the wrong scriptures or follow the wrong path; it is that they use the wrong approach. The Śrāvakas differ from the adherents of the Mahāyāna not in the path they follow, but in the "vehicle" (*yāna*) or "approach" (*naya*) they use to follow it. If all Buddhist traditions are following the same "middle" path, how do some of them seem to go wrong? In the case of the Yogācāras, the error takes two forms: they fall into the extreme of "improper denial" (*apavāda*) by denying the reality of imagined identity, and they fall into the extreme of "improper reification" (*samāropa*) by affirming the reality of dependent and absolute identity. In the case of the Śrāvakas, the mistake has to do principally with an act of false reification, as Bhāviveka points out in the commentary on verse 4.24:

> Noble Śrāvakas have an understanding that consists of the vision only of *dharmas*. Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). They [accomplish this] by practicing the path described earlier [i.e. the eightfold path] as if it were a real thing. A Blessed One achieves awakening by perfecting no-apprehension. This does not happen unless concepts of real things are completely uprooted. Therefore, it is the practice of no-apprehension that causes the noble [eightfold] path to act in a distinctive way to bring about perfect awakening. But [the path itself] is not limited to one group or another.

To practice "the approach of no-apprehension" is to avoid this extreme of improper reification.

In the end, then, did Bhāviveka "include" or "exclude" his opponents? From one point of view, Bhāviveka clearly thinks like an inclusivist. He acknowledges that the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras are following the same path and are part of a single, unified tradition. In fact, it is precisely the "exclusive" aspects of their teaching that provoke his sharpest response. With the Śrāvakas, it is their refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Mahāyāna; with the Yogācāras, it is the claim that people who looked very much like Mādhyamikas were "nihilists" and should be shunned by the community. But Bhāviveka also made a sharp distinction between their "approaches" and his own. They may have been following the same path and interpreting the words of the same teacher, but their approaches were radically different. In this respect, Bhāviveka's position was not negotiable and not inherently inclusive. Based solely on his treatment of the concept of "approach," Bhāviveka might very well be considered a principled Buddhist exclusivist; he acknowledges differences, but considers only one "approach" to be correct. In the end, whether we call him an "inclusivist" or an "exclusivist," he gives a far more rigorous and nuanced account of Buddhist intellectual diversity than one might glean from the conventional stereotype of a tolerant Buddhist tradition. In this respect, Bhāviveka has a great deal in common with other philosophers of religion who develop comprehensive views of philosophical diversity and give each opponent a place in their system, but who never give up their claim to truth.

Toward a Buddhist Philosophy of Religion

Jonathan Z. Smith has remarked that a theory of the other is another way of articulating a theory of the self (2004: 275). It would be unfortunate to leave Bhāviveka's account of the differences that separate him from other Buddhist thinkers without considering its significance for understanding not only Bhāviveka himself, but the Buddhist

tradition that he represents.

First of all, it is worth noting that Bhāviveka's critique of the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras begins in both cases with arguments about the authority and interpretation of scripture. In some respects, it is surprising to find scripture playing such a prominent role in his argument. After all, he mocks the Śrāvakas for refusing to take a critical approach to scripture, comparing them to naive children who take hard pieces of medicine just because their mothers tell them to, then bite down and break their teeth (verse 4.24). In a philosophical setting that was already deeply colored by Dignāga's approach to epistemology, Buddhist thought was moving further and further away from a formal reliance on the authority of scripture. But epistemological theory is different from the practice of debate. As John Clayton points out in his study of Indian arguments for the existence of God, intra-traditional debates focus naturally on differences about the interpretation of tradition (2006: 8). Clayton takes his examples from Rāmānuja's argument with Śaṅkara about the interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra*s, but the same could be said about Bhāviveka and his Buddhist rivals. Bhāviveka begins his discussion with the Śrāvakas by announcing that he will defend the status of the Mahāyāna as the Buddha's teaching, and he begins his critique of the Yogācāras by disputing the claim that they give the best interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom. This aspect of Bhāviveka's argument reminds us that, whatever its larger epistemological commitments may be, a "Buddhist" philosophy has to place itself in relationship to Buddhist tradition. A crucial part of this process is to resist claims by other Buddhist thinkers who say that they have privileged access to the teaching of the Buddhas. If we take Bhāviveka's arguments seriously, they pose challenging questions for Buddhist thinkers at any stage in Buddhist history. They can give us new eyes for the hermeneutical controversies that shaped the identity of Buddhist traditions throughout Asia. If a group claims to be "Buddhist," what texts or traditions does it consider authoritative? Do the members of this group limit themselves to a certain group of texts? If so, what criterion do they use to exclude other texts? What are their principles of interpretation? And most importantly, perhaps, are they willing to defend their scriptural judgments in public debate?

A second significant point has to do with Bhāviveka's use of critical rationality. His arguments may begin with tradition, but they move toward a process of critical scrutiny and argumentation. Bhāviveka is committed to the use of reason, not just in the sense that he gives reasons for what he believes and expects others to do the same, but because he considers the giving and receiving of reasons to be the highest authority in disputes about doctrine, practice, and scriptural interpretation. It is impossible to overemphasize the significance of this point for understanding Bhāviveka or for the Buddhist tradition more generally. Bhāviveka is well aware of the claim that experience (including the experience of Buddhahood) is based on a direct, non-conceptual awareness of reality, and he rejects it, not just because he feels that differences in perception have to yield to the authority of reason, but because rational analysis shows that so-called "experiences"

are ultimately no more real than anything else. In one of the most striking passages of the text (verses 5.105-6), he even says that "Buddhas use faultless inference" to remove concepts and see things as they really are. How strange it is to imagine the Buddha as a logician! And yet it was the Buddha himself, according to Buddhist tradition, who insisted that his followers should use their own critical capacities to investigate the truth of the teaching.

Some of Bhāviveka's respect for rationality can be attributed to the controversial requirements of his own intellectual setting: what John Clayton referred to as a "local rationality" (xiii). The stories we glean from Xuanzang and other sources, to say nothing of the intellectual structure of Bhāviveka's own work, depict a situation in which intellectual competition was taken seriously and could be played for high stakes. But Bhāviveka's commitment to reason is also woven into his understanding of what it means to practice a Buddhist path. The critical analysis of opponents' categories not only gave a debater the upper hand in a public dispute, it also could help strip away the subtle forms of reification that defile the mind and block the way of Buddhahood. As Bhāviveka indicates in his own choice of language, this is philosophical analysis as a form of yoga. Even if there were no Śrāvaka or Yogācāra to encounter in debate, the discipline of analysis has a useful function, not only in the sociological sense that it supports the solidarity of an interpretive community, but also in a soteriological sense. It helps a person imagine, seek, and perhaps in some small measure even achieve the tradition's highest goal: the awareness of emptiness or, in Bhāviveka's own words, the knowledge of reality.

When Bhāviveka's respect for reason is translated into the language of Indian epistemology, it involves an assertion of the primacy of inference (*anumāna*) over perception (*pratyakṣa*). This is expressed implicitly in Bhāviveka's verses 5.105-10 and stated explicitly by Jñānagarbha in his definition of reason (*yukti*) as ultimate (Eckel 1987: 71). Taken seriously, this claim has important implications for the understanding of Buddhist "experience." One of the most fundamental stereotypes about Buddhism in the modern world is that it elevates direct experience over the second-hand testimony of tradition. In some respects, this stereotype is true. Bhāviveka himself describes a path that has an experiential dimension. He even refers to the Buddha's awakening as a moment of non-conceptual awareness. But he makes it clear that this designation is metaphorical, as in verse 5.106:

> Then, without seeing, [Buddhas] see all objects of knowledge just as they are, with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space.
>
> [Commentary:] They attain the name [Buddha] and so forth. Their mind is empty in the sense that they do not grasp the five kinds of objects: past, future, present, unspecifiable, and uncompounded. This [awareness] is

> a single moment of non-conceptual, perceptual knowledge. The word "see" is a metaphor (*upacāra*): [they see] by the discipline of no-seeing (*adarśanayogena*).

Elsewhere in the text, Bhāviveka says that this moment of awareness arises by the discipline of no-arising (*anutpādayogena*)." These passages indicate that Bhāviveka's understanding of "experience" is paradoxical at best. To say that the ultimate experience is no-experience and that it arises without arising makes it seem that awakening is nothing at all. Is this what Bhāviveka means? He leaves no doubt that this is his intention when experience is considered from the ultimate point of view. Ultimately awakening is no more real than anything else. But what does such a metaphorical awakening look like from a conventional point of view?

Near the end of chapter 3, Bhāviveka completes his account of the Bodhisattva path with a verse that marks the Bodhisattva's transition to the state of Buddhahood. In my translation of chapter 3, I call this the moment when the Bodhisattva becomes a "conventional Buddha." Bhāviveka marks this transition in the following verse:

> 3.346 *bhūtvā saṃbuddhasavitro bhavyabuddhyambujākaram /*
> *bodhayaty uktikiraṇair amalair malahāribhiḥ //*

> [The Bodhisattva] becomes a Buddha and opens the minds of fortunate beings with the pure, cleansing rays of teaching, just as the sun opens the blossoms in a pond of lotuses.

The word "Bodhisattva" that stands in as the subject of this sentence is carried down from the previous verses, as if it were a carry-over from the Bodhisattva path that prepared for this moment of Buddhahood. But it would be more accurate to say that the Bodhisattva has been effaced in the act of becoming a Buddha in the service of others. In a strictly grammatical sense, the subject of the verb *bodhayati* (which means to "awaken" and also to "open," as in the blossoming of a flower) is the compound "Buddha-sun." But the commentary indicates that the distinctive characteristics of the action are attributable not to the Buddha per se, but to the influence of his previous vow (*praṇidhāna*). Bhāviveka explains the mechanism of the vow in more detail in his commentary on MMK 24.24:

> [An opponent objects:] A Buddha who is free from concepts cannot have a Mahāyāna, because such a Buddha ultimately does not teach any Dharma.

> [Bhāviveka replies:] The Tathāgata is free from concepts, but because of a promise to seek the welfare and happiness of others and because of a

> previous vow, a Manifestation Body arises from it that is capable of assisting everyone. On this basis, a teaching arises that consists of words, syllables, and sentences. [This teaching] reveals to the followers of the excellent vehicle the selflessness of *dharma*s and persons—a doctrine that is not shared by heretics, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas—in order to complete the perfections. This [teaching] is called the Mahāyāna. The teaching arises in spoken form when the ultimate Buddha is present, so [we] consider the Teacher to be the agent of this teaching.[163]

If we take Bhāviveka's account of the Buddha at face value, the "experience" of Buddhahood is austere indeed. The ex-Bodhisattva, now-Buddha has no concept at all; it is the lingering presence of the vow that allows him to function in a way that illuminates others.

This restrained view of Buddhahood is consistent with Bhāviveka's understanding of ultimate reality; from the ultimate point of view, Buddhahood, such as it is, can only arise by not arising. To say anything else would make nonsense of Bhāviveka's approach to reality. But does it make any sense of the stories other Buddhists tell about their awakening experiences? Bhāviveka can only pose this question. Others will have to answer it, based on the sources and experiences of their own traditions. But it might be useful to consider just one example from the Indian tradition that seems to bear the imprint and even the language of Bhāviveka's approach to awakening. The example comes from the life of the Tantric saint Maitrīgupta (also known as Maitrīpa or Advayavajra, "Non-Dual Thunderbolt").[164]

According to Sanskrit and Tibetan sources, Maitrīgupta was born as a brahmin in northern India and grew up to become a Buddhist monk. A series of dreams and visions led him on a long and circuitous quest for awakening, to a mountain in south India and to a teacher named Śabara, whose name might be translated simply as "Mountain Man." When Maitrīgupta asked Śabara for instruction, Śabara told him to eat no food and sit on a rock in the forest until he received a vision. After a few days, Maitrīgupta saw a woman chase a wild pig out of the forest, shoot it with an arrow, slice a piece of meat from its side, and say:

> In the forest of saṃsāra that has no arising,
> Runs the boar of ignorance.
> Shooting the arrow of clear wisdom,
> I slay the boar of ignorance.
> Eat you of the flesh—non-duality;
> Enjoy the corpse—the great bliss.

Maitrīgupta tried to commit this startling verse to memory, but by the time he got back

to meet his teacher, he had forgotten it. In despair, he tried to kill himself. Śabara said:

> Where does one find the knowing
> Of doctrines that have not arisen?
> Where does one find the forgetting
> Of doctrines that have not ceased?

Maitrīgupta accepted Śabara's teaching, went back to his monastery, and became not only a respected Tantric saint but a Madhyamaka philosopher. As a scholar he was known for expounding the doctrine of "no thought" (*amanasīkāra*).

This story is cryptic and full of holes. As an expression of historical actuality, it is as elusive as one of Maitrīgupta's dreams, and I have only made the situation worse by summarizing the story so briefly. But it seems to show a pattern that is similar in a formal sense to Bhāviveka's understanding of awakening. There is a stage of intense preparation, represented in Bhāviveka's case by the eons of practice in the Bodhisattva path In Maitrīgupta's case, this stage is represented by the rigors of his journey. Preparation can involve any number of ascetical practices, including "meditation" (*dhyāna*), mental concentration (*samādhi*), "mindfulness" (*smṛti*), the calming of the mind (*śamatha*), visualizations, or dreams (or simply hours and hours of tedious practice). Then this practice gives way to a moment of understanding. This understanding may seem anti-climactic, as if it were as much a non-occurrence as an occurrence, but it allows the practitioner to interpret the previous practices in a different way and place them in a new context of understanding. What is the cognitive content of this understanding? Śabara summarizes it in the verse that begins: "Where does one find the knowing?" This is almost a formulaic expression of Bhāviveka's concept of no-arising. In more colloquial terms, Śabara's words could be translated by saying simply: "Nothing happens." But in the narrative of Maitrīgupta's life, this no-happening is precisely the turning point that Maitrīgupta was seeking.

The story of Maitrīgupta suggests that there are two significant trajectories in the study of Buddhist experience. One trajectory is the practice that leads up the moment of awakening; the other has to do with the awakening's lingering effects. At the intersection of these two trajectories there is an indeterminate moment that in Madhyamaka terms is called simply "no-arising." We might call it "no-happening." Does it make any sense to call this "no-happening" an experience? William James used an empiricist model to answer a similar question in his account of religious experience. When he was asked to judge the validity of a religious experience, he said: "By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots" (James 20). The story of Maitrīgupta tells us that James's formulation was partly right and partly wrong. If we had the sources, it would certainly be valuable to investigate Maitrīgupta's "experience" by asking how his moment of understanding affected his subsequent life. Unfortunately, the rest of Maitrīgupta's

life is not open for study. But it is not impossible to imagine that his understanding of "no-happening" would have given a certain flavor to his life, not unlike the concept of "no thought" that apparently characterized his philosophy. In this respect, James was right: awakenings should be knowable by their fruits. But in this case James was wrong to say that we cannot also study these awakenings by their roots. For Bhāviveka, as for Maitrīgupta, the understanding of no-arising is anticipated by many affective, cognitive, and bodily practices, not the least of which is the philosophical practice of Bhāviveka's text. These practices are in principle knowable, although Bhāviveka would insist that they cannot be confused with the moment of understanding itself.

One final way in which Bhāviveka can serve as a catalyst for useful reflection outside the narrow confines of the Indian tradition has to do with the connection between metaphor and thought. Bhāviveka's arguments are situated in a much larger picture of the world. He thought of a philosophical argument not just as an "idea," a "position," a "proposition," or any of the other conventional terms that can be used to name the currency of intellectual disputes. He pictured it as a trajectory of thought or an "approach" that led eventually to a distinctive "vision" of reality. The metaphor of vision (of following a path in order to see) generates many of the important features of Bhāviveka's thought. How do philosophers typically go wrong? They wander off the path by falling into "extremes," or they are deluded into seeing things that are not there. In one unusually expressive image (in verse 4.1), they can even be terrified of not standing still (*asthānatrāsa*). It may difficult to discern the discipline of Buddhist practice and the process of liberation in the intramural disputes that occupy the attention of Bhāviveka's two chapters, but they lurk in the background and give the arguments in these chapters a degree of intellectual seriousness that goes beyond the give and take of a practical debate. In the rich and intricate details of these chapters, there is an invitation to enter a world, as Pierre Hadot has said of classical Western philosophy (Hadot 2002), where theory is a form of practice and where thinkers struggle not only to define and adjudicate their differences but to remove the barriers that prevent them from achieving their highest goal.

Notes to Part 1

1 There has been a great deal of discussion about the correct spelling of Bhāviveka's name. The name "Bhāvaviveka" comes from the Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, edited by La Vallée Poussin. For many years this was the preferred form in Western scholarship. In his discussion of the evidence, Chr. Lindtner (1995: 37-65) suggested that the form "Bhāvaviveka" be treated as a textual corruption and that "Bhavya" be adopted as the most persuasive of the different possibilities. More recently Yoshiyasu Yonezawa (1999) has shown that "Bhāviveka" is attested as early as the twelfth century in a Sanskrit manuscript of an anonymous commentary on the *Prasannapadā*. It is now generally accepted that the correct form of the name is "Bhāviveka." For further discussion of this point, see Ejima 1990 and the summary of Ejima's argument in Watanabe 1998. The authorship of *The Heart of the Middle Way* will be considered later in this book.

2 Bhāviveka refers to his Mahāyāna opponents as "*yogācāras*" in MHK 5.1 in the claim (attributed to the opponent) that "the Yogācāras have given the best introduction to the ambrosia of reality" (*tattvāmṛtāvatāro hi yogācāraiḥ sudeśitaḥ*). The commentary identifies these "Yogācāras" as "Mahāyāna masters beginning with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu" (*theg pa chen po nyid kyi slob dpon thogs med dang dbyig gnyen las sogs pa*).

3 Halbfass makes this point about the genre of Indian philosophical compendia in 1988: 349-68.

4 I have in mind the period from Vasubandhu (fourth or fifth century) to Dharmakīrti (seventh century).

5 See, for example, "'Inclusivism' and 'Tolerance' in the Encounter between India and the West" in Halbfass 1988: 403-18.

6 Halbfass makes this point about Bhāviveka in 1988: 356.

7 This statement is found in MHK chapter 3. See Eckel 1992: 169 and Gokhale 1961-62.

8 Xuanzang 1996: 316-18.

9 I have commented on this story more extensively in Eckel 1992.

10 Xuanzang 1996: 156-57.

11 Another example of the traveling southern scholar is the story of Guṇamati's challenge and defeat of the Sāṃkhya scholar Mādhava, found in Xuanzang 1996: 236-40. In the account of his journey to south India, Xuanzang tells another debate story, this time about the conflict between two southern debaters. The first is an arrogant wanderer who wears a copper belt around his waist and carries a lamp on his head. When he is asked to explain, he says that belt is meant to keep him from bursting with knowledge, and the lamp is meant to enlighten the ignorant. This wanderer beats the "drum of contention" and demands a debate. The local ruler enlists a Buddhist ascetic, also from south India, to respond. The Buddhist wins, and a local monastery is given a handsome endowment to commemorate the victory. For a parallel account of this story, see Huili 1995: 109-10.

12 The traditions about Dignāga's life are summarized in Hattori 1968: 1-11.

13 Xuanzang 1996: 161-63.

14 Tāranātha 1970: 186-88.

15 Tāranātha 1974, folio 133: *slob dpon 'di gnyis ma byon gyi bar du theg pa chen po pa mtha' dag bstan pa gcig tu gnas pa las / slob dpon 'di gnyis kyis 'phags pa klu sgrub pa dang / 'phags pa thogs med kyi lugs gnyis ni shin tu tha dad de / thogs med kyi lugs ni dbu ma'i lam ston pa ma yin par sems tsam kho na yin la / 'phags pa klu sgrub kyi bzhed pa ni kho bo cag gi 'di las gzhan du med do zhes mtha' gzhan 'gog par mdzad pas / legs ldan sku 'das pa'i 'og tsam nas theg pa chen po pa'ang nang du sde gnyis su gyes nas rtsod pa byung ngo //.*

16 The passage reads as follow: "Then Sthiramati wrote a commentary in which he explained the meaning of the *Mūlamadhyamaka* according to consciousness (*rnam rig tu*). When

copies of this commentary reached the south, Bhāviveka's students objected. They went to Nālendra and debated with Sthiramati's students. Those who hold the doctrine of no-identity (*ngo bo nyid med pa*) say that Bhāviveka's students won. But it is understood that this debate was similar to the debate between Candragomin and Candrakīrti (*de yang slob dpon blo gros brtan pas dbu ma rtsa ba'i dgongs pa rnam rag* [read *rig*] *tu 'grel ba'i rnam bshad cig mdzad la / de'i glegs pa ma lho phyogs kyi rgyud du byung nas legs ldan gyi slob ma rnams kyis mi 'thad par byas so // de dag nālendrar 'ongs nas blo brtan gyi slob ma rnams dang brtsod pas / legs ldan gyi slob ma rgyal po zhes ngo bo nyid med par smra ba rnams zer ba dang / candragomi dang / zla ba grags pa'i rtsod pa dang byung tshul gyis shes so*). Tāranātha explains that the debate between Candragomin and Candrakīrti went on for seven years without reaching a decisive conclusion (Tāranātha 1970: 203-5).

17 Verse 1.2: "Here, with respect to their basic differences, there are six *darśanas*; scholars should understand them according to the differences in their deities and in principles of reality" (*darśanāni ṣaḍevātra mūlabhedavyapekṣayā / devatātattvabhedena jñātavyāni manīṣibhiḥ*).

18 Xuanzang 1996: 58.

19 Xuanzang 1996: 283.

20 Huili 1995: 130-50.

21 Li Rongxi gives **Aghadarśanabheda Śāstra* as the Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese *Po ejian lun*. Dan Lusthaus has pointed out that the title means simply: "The Treatise that Refutes False Views."

22 Xuanzang 1996: 145.

23 Translated by Daniélou 1989.

24 For a thoughtful study of this text, including discussion of its sources and theories about its composition, see Monius 2001.

25 Daniélou 1989: 124.

26 See Sastri 1937 and Monius 2001: 14 (n. 14).

27 This list of four stages corresponds to the well known list of three kinds of wisdom: wisdom that comes for hearing (*śrutamayī prajñā*), wisdom that comes from thinking (*cintāmayī prajñā*), and wisdom that comes from repeated practice (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). Why *darśana* is added as a fourth is unclear. Perhaps it is an indication simply of the text's reverence for the vision of reality that comes from all three of these practices, a vision that in some contexts is equated with "philosophy."

28 Daniélou 1989: 172.

29 Monius 2001: 61.

30 According to Granoff (1989: 113-14), the earliest recorded version of Akalaṅka's life story (from which this story comes), is told by Prabhācandra in the *Kathākośa*.

31 Full bibliographical information about this text is found in the Bibliography.

32 *Shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa / Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, Otani no. 5259.

33 This possibility was first pointed out by V. V. Gokhale in his edition and translation of chapter 2. The colophon at the end of chapter 3 reads: "Here ends the chapter on the quest for the knowledge of reality in the introduction to the ambrosia of reality" (*tattvāmṛtāvatāre tattvajñānaiṣaṇāparicchedo samāptaḥ*).

34 Hattori 1968: 9. Two of these texts (if they are texts) are mentioned by Śāntarakṣita in the *Vādanyāyaṭīkā*, and one is mentioned in the *Nyāyamukha*. The word *samuccaya* in the title of Dignāga's text is the same word that is translated "compendium" in the title of Haribhadra's *Compendium of Six Views* (*ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*). I am reserving the word "compendium" to refer to a text that gives each tradition its own chapter, but Dignāga's text is another important type of philosophical survey, where the chapters are organized by topic rather than by tradition.

35 Qvarnström 1999.

36 See also the commentary on MHK 1.21, 3.58, 3.97, 3.176, 3.196, 5.14cd, and 5.83cd.

37 Ruegg 1990: 63-64. A commonly cited precedent for this usage is the commentary on *The Treasury of Abhidharma* (*Abhidharmakośa*) 1.3, where Vasubandhu uses the term *ācārya* to refer to himself as the author of the verses. In this context, however, Vasubandhu is not citing his own opinion but is quoting the words of an opponent.

38 Gokhale 1985: 77 and 99.

39 See Clooney 1993 and 1994: 139-69.

40 *De ltar "di ni dbu ma yi // snying po mdor bsdus byas pa yin // blo ldan mdo sde du ma yi // gzugs brnyan lta ba'i me long yin //* (sDe-dge, Dza, folio 329a).

41 *Byas pa zhes bya ba ni rnam par bkod pa ste / bdag shes rab* [*rang* D] *kyis dpyod par byed pas so // des na bstan bcos byed pa'i slob dpon bdag nyid bstan pa yin no //* (sDe-dge, Dza 329a).

42 See, for example, MHK 8.78-84 in Qvarnström's edition and of the Vedānta chapter. These verses are included in the Sanskrit manuscript of the verses but are not found in the Tibetan translation or the commentary.

43 Translated by La Vallée Poussin as "Le joyau dans le main" (1933a: 68-138).

44 Bhāviveka interprets this passage as a criticism of Madhyamaka in MHK 5.82-84.

45 *Gang gi phyir kho bo mtha' gnyis spangs pas / dbu ma'i lam ston pa'i phyir med pa nyid kyang 'gog par byed de* (Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka, vol. 95, Tsha, folio 345a).

46 *'Di don rgyas par slob dpon zla ba grags pa'i zhal snga nas mdzad pa'i dbu ma phung po lnga pa dang / bdag gis bkod pa rtog ge 'bar ba la sogs par lta bar bya'o* (Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka, vol. 95, Tsha, folio 335b).

47 See particularly Lindtner 1984.

48 On the date of Bhāviveka see Kajiyama 1968-69.

49 Discussed in Eckel 1987.

50 Tibetan sources indicate that Śāntarakṣita arrived in Tibet for the first time around 763 and stayed from 775 to his death in approximately 788. Kamalaśīla visited Tibet during the "Council of bSam yas" in 792-94 and died there in approximately 795. For a discussion of the historical sources, see Ruegg 1981: 67-71; and 1982.

51 Since much of this literature is only available in Tibetan translation, the Sanskrit terms are often only approximations. In this case, however, they are confirmed by the Sanskrit text of Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, a text that reflects this stage in the development of Madhyamaka thought. See Eckel 1987, and Keira and Ueda 1998.

52 *Ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ste // de 'dra las byung de bzhin no //* (sDe-dge, Otani no. 3892, Ha, folio 41b). On Śrīgupta's use of this formula, see Eckel 1987: 63.

53 On Jñānagarbha's use of this formula, see Eckel 1987: 40-43. The formula also appears in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 64: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //* (Ichigo 1985: 202). Stories about the lineage that leads from Śrīgupta to Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita come from Tāranātha's *History* and are discussed in Ruegg 1981: 67-71.

54 On Dharmakīrti's use of the term *arthakriyā*, see Nagatomi 1967-68.

55 For a discussion of the key passages in Candrakīrti and their relationship to Bhāviveka's successors, see Eckel 2003.

56 Franco 1987 and de Jong 1989.

57 Eckel 2003.

58 *Chu shing gi ni phung po bzhin // ma brtags nyams dga'i mtshan nyid can // rgyu las skyes dang don byed nus // tshu rol mthong ba'i kun rdzob yin //* (sDe-dge, Otani no. 3854, Tsha, folio 260a).

59 MHK 3.26: *tatra bhūtasvabhāvaṃ hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ / kṛtakatvād yathājñānaṃ hetumatvādito 'pi vā //*. In the MMK the argument can be distilled into the assertion: If something exists (as a thing in its own right), it cannot arise from any cause. In the MHK the argument is reversed, if something has a cause, it cannot be a thing in its own right.

60 *Niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //* (Ichigo 1985: cxiii).

61 *Tattvāvatāra* 1: *phyi rol nang na gnas 'di kun // yang dag tu ni rang bzhin med // gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin nyid // 'bral ba'i phyir na gzugs brnyan bzhin //* (sDe-dge, Otani no. 3892, Ha, folio 39b).

62 *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* 14: *du mas dngos po gcig mi byed // du mas du ma byed ma yin // gcig gis du ma'i dngos mi byed // gcig gis gcig byed pa yang min //*. For commentary on this verse, see Eckel 1987: 80. Haribhadra discusses this argument at length in the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* (970-71). He also mentions the other version of the "one and many" argument at the beginning of his *Sphuṭārtha* (Naughton 1991: 18).

63 *Spyir ba bkag pa ni / bdag las mi skye gzhan las min // gnyis las mi skye rgyu med min // rgyu ngan pa las mi skye zhing // kun rdzob nyid du'ang skye ba min // don dam par ni / gcig las du ma'i dngos mi skye // du mas gcig gi dngos mi skye // gcig las gcig kyang mi skye zhing // du ma las kyang du ma min // yod pa nam yang mi skye ste // med pa'ang skye bar rigs ma yin // yod dang med pa'ang gnyi ga min // gnyi ga min pa'ang mi skye'o // dngos po gcig tu mi rigs te // du ma dag tu'ang rigs pa min // gcig dang du ma ma gtogs pa'i // dngos gang rnyed par ga la gyur // dbu ma'i rtsa ba rtsod pa zlog // stong nyid bdun cu rigs drug cu // rnam par 'thag pa la sogs pas // dngos rnams skye med shes par bya //* (sDe-dge, Otani no. 3854, Tsha, folio 326b).

64 As in the work of Atiśa (tenth-eleventh century). See Ruegg 1981: 68 and 112.

65 Sastri 1931: 41-49.

66 As in Hiriyanna 1970 and Chatterji and Datta 1968. On the use of the term *darśana* in the Sanskrit doxographies, see Halbfass 1988: 349-68.

67 The term *siddhānta* in its Tibetan form (*grub mtha'*) is more common in Tibet (Mimaki 1976 and 1992).

68 Dignāga, *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* 23.

69 Translated from the Tibetan (*tha snyad la yang rmongs gyur pa // lta ba'i phreng 'khrugs 'gro rnams las*). The Sanskrit is not available.

70 In this translation, I have adopted the terminology of Dutt's study of the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (Dutt 1932) and included the Pali equivalents of key technical terms. Bhāviveka's word "heretic" (Skt. *tīrthika*) is not found in the Pali. Bhāviveka would have worked from a Sanskrit version. The Tibetan translation is found in the sDe-dge edition, Dza, folio 325b: *'di ltar sngon gyi mtha' la rtog* [*rtogs* P] *pa'i mu stegs ni bco brgyad de / de rnams la bzhi ni rtag par smra ba'o // bzhi ni gzhan 'ga' zhig rtag par smra ba'o // bzhi ni mtha' dang ldan pa dang mtha' dang mi ldan par smra ba'o // bzhi ni ngag gi rnam par g.yeng ba can no // gnyis ni rgyu med par 'byung bar smra ba ste de ltar bco brgyad do // phyi ma'i mtha' la rtog pa ni bzhi bcu rtsa ba zhi ste / de rnams las bcu drug ni 'du shes dang ldan par smra ba'o // brgyad ni 'du shes med par smra ba'o // brgyad ni 'du shes yod pa yang ma yin 'du shes med pa yang ma yin par smra ba'o // lnga ni mthong ba'i chos la mya ngan las 'da' bar smra ba'o // bdun ni chad par smra ba ste lta ba bzhi bcu rtsa ba zhi yin no //*.

71 For different approaches to this question, see Dutt 1932; Norman 1983a: 33; and Qvarnström 1999: 173.

72 *Prasannapadā* 498. Pali sources can be investigated in the CPD s.v. *atakkāvacara*.

73 MHK 3.286: *pāpātmanām iva svargaḥ saraṇānām ivāraṇā / jātyandhānām ivādityas tārkikānām agocaraḥ //*.

74 This could be translated: "with empty minds."

75 The Tibetan text of this passage can be found in the edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of this chapter later in this book.

76 As in MHK 4.33ab: "The reason is inconclusive, so the opponent loses the argument" (*hetuḥ savyabhicāro 'to vādatyāgaś ca vādinaḥ*). In the commentary on this verse, Bhāviveka glosses *vādin* as "the other" or "the opponent."

77 Here the term *liṅga* should be understood as a logical "mark."
78 In his analysis of Mīmāṃsā-Buddhist debates about the authority of tradition, Dan Arnold notes that even if one were to grant that the Vedas are unfalsifiable, problems still arise about how the texts should be interpreted (Arnold 112-13). Bhāviveka would say that these problems can only be solved by the use of reason.
79 Qvarnström 1999: 184. The Jain list is found in Schrader 1902: 15-16.
80 Verse 1.2: *darśanāni ṣaḍevātra mūlabhedavyapekṣayā / devatātattvabhedena jñātavyāni manīṣibhiḥ.*
81 MHK 8.86: *tāthāgatīm avitathāṃ matvā nītim imāṃ śubhām / tasmāj jātaspṛhais tīrthyaiḥ kṛtaṃ tatra mamāpi tat //.*
82 The Nyāya tradition increased in prominence in the seventh century with the appearance of Uddyotakara.
83 *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* 1.2 (as quoted in Folkert 1993: 115).
84 Folkert 1993: 132ff. On the Tibetan compendia, see Mimaki 1982.
85 Halbfass 1988: 268.
86 Verse 2.136: *ekasminn api dṛśye 'rthe darśanaṃ bhidyate pṛthak.* All references to the *Vākyapadīya* are taken from the edition by Wilhelm Rau, 1977.
87 *Vākyapadīya* 3.1.103-4.
88 *Vākyapadīya* 2.489. The word "lead upward" (*unnetum*) will be discussed below.
89 *Apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ trayīdarśanadūṣaṇāt / yad yathoktaṃ tathoktaṃ tad yathā nagnāṭadarśanam //.*
90 On the *nayavāda* in classical Jain sources, see Folkert 1993: 219-27; and Jaini 1979: 93-97.
91 Folkert 1993: 220.
92 *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*: 159.
93 *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, ch. 3, sect. 73. Lamotte (1976: 109-11) discusses several parallel passages in other sūtras, including the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra.*
94 The key passage is found in the prose digression that follows MHK 4.35: "The *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra* points out in all its pronouncements: 'There is one vehicle, not two or three.' The *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* says: 'The letter (*vyañjana*) teaches how a vehicle is defined; the meaning (*artha*) is the one approach (*naya*) to the knowledge that enters the indivisible Dharma Realm (*dharmadhātu*).' Likewise, it says in the *Sāgaramati Sūtra* and others: 'All vehicles are included in one vehicle.'" References can be found in the footnotes to the translation.
95 As discussed, for example, in Nattier 2007.
96 On the distinction between provisional meaning (*neyārtha*) and definitive meaning (*nītārtha*) in Buddhist sources, see Lamotte 1949 and Lopez 1988.
97 Compare the Jain definition of *naya* mentioned earlier: "that by which an object (*artha*) is led to (*nīyate*) or ascertained (*paricchidyate*) in a particular respect (*ekadeśaviśiṣṭa*)."
98 The distinction figures prominently in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*, a source that Bhāviveka quotes extensively in his account of the Śrāvakas.
99 *Vākyapadīya* 1.42.
100 *Vākyapadīya* 1.30.
101 *Vākyapadīya* 2.489.
102 Quoted in Derrida 1982: 217.
103 Nemerov 1991: 228.
104 When Bhāviveka refers to the "palace of reality" and the "mountain of wisdom," he has in mind the image of an Indian temple that combines the symbolic function of a palace for a deity and also the cosmic mountain at the center of the earth. These symbolic connections are discussed in Eckel 1992: ch. 1.
105 Jonas 2001: 135-56.
106 Jonas 2001: 152.

107 In the introduction to verse 3.292, the "he" of this verse is identified as a "practitioner (Tib. *rnal 'byor pa* / Skt. *yogin*). In later verses this practitioner is referred to as a Bodhisattva.
108 Bernhard 1965-68: 127. Compare also the *Dhammapada* in Carter and Palihawadana: 116. A similar verse is found in *Mahābhārata* 12.17.19: *prajñāprāsādam āruhya naśocyañ śocato janān / jagatīsthān ivādristho mandabuddhīn avekṣate //.*
109 For a commentary on the concept of repentance and conversion in Buddhist sources, see Eckel 1996.
110 The best source for the study of Bhāviveka's commentarial method is chapter 1 of *The Lamp of Wisdom*, his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses on the Middle Way*. Bhāviveka also gives a useful analysis of the parts of the syllogism in his account of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) at the end of chapter 27. For a translation and discussion of this passage, see Lindtner 1986a.
111 *Na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ / tadutpādavaiyarthyāt / atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca / na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti / atha sann api jāyeta / na kadācin na jāyeta /* (*Prasannapadā* 14).
112 *Na paramārthata ādhyātmikāyatanāni svata utpannāni / vidyamānatvāt / caitanyavad /* (*Prasannapadā* 25-26).
113 There has been significant discussion in Buddhist scholarship about whether it is appropriate to call the standard Indian inference as a "syllogism." (See Dreyfus 2003: 206-7 and Tillemans 1984.) There are important differences between the Indian inference and a standard Aristotelian syllogism, especially in the role of the "example." In this account of Bhāviveka's logic, I will follow the standard scholarly practice of referring to his argument as a "syllogism," even though it is subject to somewhat different formal requirements.
114 For a thorough study of this distinction in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka, see Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, especially Cabezón's account of the earliest uses of this distinction in Tibet (291-93).
115 *Sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet / tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam // Vigrahavyāvartanī* 1.
116 The cart, pot, and cloth are standard examples of composite entities that have no identity in their own right but are still able to perform practical functions.
117 *Yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ // Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29.
118 Bhāviveka's responds to this problem in verse 4.72 and in the subsequent commentary. His argument mirrors the account of his logical procedure in the commentary on verse 3.26. See the commentary on verse 4.72 for a more complete explanation.
119 *Sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*: *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.2.3 (Thakur 628).
120 *Tau samānādhikaraṇau viruddhau dharmau pakṣapratipakṣav ity uktau tayor ekataraṃ vaitaṇḍiko na sthāpayatīti parapakṣapratṣedhenaiva pravartata iti.* Quoted from Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Thakur 628).
121 Stcherbatsky 1930: vol. 1, p. 344.
122 Bhattacharya 1975.
123 Eckel 1980: 232-34.
124 As in MMK 24.8-10: "Buddhas rely on two truths when they teach the Dharma: ordinary relative truth (*lokasaṃvṛtisatya*) and ultimate (*paramārtha*) truth. Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound reality (*tattva*) in the Buddhas' teaching. It is impossible to teach the ultimate without relying on the conventional (*vyavahāra*), and without understanding the ultimate, it is impossible to attain nirvāṇa."
125 *Gal te rang gi phyogs bzhag pa med pa'i phyir dang / gzhan gyi phyogs sun 'byin pa'i co 'dri ba nyid ma yin nam zhe na / kho bo cag gi phyogs la ni ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid yin te / chos rnams kyi ngo*

bo nyid ni de yin pa'i phyir de na co 'dri ba nyid ma yin te / re zhig de ltar phyogs kyi skyon med par rnam par bzhag go // (Tibetan quoted from Iida 1980: 87-88).

126 Bhāviveka follows the logical procedure formulated by Dignāga (circa 400-480). The account that follows is based on Matilal 1998 and the edition and translation of Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* by Tachikawa (1971). Śaṅkarasvāmin is thought to have been a student of Dignāga. For a thorough logical analysis of the *Nyāyapraveśa*, see Gillon and Love 1980.

127 B. K. Matilal has commented on the logical issues implicit in this translation in 1998: 18-30.

128 Matilal 1998: 7.

129 On the historical significance of this point, see Eckel 2003.

130 This summary of the definition of the "inconclusive" reason is meant to include four of Śaṅkarasvāmin's six types (Tachikawa 1971: 124 and 142): one that is common [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*], one that is present in some *sapakṣa* and in all *vipakṣa*, one that is present in some *vipakṣa* and all *sapakṣa*, and one that is present in some *sapakṣa* and some *vipakṣa*. It exclude the "uncommon" (*asādhāraṇa*) reason and the reason that "establishes a set of contradictory results." Bhāviveka does not refer to the last of these types.

131 *Kośa* 2.62ab: "With the exception of the last, the mind and mental phenomena that have already arisen are the immediately preceding [condition]" (*cittacaittā acaramā utpannāḥ samanantaraḥ*).

132 It is possible that Bhāviveka considers a *viruddha-hetu* to be a subcategory of *anaikāntika-hetu*.

133 For a recent account of Dignāga's concept of the "unique particular" with references to the appropriate sources, see Arnold 2005, chapter 1.

134 As Georges B. J. Dreyfus has pointed out in his account of Tibetan debate (2003: 209).

135 AAA 267.

136 The *paṅkaprakṣālana-nyāya*, as discussed in Apte's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Appendix E: 66.

137 This section of the text also appears as a separate work in the Tibetan Canon (Otani no. 5640).

138 See Eckel 1985b: 74. On the term *yogācāra-bhikṣu*, see Silk 2000: 273.

139 As in *Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* 10.9; 22.10, 13; and 26.3.

140 The title of Āryadeva's text is discussed in Lang 1986 and Ruegg 1981: 52-53. For examples of the term *yogin* in the work of Candrakīrti, see May 1959: 229.

141 Huili 18. The following story about entrance to Nālandā is found on page 91.

142 *Dbu ma'i lam de ston par byed cing / sgrogs par byed pas ka zhes bya ste / skad kyi dbyings kyi sgra las* [*la* P] *dbu ma'i bstan bcos zhes bya ba'am / dbu ma zhes bya ba'i ming gang la yod pa de ni dbu ma'o // yang na ka zhes bya ba'i ming gis brjod pa yin pas dbu ma zhes bya ste / dbu ma'i grub pa'i mtha'o //* Sde-dge, Dza, folio 329a.

143 BBh 31; Willis 1979: 161-62. It would be useful to know what kind of institutional exclusion is involved in saying that someone is "a person with whom one should not share living quarters" (*asaṃvāsya*). Shayne Clarke (2008) explains that the possibilities can range from outright expulsion to some form of shunning. Either way, the term suggests that the person is no longer a monk in good standing in the monastic community.

144 Verse 5.7. The commentary explains the term "Perfection of Wisdom" by quoting a series of phrases from the sūtras.

145 Even though we no longer have these commentaries by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the point is clearly reflected in later commentaries. On the difference between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka interpretations of the Heart Sūtra, see Eckel 1987a. John P. Keenan (1997: 45) has said that "there is no extant textual evidence to support the view that [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] ever explicitly denigrated Mādhyamika thought." I take this to mean that

they did not designate the "Mādhyamikas" by name as their opponents. Bhāviveka clearly thought that passages like the one just quoted from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* constituted an explicit critique of the Madhyamaka and required his response.

146 MMK 24.8-9: *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ // ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ / te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane //.*

148 The full passage reads as follows: "Having finished translating Bodhisattva Asaṅga's Commentary on the [*Vajracchedikā*]*Prajñāpāramitā*, [I], Yijing, have examined carefully the nine examples that are singled out by the great master. I can say that the text is subtle and deep. Who else but someone in proximity to the Stage of Joy (*pramuditābhūmi*), could have produced such knowledge and wisdom? In the Western Lands (i.e. India), it has been handed down from master to disciple that in olden times Asaṅga Bodhisattva received these eighty verses directly from the venerable Maitreya in Tuṣita Heaven. They lay out the essentials of the Prajñāpāramitā according to the principles of the Yogācāra school, elucidating the meaning of consciousness-only. Consequently these teachings have flowed from India—ah! golden, a blazing radiance—all the way to Japan, and they have been disseminated in China like the light of the moon drifting over the peaks of the Himalayas. There were many commentaries on the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā* in the India. Having investigated their beginnings, the earliest is this verse commentary [by Asaṅga]. The great master Vasubandhu himself wrote a commentary on this work. Although Chinese translations [of the sūtra] have been made, they are deficient in conveying its meaning. So I sat down to carefully scrutinize it, earnestly examining its intricacies, and retranslated the commentary and sūtra to match their intent. Again, Bodhisattva Vasubandhu wrote a commentary, [emphasizing] the sevenfold meaning of the Prajñāpāramitā. His treatise was copiously transmitted at Nālandā, but its meaning contained such subtleties that those who analyzed it could not figure it out. A Dharma-master, Siṃhacandra, wrote a commentary on it, and in eastern India a learned layman named Candragomin wrote a commentary that explained the meaning by collating [the teachings of] various schools. While all of these conform to the idea of three identities, the same is not the case for Mādhyamikas, who have different commentaries that accord with the teachings of Nāgārjuna instead of Yogācāra.

"For Yogācāra the real exists, but the conventional does not exist; and [Yogacara] takes the three identities as foundational. For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist; and actually the two truths are primary. The great tenet of Prajñāpāramitā embodies both of these intentions. Just as we here in China have our [sectarian] divisions of the Dao into North and South, in the Western Lands the theoretical divide is between emptiness and existence. One should be aware of how these divisions are connected. If the principles are not harmonized and blended, each will be accepted [in opposition to the other by different factions]. The saints sincerely point out flaws [in others' opinions] and argue about the Vehicles. . . ." This passage occurs at the end of Yijing's translation of Asaṅga's Commentary on the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (T 1817:783ab). (This translation has been provided by Dan Lusthaus.) The Sanskrit text of Asaṅga's commentary has been published by Tucci, with a summary of Vasubandhu's analysis (1956-58: 1-171).

149 This explanation follows Vasubandhu's commentary: *na tathāsya bhāvo yathā pratibhāsa utpadyate / na ca sarvathābhāvo bhrāntimātrasyotpādāt //.*

150 *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*: 21.

151 Note that Bhāviveka's way of using the word *bhrānti* differs from the way Vasubandhu and Sthiramati used it in their commentaries on the *Madhyāntavibhāga* quoted earlier. In that context, *bhrānti* was used to name "deluded awareness" and was a synonym of consciousness or dependent identity. Here *bhrānti* is used as a way of describing imagined identity.

152 Tsong kha pa's argument is discussed in detail in Eckel 2003.

153 In verse 5.18 and in the commentary that follows, Bhāviveka uses the argument and language of the first verse of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*. Other sources are outlined in the notes on the translation of 5.18 and following verses.
154 The quotation comes from *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 2.189: *nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantraś ca vidyate*. Other occurrrences of this verse are noted in Lindtner 1982a: 155. I translate *bhāvaḥ* as "nature" rather than as "entity" or "thing."
155 The Tibetan translation (*sangs rgyas*) supports the reading *buddhāḥ*, but it would seem more appropriate to read *budhāḥ* ("scholars") as in 3.252.
156 In the commentary on 5.106, Bhāviveka explains that the Buddhas' awakening is only "vision" in a metaphorical sense. Actually Buddhas "see" by the discipline of no-seeing: "[The Buddhas' awareness] is a single moment of non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*), perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*). The word "see" (*paśyanti*) is a metaphor (*upacāra*): [they see] by the discipline of no-seeing (*adarśanayogena*)."
157 Compare Bhāviveka's definition of the Buddha as "the understanding that is no understanding" (*abodhabodha*) in MHK 3.267 (Eckel 1992: 158).
158 See note 148.
159 Eckel 1987b: 71.
160 A particularly useful source for the study of this Vedānta argument is Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, edited and translated by A. J. Alston (1971: 78ff.).
161 As in chapter 2 (*āvaraṇapariccheda*) of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (MAV).
162 This point was discussed on pages 37-38.
163 For further discussion of Bhāviveka's understanding of the "previous vow" and for the source of this passage, see Eckel 1992: 75.
164 This analysis is based on Mark Tatz's account of the lives of Maitrīgupta in Tatz 1987.

Part 2:
Translation

A Note on the Translation

Indian philosophical literature, whether it is verse or prose, poses distinctive problems for a translator. On the surface, the challenge may seem simple. John Dryden once said about his own translations of the classics: "I have endeavor'd to make Virgil speak such English as he would himself have spoken, if he had been born in England, and in this present age." A translator who takes Dryden's advice literally would have to force Bhāviveka's argument into the idiom of a contemporary philosopher. This might have its value in certain settings, but it risks obscuring the distinctive rhetorical patterns and styles of argument that made Bhāviveka's text persuasive in its own cultural milieu. In this translation I have not tried to make Bhāviveka speak like a contemporary philosopher. I have tried instead to lead scholars of Buddhism or Indian philosophy into Bhāviveka's intellectual world with as few barriers as possible. To say that the result is "readable" in the same way that the translation of a sūtra or a Buddhist legend might be readable would be to say too much, and it would distort the intention of Bhāviveka's text. My goal has been simply to make Bhāviveka's work "intelligible" so that a thoughtful and attentive reader can understand why Bhāviveka's arguments would have been effective tools to understand the serious questions of Buddhist philosophy in sixth-century India.

The first step for the reader, like the translator, is to identify the logical components of Bhāviveka's arguments. In most cases this means identifying the opponents' objections that begin each chapter and then setting them side by side with Bhāviveka's responses. Almost all of these arguments are presented in the form of a standard three-part syllogism, including a thesis, a reason, and an example. Bhāviveka begins his responses to the opponents' syllogisms by pointing out their "faults" (*doṣa*), then he states syllogisms of his own and defends them against the faults alleged by his opponents. The best way to enter into the spirit of these arguments is to imagine that the text is preparing a student for a debate. Sometimes Bhāviveka refers to opponents with the second person pronoun: "If you say such and such, we reply." Sometimes he refers to them in the third person as "the opponent" (*para*) or as the representative of a particular tradition. Sometimes no opponent is identified, but the argument still continues in the form of a hypothetical debate.

One of the potential barriers to understanding has to do with the elliptical style of scholarly Sanskrit. To translate Bhāviveka's arguments into intelligible English often requires the insertion of words that were not necessary in the text's original setting. Sometimes this is due to the technical sophistication of the text. Bhāviveka was writing for someone who already had mastered a certain body knowledge and did not need to be told the meaning of common technical terms. When Bhāviveka presupposes some form of technical knowledge, I have attempted to provide an explanation in the notes. Another

reason for the elliptical character of the text has to with a stylistic preference for nouns over verbs. For example, a typical three-part syllogisms (expressing a Yogācāra objection in verse 5.27) is translated as follows: "External objects have the nature of mind, because they are objects of cognition, like an immediately preceding cognition." In Sanskrit this syllogism is more compact: "An external object (*bāhyo 'rtho*) [has] the nature of mind (*cittasvabhāvo*), because of consciousness-object-ness (*vijñānaviṣayatvena*), like an immediately preceding (*yathā samantaraḥ*)." The term "immediately preceding cognition" is abbreviated, and the verbs are understood. When this syllogism is transposed from the Sanskrit structure into English, other stylistic choices naturally follow.

Another fundamental reason for the compactness of Sanskrit argument has to do with the practice of *anuvṛtti* or "carrying over." Words that are mentioned early in an argument can be "carried over" or understood in subsequent verses. Sometimes they are referred to simply by the pronouns "this" or "that"; sometimes they are omitted altogether. Since these words are meant to be understood from the context, it would be justifiable for a translator to insert them with no special indication that they are missing in the text. A more common practice in translations of Indian sources is to insert these words in brackets, to indicate that they are unspoken but are required for a full translation of the text. I have adopted that practice here and have added the "carried over" words in brackets. (When the source of a "carried over" word is unclear, I have explained it in the notes.) But I have great sympathy for those who argue that translators of Indian texts should drop the use of brackets. When we read a modern translation of Plato's *Republic*, it would seem absurdly pedantic for a translator to insert words in brackets. Most readers would be tempted to say: If the translation requires the addition of a word, add it and forget the brackets. If the word is not required, leave it out. We may need to wean the translation of Buddhist philosophy from the pedantic equivocation of the bracketed word. But for a scholarly translation, it seems better to indicate the presence of a carried-over word, rather than send the reader on a fruitless quest for a word that is not found in the text. I have tried to use brackets only for words that are required by the text. I have not used them to insert my own explanatory comments. Explanation and commentary can be found in the notes.

The question of what to insert and what to leave out comes up most acutely in the translation of Bhāviveka's verses. Bhāviveka follows a common Buddhist practice of expressing his arguments in verses embedded in commentary. (Other prominent examples of this genre are Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*.) The most common suspicion about this text is to doubt Bhāviveka's authorship of the commentary, but few doubt the authorship of the verses. Why did Bhāviveka choose to write in verse? Tradition certainly played a role. His text mimics the verses of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikāḥ* and implicitly lays claim to their authority. But his verses also were intended to play a role in the process of debate. As the story of Dharmapāla's triumphant feat of memorization makes clear, a scholar could gain

competitive advantage by memorizing his opponent's verses and repeating them without error. Verses were the currency of debate. We know very little about Indian debate practices and can only guess at the way these verses were actually used, but Bhāviveka gives us a picture of what might have made a successful verse. First of all, to be easy for a student to memorize and useful in debate, a verse should be forceful and clear. A debater would want a verse that could put the opponent on the defensive and persuade the audience that his view was correct. This is hard to do with a verse that is murky, ambiguous, or obscure. But a successful verse should not be too clear. It should challenge the opponent's mastery of the tradition, use words in a clever way, and flatter the audience's learning. At least this is what we might imagine, and this is what we find in some of Bhāviveka's most successful verses. In my translation of the verses, I have tried to strike a proper balance between clarity and compactness, so that some of Bhāviveka's rhetorical skill comes through. When the impact of the verse depends on a play on words (as in verse 4.65), this word-play is explained in the notes.

The notes are more extensive than usual and deserve some explanation. They are meant to do three things. Their most important function is to elucidate the logical structure of the argument. Unless the argument is clear, it is impossible to understand the significance of the text. The second function is to fill in some of the intellectual background that Bhāviveka could assume in his original audience and did not need to explain. I use the word "some" deliberately. A vast amount of the cultural lore that lies behind this text is now lost. But I have tried to draw on the resources of every aspect of Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) scholarship to construct a picture of Bhāviveka's sources. The result is an extraordinarily rich and detailed picture of Buddhist intellectual life in sixth-century India. I hope that these notes will spark a multitude of new questions and new lines of investigation in Indian Buddhist scholarship. The third and perhaps least significant function of the notes is to explain why I have interpreted certain technical terms in the way I did. Rather than invent new terminology, I have tried to situate this translation within the established traditions of Buddhist scholarship, represented by Edward Conze, Franklin Edgerton, Étienne Lamotte, André Bareau, B. K. Matilal, Peter Skilling, and others. I hope this will make the terminology less mysterious than it would be otherwise. Finally, I should say what the notes are not intended to do. After Étienne Lamotte's *Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, it would be foolish to try to give a complete account of every Buddhist concept mentioned in this work. Instead, I have tried to indicate the sources where a reader can find a more complete explanation. Sometimes these are primary sources like the *Abhidharmakośa*; sometimes they are reference works like Franklin Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*; and sometimes they are the works of Lamotte himself. The goal is to make Bhāviveka's work intelligible, and through it to cast light on the tradition he represents.

To facilitate reference to the Tibetan text, I have included the folio numbers of the sDe-dge edition in the margins of the translation.

Chapter 4: Analysis of Reality According to the Śrāvakas

Now, here begins the fourth chapter, the analysis of reality according to the Śrāvakas.[1] The purpose is to prove that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching.

Introduction

Reality is experienced (*anubhūta*) by profound knowledge of the supreme Dharma as it has previously been defined. D145a

> 4.1 Those who have low aspirations cannot understand this difficult approach. Shaken by baseless fear, they make the following claims.[2]

This approach (*nīti*)[3] is the aforementioned quest for the knowledge of reality[4] (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*). This approach is difficult for those who do not know the means to remove the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*)[5] and cannot understand it. They

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1 The title of this chapter appears two different ways. In the opening line, it is called "the analysis of reality according to the Śrāvakas." At the end of the chapter, it is called "the introduction to reality according to the Śrāvakas." I have combined these two versions of the title to reflect the title of the Yogācāra chapter. The term translated as "analysis" (*viniścaya*) occurs frequently in the titles of Indian philosophical texts. Bhāviveka is likely to have associated it with important Yogācāra works, such as the *Tattvaviniścaya* (Asaṅga's lost commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*) and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. For further discussion of the meaning of this term, see Schmithausen 1969b.

2 The terminology in this verse and in the accompanying commentary reflects conventional Mahāyāna accounts of the shortcomings of the Śrāvakas. Compare, for example, MSA 1.18: "If someone who has inferior aspirations, has a very low status, and is surrounded by inferior friends does not aspire to the Dharma that is broad, deep, and well taught, it is established [as superior]" (*hīnādhimukteḥ sunihīnadhātor hīnaiḥ sahāyaiḥ parivāritasya / audāryagāmbhīryasudeśite 'smin dharme 'dhimuktir yadi nāsti siddham //*).

3 Bhāviveka's criticism of the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras focuses on errors in their "approach" (*nīti* or *naya*). For a discussion of this term in Bhāviveka's account of Buddhist philosophical differences, see Part 1 of this book.

4 "The quest for the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*)" is the title of MHK chapter 3.

5 On the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), see note 29 below.

cannot understand the approach or the path of the Mahāyāna, which is called a vehicle because it is used to travel or reach a destination. Why? Because they are deficient in the faculties (*indriya*), namely faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom.[6] The vision in which there is no-apprehension (*anupalambhadarśana*)[7] is not a basis for fear,[8] but they think of it as a frightening nihilistic view (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*). It is as if they were afraid of empty space. They do not see anything without being afraid, and their minds tremble in the grip of the demon of realism. It is as if they were drawing inferences about the sun from the light of a firefly, or about the ocean from the mark of a cow's hoofprint.[9] These adherents of the Śrāvakayāna[10] have no aspiration (*adhimukti*) for the [vehicle] that is deep and broad.[11] They think and they argue that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching.

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6 On the five faculties, see Gethin 2001: ch. 4.

7 Bhāviveka equates the Buddha's non-conceptual awareness with awareness in which there is no "apprehension" (*upalambha* or *upalabdhi*). Bhāviveka's most thorough account of the practice of no-apprehension is found in verses 4.20-22. See note 133 below.

8 The term translated as "baseless" (*asthāna*) can mean "out of place" or "unsuitable." More literally, it can mean "no place" or "no standing." The simplest way to translate the compound *asthāna-trāsa* ("baseless fear") is as an unsuitable, unnecessary, or useless fear. But the compound also can be interpreted as referring to a fear of "no place" or "no standing." These meanings play an important role in the account of the Bodhisattva practice in the first chapter of *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*: "When one speaks of a 'Bodhisattva,' what *dharma* does the word 'Bodhisattva' denote? I do not, O Blessed One, see (*samanupaśyāmi*) that *dharma* 'Bodhisattva,' nor a *dharma* called 'perfect wisdom.' Since I neither find (*avindan*), nor apprehend (*anupalabhamāno*), nor see (*asamanupaśyan*) a *dharma* 'Bodhisattva,' nor a 'perfect wisdom,' what Bodhisattva shall I instruct and admonish in what perfect wisdom? And yet, O Blessed One, if, when this is pointed out, a Bodhisattva's heart does not become cowed, nor stolid, does not despair nor despond, if he does not turn away or become dejected, does not tremble, is not frightened (*uttrasyati*) or terrified (*saṃtrasyati*), it is just this Bodhisattva, this great being who should be instructed in perfect wisdom" (Conze 1973b: 83-84). Several lines later Subhūti relates the Bodhisattva's fearlessness to the discipline of no-standing (*asthānayoga*): "A Bodhisattva who does not become afraid when this deep and perfect wisdom is being taught should be recognized as not lacking in perfect wisdom, as standing at the irreversible stage of a Bodhisattva, standing firmly, with the discipline of no standing (*asthānayogena*)" (translation adapted from Conze 1973b: 85). For other uses of the term *asthāna* in the Perfection of Wisdom literature, see Conze 1973a, s.v. *asthāna* and *asthāna-yoga*. Compare also Bhāviveka's use of the term *apratiṣṭha* ("no foundation") in his account of the Dharma Body of the Buddha in MHK 3.278 and his account of "nirvāṇa-without-foundation" (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) in MHK 1.20-21; 3.292-95.

9 Mahāyāna sūtras often compare the Śrāvakayāna to the light of a firefly and the water in a cow's hoofprint, as in chapter 3 of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* and the *Ārya Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa Sūtra* (Otani no. 760/32), translated in Chang 1983: 117-21. The comparison is also found in the *Aśokāvadāna* (Strong 1983: 190).

10 Tib. *nyan thos kyi theg pa pa / Skt. śrāvakayānin* or *śrāvakayānika*.

11 Compare Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* 4.79: "Those who are dejected and unaccomplished criticize the Mahāyāna because it is deep and broad. They do this out of ignorance and cause harm to themselves and others."

The Śrāvakas' Objection

To prove that it is not, they say:

> 4.2 The Teacher's[12] body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition, because it is a body, like the body of a cowherd.[13] So they say.[14]

The word "Buddha" refers to the moment of cognition that follows the diamond-like concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*) and is attained by the sixteen moments of thought in the path of liberation (*vimuktimārga*).[15] This does not contradict the teaching of any schools (Tib. *sde pa* / Skt. *nikāya*). Furthermore, it is reasonable for this non-conceptual

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12 The word "Teacher" (*śāstṛ*) refers to the Buddha.

13 Verse 4.2 states the first formal syllogism of the chapter:

> The Teacher's body (*śarīra*) is not the locus (*āśraya*) of non-conceptual cognition,
> because it is a body,
> like the body of a cowherd.

In spite of its apparent simplicity, this verse presents a number of problems. The first has to do with the meaning of the word "locus" (*āśraya*). *Āśraya* can refer to the place where the Buddha's non-conceptual cognition is located or to the object that is named by the term "non-conceptual." The first option is the simplest grammatically, but the second option removes some of the awkwardness of the commentary. Following the second option yields the following translation: "If the Buddha is a non-conceptual cognition, then a body cannot be called ["Buddha"], because it is a body, like the body of a cowherd."

The second problem has to do with the reason in the syllogism: "because it is a body." The Tibetan translation (*lus can yin phyir*) reflects a reading of *śarīritvāt* ("because it has a body") rather than *śarīratvāt* ("because it is a body"). A literal reading of the Tibetan translation of the verse yields the following thesis: "The Teacher's non-conceptual cognition does not have a body as its locus." The problem with this is that it produces an impossible example. It makes no sense to say that a cowherd does not have a body. The example is possible only if the Teacher's body is the subject of the inference: "The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition . . . like the body of a cowherd." If this is the thesis, then the reason must be "because it is a body" (*śarīratvāt*) rather than "because it has a body" (*śarīritvāt*). The Tibetan translation must be an error on the part of the translator or copyist.

14 The particle *kila* (translated as "so they say") normally has an emphatic meaning, but here it is used ironically to distance Bhāviveka from the words of the opponent, as in Speijer 1886: 312. The word is used the same way in 5.2.

15 According to *Kośa* 6.28ff., all of the sixteen moments of thought are part of the *darśanamārga* ("path of vision"), with the exception of the sixteenth, which is part of the *bhāvanāmārga* ("path of practice"). Bhāviveka lists the sixteen moments in the commentary on verse 4.27. Obermiller discusses these moments in his analysis of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (1932a: 22, 39). Although Bhāviveka says that this numbering system does not contradict the teaching of other schools, others would not agree. For a different account of the moments leading to awakening, see Skilling 2006: 113-14.

D145b [cognition] to be the Buddha, because it apprehends the four noble truths, like a Pratyekabuddha's cognition and so forth. The thesis is that a non-conceptual cognition can be the locus, because it is non-conceptual, but a body that has auspicious signs and marks cannot be called "Buddha." Why? Because it is a body. A body cannot be the locus of the non-conceptual [cognition that is the] Buddha. What is the example? Like the body of a cowherd and so forth. This [argument] shows that [the Śrāvakas] think that the Buddha is a moment of cognition and do not accept the definition that is widely known in the Mahāyāna, namely, that [a Buddha consists] of three bodies. The Master[16] says "so they say" (*kila*), because he does not agree. He does not want to be defiled by the opponents' opinions, by their alleged altruism, or even by their words.

If the adherents of the Mahāyāna[17] say,

> In the Mahāyāna, the Buddha's awakening (*bodhi*) is said to have five aspects: an eternal body, Thusness as a mere *dharma*, the understanding of conditions, the understanding of no-arising, and omniscience,[18]

they are not knowledgeable[19] about the approach of the teaching (*pravacananīti*), because [they think that awakening] is achieved by a different path. In response [we] say:

4.3 The great awakening of the Buddhas is achieved[20] by following the eight-

16 The word *ācārya* ("Master") in this passage is used like the word *śāstrakāra* ("author") in the commentary on 5.2 to refer to the author of the verses. The word is used in a similar way in the commentary on 5.14cd and 5.83cd. Some have taken this to mean that the author of the commentary is different from the author of the verses. This issue is discussed in Part 1 of this book.

17 Tib. *theg pa chen po pa* / Skt. *mahāyānin* or *mahāyānika*.

18 The source of this verse is unknown.

19 The Tibetan term *mkhas pa* ("knowledgeable") is used to translate several different Sanskrit terms, including *sat* (4.23), *vidvān* (4.45, 60, 74), *budha* (4.67), and *dhīra* (5.1), as well as terms such as *kauśalya* ("skill") in the compound *upāya-kauśalya* ("skill-in-means"). As a noun, it is translated as "scholar"; as an adjective, it is translated as "knowledgeable" or "wise." The term often refers to an adherent of the Mahāyāna or to a member of the author's own school. See, for example, *Ālokamālā* 121, 163; *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (La Vallée Poussin 1932-33b: 154); and *Jñānasārasamuccaya* (Mimaki 1976: 188). Commenting on 5.1, Bhāviveka explains that a "scholar" (Tib. *mhkas pa* / Skt. *dhīra*) is a "Mahāyāna master" (*ācārya*).

20 Bhāviveka's use of the words *prati-pad* and *prati-i* (translated here as "achieved") is discussed more extensively in the notes on verses 5.8-9. These words combine a sense of motion with a sense of understanding. Normally they are translated with the word "understand" (following the Tibetan *rtogs*). Here, where the verb *prati-i* occurs twice and take "awakening" and "path" as its direct objects, it seems better to translate it in the first case as "achieve" and in the second as "follow." The Tibetan translators made a similar choice by translating one occurrence of the word as *rab rtogs byed* ("understand") and the other as *'dren byed* ("lead").

fold path, because it is awakening, like a the awakening of a student.[21]

According to tradition,[22] the noble eightfold path, which consists of right vision, right thinking, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, is the means to attain perfect Buddhahood. Therefore, the Buddhas' awakening is achieved or experienced (*anubhūta*) by this path. Awakening is D146a achieved by the discrimination (*pravicaya*) of all *dharma*s. This is the nature of awakening, and because this is the nature of awakening, awakening must be achieved by this path and no other, like the awakening of a Śrāvaka. A Buddha's awakening is achieved by the eightfold path, like the awakening of a Śrāvaka.[23]

Someone may ask: If [Śrāvakas and Buddhas] have the same path, why is the Śrāvakas' awareness one-sided and dependent on others, while the Buddha's is omniscient (*sarvākārajña*) and independent of others?[24]

[Reply:]

4.4 A Teacher can be omniscient because of the excellence of his faculties, just as [we] think that someone can have [different] analytical insights, even though there is no difference in the path.

The Blessed One's five faculties[25] are extremely sharp, the Śrāvakas' are dull, and the Pratyekabuddhas' are in between. This is why the Blessed One has the omniscience of a Self-Existent One (*svayambhū*), while Śrāvakas and others do not. [We] see that Śrāvakas have different faculties, even though their path is the same. For example, it says:

> The wisdom of all sentient beings, apart from the Tathāgata, does not amount to even a sixteenth part of the wisdom of Śāriputra.

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21 The word "student" (*śiṣya*) is a synonym for "Śrāvaka."

22 Interpret *lung gi rigs pa* as *āgama-nikāya* ("body of tradition") rather than *āgama-yukti* ("argument of tradition").

23 Compare MN III 7-15 (*Gopaka-Moggallāna Sutta*).

24 The Śrāvakas have just argued that the Mahāyāna teaches "a different path." Here the adherent of the Mahāyāna seems to ask the Śrāvakas to explain how their view of the path accounts for the difference between Śrāvakas and Buddhas. The Tibetan text contains an additional negative particle: "If [Śrāvakas and Buddhas] do not have the same path, why is the Śrāvakas' awareness one-sided. . . ?" The passage makes better sense if this particle is dropped. The *Abhidharmadīpa* discusses the same issue in verses 239-41, in response to the following objection: "If it is said that there is no path to awakening other than the Tripiṭaka, which begins with the Sūtras, then, if there is no difference in the path, there should be no difference in the results achieved by Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas" (Jaini 1977: 202). See also *Traité* 1559. Bhāviveka gives his own position in verses 4.20cd-22: Bodhisattvas practice the same path, but practice it differently.

25 Literally, "the faculties (*indriya*) that begin with faith."

And:

> Maudgalyāyana is the foremost of those who have magical power, Aniruddha is the foremost of those who have clairvoyance, Ānanda is the foremost of those who retain what they have heard, and Pūrṇa is the foremost of those who recite the Dharma.[26]

Pratyekabuddhas have five aspects. What are they? It is said:[27]

> Those who are in the Pratyekabuddha stage (*bhūmi*) have five aspects: lineage (*gotra*), path (*mārga*), achievement (*samudāgama*), way of life (*vihāra*), and behavior (*carita*). The lineage of Pratyekabuddhas has three characteristics. First, it can happen naturally that a Pratyekabuddha has little passion and is not inclined toward society, or he can have little com-
> D146b passion and not be inclined to serve the interests of sentient beings, or he can have excessive pride, want to have no teacher, and become awakened alone. There are three kinds of paths. Some worship Buddhas for a hundred eons, resolve to attain solitary awakening, and reach fulfillment. Others worship Buddhas, but attain only partial fulfillment. Others, who [resolve] to become [Pratyeka-] buddhas, attain the results [of asceticism], but do not become Arhants. These three [paths] are the causes of [three] achievements. With these [paths], [Pratyekabuddhas] attain Arhantship without a Buddha and without a teacher. A Pratyekabuddha who achieves the first [achievement] is compared to the horn of a rhinoceros. Others achieve [achievements] that constitute conditional Pratyekabuddhahood.[28] The first has a solitary way of life and aspires to profound insight. The other two live in groups. [All] control their bodies, and so forth, beg for food, and remain silent to help those who are less fortunate.

There are differences in their awareness, but not in their path. The Buddha's [awareness] should be seen in the same way.

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26 Compare AN I 23-24 (*Etadagga Vagga*): *iddhimantānaṃ yad idaṃ mahā moggallāno. dibbacakkhukānaṃ yad idaṃ aniruddho. dhammakathikānaṃ yad idaṃ puṇṇo mantāniputto*. Ānanda is not mentioned in this passage.

27 Bhāviveka's account of the "aspects" of the *pratyekabuddhabhūmi* is similar to the explanation found in the text of the same name edited by Wayman (1960) and translated by Kloppenborg (1974: 126-29). Many of the obscure and elliptical phrases in Bhāviveka's verses can be filled in from this text, but difficulties remain. The last *pāda*, for example, may refer to the idea that Pratyekabuddhas teach with their body, but without words, but the verse can be interpreted quite differently.

28 On "conditional" Pratyekabuddhahood, see Norman 1983 and Collins 1992.

Now, the adherents of the Mahāyāna may say: There are two kinds of obstacles (*āvaraṇa*): the obstacles that consist of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*), such as passion, and the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), such as material form (*rūpa*).[29] Of these, the [eightfold] path removes only the obstacles that consist of defilements, not the obstacles to knowledge. As it is said:

> The diversity of the world is not desire; the passion of the human imagination is desire. The diversity of the world may remain, but those who are wise control their desire for it.[30]

Similarly,

> O desire, I know your root; you arise from imagination. I will no longer imagine you, and you will then no longer exist for me.[31]

This means that someone who is free from imagination is free from defilements. D147a
Śrāvakas and others are subject to the traces (*vāsanā*) of defilements that are produced from time immemorial by the obstacles that consist of defilements. The Blessed One has completely uprooted the entire network of defilements, along with their traces, by long practice of the vision (*darśana*) of emptiness. So [the Blessed One] is said to be distinctive, in that he has the means (*upāya*) to remove the obstacles to knowledge.

This [assertion] is not correct. Why?

> 4.5 [We] think that obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path, because they are mental obstacles, like obstacles that consist of defilements.[32]

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29 Bhāviveka's account of the obstacles that consist of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) follows chapter 2 (*āvaraṇaparicc heda*) of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, attributed to Maitreya. In his commentary on MMK 18.4-5, Bhāviveka says: "The liberation of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas results from a vision of the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of persons (*pudgala*). [The liberation] of those who follow the Buddhayāna is attained by removing both the obstacles that consist of defilements and the obstacles to knowledge" (Eckel 1980: 214-15). For further discussion of these obstacles, see the commentary on verses 4.26-29 below. See also BBh 62; Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 104; and May 1959: 141.

30 *Udānavarga* 2.7: *na te kāmā yāni citrāṇi loke saṃkalparāgaḥ puruṣasya kāṃaḥ / tiṣṭhanti citrāṇi tathaiva loke athātra dhīrā vinayanti cchandam*. The Sanskrit text is found in Bernhard 1965-68: 114. This verse is quoted in the commentary on MHK 3.24ab (Iida 1980: 80) and in the commentary on *Kośa* 3.3.

31 *Udānavarga* 2.1: *kāma jānāmi te mūlaṃ saṃkalpāt kāma jāyase / na tvāṃ saṃkalpayiṣyāmi tato me na bhaviṣyasi*. The Sanskrit text is found in Bernhard 1965-68: 112. This verse is quoted in Candrakīrti's commentary on MMK 18.5.

32 Bhāviveka gives a clear explanation of this syllogism in the commentary:

"Removal of obstacles to knowledge" is the subject (*dharmin*). "By the same path" is the predicate (*dharma*). The combination of subject and predicate is the thesis (*pakṣa*). An obstacle is something that hinders or obscures. "Because they are mental obstacles" is the reason (*hetu*). This is qualified [by the term "mental"] to avoid the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatva*) that would come from similarity with an external obstacle. "Like obstacles that consist of defilements" is the example.[33] In other words,[34] obstacles to knowledge can be removed by this path, just as [the obstacles] that consist of defilements can be removed [by this path], because both are obstacles.

[An adherent of the Mahāyāna] may say that, according to the texts of the Śrāvakayāna, omniscience is attained by this very same path, but not according to the texts of the Mahāyāna. But this is incorrect for the following reason:

> 4.6 Even in the Mahāyāna, [you] think that this path leads to the omniscience of a Sage, because [the Mahāyāna] is a different vehicle, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna.[35]

The following words should be supplied: "In all three vehicles, this very same path is the cause of the attainment of the three types of awakening, and apart from this path there is no awakening whatsoever."

Why waste any more words? If [someone claims that] the Mahāyāna does not

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> Removal of of the obstacles to knowledge is brought about by the same path,
> because they are mental obstacles,
> like the obstacles that consist of knowledge.

He responds to this argument in verses 4.25-27. In the commentary on verse 4.5, he explains that the word "obstacle" is qualified by the term "mental" to avoid confusion with "external" obstacles. An external obstacle is a physical object like a blanket. A blanket covers or obstructs one's vision of a bed, but it is not the kind of obstacle that is removed by practicing the path.

33 There is a problem in the Tibetan text of this line: *zhes bya ba'i* should be the end of one sentence and *nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa* the beginning of another. It is likely that something has been left out.

34 "In other words" (Tib. *snyam du bsams pa yin no* / Skt. *ity abhiprāyaḥ* or *iti cintā*) is a common way for a commentator to paraphrase the meaning of a verse. See Tubb and Boose 25.

35 The argument in verse 4.6 seems to mean that the adherent of the Mahāyāna has to admit that there is only one path, because the Mahāyāna is a vehicle, not a path. In other words, there may be many vehicles, but these vehicles follow only one road. Bhāviveka turns the same point against the Śrāvaka in verses 4.20cd-22, when he says that the Mahāyāna follows the same path but uses a different "approach" (*naya*). In his discussion of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra*s later in the chapter, he treats *yāna* and *naya* as equivalent terms. (See notes 242-44.) In the commentary that follows verse 4.6, Bhāviveka supplies an unusually long sentence to fill out the meaning of the verse. Since the Tibetan *zhes bya ba ni* (Skt. *iti*) occurs at the end of the sentence, it is possible that only the last clause ("and apart from this path . . .") is intended.

contradict the Buddha's teaching, then it is reasonable to analyze whether the path [taught in the Mahāyāna] is consistent with the point of view [of the Buddha's teaching].[36] It cannot be the teaching of the Buddha, because it is contradicted by reason (*yukti-viruddha*).[37] In what way? D147b

> 4.7 The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, or because it teaches a different path, like the Vedānta view.[38]

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. Why? Because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas, Abhidharma, and Vinaya. Everything that was taught by the Buddha appears in the Sūtrāntas, Abhidharma, and Vinaya, and not even the word "Mahāyāna" is mentioned in the Sūtrāntas, Abhidharma, and Vinaya. Therefore, [the Mahāyāna] is not the Buddha's teaching, like the Vedānta view. Vedānta is the conclusion (*avasāya*) or end of the Veda.[39] It says that one [removes] impurities and attains liberation by bathing at pilgrimage places on [rivers] such as the Ganges, by fasting, and by reciting mantras in three ways (*traidhātuka*).[40] The adherents of the Mahāyāna also bathe in the four

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36 The text that introduces verse 4.7 is unclear and may be corrupt.

37 In the *Vyākhyāyukti* (VY), Vasubandhu defines "reason" (*yukti*) as the three means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*): perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and authoritative tradition (*āptāgama*). (See Skilling 2000: 321.) According to this definition, it would contradict reason to contradict the Buddha's teaching as recorded in the sūtras.

38 The two arguments in this verse constitute the heart of the Śrāvaka objection:

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching,
> because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth,
> and because it teaches a different path,
> like the Vedānta view (*vedāntadarśana*).

Bhāviveka's response is found in verses 4.34-56. In the commentary on verse 4.7, the opponent includes the Abhidharma in the teaching of the Buddha. This may indicate that Bhāviveka is imagining a Sarvāstivādin opponent, rather than a Sautrāntika. Sarvāstivādins defended the authority of the Abhidharma with arguments that were similar to the arguments used by Bhāviveka to defend the Mahāyāna.

39 The word translated as "conclusion" (*nges pa*) normally corresponds to one of the Sanskrit words for "certainty," such as *niścaya*. Negi also cites *avasāya* as a possible equivalent. It is likely that Bhāviveka is defining the word *anta* in Vedānta as "conclusion" or "settled meaning," both of which are meanings of *avasāya*. Bhāviveka gives a similar etymology of "Vedānta" in the commentary on MHK 8.1: "Vedānta occurs at the end of the Veda and is conclusive knowledge of non-attachment" (*rig pa'i mthar phyin pa ni rig byed mtha' pa ste / chags pa med par nges par rig pa'o*: sDe-dge Dza, folio 251a).

40 According to Douglas Renfrew Brooks (private communication), the word *traidhātuka* ("three realms") can refer in Hindu Tantra to three kinds of recitation (silent, under one's breath, and aloud) or to recitation that is directed toward three realms (the world, the

rivers called Ganges, Sindhu, Pakṣu, and Sītā,[41] drink from them, and, while standing in them, initiate and repeat *dhāraṇī*s and mantras to remove impurities and increase merit. Because [the Mahāyāna] teaches this other path, it is like the Vedānta view. This is why [we] say that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching.

> 4.8ab Or [the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching] because it improperly denies cause and effect, like a nihilistic view (*nāstikadarśana*).

This is another reason [for the claim that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching]. [The adherents of the Mahāyāna] accept that everything is completely empty of self, and they say that, because there are no actions, results, [four] truths, or [three] jewels,
D148a there is nothing to be done, no action, and no result. Because they improperly deny (*apa-vad*) cause and effect, the system (*siddhānta*) of the Mahāyāna is equivalent to the view that there is only this world. Are they not also annihilationists (*ucchedavādin*)? They hold the view that neither this world nor any other exists and no result comes from good or bad actions.[42] The point of the Madhyamaka chapter that begins with the following verse is relevant here as well:

> If everything is empty and there is no arising or cessation, then the four noble truths do not exist for you.[43]

Furthermore,

> 4.8cd The point is clinched because it is not included in the eighteen schools.

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ancestors, and the gods). Here Bhāviveka is comparing a Mahāyāna practice to one that is found in Vedānta tradition.

41 Edgerton discusses these four rivers in BHSD, s.v. "Pakṣu." The names of the four rivers also appear in MVY 3304-8 in the names of four Nāgarājas. The accepted form of the last name is Sītā, although the sDe-dge clearly reads Śīta. See the commentary on verse 4.36 for more discussion of these rivers. For a contemporary account of these rivers in Himālayan geography, see Staal 2004.

42 This is a stock definition of a false view (Skt. *mithyādṛṣṭi* / Pali *micchādiṭṭhi*), as in the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (MN III 71ff.): "What, O monks, is a false view? There is no such thing as alms, sacrifice, or oblation; there is no such thing as the fruit or result of good or bad actions; there is no such thing as this world or the next. . . ." The commentary on *Kośa* 4.78 defines a false view with a quotation from a sūtra: "There is no such thing as alms, sacrifice, or oblation, no good action, and no bad action" (*nāsti dattaṃ nāstīṣṭaṃ nāsti hutaṃ nāsti sucaritaṃ nāsti duścaritam*). Seven different types of "annihilation doctrine" (*uccheda-vāda*) are listed in the *Brahmajāla Sūtra* (DN I 2-46). None corresponds precisely to this formula. For further discussion of "false views" in the Pali tradition, see Jaini 2007.

43 MMK 24.1.

The argument is formulated as follows: The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the eighteen schools, like the Vedānta view.

How did the divisions of the eighteen schools (*nikāya*) come to be?[44] [I] have heard about them in my lineage (*guruparamparā*) as follows.

A Sarvāstivāda Account[45]

One hundred and sixty years after the parinirvāṇa of the Blessed One, the Buddha, in the reign of the king named Dharmāśoka in the city called Kusumapura, there was a great schism (Tib. *dbyen chen po* / Skt. *mahābheda*) in the Saṃgha as a result of various disputes (Tib. *rtsod pa* / Skt. *vivāda*). The first division was into two schools: the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sthāvira.

Eventually the Mahāsāṃghika school divided into eight: (1) the Mahāsāṃghikas, (2) the Ekavyāvahārikas, (3) the Lokottaravādins, (4) the Bahuśrutīyas, (5) the Prajñaptivādins, (6) the Caitikas, (7) the Pūrvaśailas, and (8) the Aparaśailas.

Eventually the Sthāviras divided into ten: (1) the Sthāviras who are also called Haimavatas, (2) the Sarvāstivādins who are called Vibhajyavādins[46] and the Hetuvādins D148b whom some call Muruṇṭakas, (3) the Vātsīputrīyas, (4) the Dharmottarīyas, (5) the Bhadrayānīyas, (6) the Sāṃmitīyas whom some call Avantakas and others Kaurukullas, (7) the Mahīśāsakas, (8) the Dharmaguptakas, (9) those called Suvarṣakas whom some call Kāśyapīyas, and (10) the Uttarīyas whom some call Saṃkrāntivādins. These are the divisions of the eighteen schools.

Here, the great (*mahā*) community (*saṃgha*) is the Mahāsaṃgha. Those who claim to be this [great community] are Mahāsāṃghikas. Some make the conventional claim (*vyavahāra*), "The Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, comprehend all *dharma*s with a single thought and realize all *dharma*s with a single moment of wisdom," so they are called Ekavyāvahārikas. Those who say, "Because the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, have passed

44 Bhāviveka's account of the divisions of the eighteen schools (*nikāyabhedavyākhyāna*) appears as a separate text in the Tibetan canon (Otani no. 5640). Bareau (1955 and 1956) has translated the text in French and provided a thorough comparative analysis. For more recent analysis of traditions concerning the eighteen schools, see Nattier and Prebish 1977 and Cousins 1992.

45 According to Tāranātha, Bhāviveka incorporates three different traditions about the divisions of the Saṃgha. Bareau (1955: 20-21) explains that the first of these traditions is of Kashmiri Sarvāstivādin origin and gives "*une mauvaise lecture*" of the table found in the account of the eighteen schools attributed to Vasumitra (translated by Bareau 1954). Cousins (1992: 28) explains that the attribution of this work to the Sarvāstivādin master Vasumitra is absent in the earliest Chinese translation and should be considered questionable. Cousins refers to the author instead as "Pseudo-Vasumitra." A probable date for this work is the third or fourth centuries CE.

46 On the Vibhajjavādins, see Cousins 2001.

beyond the world of all ordinary *dharma*s, a Tathāgata has no ordinary *dharma*s," are called Lokottaravādins. Those who follow the Master Bahuśruta are the Bahuśrutīyas. Those who say that conditioned states (*saṃskṛta*) are suffering in the sense that they refer to one another (*anyonyaprajñapti*) are the Prajñaptivādins. Those who live on a mountain with a shrine are the Caitikas. Those who live on the eastern and western mountains are, respectively, the Pūrvaśailas and the Aparaśailas.

Those who claim to belong to the noble (*ārya*) lineage of the elders (*sthavira*) are the Sthāviras. These [Sthāviras] are called Haimavatas if they live in the Himalayas. Those who hold the doctrine (*vāda*) that everything exists, including the past, future, and present, are Sarvāstivādins. Some of these [Sarvāstivādins] are called Vibhajyavādins because they hold a doctrine that is based on the following distinction: "Past karma exists when its result has not yet arisen, but [karma] whose result has already been
D149a experienced and future [karma] do not exist." Of these [Vibhajyavādins], the ones who hold the doctrine that "anything that has already arisen, that is arising, or that will arise has a cause" are Hetuvādins. Of these, some are called Muruṇṭakas because they live on Mt. Muruṇṭa. A woman who belongs to the Vatsagotra is Vatsī, and a boy born to her is Vatsīputra. The Vātsīputrīyas' teacher belongs to this gotra. The Dharmottarīyas follow the teaching of Master Dharmottara. The Bhadrayānīyas are students of a good vehicle (*bhadrayāna*).[47] Those who teach the approach of Master Sammata are the Sāṃmitīyas. Of these, some are called Avantaka because they gather in the city of Avanti, and some are called Kaurukulla, because they live on Mount Kurukulla. The Mahīśāsakas govern according to the teaching of the sound of the word "happiness of the earth" (*mahībhadra*),[48] and teach a large group of sentient beings that rebirth does not take place. The Dharmaguptakas claim to be [students] of Master Dharmagupta. The Suvarṣakas cause the rain of the praiseworthy, supreme Dharma to fall. They also are the Kāśyapīyas because they claim to be [students] of Master Kāśyapa. In a similar way, the Uttarīyas claim to be [students] of Uttara. Of these, some hold the doctrine that "the person (*pudgala*) transmigrates from this world to the next." These are Saṃkrāntivādins.

Of these [eighteen schools], the eight that were mentioned first, beginning with the Mahāsāṃghikas, along with the Sthāviras, Sarvāstivādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmottarīyas, and Kāśyapīyas who were mentioned later, hold the doctrine of no-self (*anātmavāda*). They say that the self (*ātman*) and whatever belongs to the self (*ātmīya*), as imagined by non-Buddhists (*tīrthika*), are empty, and no *dharma*s have any self. The remaining five schools, beginning with the Vātsīputrīyas, hold the doctrine of the person (*pudgala*) and
D149b say: "The person cannot be specified as identical to or different from the aggregates

47 Following Bareau 1956: 170. Elsewhere Bareau (1955: 128) explains that in China the Bhadrayānīyas are understood to be "students who follow [the teacher] Bhadra."

48 Following Bareau 1955: 181 and 1956: 170, but the Tibetan is obscure.

(*skandha*); it is known (*jñeya*) by the six forms of cognition; and it can be liberated from saṃsāra." These are the divisions of the eighteen schools.

A Mahāsāṃghika Account[49]

Others say that the basis [of the divisions] is explained as before, but that there are three fundamental divisions: the Sthāviras, the Mahāsāṃghikas, and the Vibhajyavādins. Of these, the Sthāviras come in two forms: the schools of the Sarvāstivādins and the Vātsīputrīyas. The Sarvāstivādins come in two forms: Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. The Vātsīputrīyas come in four forms: Sāṃmitīyas, Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, and Ṣaṇṇagarikas. In this way, there are six kinds of Sthāviras. There are eight kinds of Mahāsāṃghikas. These are called Mahāsāṃghikas, Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Rājagirikas, Haimavatas, Caitikas, Siddhārthikas, and Kaukkuṭikas.[50] These are the divisions of the Mahāsāṃghikas. There are four kinds of Vibhajyavādins: Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, Dharmaguptakas, and Tāmraśāṭīyas. These are the eighteen divisions of the schools of the noble ones.

A Sāṃmitīya Account[51]

Still others say, "One hundred and thirty-seven years after the parinirvāṇa of the Blessed One, in the city of Pāṭalīputra, the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma convened a group of noble ones, who were unattached and had become cool. Then, when the community (*saṃgha*) consisting of the noble Mahākāśyapa, Mahāloma, Mahātyāga, Uttara, Revata, and so forth, who were Arhants and had attained analytical knowledge (*pratisamvid*), were residing there, the evil Māra, who is the opposite of everything good,[52] took the robes of a monk. Displaying a variety of supernatural powers (*ṛddhi*), he used five points to cause a great schism in the community.[53] Learned elders (*sthavira*) named Nāga and

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49 For an analysis of the Mahāsāṃghika traditions that lie behind Bhāviveka's second account of the divisions of the Saṃgha, see Bareau 1955: 22ff.

50 Known in Pali as Gokulikas. The etymology of the name is discussed by Cousins 1992: 48-49. This group may be identical to the Kaurukullas mentioned by Bhāviveka in the Sarvāstivāda account.

51 For an analysis of the Sāṃmitīya traditions reflected in Bhāviveka's third account of the divisions of the Saṃgha, see Bareau 1955: 17ff. The name of this school is often spelled Sāṃmatīya. In adopting the form Sāṃmitīya, I am following the usage recommended by Skilling (2006: 99), as I am in substituting Sthāvira for the more common Sthavira.

52 Bareau interprets *mi* as "man" rather than as the negative particle and translates this phrase as "*de façon à être semblable à un homme ayant toutes les qualitiés* (*bhadra*)" (1956: 172).

53 This is the first of two accounts of the infamous "five points" of Mahādeva. The second occurs in the account of the Ekavyāvahārikas in the next paragraph. Cousins' (1992) analysis of these points makes it possible to clarify some aspects of Bhāviveka's list, but obscurities remain. The second and third points ("ignorance" and "doubt") are the same in both

D150a Sthiramati praised the five points. They said: "It is the teaching of the Buddha that [an Arhant] answers to someone else, is ignorant, has doubt, is [caused to] investigate (or comprehend) by others, and [claims that] the path itself is the means of healing the self." This brought about the division into the two schools called the Sthāviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas. The community quarreled over this division for sixty-three years. Two hundred years later, the teaching of the elder Vātsīputra was collected. After it had been collected, the Mahāsāṃghikas also gave rise to two forms, the Ekavyāvahārikas and the Kaukkuṭikas.

Of these [two], the Ekavyāvahārikas make the following basic claims (Tib. *dam tshig gi rtsa ba* / Skt. *samayamūla*): The Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, are supermundane (*lokottara*), and the Tathāgatas do not have any mundane (*laukika*) *dharma*s.[54] The Tathāgatas do not turn the wheel of the Dharma in all their teachings.[55] The teachings of all the Tathāgatas manifest[56] the essence (*garbha*) [of reality?]. Tathāgatas do not have any attachment to the form in which they reside. When they are Bodhisattvas, they do not enter the *kalala*, *arbuda*, and *peśin* stages of embryonic development.[57] Bodhisattvas

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accounts and are non-controversial. The fourth point (*yongs su brtag pa*) is clearly related to the Pali term *paravitāraṇā*, which represents the fourth point in the *Kathāvatthu*. The Tibetan *yongs su brtag pa* would normally represent forms of the Sanskrit verbs *pari-īkṣ* and *pari-kḷp*, both of which can mean to "investigate" or "understand," like the Pali *vitāraṇā*. The prefix *pari* (represented by the Tib. *yongs su*) could be interpreted as a mistaken reading of *para*. Replacing *pari* with *para* makes it possible to follow Cousins' translation of the Pali as "[caused to] investigate or comprehend by others." Bhāviveka's text gives two different versions of the first point: "answers to someone else" (*gzhan la lan gdab pa*) and "is caused to realize the teaching by others" (*gzhan dag gis bstan pa sgrub par byed do*). These are not identical to Cousins' interpretation of the Pali version of the first point (*parūpahāra*) as meaning that the Arhant is "provided various requisites by others." But Bhāviveka's terms are close. The biggest difficulty comes in the interpretation of the fifth point. Bhāviveka offers two versions: one says that "the path is the means to heal the self" (*bdag nyid gso bar byed pa ni lam*), while the other says that "the path removes suffering" (*sdug sngal spong ba'i lam*). Cousins points out that the *Kathāvatthu* mentions two items that can function as the fifth point: the possibility that someone can speak in a state of attainment (*samāpannassa*) and the cryptic formula *dukkhāhāro maggaṅganam*. It is possible to see Bhāviveka's second version of the fifth point ("the path removes suffering") as reflecting the second of the options in the *Kathāvatthu*, but Bhāviveka's first version of the fifth point (the one that is found in this passage) seems too far removed from the Pali to represent the same technical term.

54 Cousins (1992: 48) notes that Ekavyāvahārika and Lokottaravādin are likely to be two names for the same school.

55 The meaning of this sentence is uncertain. Bareau (1956: 173) notes that this statement, as here interpreted, is contrary to the one reported by Vasumitra and Vinītadeva. It also contradicts Cousins' (1992: 49) account of the Ekavyāvahārikas' view that Buddhas have "only one kind of utterance."

56 Bareau identifies Tib. *mngon par mos pa* with Skt. *abhimuñcanti*, presumably by analogy with *adhimukti* (Tib. *mos pa* or *lhag par mos pa*). It also could represent *abhilāṣin* "to desire."

57 These stages of embryonic development are discussed in various places in the *Kośa* commentary, including 2.52 (on causation) and 3.15 (on the process of reincarnation).

enter their mothers' sides as great elephants and come forth by themselves, but they have no idea of desire. By their own free will, they take birth in unpleasant realms (*durgati*) and bring sentient beings to maturity. They understand the four truths with a single cognition (*jñāna*). The six forms of consciousness are passionate (*sarāga*) and dispassionate (*virāga*).[58] The eyes see material forms. Arhants are provided for by others, are ignorant, have doubts, are caused to investigate (or understand) by others, and pronounce [the word] "suffering" as the cause of the path.[59] One can speak while in an attainment (*samāpatti*). There is a removal of impurity (*aśuci*). Someone who has realized (*sākṣātkṛta*) restraint (*saṃyama*) is said to have removed all bondage (*saṃyojana*). Tathāgatas do not have mundane (*laukika*) correct views (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). Since the mind is luminous by nature (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*), one cannot say whether dispositions (*anuśaya*) are similar to the mind or not.[60] A disposition is one thing and possession (*paryavasthāna*) is another. The past and future do not exist. A stream-winner (*śrota-āpanna*) attains meditation (*dhyāna*). These are the claims of the Ekavyāvahārikas. D150b

The divisions of the Kaukkuṭikas are called the Bahuśrutīyas and the Prajñaptivādins. Of these, the Bahuśrutīyas make the following basic claims: There is no analysis (*vicāra*) on the path to deliverance (*nairyāṇika*). The truth of suffering, conventional truth, and the noble truths are truths. One enters the perfect fixed course (*nyāmāvakrānti*)[61] by seeing the suffering of conditioned states (*saṃskāraduḥkha*), but not by seeing the suffering of suffering (*duḥkhaduḥkha*) or the suffering that is due to change (*vipariṇāmaduḥkha*).

58 Vasumitra reports a similar claim (Bareau 1956: 174). As a general assertion it would be unremarkable, as would the following assertion about the eyes seeing material forms. It is likely that it refers to the Bodhisattvas' process of liberation and is related to the discussion in *Kathāvatthu* 3.3 (and in *Kośa* 6.77-78) about the removal of desire at the moment of liberation.

59 An earlier version of these five points was discussed in the preceding paragraph. The first four points here are either identical or close enough to be considered identical to the points mentioned earlier. The major difference comes in point five. According to Cousins' (1992) analysis of the five points, the *Kathāvatthu* offers two versions of the fifth point: someone can speak in a state of attainment (*samāpannassa*) and the cryptic formula *dukkhāhāro maggaṅganam*. In this paragraph, Bhāviveka refers to both of these points, but in reverse order. Cousins interprets the second (*dukkhāhāro maggaṅganam*) to mean "pronouncing [the word] 'suffering' is the cause of the path." Bhāviveka's Tibetan translator takes *āhāra* (mistakenly) as "remove" (*spong ba*) and does not show any evidence of the Pali term *aṅga*. Otherwise, the text of Bhāviveka reflects Cousins' account of the fifth point and should be translated accordingly.

60 "Dispositions" (*anuśaya*) are discussed in *Kośa* 5. In his translation of this chapter, La Vallée Poussin comments on the issues mentioned here.

61 "One enters the perfect fixed course" translates Tib. *yang dag par skyon med pa la 'jug*. As Edgerton explains, s*kyon med pa* represents the Sanskrit *nyāma* (BHSD). The term *samyaktva-nyāma-avakrānti* is found in the BBh: 244. Edgerton points out that the Tibetan translation (*mi skyon med pa*) is based on a mistaken etymology of the hybrid Sanskrit form *nyāma*.

The Saṃgha is supermundane (*lokottara*). Arhants are provided for by others.[62] There is a correct way of recitation.[63] There is a correct entrance into concentration (*samādhi*). These are the claims of the Bahuśrutīyas.

The Prajñaptivādins [make the following claims]: There is suffering that is not an aggregate. There are sense media (*āyatana*) that are incomplete. The conditioned states refer to one another. Suffering is ultimate. Mental phenomena are not the path. There is no premature death. The person (*puruṣa*) does not act. All suffering comes from karma. These are the basic claims of the Prajñaptivādins.

D151a From a division of the Kaukkuṭikas come the Sthāviras who are called Caitikas. A wanderer by the name of Mahādeva was initiated (*pravrajita*) and lived on Mt. Caitya. He maintained the [five] points[64] of the Mahāsāṃghikas and established the school of the Caitikas.

These are the six divisions of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

There are two kinds of Sthāviras who are called the previous (*pūrva*) Sthāviras and the Haimavatas. The previous Sthāviras make the following basic claims: Arhants are not provided for by others.[65] The [rest of the] five points are equally false. There is a person (*pudgala*).[66] There is an intermediate state (*antarābhava*). An Arhant attains parinirvāṇa. The past and future exist. Nirvāṇa has a purpose (or meaning).[67] These are the basic claims of the previous Sthāviras.

The Haimavatas make the following basic claims: Bodhisattvas are not called ordinary (*pṛthagjana*).[68] Even outsiders have the five super-knowledges (*abhijñā*). The person (*pudgala*) is said to be different from the aggregates, because the person continues after the achievement of nirvāṇa, when the aggregates have ceased. One can speak in a state of concentration. One removes suffering by means of the path.[69] These are the basic claims of the Haimavatas.

There are two kinds of former (Tib. *dang po'i*) Sthāviras: the Sarvāstivādins and the

62 This is the first of the "five points" mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs. Bareau (1955: 82) indicates that the Bahuśrutīyas affirm all five of these points.

63 This and the following point are unclear.

64 The "five points" of Mahādeva were mentioned previously in the introductory paragraph of the Sāṃmitīya account and in the paragraph on the Ekavyāvahārikas.

65 As the following sentence indicates, this can be taken as the negation of the first of the "five points" of Mahādeva.

66 Bareau (1955: 110 and 1956: 171) points out that the Sthāviras never held this position; this claim should be interpreted as an attempt by the Sāṃmitīyas to validate the fundamental teaching of their own school.

67 Bareau (1955: 110) notes that the meaning of this assertion is unclear.

68 Bareau (1955: 113) notes that Bhāviveka reverses the thesis recorded in Vasumitra and Vinītadeva. He does the same with the following assertion about "outsiders." He also lists a Sāṃmitīya view about the persistence of the *pudgala* after parinirvāṇa. As Bareau notes, this makes his account of the Haimavatas questionable.

69 Emend both P and D to *lam gyis*.

Vātsīputrīyas. The Sarvāstivādins make the following basic claims: Everything is comprised of two [categories]: conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). What is the point of this statement? There is no person (*pudgala*). As it is said:

> The body is born without a self, without an agent, and without a knower. You, great Śrāvaka, should listen to this teaching about how to enter the stream of saṃsāra.

These are the basic claims of the Sarvāstivādins.

They make the following additional basic claims:[70] Everything is included in name D151b and form (*nāmarūpa*). The past and future exist. A stream-winner is said not to fall back (*aparihāridharma*).[71] Conditioned things have three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). The four noble truths are realized gradually (Tib. *rim gyis* / Skt. *krameṇa*).[72] One enters the fixed way (*nyāmāvakrānti*)[73] by means of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), wishlessness (*apraṇihita*), and signlessness (*animitta*). One enters the result (*phala*) of a stream-winner in fifteen moments. A stream-winner attains meditation (*dhyāna*). Even an Arhant is capable of falling back. Even ordinary people remove passion (*rāga*) and malice (*vyāpāda*). Even outsiders have the five super-knowledges (*abhijñā*). Even the gods practice celibacy (*brahmacaryā*). All sūtras are interpretable in meaning (*neyārtha*).[74] One enters the fixed way from the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). There is a mundane (*laukika*) correct view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). The five groups of consciousness are neither passionate nor dispassionate. These are basic claims of the Sarvāstivādins.

Another division of the Sarvāstivādins is the Vibhajyavādins. The Vibhajyavādins are divided into the Mahīśāsakas, the Dharmaguptakas, the Tāmraśāṭīyas,[75] and the Kāśyapīyas.

The Mahīśāsakas make the following basic claims: The past and future do not exist. Present conditioned states do exist. When one has seen the truth of suffering, one has seen the four [noble] truths. Dispositions (*anuśaya*) are one thing and behavior (*paryavasthāna*) another. There is no intermediate state (*antarābhava*). There is celibacy (*brahmacaryā*) even in the realm of the gods.[76] Even Arhants accumulate merit. The five groups of consciousness are both passionate and dispassionate. There is a

70 Ten of the sixteen assertions in this paragraph are repeated with only slight variations later in the text. Both sections give the impression of being interpolations.

71 Bareau interprets *mi nyams pa'i chos* as "*n'a pas des choses* (*dharma*) *de recul* (*parihāṇi*)."

72 See *Kośa* on *anupūrva-abhisamaya* and *Kathāvatthu* on *anupubba-abhisamaya*.

73 See note 61 on Edgerton's explanation of the term *nyāma*.

74 Bareau (1955: 145) reports two related positions from Vasumitra: "all the Buddha's statements are not literal" and "all sūtras do not have a definitive meaning."

75 On the Tāmraśāṭīyas, see Skilling 1993b: 155ff.

76 Bhāviveka contradicts Vasumitra (Bareau 1955: 183).

person (*pudgala*) who is *samaśīrṣin*, and so forth.[77] A stream-winner attains meditation
D152a (*dhyāna*). Even ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*) remove passion and malice. The Buddha is included in the Saṃgha. [Gifts to] the Saṃgha produce a great result, but [gifts to] the Buddha do not [produce] a similar [result].[78] The Buddha and the Śrāvakas have the same liberation (*vimukti*). The person is invisible. No mind (*citta*) or mental phenomena (*caitta*), and nothing that arises, transmigrate from this world to the next. All conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) [*dharma*s] are momentary. Karma arises as the expansion of conditioned states (*saṃskāra*).[79] Conditioned states do not continue. Karma conforms to the mind, but there is no karma of body and speech. There is nothing that cannot be destroyed.[80] Worship of a shrine (*caitya*) is fruitless. Dispositions are always present. One enters the fixed way by seeing conditioned [*dharma*s]. These are the basic claims of the Mahīśāsakas.

The Dharmaguptakas make the following basic claims: The Buddha is not included in the realm of the Saṃgha. [Gifts to] the Buddha produce a great result, but [gifts to] the Saṃgha do not.[81] There is celibacy (*brahmacaryā*) even in the realm of the gods. There are mundane (*laukika*) *dharma*s. These are the basic claims of the Dharmaguptakas.

The Kāśyapīyas make the following basic claims: [Karmic] results and resulting *dharma*s (*vipākadharma*) exist as future *dharma*s.[82] There is not complete awareness (*parijñāna*) of any removal (*prahāṇa*), and there is not complete awareness of no removal.[83] In addition, all of the positions of the Dharmaguptakas are basic claims of the Kāśyapīyas.

The Tāmraśāṭīyas make the following basic claim: The person does not exist.

The Saṃkrāntikas are particular Sarvāstivādin masters who expound the teaching

77 Bareau notes that the Tibetan translator has misunderstood the original Sanskrit *samaśīrṣin* (Pali *samasīsī*). Compare Vasumitra's report on the Mahīśāsakas, and also *Puggalapaññatti* 1.16: *Katamo ca puggalo samasīsī? Yassa puggalassa apubbaṃ acarimaṃ āsavapariyādānañ ca hoti jīvitapariyādānañ ca ayaṃ vuccati puggalo samasīsī* (Bareau 1954: 260). A person who is *samaśirṣin* is a "non-returner" (*anāgāmin*) (Bareau 1955: 184).

78 This interpetation is confirmed by Vasumitra (Bareau 1955: 185). The reason is that the Buddha is included in the Saṃgha.

79 Bareau, Walleser, and Teramoto have different interpretations of this sentence. See Bareau 1956: 181.

80 Bareau 1955: 187 (thesis no. 34).

81 The Mahīśāsakas make the opposite claim in the preceding section.

82 Although the Tibetan in unclear, Bareau points out that this is a statement of the Kāśyapīyas' basic principle: past karma whose result has not yet come to fruition exists, while other aspects of the past do not exist (1955: 202). Bareau takes the first part of the sentence as a *dvandva* compound and translates it as "*la maturation* (*vipāka*) *et les choses de maturation* (*vipākadharma*)."

83 The translation follows Bareau (1955: 202). The Tibetan says only: "There is no complete awareness of removal (*spang la yongs su ma shes pa yang yod do*)." Vasumitra gives a more complete explanation.

of Uttara. They make the following basic claims: The five aggregates (*skandha*) transmigrate from this world to the next. There is no cessation of aggregates apart from the path. There are aggregates with fundamental transgressions (*mūlāpatti*). The person is not apprehended as ultimate. Everything is impermanent. These are the basic claims of D152b
the Saṃkrāntikas. The fundamental claims of the Sarvāstivādins come in these seven forms.

The Vātsīputrīyas make the following basic claims: That which can be appropriated (*upādeya*) and that which is appropriated (*upādāna*) are nominal (*prajñapti*). There is no *dharma* that transmigrates from this world to the next. The person transmigrates in dependence upon (*upādāya*) the five aggregates. There are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) [*dharma*s] that are momentary and non-momentary. The person cannot be said to be identical to or different from the aggregates on which it depends (*upādānaskandha*). Nirvāṇa cannot be said to be identical to or different from all *dharma*s. Nirvāṇa cannot be said to exist or not exist. The five groups of consciousness (*vijñānakāya*) are neither passionate nor dispassionate. These are the basic claims of the Vātsīputrīyas.

There are two kinds of Vātsīputrīyas: the Mahāgirīyas and the Sāṃmitīyas. The Sāṃmitīyas make the following basic claim: That which is going to exist and that which does exist, that which is going to cease and that which does cease, that which is going to arise and that which does arise, that which is going to die and that which does die, that which is going to act and that which does act, that which is going to be destroyed and that which is destroyed, that which is going to be conscious and that which is conscious exist. This is the basic claim of the Sāṃmitīyas.

There are two kinds of Mahāgirīyas: the Dharmottarīyas and the Bhadrayānīyas. The Dharmottarīyas make the following basic claims: In birth there is ignorance and birth, and in cessation there is ignorance and cessation. The [teachings] of the Bhadryānīyas are the same.

Some say that the Ṣaṇṇagarikas are a division of the Mahāgirīyas. Others say that they are a division of the Sāṃmitīyas.

These are the four divisions of the Vātsīputrīyas. D153a

These are the eighteen schools that followed the masters, and these are their basic concepts. There are many more internal subdivisions that could be mentioned. What are they?

The distinctive doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins are divided into four categories: the transformation of entities (*bhāva* or *vastu*), [the transformation] of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), [the transformation] of states (*avasthā*), and mutual (*anyonya*) [transformation].[84]

The first of these, the transformation of entities, is attributed to Bhadanta

84 The next four paragraphs show that the word "transformation" is meant to apply to all four of these categories. See *Kośa* 5.25d for an account of these four positions.

Dharmatrāta. He says: "When time passes,[85] *dharma*s are transformed into other entities, but they are not transformed into other substances. When a golden pot is broken and fashioned into something else, it is transformed into a different shape, but it is not transformed into a different substance. When milk is transformed into curds, it has a different flavor, strength, and result but not a different color. Similarly, when *dharma*s pass from the past into the present, the entities of the past cease to be, but the substances do not. Similarly, when *dharma*s pass from the present into the future, the entities of the present cease to be, but the substances do not."

[The doctrine of] the transformation of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) is attributed to Bhadanta Ghoṣaka. He says: "When time passes, *dharma*s that have the characteristic of being past take on (lit. do not lack) the characteristics of being present and future, and [*dharma*s] that have the characteristic of being future develop the characteristics of being past and present. For example, when a man desires a particular woman, he develops a desire for others."

[The doctrine of] the transformation of state (*avasthā*) is attributed to Bhadanta Vasumitra. He says: "When time passes, *dharma*s that are said to become one thing or another change state but are not transformed into another substance. For example,
D153b when one counts a single post, it is called 'one.' When it belongs to [a series of] a hundred, it is called 'hundred.' When one counts a thousand, it is called 'thousand.'"

[The doctrine of] mutual transformation is attributed to Bhadanta Buddhadeva. When time passes, the transformation of one *dharma* into another depends on [whether it is viewed] before or after it occurs. For example, the same woman can be called mother or daughter.

These four [teachers] are called Sarvāstivādins because they agree in saying that everything exists.

Similarly, some say that there are seven conditions (*pratyaya*): the causal (*hetu*), the objective (*ālambana*), the immediate (*samantara*), the dominant (*adhipateya*), the active (*kāraka*), the nutrient (*āhāra*), and the supportive (*āśraya*). Similarly, some say that there are four mental states (*citta*) that understand (*ava-budh*) the four [noble] truths. Others say that cognitions (*jñāna*) of *dharma*s and subsequent cognitions (*anvayajñāna*) make eight kinds [of cognition], but discriminative cognition (*pratisaṃkhyānajñāna*) is not [one of them]. Others say that there are twelve, while others think that there are sixteen. Similarly, [some say that] there is no consciousness (*citta*) in unconscious sleep, but there is in the remaining states (*samprayukta*).

When there is a cessation (*nirodha*) of ideas (*saṃjñā*) and feelings (*vedanā*), there is[86] a negation (*pratiṣedha*) of ideas and feelings. The remainder are as above. Someone

85 Bareau emends *'jig* to *'jug* (*pravartana*) to be consistent with the phrase that begins the next three paragraphs.

86 Bareau says "*il n'y a pas*." On what basis is unclear.

who feels aversion toward doubt [achieves] attainment (*samāpatti*) in meditation (*dhyāna*) without analysis. In a similar way, someone who feels aversion toward pleasure [achieves] attainment in meditation (*dhyāna*) without pleasure, and someone who feels aversion toward ideas and feelings [achieves] the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) through the ideas and feelings.

Also, some say that the attainment of the distinction between the object (*viṣaya*) and the mind (*citta*) is nirvāṇa. Others say that the absence of the aggregates is nirvāṇa, but their presence is not. Some say that nirvāṇa is indeterminate in nature.

Similarly, others say that the immeasurables (*apramāṇa*) are the limbs of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*). Some say that there are three great results (*phala*): the result that is D154a [obtained] by the mind of someone else (*paracitta*), the great result, and the result that is immeasurable. Similarly, whatever goes to a certain realm (*gati*) because of defilements (*kleśa*), accompanied [by these defilements?], is karma.[87] Similarly, removal does not go to these realms. Some take the position that one goes first because of one's previous karma. Others take the position that it is because of habitual (*yathābhyasta*) karma. Some say that it is because of practice (*abhyāsa*) of five kinds, that is, the practice of the previous four[88] plus a particular condition.[89] Some say that past attachment (*upādāna*) burns the fire of karma. Others say that it is present karma [that is burned].

Some say that intention (*cetanā*) is karma, because, by virtue of the five impediments (*nīvaraṇa*), it is inconsistent with everything that is proper.[90] Some think that the form realm has four colors.[91] Some think that it has one color.

Similarly, others say that there is a person different from the aggregates. [They also say that] not only the aggregates exist, but [the person] is conceived as appropriating the aggregates of appropriation (*upādānaskandha*). This is because the absence of appropriation is nirvāṇa. When one has investigated the four noble truths in order, one achieves understanding (*abhisamaya*). In the intermediate state there is no inconsistent (*vipakṣa*) mind (*caitta*).[92] One enters the fixed way with the limbs of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*) that apprehend suffering. One attains the result of becoming a stream-winner with thirteen thoughts (*citta*) that are based on attention (*manasīkāra*) concerning the impermanence

87 This paragraph would be better translated by making human beings the agents of the verbs: "To go to a particular realm [of rebirth] because of defilements is karma. When one removes [these defilements], one is not reborn. Some say that the first place one goes is caused by one's earliest karma. Others say that [the first place one goes] is caused by one's habitual karma, etc."

88 The previous four are karma, the removal of karma, previous karma, and habitual karma.

89 ". . .*ayant bien accomplis par les cinq sortes*, *on fait une distinction entre les quatre antérieurs* (*pūrva*) *et la condition* (*pratyaya*)" (Bareau).

90 As Bareau notes, the Tibetan is unclear. I have followed Bareau's conjecture about the meaning. On the five *nīvaraṇa*s see BHSD.

91 DN reads *khams bzhi bar* ("four realms") for *kha dog bzhi* ("four colors").

92 Bareau translates "inconsistent" (Tib. *mi mthun pa* / Skt. *vipakṣa*?) as "*inadéquate*."

of the conditioned states that are included in [the realm of] desire. When one is situated in this *dharma* [i.e. in the stage of a stream-winner], one does not fall back. One also has begun in this way.[93] Even an Arhant can fall back. There is an intermediate realm. The past and future exist. Nirvāṇa is the only goal (*artha*) of wholesome (*kuśala*) *dharma*s. The cessation of the aggregates is liberation from time. Even the gods practice celibacy (*brahmacaryā*). One enters the fixed way from the realm of desire. Even ordinary people
D154b remove passion and hatred. The five groups of consciousness are neither passionate nor dispassionate, because they are non-conceptual. The sixth is both passionate and dispassionate. An Arhant apprehends the defiled (*sāsrava*) and the undefiled (*nirāsrava*) with form (*rūpa*) and mind (*citta*) that are defiled (*sāsrava*). One does not go to another place with[94] the mind, but one can apprehend a distant place while remaining here. There is no form in the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*). Even an Arhant can fall back.[95] There can be an untimely death. A human being engages in action. There is ordinary, correct vision. Even outsiders have the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*). Arhants are not provided for by others,[96] are not ignorant, do not have doubts, are not caused to investigate (or comprehend) by others, and do not engage in speech.[97] This is because they have generated the faculties (*indriya*), powers (*bala*), and limbs of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*).

The Śrāvakas of the Blessed One are not born in Uttarakuru,[98] in the heaven of Māra (*mārakāyika*),[99] or as an unconscious (*asaṃjñin*) being.[100] A stream-winner does not attain meditation (*dhyāna*).[101] All sūtras are definitive in meaning (*nītārtha*). There are dispositions (*anuśaya*) that are not associated (*viprayukta*) [with the mind][102] and dispositions that are mental phenomena (*caitta*). The conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) [*dharma*s] are momentary and not momentary. When appropriation ceases, karma is burned.

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93 Another obscure sentence. The *de bzhin du* at the beginning might indicate that it begins another topic.

94 Read *kyis*.

95 Repetition of a sentence that appears earlier in the paragraph.

96 This point and the four that follow negate the "five points" of Mahādeva mentioned earlier. The first four points are clear; the fifth is more problematic. As before, it seems likely that the formula "do not engage in speech (*ngag 'jug pa'i smra ba med de*)" means that Arhants do not proceed on the path by pronouncing the word "suffering."

97 "In a state of concentration" can be supplied from the discussion of the Vyāvahārikas.

98 Uttarakuru (or Kuru) is one of the four continents (*dvīpa*) in *Kośa* 3.55.

99 Interpret *bdud ris* as *mārakāyika* (gods who belong to the heaven of Māra). Lamotte (1972: 100) explains that Māra is the head of the sixth and last class of the gods of the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*). See also *Traité* 339-46 and DPPN 2.613 (s.v. "Māra").

100 *Kośa* 2.41 and commentary explain that "the beings who are unconscious" (*asaṃjñisattva*) are the Bṛhatphala gods. According to the commentary on *Kośa* 3.1, the Bṛhatphalas reside in the fourth *dhyāna* of the form realm (*rūpadhātu*).

101 This and the following sentence negate two of the "additional basic claims" from which large portions of the preceding paragraph are drawn.

102 On the *dharma*s that are not associated with the mind (*cittaviprayukta*), see *Kośa* 2.35. The dispositions are discussed at the beginning of *Kośa* 5.

Certain sentient beings, as a result of ignorance, die just when they have attained the end of death. The single thought that acts as a cause of death is laid to rest. The immeasurables are not the limbs of awakening. When sixty-seven attainments (*samāpatti*) have been accomplished, a Bodhisatttva correctly practices nineteen attainments (*samāpatti*), the faculties (*indriya*), the powers (*bala*), and the limbs of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*). The bonds (*saṃyojana*) are completely removed by the immediate path D155a (*ānantaryamārga*).[103] The path of a candidate (*pratipannakamārga*) is definitely twofold.[104] The results of asceticism (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are not attained gradually (*krameṇa*). One realizes the result of a once-returner (*sakṛdāgamin*) and a non-returner (*anāgamin*) with the mundane paths (*laukikamārga*).[105] Rebirth (*saṃsāra*) also is changed. There is no *dharma* that moves from this world to the next. A sentient being (*sattva*) transmigrates by depending (*upādāya*) on the aggregates. The form realm (*rūpadhātu*) has four colors. Similarly, the intermediate realm (*antarābhava*) has ten colors or is like the color of mother of pearl. Similarly, the intermediate realm (*antarābhava*) lasts five days, seven days, or longer. Similarly, karma is never non-existent, never lost, and never laid aside. The result (*vipāka*) of karma is not lost;[106] it lasts in the same continuum as long as there is rebirth. When one has acquired the conditions of karma that were previously accumulated or were accumulated later, one goes to particular realms (*gati*). Definite karma cannot be reversed.

A Bodhisattva enters the womb as a human being (*puruṣarūpa*). [A Bodhisattva] does not enter the body of its mother as an elephant;[107] that is something that she imagines in a dream. [The Bodhisattva] is present in the *kalala*, *arbuda*, and *peśin* stages of embryonic development. Even though [a Bodhisattva] is born from a womb, it is capable of [attaining] a liberation (*vimukti*) in which there are no hindrances (*āvaraṇa*). The Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, have knowledge (*jñāna*) that enters into enjoyment. In a single moment of thought, [the Buddhas] cease to be ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*). In a D155b single moment of thought, they remove all hindrances. In a single moment of thought, they attain the liberation in which there is no hindrance to omniscience. In a single moment of thought, they bring the *dharma*s of a candidate (*pratipannaka*) to an end and generate [the *dharma*s] of someone who has attained the result (*phalastha*).

All conditions (*pratyaya*) are included in four conditions. It is because of suffering

103 The *ānantarya-mārga* is called the *prahāṇa-mārga* ("path of removal") in the commentary on *Kośa* 4.87. See *Kośa* 6.65 for a discussion of the *ānantarya-mārga* in relation to the *prayoga-vimukti-* and *viśeṣa-mārga*s.

104 This seems to be the best possibility among the various subdivisions of the path mentioned in the the commentary on Kośa 5.28.

105 "The paths of liberation (*vimuktimārga*) and the immediate paths (*ānantaryamārga*) are mundane (*laukika*)" (*Kośa* 6.49).

106 DN reads *nyams su myong ba* ("experienced") rather than *nyams par* ("lost").

107 This position contradicts one of the assertions of the Vyāvahārikas.

that someone whose obsessions (*paryavasthāna*) need to be removed commits deadly sins (*ānantarya*); it is not because of something else. By collecting into four the dispositions (*anuśaya*) that are removed by vision (*darśana*), one has collected all. These cut off all wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*),[108] but the ones that are removed by practice (*bhāvanā*) do not. As long as one resides entirely in practice, one is not hurt by anyone else, nor is one hurt by effort; and when one's time has run out, one dies. All Arhants die by separating but do not die by transmigrating. As it is said, "One dies by separating from the body, because an Arhant separates from the last body." "Body" here means the body with the senses (*indriyakāya*). That which is going to exist, that which does exist, that which is going to cease, that which does cease, that which is going to arise, that which does arise, that which is going to die, that which does die, that which is going to act, that which does act, that which is going to be destroyed, that which is destroyed, that which is going to move, that which does move, that which is going to be conscious, and that which is conscious exist.[109] They are included in three groups of sentient beings, but they are not all *dharma*s.[110] All feelings come from karma. All karma that has to be removed by previous practice (*bhāvanā*) matures by means of karma. This is the end [of the explanation of the divisions in the eighteen schools].

If the Mahāyāna were included in any of these scholastic divisions (*nikāyabheda*), it would be considered the Buddha's teaching, but, because it is not even mentioned in the teachings (*pravacana*) of these schools, the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. It is not included in the eighteen schools because it was not collected by the compilers of
D156a the root collection[111] at the time of the Buddha's parinirvāṇa and was not collected by compilers later, after the schism.

Miscellaneous Objections

To teach that the Tathāgata is eternal contradicts the statement that everything is impermanent. To say that there is "pervasion by the essence of the Tathāgata" (*tathāgatagarbha*) and that there is an "appropriating consciousness" (*upādānavijñāna*) does not avoid the concept of a self (*ātmagrāha*). To say that the Buddha has not attained nirvāṇa is to say that there is no peace. These [three claims] contradict three seals of the Dharma.[112] [The Mahāyāna] predicts [the awakening] of great Śrāvakas and insults

108 The *anuśaya*s removed by vision [of the four noble truths] are discussed in *Kośa* 5.4. Those that are removed by practice are discussed in *Kośa* 5.5. Unfortunately these two sentences remain obscure.

109 A repetition of the formula used earlier in the account of the Sāṃmitīyas.

110 This sentence is unclear.

111 Tib. *rtsa ba'i yang dag par sdud par byed pa* / Skt. *mūlasaṃgītikāraka*.

112 The seals of the Dharma (*dharmamudrā*), like the *dharma-uddāna*s, are summaries of the Dharma. They appear in lists of three (as here) or four, including three "characteristics"

Arhants. It also pays homage to householders and exalts Bodhisattvas over Buddhas. The vows (*praṇidhāna*) of Bodhisattvas like Gaganagañja are just words.[113] To say that Śākyamuni is a manifestation (*nirmāṇa*) denies the entire teaching (*upadeśa*). To say that [the Buddha] is always in a state of concentration (*samādhi*) is unreasonable. Many [Mahāyāna] sūtras teach useless mantras. To say that even great evil can be uprooted denies that karma has a result. The Vaipulya has a different teaching.[114] And [the Mahāyāna] is not mentioned in the divisions in the dream of Kṛkin.[115] For all these

(*anitya*, *duḥkha*, and *anātman*) and nirvāṇa as peace. See Lamotte 1976: 63-64.

113 The name Gaganagañja ("Space-Treasury") occurs in a list of Bodhisattvas in MVY 700 and at the beginning of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*. (For other occurrences, see Lamotte 1976: 4.) Why Gaganagañja would be singled out in this critique of the Bodhisattva vow is unclear, especially when other, better-known Bodhisattva vows might have served just as well. The answer to this question seems to lie in the story of Gaganagañja as told in *The Questions of Gaganagañja Sūtra* (*Ārya Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā Sūtra*, Otani no. 815). In response to questions by Gaganagañja, the Buddha explains how a series of categories, beginning with generosity (*dāna*), are similar to space (*yathā gaganam*). When the Buddha finishes his explanation, a Bodhisattva named Myur-du Spobs-pa asks Gaganagañja to explain the meaning of his name: "Does it mean that space (*gagana*) is your treasury (*gañja*)?" Gaganagañja replies: "Yes, space is my treasury." Then the Buddha asks Gaganagañja to show the distinctive characteristic (*viśeṣa*) of "Space-Treasury." Gaganagañja tells Myur-du Spobs-pa to ask for whatever he wants, and it will showered on him from space. The text goes on to explain that these gifts come from Gaganagañja's sustaining power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and from the sustaining power of his vows (*praṇidhānādhiṣṭhāna*). (sDe-dge Pa, folio 284a/2.) A later passage explains that Gaganagañja's vows (*praṇidhāna*) are inexhaustible, just as space is inexhaustible (Pa, folio 287a/5), and goes on to say that space is "just words" (*ming tsam pa ni nam mkha' ste // de la kha dog dbyibs kyang med // sems dang yid dang rnam shes kyang // ming gis yongs su bstan pa'o //*). (Pa, folio 288a/2-3.) Here the opponent's argument seems to play on the idea that Gaganagañja's vows, like space, are "just words."

114 In the second chapter of the VY (158-60), Vasubandhu explains that a monk who knows the Dharma (*dharmajña*) knows the twelve divisions (Tib. *yan lag* / Skt. *aṅga*) of the Buddha's teaching. These divisions are *sūtra*, *geya*, *vyākaraṇa*, *gāthā*, *udāna*, *nidāna*, *avadāna*, *itivṛttaka*, *jātaka*, *vaipulya*, *adbhutadharma*, and *upadeśa*. Vasubandhu equates the Vaipulya with the Mahāyāna and explains that the Mahāyāna is "a teaching (Tib. *lung phog pa* / Skt. *upadeśa*) according to which Bodhisattvas use ten perfections to reach ten stages (*bhūmi*) and attain Buddhahood, as the location of ten powers (*daśabalāśraya*)." Later in the text (175-76), Vasubandhu formulates the opponent's objection as a claim about the nature of the Vaipulya: "Similarly, the claim that the *vaipulya-aṅga* is the Mahāyāna contradicts tradition (*āgama*)." Bhāviveka's position is similar to Vasubandhu's and is subject to the same objection. Skilling (1997b: 31-42) points out that this position is also found in the *Traité* (44). See Lamotte 1988: 140-47 on the place of the *vaipulya-aṅga* in the nine and twelve *aṅga*s of the Buddhist canon.

115 King Kṛkin (Pali Kiki) is a legendary king of Benares who lived at the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa. The ten dreams of King Kṛkin are mentioned in the commentary on *Kośa* 3.13 in the context of a discussion of the soul in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). Vasubandhu says that the form of the soul is similar to the form it will assume in the next life. This claim provokes another question: If so, why did the Bodhisattva's mother dream that the Bodhisattva entered her womb in the form of a white elephant? Vasubandhu explains that

reasons, the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. It clearly was [taught] by Māra to mislead foolish and ignorant people.[116] There are many other [points] that have not been mentioned.

The Mahāyāna view (*darśana*) also completely contradicts perception and so forth.

4.9 If a cognition apprehends something like material form and also is aware
D156b of itself, it must exist. So someone who holds the doctrine of no-arising
also contradicts perception.[117]

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her dream was only a sign of the future, like the dreams of King Kṛkin. Yaśomitra's commentary on *Kośa* 3.13 tells the story of the dreams, based, he says, on the Vinaya: "King Kṛkin saw ten dreams: an elephant goes out through a window and is caught by the tail; a well flows in front of someone who is thirsty; someone trades barley for pearls; sandalwood is scattered like wood; thieves steal flowers and fruit from trees in a park; a young elephant frightens older elephants; a monkey is smeared with something unclean and defiles others; a monkey is consecrated as a king; eighteen people tug on a small piece of cloth; a large group of people disagree with one another and start to quarrel, and so forth." When King Kṛkin tells these dreams to the Buddha Kāśyapa, Kāśyapa explains that they are signs of a conflict that will arise at the time of the Buddha Śākyamuni: "In the future there will be a Tathāgata named Śākyamuni. When his Śrāvakas have been scattered, after leaving the company of their own people and relations and going forth into monastic life, they will consider monasteries to be their homes and will become attached, like an elephant who goes out through a window and is caught by the tail." Here in the TJ, the objector is referring to the last two of Kṛkin's dreams. Kāśyapa explains: "The dream of the cloth shows that [Śākyamuni's] teaching will be divided into eighteen parts, but the cloth of liberation will not be torn. The dream about the quarrel shows that his Śrāvakas will fall into disputes with one another because of their adherence to schools (*nikāyaparigrahāt*)." For further references to the dreams of King Kṛkin, see Lessing and Wayman 1968: 66-69; E. Obermiller 1939b: vol. 2, p. 98. La Vallée Poussin has a helpful summary of earlier scholarship on the dreams in the notes on his translation of *Kośa* 3.13.

116 On the accusation that the Mahāyāna is the teaching of Māra, see Jaini 2002. Compare also the *Ratnarāśi*: "These are not what was spoken by the Buddha, but rather they are one's own personal fabrications, or they are created by Māra to cause havoc. Therefore they will mislead many beings" (translated in Silk 1994: 382-83).

117 The commentary on 4.9 explains that the two predicates in the first half of the verse ("apprehends something like material form" and "is aware of itself") are meant to serve as reasons for two separate flaws in the doctrine of non-arising (*ajātivāda*): If a cognition has an object, then the denial of external objects contradicts perception (*pratyakṣa*). If a cognition is aware of itself (*svasaṃvedya*), then the claim that cognition does not arise contradicts common sense (*prasiddha*). The word *api* in the first line sets "aware of itself" apart as a separate point in addition to "apprehends something like material form." The function of the *api* in the second line is less clear. It seems to indicate only that "the contradiction of perception" is not the only problem with the assertion of no-arising. If this is its purpose, the word *ādi* would have been a better choice, but it is not supported by the commentary. It is difficult to account for the use of *gnod* to translate *jāyate*. It would make more sense to read *yod* to conform to the last line of the commentary.

A cognition that apprehends something like material form is one that apprehends objects (*viṣaya*) such as material form. Conceptual cognitions of objects (*viṣayavijñāna*) are defined as conceptual cognitions that are consistent with the thing itself (*bhāvasvabhāva*).[118] [To say that a cognition is aware of] itself means that it is experienced in its own continuum (*santāna*). The word "also" (*api*) means that all sentient beings have this knowledge. If a cognition has an object, then the idea that [objects] do not arise is unreasonable and contradicts perception (*pratyakṣa*). The claim that [objects] do not arise also contradicts common sense (*prasiddha*), because it contradicts something that everyone knows.

> 4.10 If he says that he does not contradict perception and common sense, because he uses the qualification "In reality things do not arise,"

If he says: Mādhyamikas make statements such as the following: "[Cognition] is not in the eye, it is not in form, and it is not between them or in both of them. Wherever it might be present, it neither exists nor does not exist."[119] So no cognition (*jñāna*) is apprehended. For this reason, it is impossible for us ultimately to contradict either perception (*pratyakṣa*) or common sense (*lokaprasiddha*), because there is no perception and ordinary people (*loka*) are deluded by a veil of ignorance.

To show that he is a clown (*vidūṣaka*), [we] reply:

> 4.11 Then this faulty argument would be correct: "It is ultimately correct to have sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another [woman]."[120]

"It is ultimately correct to have sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden" is the point to be proved (*sādhya*). "Because she is a woman" is the reason (*hetu*). Anyone who is a woman is appropriate for sexual relations. What is the example? Like another woman; that is, like one's own wife. Some may say that this point contradicts ordinary experience (*laukika*) and tradition (*āgama*), but there is no fault, because this point is qualified D157a
by the word "ultimately." But this is unreasonable. It is as if a wicked person said that, when desire drives someone to approach a woman, all women are equally capable of relieving desire. When you improperly deny (*apavāda*) all things, it is like saying that there is nothing wrong with that statement.

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118 On conceptual cognition in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see the notes on 5.14.

119 The source of this verse is unclear. It is not found in MMK 3 (*cakṣurādīndriyaparīkṣā*), in Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* 13 (on the sense faculties and their objects), or in Bhāviveka's analysis of vision in MHK 3.46ff.

120 This verse should be read together with the reference to Persian (*pārasīka* or *maga*) religion in the next verse. Apparently a common charge against Persian religion was that it advocated forbidden sex (*agamyāgamana*). See Lindtner 1988 and van der Kuijp 2006.

There is another big fault.

4.12 If [he says that] the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then that is not true. Otherwise, the teaching of Yonāka Deva would be true, and that is not acceptable.[121]

In the Mahāyāna, the statements, "Suffering, arising, cessation, and the path do not exist," and, "Even someone who understands the four noble truths does not attain nirvāṇa," are accepted as the words of the Teacher. If the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then explain what else is true? If someone says that the teaching of the Mahāyāna is true, this is unreasonable, because it differs from the vision of the [four noble] truths, like the teaching of Yonāka Deva. According to this [teaching], the following is true: "One is liberated from transmigration by killing an ant with a golden needle in a golden pot. The one who kills this [ant] is thought to gain the result of liberation. Killing cows, and so forth, and having sex with one's parent are causes of heaven and so forth."[122]

Furthermore, [the Mahāyāna opponent] misinterprets the traditional statement, "The triple world is mind-only," and denies the existence of the external sense-media (*bāhyāyatana*) and so forth.[123] So the teaching [of the Mahāyāna] again is wrong, for the following reason:

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121 The commentary makes the logical structure of this verse more clear. The objector has in mind the following syllogism: "The statement that the four noble truths are not true is not true, because it is different from the four noble truths, like the teaching of Yonāka Deva." If a statement that contradicts the four noble truths could be true, then the teaching of Yonāka Deva could also be true, and that is not a point that the Mahāyāna accepts. The phrase "he says that" (which corresponds to the Sanskrit particle *iti*), refers to the Mahāyāna opponent who holds the doctrine of no-arising (*ajātivādin*) in verse 4.10, as is clear from the commentary. For a full discussion of the reference to Yonāka Deva in this verse see Lindtner 1988. It can be interpreted together with Bhāviveka's response in 4.68 and a further reference to Persian religion (*magaśāstra*) in MHK 9.31. Lindtner points out that Bhāviveka depends heavily on Abhidharma sources, such as the *Kośa* and *Mahāvibhāṣā*, for his knowledge of Persian religion. The word *yonāka* is derived from *yona* (Skt. *yavana*), the common Indian word for a barbarian. The Tibetan translation of "Yonāka Deva" (*nam mkha'i lha*) suggests that Yonāka Deva should be identified as a sky god. The commentary on 4.68 says that Yonāka is created by Brahmā. This seems to rule out the possibility that Bhāviveka is referring to Ahura Mazda. Lindtner suggests that Yonāka should be identified with Mithra.

122 Van der Kuijp (2006: 198) points out that the elements of this ritual are discussed in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*.

123 The Yogācāra view of the apprehension (and no-apprehension) of mind-only is discussed in 5.4 and commentary: "Based on the apprehension (*upalabdhi*) of mind-only (*cittamātra*), there arises no-apprehension of objects (*viṣaya*). If there are no objects (*grāhya*), there also can be no subjects (*grāhaka*). Therefore, based on no-apprehension of objects, there arises no-apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject." Bhāviveka's response begins in 5.17.

4.13 The external sense media exist, because a cognition arises with their image. [The existence of] the object of cognition should be just as acceptable to you as the existence of the mind.[124]

External sense media are the subject, and their existence is the predicate. The image (*nirbhāsa*) of these external sense media consists of the form of the object (*ālambanākāra*). D157b
To have their image is to arise with their image. What arises with this image? A cognition. That is, one of the six forms of sense consciousness. It has not been established that a cognition arises without any object (*viṣaya*). [Your] position about the existence of the mind is well known in your texts. The existence of external sense media should be just as acceptable to you as your position about the existence of the mind. This is the meaning [of the verse].

4.14 If you do not think that the mind exists, then the world is not mind-only. And if the world is your subject, there is no reason or example.

Also, if you think that one first apprehends mind-only and does not apprehend the external sense media and so forth, then, when one no longer apprehends the sense media and so forth, one does not apprehend mind-only, you undermine the scriptural (*āgama*) statement: "This is mind-only." Furthermore, what is the reason for the statement, "The world is mind-only," and what is the example? This [statement] has no correct reason or example, so it is merely a thesis (*pratijñā*), and a thesis alone does not prove a point.

This is a statement of the objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) formulated by the adherents of the Śrāvakayāna.

Bhāviveka's Response

4.15 "According to the approach explained earlier, the opponent's approach has gone wrong. The opponent cannot tolerate this and has spoken out, but his statements are unreasonable." This is what [we] think.[125]

124 "Because a cognition arises with their image" (*tannirbhāsodayād dhiyaḥ*) is a common formula in Bhāviveka's account of the objects of cognition. See verses 5.36 and 61 and accompanying notes. The argument about "mind-only" is discussed at length in verses 5.17-54.

125 "The approach that was explained earlier" refers to the arguments in chapter 3, many of which criticize categories accepted by the Śrāvakas. These arguments begin in 3.26 with a formal syllogism about the gross elements: "Earth and so forth do not have the nature of elements. . . ." According to Bhāviveka, the opponent cannot tolerate the impact of these arguments on his own position and attempts to refute them. In this verse, Bhāviveka begins his response to the opponent's attempt at refutation. Bhāviveka starts, as he does again in verse 5.9, by playing on the sense of motion in the word "approach" (*nīti*). A literal translation would be:

Here the quotation marks indicate that [the verse] introduces the response (*uttarapakṣa*). The opponent is an adherent of the Śrāvakayāna. "The approach that was explained earlier" refers to [verses] such as "Earth and so forth do not have the nature of elements." According to this approach, his approach, which is the approach of the Tripiṭaka, has gone wrong. "Cannot tolerate" means "cannot bear." His statements are his claims of refutation. "Are unreasonable" means that they will be refuted by the response that fol-
D158a lows. This is the meaning [of the verse].

The opponent's objection implies the following argument: The Teacher has non-conceptual cognition (*nirvikalpadhī*), because he apprehends the four noble truths, just as Pratyekabuddhas and so forth have [non-conceptual] cognition.[126]

[We] reply as follows:

> 4.16 [We] think that the Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual, because his cognition apprehends no-self, just as it has the no-self of persons as its object.

"According to the approach explained earlier, there is a misstep (*vipad*) in [the opponent's] own approach." The word *vipad* ("misstep") could be translated as "misfortune," "disaster," or even "death," but its root meaning comes from the verb *pad* (to "fall" or "go"). With the prefix *vi-*, it means to go astray. Monier-Williams defines *vi-pad* in its verbal form as: "to go wrongly, fail, miscarry, come to nought, perish, die."

126 Verses 4.16-19 respond to the Śrāvaka's first objection in verse 4.2:

> The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition,
> because it is a body,
> like the body of a cowherd.

Rather than criticize this syllogism directly, Bhāviveka takes up the assumption that lies behind it:

> The Teacher has non-conceptual cognition,
> because he apprehends the four noble truths,
> just as Pratyekabuddhas and so forth have [non-conceptual] cognition.

This syllogism reads more clearly if "cognition" is taken as the subject:

> The Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual,
> because it apprehends the four noble truths,
> like the cognition of Pratyekabuddhas and so forth.

In verse 4.16, Bhāviveka gives a syllogism of his own:

> The Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual,
> because his cognition apprehends no-self,
> like [a cognition] that has the no-self of persons as its object.

The Blessed One has no concept of a person, because he understands that persons have no self, and he has no concept of a *dharma*, because he understands that *dharma*s have no self. Since everything is either a person or a *dharma*, what can he conceptualize that would affect his non-conceptuality?

> 4.17ab The [opponent's] argument is refuted, because it does not avoid contradiction,[127]

This argument refutes the [opponent's] previous argument by contradicting it.

> 4.17cd when it denies the arising of functional cognitions and so forth.

Functional (*prāyogika*) cognitions[128] are subsequent to supermundane (*lokottara*) non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) [cognitions]. These are called pure mundane cognitions (*śuddha-laukikajñāna*), and Mādhyamikas think that these [cognitions] arise. The opponents imagine that, according to our view, none of the Buddha's actions exist, beginning with the Blessed One's forty-year teaching of the Dharma. They also [imagine] that we deny the arising of functional cognitions. This is incorrect, because it superimposes [the opponents' own interpretation] on [a position] that is not at fault.

But when it comes to supermundane cognition, we use reason to prove that it is incorrect to argue that [supermundane cognition] is conceptual. This is proved in the following way:

> 4.18 Since there is no object of cognition, awakening is understood as the no-arising of cognition with regard to this [no-object], because this [no-arising] is consistent with the reality (*tattva*) of the object.[129]

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127 The relationship between verses 4.17ab and 4.16 is unclear. Since 4.17ab is missing in the Tibetan of both the verses and the commentary, it is possible that it was orginally part of the commentary and was added incorrectly to the Sanskrit text of the verses.

128 On functional (*prāyogika*) cognitions, see *Kośa* 2.53 and 72.

129 Verse 4.18 follows Bhāviveka's definition of the Buddha in MHK 3.266-67: "No object of knowledge exists at all, so [the Buddhas] who know reality say that the reality that has no equal is [the object] about which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises. The no-arising of cognition, which is called 'Buddha' because it is the understanding of this [reality], is the primary [Buddha], because it is the understanding that is no-understanding, and because it dispels the sleep of concepts." Behind the complexity of these clauses, Bhāviveka is making a simple point: in the primary or literal (*mukhya*) sense, a Buddha is the no-arising (*anudaya*) of cognition (*dhiyaḥ*). Why is it no-arising? Because there ultimately is nothing for any cognition to know.

While the obvious way to read 4.18 is as a reflection of the definition in 3.266-67, the Tibetan translation introduces a different interpretation: instead of *anudaya* (no-arising), it assumes *anūdaya* (arising that is consistent) and takes the relative pronoun *yas* as if it were

D158b We have already proved that objects of cognition (*jñeya*), which are defined as aggregates (*skandha*), sense media (*āyatana*), and realms (*dhātu*), have no identity (*svabhāva*). If their identities are completely unestablished and there is nothing to be cognized, how can there be any cognition? The no-arising of cognition with regard to this [no-object] is non-conceptual awakening. [We] think that [this no-arising of cognition] is awakening, because it is understood in such a way that it is consistent with the reality (*tattva*) of the object, whose identity is unestablished. If [this awakening] were established, it would be momentary and would be like an illusion or a dream. How could it then be consistent [with reality]?

> 4.19 [We] think that [the Buddha's] cognition is free from concepts of identity (*svabhāva*) and so forth. If [you] are denying that this [cognition] has a locus, [you] are proving [our] point.[130]

Non-conceptual awakening has no concept (*vikalpa*) of the identity of a thing as itself or as something else, the discrimination (*nirūpaṇā*) [of this identity], or the recollection (*anusmṛti*) of this [identity].[131] It also is perceptual in nature (*pratyakṣalakṣaṇa*). [We] think that this [non-conceptual awakening] is the Teacher. If [you] are proving that this [non-conceptual awakening] does not have the manifestation body (*nirmāṇakāya*) called Śākyamuni as its locus (*āśraya*), [you] prove [our] point, because its locus is the enjoyment body (*samboghakāya*) that resides in Akaniṣṭha.

Objection: In that case, how can it be called peaceful (*śānta*), empty (*śūnya*), non-dual (*advaya*), and so forth?

Reply:

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a locative. This results in the following translation: "The one in whom a cognition arises that is consistent with this [object] is known as the non-conceptual awakened one." This introduces a person into Bhāviveka's verse and relieves the starkness of his language, but it is inconsistent with the formula used elsewhere in the text. It is preferable to read *anudaya* and identify the primary or literal Buddha simply as no-arising.

Near the end of the commentary on this verse, the phrase "whose identity is unestablished" uses the word *yongs su sgrub pa*, a word that can be used to translate the Yogācāra concept of absolute (*pariniṣpanna*) identity. It is more likely that the word is being used here in a non-technical sense, since the Yogācāra meaning would add an unnecessarily controversial note to this already complex passage.

130 In verse 4.19, Bhāviveka directly addresses the opponent's thesis in verse 4.2: "The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition." He agrees that Śākyamuni's body is not the locus. For him Śākyamuni is simply a "manifestation body" (*nirmāṇakāya*). He thinks that the locus of awakening is the "enjoyment body" (*samboghakāya*) in Akaniṣṭha heaven. This point is discussed in more detail in the commentary on MHK 3.268 (Eckel 1992: 159-60).

131 These three kinds of concepts correspond to the three kinds of *vikalpa* (*svabhāva*, *nirūpaṇā*, *anusmaraṇa*) mentioned in *Kośa* 1.33. They are discussed in the commentary and notes on MHK 5.15.

4.20ab It is called peaceful and so forth by superimposing concepts.[132]

Words such as "pure" (*śuddha*), "inherently luminous" (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*), and "the one who alleviates poverty and sickness" are applied with one's own concepts, as in the case of a wishing-jewel.

Objection: According to the teaching, full perfect awakening (*samyaksambodhi*) is attained by the eightfold path (lit. the path that begins with right vision).[133]

Reply: This is true, but one attains full, perfect awakening by practicing this path with the approach of no-apprehension (*anupalambhanaya*) and without habitual attachment to things (*vastvabhiniveśa*). What is the practice of no-apprehension? D159a

4.20cd-21 Someone who practices the path that begins with right vision as no vision, no thought, no speech, no action, no livelihood, no effort, no mindfulness, and no concentration, . . .[134]

Right vision is no vision, because no *dharma*s are established in their own right. Right thought is no thought, because past thoughts have ceased, future thoughts have not yet occurred, and present thoughts do not continue. Right speech is no speech, because it is impossible to apprehend as speech the place, action, and effort, separately or together, of individual syllables. Right action is no action, because the body, senses, and mind[135] have no self, and, because the sentient being who engages in good action ceases as soon as it arises, there ultimately is nothing to receive the action. Right livelihood

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132 Compare MHK 3.282: "Words such as 'Buddha' are superimposed in a way that corresponds to [the Buddha's] understanding (*pratipatti*), but ultimately [the Buddha] is considered indescribable because he cannot be conceptualized in any way" (Eckel 1992: 165).

133 In verses 4.20-24, Bhāviveka responds to the Śrāvaka's objection in verse 4.3:

> The great awakening of the Buddhas is achieved by following the eightfold path,
> because it is awakening,
> like the awakening of a student.

He agrees that the path is the same, but he insists that the path should be practiced with "the approach of no-apprehension" (*anupalambhanaya*). For other references to the concept of "no-apprehension," see the commentary on MHK 1.18cd, 21; 3.266, 292 (Eckel 1992: 158, 172); 5.4-5, 51-54. Bhāviveka uses *anupalambha* and *anupalabdhi* interchangeably. In MHK 1.21, the term is *anupalambha*: "Scholars do not apprehend saṃsāra or nirvāṇa as different or the same, so they do not stand anywhere, yet they stand everywhere in saṃsāra" (*bhedābhedena saṃsāranirvāṇānupalambhataḥ / na ca kvacana tiṣṭhanti sarvatra ca bhave budhāḥ //*). In MHK 5.5, the term is *anupalabdhi*, reflecting the terminology of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*.

134 The "when" of 4.20cd is followed by the "then" of 4.22. The practitioner in this verse is identified as a Bodhisattva in the introduction to 4.22 below.

135 The word for "mind" is Tib. *blo'i tshogs* / Skt. *dhīkāya*. The same term is translated as "composite cognition" in the commentary on 5.90ab.

is no livelihood, because the body's primordial attachment to possessions causes the body to grow and accumulate things like food and clothing. The idea that these are beneficial is superimposed on the aggregates, as on a ball of foam, a bubble, a mirage, a plantain tree, or an illusion.[136] The body is inanimate, unconscious, and inactive, like grass or trees, and the mind is like an illusion, so they do not engage in right effort even for a moment. In reality there is no right effort, but striving for wholesome qualities (*kuśaladharma*) can be referred to as right effort conventionally (*vyavahārataḥ*). Ultimately there is no experience of sense-consciousness (*indriyavijñāna*), so what can mindfulness, which is a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) that arises subsequent to [sense consciousness], conform to? If there is nothing to be mindful of, there is no act of
D159b mindfulness that can be called "mindfulness." However, it is possible to say in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*) that non-forgetfulness is right mindfulness. Since past consciousness (*citta*) has ceased, future [consciousness] has not yet arisen, and present [consciousness] is about to cease, there is not even a moment of consciousness to be concentrated. There is no sequential apprehension of objects, so no-concentration is referred to conventionally as concentration.[137]

A Bodhisattva who has practiced this [path]

> 4.22 achieves the awakening of a Buddha. Since this is our position, either there is the fault of proving something that we have already accepted, or one should investigate the practice.

When [the opponents] say that awakening is achieved by the eightfold path, they prove something that has already been accepted. If the opponents do not accept this, one should focus on the eightfold path and investigate whether it is reasonable to practice it as we have described it.

Objection: When someone follows this path, is it reasonable to practice it this way? And in what way is it reasonable?

Reply: It is held to be true if it follows inference and does not contradict tradition.

Objection: Following your inference contradicts tradition.

Reply:

> 4.23 For scholars who follow inference, reality does not contradict tradition, and they think of practice in exactly the same way.[138]

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136 Compare PP 41: "Material form is like a ball of foam, feelings are like a bubble, ideas are like a mirage, volitional states are like a plantain tree, and consciousness is like an illusion." See also MHK 1.31.

137 The last sentence in this paragraph seems to contain one too many negative particles. In the absence of a better solution, I have read *yin no* for *ma yin no*.

138 The word order in the verse treats "does not contradict tradition" as the subject and "reality"

The introduction to "Seeking the Knowledge of Reality," defines reality as peaceful, empty, non-dual, not dependent on anything else, no-apprehension, and so forth.[139] This does not contradict tradition or reason. We have established it, and it is reality. The reason (*yukti*) for this practice (*bhāvanā*) will be explained shortly. Its traditional sources (*āgama*) are as follows:

It is said:[140] "O Mañjuśrī, whoever sees all *dharma*s as equal, non-dual, and incapable of being dichotomized has the right view. O Mañjuśrī, whoever sees all *dharma*s without seeing and without thought, concept, or imagination has right thought. Whoever sees all *dharma*s without speaking and understands the equality of no speech has right speech. Whoever sees all *dharma*s without action and who does not apprehend any agent has right action. Whoever does not increase or decrease any *dharma* and who stays in the equality of no livelihood has right livelihood. Whoever does not initiate any *dharma*, does not undertake anything, and does not attempt to subdue anyone else has right effort. Whoever is free from the path in which one is mindful of all *dharma*s and thus has no mindfulness has right mindfulness. O Mañjuśrī, whoever sees all *dharma*s as naturally concentrated, does not apprehend the disturbance of any effort and has right concentration. This is the way to see the noble eightfold path. Anyone who has this correct view of the path is said to have crossed over, to have gone beyond, to have reached dry land, to have attained peace, to have attained fearlessness, to be undefiled, to be an Arhant, an ascetic, and a brahmin." D160a

Likewise, in *The Perfection of Wisdom* it says: "One should practice the right view based on isolation, non-attachment, and cessation with the approach of no-apprehension."

Someone may say that this practice of no vision is a different path, but this should not be said. It should be said that [awakening] is achieved by the same path. Why? The right way to practice the eightfold path is as an antidote to remove unwholesome *dharma*s, such as wrong views, that are not conducive to liberation. In the *Ārya Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* it says:[141] "What is right vision? Right vision does not come from seeing a noble one as having the self, the being, the life, the motion, the soul, the person, the cessation, the permanence, the existence, the non-existence, the wholesome [*dharma*s], the unwholesome [*dharma*s], the indeterminate [*dharma*s], the rebirth, and the nirvāṇa of a supermundane noble one. What is right thought? Right thought is not D160b

as the predicate. I have reversed the order to make clear that this is Bhāviveka's definition of reality.

139 This definition mirrors the definition in MHK 1.1-2. Compare also MHK 3.245-46, 266ff. On Bhāviveka's understanding of inference and tradition, see Part 1 of this book.

140 The source is the *Ārya Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa Sūtra* (*'phags pa chos thams cad 'byung ba med par bstan pa shes bya ba'i theg pa chen po'i mdo*), Tōhoku no. 180, Ma, folios 267a-96a. This quotation is located in folios 278a to 278b. Bhāviveka abbreviates the conclusion; otherwise, he follows the text closely. Some fragments of the corresponding Sanskrit text, along with an edition of the Tibetan, have been published in Braarvig 2000: 139ff.

141 Braarvig 1993, vol. 1, pp. 543-48; vol. 2, pp. 144-45.

to think thoughts that are passionate, hateful, or ignorant and to think thoughts that stem from moral conduct, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and the vision in which there is knowledge of liberation."[142] Therefore, one carries out the practice of no vision, and so forth, in order to remove habitual attachment to real things. By doing this, one removes the stream (*santāna*) [of defilements], along with their traces (*vāsanā*), with a single, correct moment of a Self Existent One's realization (*abhisamaya*) of the reality of all *dharma*s. If traces have to do with the existence and continued presence of objects of cognition (*jñeya*), then, on what basis can a trace arise when one does not apprehend any object of cognition? This is the sequence (*krama*) [of practice] in the Mahāyāna.

[The next verse] explains that one attains reality by practicing the aforementioned path with this kind of vision.

4.24ab To understand this[143] is to be Buddha. Anything else is mother's candy.

D161a It is reasonable to say that a Buddha has understood reality by practicing this traditional teaching in a way that is consistent with reason, because such a person has correct knowledge. If an argument about reality is consistent only with tradition and contradicts reason, it is like the sweet medicine that mothers give to little children. It cannot stand up to analysis. To trick little children into taking their medicine, some women give them hard pieces covered with sugar, saying: "Here, eat this candy." Thinking that their mothers would not deceive them, these children put the pieces in their mouths, bite down hard, and break their teeth. In the same way, some people do not properly understand that the Sugata's teaching is like the prescription of a great physician: it uses conventional language (*saṃketa*) and has a hidden intention (*abhiprāya*).[144] They take the statement, "This is the Sage's teaching," literally, and they teach this habit (*abhiniveśa*) [to others]. Scholars think of these people like children who take sweet medicine from their mothers. They should not follow tradition alone; they should engage in rational inference.

The reason (*yukti*) is as follows:[145] Noble Śrāvakas have a realization (*abhisamaya*)

142 Moral conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), liberation (*vimukti*), and vision in which there is knowledge of liberation (*vimuktijñānadarśana*) constitute the five "supermundane aggregates" (*lokottaraskandha*). See PP 48, 292, and 432.

143 The word "this" refers to "the reality that does not contradict tradition" mentioned in the previous verse. In the commentary, Bhāviveka explains that "anything else" is an understanding of reality that "is consistent only with tradition and contradicts reason." People who accept a view of reality based only on tradition are like children who accept hard medicine from their mothers thinking that it is candy and end up breaking their teeth.

144 The concept of *abhiprāya* figures prominently in Vasubandhu's defence of the Mahāyāna in the VY. This is one of the rare places where Bhāviveka uses it in his own argument.

145 In the commentary on 4.23, Bhāviveka said: "The reason (*yukti*) for this practice (*bhāvanā*) will be explained shortly." Here he provides that explanation.

that consists of the vision only of *dharma*s. Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding (*parijñāna*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). They [accomplish this] by practicing the aforementioned path as if it were a real thing. A Blessed One achieves awakening by perfecting (*samāpatti*) no-apprehension. This does not happen unless concepts of real things are completely uprooted. Therefore, it is the practice of no-apprehension that causes the noble path to function in a distinctive way to bring about perfect awakening. But [the path] is not limited to one group or another.

> 4.24cd This is a decisive response to the claim that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. D161b

[An argument] that produces certainty and causes someone to understand the point at hand is a decisive response (*nirṇaya*). What is it? The Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, because it does not contradict tradition that is consistent with reason. If it contradicted inference, it would not be the Buddha's teaching, like the doctrine of nihilism (*uccheda-vāda*). The Mahāyāna is not contradicted by reason. The reason itself will be explained later. Therefore, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna.

Furthermore,

> 4.25 The aforementioned path is not sufficient to attain the Buddha's awakening, because its awakening has to do with the aspects of suffering and so forth, like the path of the Pratyekabuddhas.[146]

"Without the practice of no-vision and so forth" should be supplied. The aspects of suffering and so forth are as follows. Suffering has four aspects: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and no-self. The aspects of arising, cessation, and the path are described in the sūtras in a similar way. Or one can think of the twelve aspects as suffering, arising, cessation, the path, that which is to be understood, that which is to be removed, that which is to be realized, that which is to be practiced, the act of understanding, the act of removal, the act of realization, and the act of practice. The Pratyekabuddha path is similar. Since the Blessed One does not apprehend these twelve aspects, he understands their equality.

> 4.26 Either the opponent's position is contradicted by inference or the example is impossible. This [path] does not remove those [obstacles].

146 Verses 4.25-26 respond to the objection in verses 4.4-5. The key syllogism was stated in verse 4.5:

> Obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path,
> because they are mental obstacles,
> like the obstacles that consist of defilements.

[The opponent] says that the obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path.
D162a However, the obstacles to knowledge cannot be removed without the distinctive practice [of no-apprehension]. Even the Blessed One does not remove the obstacles to knowledge with this path, because he removes them with another distinctive form of practice. If it were possible to remove the obstacles to knowledge on this path, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas would remove both obstacles, along with their traces, but this is impossible. Therefore, the obstacles to knowledge are only removed by the distinctive practice of the path as described in the Mahāyāna.

Furthermore,

> 4.27 The cognitions of no-arising and cessation are not ultimately true, because they are conceptual, like an erroneous cognition. What is awakening really about?

The cognitions that the aggregates do not arise and that defilements cease occur when a person completes the sixteen moments of thought,[147] namely conviction (*kṣānti*) in the cognition of *dharma* with regard to suffering, cognition of *dharma* with regard to suffering, perseverance in the subsequent cognition of suffering, the subsequent cognition of suffering, and the same [perseverance in the cognition of] *dharma*, cognition [of *dharma*], perseverance in subsequent cognition, and [subsequent] cognition with regard to arising, cessation and the path. Since this was taught by the Blessed One, the opponent thinks that awakening is the cognitions of cessation and no-arising, but this is not consistent [with reason]. To refute it, [we] say that these [cognitions] are not ultimately true. Why? Because they are conceptual, like an erroneous cognition. The cognitions of cessation and no-arising are like an erroneous cognition, that is, they apprehend a false [object], so they cannot be correct awareness.

> 4.28ab This also responds to the reason in which [the Mahāyāna] is called a different vehicle.[148]

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147 On the sixteen moments, see note 15.

148 In verse 4.6 the opponent argued: Even in the Mahāyāna, the same path leads to omniscience, because [the Mahāyāna] is a different vehicle, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna. The commentary on 4.28ab explains that the author responds with a syllogism of his own:

> The path of the Śrāvakayāna does not cause perfect awakening,
> because it lacks the practice [of no-apprehension] and cannot remove obstacles to knowledge,
> like the Pratyekabuddhayāna.

The challenge here is to relate the syllogism in the commentary to the condensed language of the verse. Bhāviveka seems to be saying that the opponent has used "other-vehicleness" as

The path that is described in the Śrāvakayāna is not the cause of perfect awakening, because it lacks this practice [of no-apprehension] and cannot remove the obstacles to knowledge, like the Pratyekabuddhyāna. This is the construction [of the verse]. D162b

4.28cd How can an Arhant attain nirvāṇa if he still has obstacles?

There are two obstacles: the obstacles that consist of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). There are two types of obstacles that consist of defilements: those that cause bondage (*bandhana*) and those that consist of traces (*vāsanā*). The obstacles to knowledge cause bondage. Of these [obstacles], the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas remove only the defilements that cause bondage, not the defilements that consist of traces. They also do not [remove] the second kind of obstacle, the obstacle to knowledge. Therefore, it is wrong to say that an Arhant attains nirvāṇa, because he still has obstacles, like a stream-winner (*śrota-āpanna*). This proves that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have to remove traces and accumulate the requisites of awakening (*bodhisambhāra*) to become Buddhas.

If so, there are two kinds of ignorance: defiled (*kliṣṭa*) and undefiled (*akliṣṭa*). Of these, defiled ignorance is made up of pride in the self, ignorance of the self, desire for the self, and so forth. Undefiled ignorance is made up of traces, as is said in Vararuci's *Teaching of the Deeds of the Buddha*:[149]

> There are two kinds of ignorance: mundane (*laukika*) and noble (*ārya*).

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his reason (*hetuyānāntaratvākhya*) to prove that the path of the Śrāvakayāna leads to omniscience. Bhāviveka argues that this path cannot produce omniscience because it lacks the necessary practice of no-apprehension. The Sanskrit is puzzling. The noun *ākhya* is normally feminine (*ākhyā*). If we accept the reading *ākhya*, then it should be an adjective agreeing with *gatottaraḥ*. If we change *ākhya* (*ākhyaḥ* before *sandhi*) to *ākhyā*, then *sandhi* will reduce the length of the verse by one syllable. The best option is to treat *gatottaraḥ* ("response") as the noun and -*ākhya* as the adjective. The literal translation of the verse would then be: "By this same [argument] there is a response that speaks of other-vehicle-ness as the reason."

149 Vararuci's *Teaching of the Deeds of the Buddha* (Tib. *sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa bstan pa* / Skt. *buddhakriyānirdeśa*?) is quoted again later in this chapter in Bhāviveka's discussion of the claim that "The Mahāyāna predicts the awakening of great Śrāvakas and insults Arhants." The name Vararuci appears in several forms in Tibetan: *mchog 'dod* (as here), *ba ra ru ci* (later in this chapter), and *mchog sred* (MVY 3496, in a list of "previous teachers" that includes Bhavya and Pāṇini). Tāranātha transmits two different legends about a figure named Vararuci. One has to do with a brahmin who lived on the northern frontier during the reign of king Mahāpadma and was involved in the transmission of the *Vibhāṣā* (Tāranātha: 85-87). Another has to do with a brahmin who lived in Magadha and traveled to other regions of India, including the south where he taught Sanskrit grammar to king Udayana (Tāranātha: 111-15). Sanskrit traditions about Vararuci's life and works are even less conclusive, as noted by Losang Norbu Shastri (2001). The title *Deeds of the Buddha* does not appear in any of the known lists of Vararuci's works.

> The mundane produces karmic formations; the noble goes beyond. When a student is in a state of cessation, with a concentrated mind, he has no grasping and is no longer reborn. When he is not in a state of cessation, he is deluded by noble ignorance. He is said to be liberated when his consciousness is free from grasping. But how can someone who is deluded be liberated if he is deluded? His consciousness is hidden in *dharma*s as sense media (*āyatana*). He is not reborn, but he has not reached final awaken-
> D163a ing. Compared to the Buddha's Dharma Body, his nirvāṇa is passive. True nirvāṇa is the Dharma Body of the Buddha. The Buddha realizes this and continues by his sustaining power.

Noble Śrāvakas completely remove defiled ignorance by understanding the selflessness of persons. Undefiled [ignorance] does not obstruct this liberation, so they are said to have attained the cognitions of cessation and non-arising, even though they still have [undefiled ignorance].

> 4.29 If [the opponent] thinks that [a Śrāvaka's] liberation is like a Buddha's, because [a Śrāvaka] removes defiled ignorance, this is wrong, because neither the primary nor the manifested Buddha actually [removes defiled ignorance].

As a Bodhisattva, the Buddha removes defiled ignorance by realizing the conviction (*kṣānti*) that is based on words (*ghoṣānuga*), based on analysis (*anulomikī*), and directed toward *dharma*s that do not arise (*anutpattikadharma*).[150] Neither the primary [Buddha], which is the Dharma Body, nor the manifested (*nirmāṇa*) Buddha remove defiled ignorance.[151] So a Buddha and [a Śrāvaka] do not have the same liberation.

Furthermore, according to the approach of the Mahāyāna, [we] say that the Blessed One practices the path and becomes awakened in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*), but not in an ultimate sense (*paramārthataḥ*). Accordingly,

> 4.30 In the Mahāyāna, the path does not really lead to the awakening of a Buddha, because it has concepts and cognitive marks, like a path that is clearly mundane.

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150 The three kinds of *kṣānti* are discussed in Lamotte 1965: 160-61. Lamotte points out that these three follow an intellectual process that mirrors the three forms of wisdom: wisdom that consists of hearing (*śrutamayī*), thinking (*cintāmayī*), and practice (*bhāvanāmayī*). In this case, *kṣānti* is better translated by "conviction" than by the more common term "patience."

151 On Bhāviveka's distinction between the primary (*mukhya*) and the manifested (*nirmāṇa*) Buddha, see Eckel 1992: 115-22.

The path is not a cause of awakening, because it has concepts (*vikalpa*) and cognitive marks (*nimitta*) such as, "This world and the other world exist," like the path of wholesome action that leads to rebirth as a god or human being.

4.31 Someone may say: If the path is unreal, then it cannot cause the cessation of defilements, because it is unreal, just as the cognition that a post is a man cannot cause their cessation.[152]

The practice of the path is intended to bring about the cessation of defilements, but if it is unreal, how can it cause the cessation of defilements? The cognition that a post is a man cannot dispel doubt. This is the opponent's objection. In other words, if the path D163b
is unreal, it cannot cause the cessation of defilements. And if the cognition that a post is a man is incorrect, it cannot cause their cessation.

We reply:

4.32 It is like the cognition that a rope is a mass of vines, which serves as an antidote to a terrified person's mistaken idea that a rope is a snake.[153]

Someone may mistakenly think that a rope is a snake and not know that it is a rope, then he may realize that it is a coil of vines and thus a rope. The cognition that it is a coil of vines is not [ultimately] true, but it is an antidote to [the mistaken idea of] a snake. Similarly, someone may have a mistaken view of the aggregates and, because of this wrong concept, become attached. Then, when he knows that he is mistaken about them

152 The opponent responds to Bhāviveka's point about ultimate truth with a *prasaṅga*: "If the path is unreal, then it cannot cause the cessation of defilements." This argument is then translated into a syllogism:

The path does not cause the cessation of defilements,
because it is unreal (*abhūtatvāt*),
like a cognition that a post is a man.

This objection is common in Madhyamaka literature, as in the opening verse of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and in MMK chapter 24. The reason, *abhūtatva* ("unreality"), is a good example of the ambiguity in Sanskrit words for existence, which can refer not only to existence but to truth. The path is nonexistent (*abhūta*) in the same way that a false cognition is untrue (*abhūta*). The Tibetan translator dealt with the ambiguity by translating *abhūta* as *mi bden pa* ("untrue").

153 Bhāviveka argues that the opponent's reason ("because it is unreal"), is inconclusive, because unreal things can have real effects. For other Madhyamaka examples of this argument, see Nāgārjuna's discussion of the pot, cloth, and cart and the magically created man in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 22-23. For more discussion of the comparison of the snake and the rope, see MHK 5.55-56.

and develops the view that is the antidote, namely right vision and so forth, he knows that both [right vision and wrong vision] are wrong, because they involve concepts of real things. No-vision is right, because nothing has any identity at all. As it is said in the *Tathāgatakośa Sūtra*,[154]

> O Kāśyapa, it is as if someone were suffering from a poison of doubtful reality, cried out, "I have taken poison, I have taken poison," and beat his breast. A skilled physician might then give him another false poison, remove his idea about the doubtful poison, and free him from suffering. What do you think, Kāśyapa? If the physician had not given the man the other, false poison, would he have lived?
>
> No, Blessed One. He suffered from unreal poison, and he was cured by another unreal poison.
>
> D164a The Blessed One said: Kāśyapa, I teach the Dharma in the same unreal way to foolish people who are defiled by defilements.
>
> Does the Blessed One not teach the truth? How can the Blessed One's teaching not be true?
>
> The Blessed One said: What do you think, O Kāśyapa? Are you liberated by [a teaching] that is true or by one that is not true?
>
> I am liberated by [a teaching] that is not true, not by one that is true. Why? The Blessed One said that desire, hatred, and ignorance are unreal. O Blessed One, if desire were real, [meditation on] repulsive things (*aśubha*) could not remove desire. O Blessed One, if hatred were real, friendliness (*maitrī*) could not remove hatred. O Blessed One, if ignorance were real, dependent origination could not remove ignorance. O Blessed One, it is because desire, hatred, and ignorance are unreal that meditation (*bhāvanā*) on repulsive things, friendliness, and dependent origination can remove them. O Blessed One, all defilements are unreal, so they are removed by unreal realizations. O Blessed One, both the defilements and the means to remove them are unreal, so one is free not only from unreal defilements, but also from unreal realizations.

D164b 4.33ab The reason is inconclusive, and the opponent loses the argument.

[The opponent] says [that the path does not cause the cessation of defilements] because it is unreal, like a cognition that a post is a man. But something that is unreal can

154 The Tibetan title is *de bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzod kyi mdo*. This sūtra is sometimes mistakenly identified as the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra* (Tōhoku no. 258). Paul Harrison has identified it as the *Tathāgataguhyakośa Sūtra* (T 821, 17.844a17-b5), for which there is no Tibetan translation.

remove an unreal mistake. The reason is inconclusive (*savyabhicārin*), because unreality (*abhūtatva*) can imply removal, as in the case of the mistaken cognition that a rope is a snake, or unreality can imply no removal, as in the case of the mistaken cognition that a post is a man. Because of this example, the opponent's argument that a real path causes an accumulation of real defilements to cease is false. Without these two [i.e. a correct reason and example], the argument in favor of the Śrāvakayāna is lost.

Furthermore,

> 4.33cd This also is an answer to [the argument that the path is real] because it is an antidote to defilements.

The opponents may say: The path is real, because it is an antidote to defilements, just as light is an antidote to darkness. This [argument] also can be answered by saying, "an unreal antidote can remove unreal defilements," and using the example of the rope, the snake, and the coiled vines. Since the reason is inconclusive, the opponent loses.

[The opponent says:] We have already proven that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. Therefore, it is wrong to teach a Mahāyāna that has no scriptural source (*anāgama*), since it is nothing but dry logical reasoning.[155]

To answer this claim, [we] distinguish between the objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) and the response (*pratipakṣa*).

> 4.34 According to us, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's, because it shows that there is no self and so forth, and because it displays the greatness of the three jewels, like the Śrāvakayāna.

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155 In verse 4.34, Bhāviveka takes up the opponent's argument in verse 4.7:

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching,
> because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth,
> or because it teaches a different path,
> like the Vedānta view (*vedāntadarśana*).

Bhāviveka starts with a syllogism of his own:

> The Mahāyāna is the Buddha's [teaching],
> because it shows that there is no self and so forth,
> and because it displays the greatness of the three jewels,
> like the Śrāvakayāna.

In verse 4.35 and in the subsequent commentary, he offers more reasons why the Mahāyāna should be considered the Buddha's teaching. These function as counter-arguments (*prati-tarka*) to contradict the opponent's thesis.

The Mahāyāna is the path known as the six perfections together with their results. It
D165a also is the texts (*śāstra*) that make them clear. This [Mahāyāna] is the subject (*dharmin*). "Is the Buddha's" means that it is the Buddha's teaching. This is the predicate (*sādhya*). The combination of the subject and the predicate is the thesis. To have no self is to transcend what other heretics (*tīrthika*) imagine to be the self and so forth. The state of having no self (*nirātmabhāva*) is no-self-ness (*nairātmya*). Something that has no self and so forth not only has no self but also is empty, impermanent, and so forth. To show that there is no self and so forth is to reveal it. A jewel is an object that is difficult to obtain and brings pleasure. The three jewels are the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha. The greatness (*māhātmya*) of the three jewels is their great nature. To display the greatness of the three jewels is to proclaim it. Whatever shows that there is no self and so forth and also displays the greatness of the three jewels is the Buddha's teaching, like the Śrāvakayāna. To be like the Śrāvakayāna is to be similar to it. For this reason, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching.

Objection: This is not the case. According to us, the three baskets (*tripiṭaka*) cause one to obtain [the three jewels],[156] but the Mahāyāna does not. Since we do not accept that it is the Buddha's teaching, this [argument] suffers the fault of not being accepted by both parties.

Reply: Undefiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*) is removed by a single moment of a Self Existent One's correct knowledge, which understands all *dharma*s. Someone who has practiced no-apprehension is free [from undefiled ignorance]. This was taught by the Buddha in the other vehicle, so it is not the case that this point is not accepted by both parties.

D165b 4.35ab And the reason is not accepted, because it is contradicted by a counter-argument.

In the objection, [the opponent] argued that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, like the Vedānta view. To respond, it is necessary to establish its contradiction and thereby [demonstrate that] the reason—because [the Mahāyāna] is not included in the sūtras and so forth—is not accepted. How?

4.35cd Because the teachings of the Mahāyāna, beginning with the [four] truths, are included in the Tripiṭaka (lit. Vinaya and so forth).

156 The text of the Peking says only that the three baskets are "the cause of obtaining" (*thob pa'i rgyu*). The sDe-dge specifies that one obtains "the three vehicles" (*theg pa gsum*). Clearly something has gone amiss. Perhaps one obtains "the three jewels" (*triratna*) rather than "the three vehicles" (*triyāna*).

The teachings of the Mahāyāna, such as the truths of suffering, arising, cessation, and the path, the faculties (*indriya*), the strengths (*bala*), the limbs of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*), the paths, the ten powers (*bala*), the modes of fearlessness (*vaiśāradya*), the analytical awarenesses (*pratisaṃvid*), and the special qualities of a Buddha (*āveṇikabuddhadharma*) are taught word for word[157] in the Vinaya, Sūtras, and Abhidharma. [The teachings of the Mahāyāna] are the same in the way they use these practices to remove defilements. They are distinctive in that only the Blessed One uses the Mahāyāna approach of no-apprehension to remove the obstacles to knowledge. Therefore, because the truths taught in the Vinaya and so forth are fully explained in the Mahāyāna, the Sūtras and so forth are consistent with the Mahāyāna. Since the Mahāyāna is included implicitly in the Sūtras and so forth, the opponent's reason is not accepted.

Objection: Although some [teachings], such as the noble truths, are included in the Mahāyāna, [the Mahāyāna] contradicts the texts (*śāstra*) of many different schools, as we pointed out in our objection.

Reply: Your mind is stained by the traces of false attachment, and you speak without definitively grasping the meaning of Mahāyāna texts. We respond: D166a

The Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, because it is consistent with the seals (*mudrā*) of the Dharma. It also is possible to argue that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, because it follows the sūtras [that teach] the noble truths, because it is the true vision that disciplines defilements, and because it is consistent with the teaching of dependent arising.

Furthermore, all eighteen schools follow their own canonical texts (lit. Sūtras and so forth) and greatly contradict one another. With its deep and broad approach of acting for the welfare of others, the Mahāyāna sometimes does not follow a particular canonical collection (*sūtrādipiṭaka*) of the Śrāvakas, but it does follow the sūtras of the Mahāyāna, because it appears in the seven hundred precepts (*śikṣāpada*) of a Bodhisattva and is consistent with the doctrine of emptiness. Therefore, it is consistent with the seals of the Dharma.

Another response is to say that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, because it was collected by the original compilers, such as Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, Guhyakādhipati, and Maitreya.[158] Śrāvakas did not compile our root collection, because the teachings of the Mahāyāna were beyond them.

As it is said in the *Śiṃśapāvana Sūtra*,

157 Lit. in syllables (*akṣara*), words (*śabda*), and consonants (*vyañjana*).

158 Tāranātha lists the same four Bodhisattvas as original compilers of the Mahāyāna (trans. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya: 98). The *Traité* (383) lists the compilers as Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, and Vajrapāṇi. (Guhyakādhipati is an epithet of Vajrapāṇi.) Bu-ston's account of the compilation of the Mahāyāna mentions the tradition of the *Tarkajvālā* along with several others (Obermiller 1932b: 2.101-2).

> Ānanda, I have understood an extremely large number of *dharma*s, as many as there are leaves in this Śiṃśapā grove, but I have not taught them to you. They are not profitable for you; they do not cause you to be weary [with saṃsāra] or free from desire.[159]

Similarly:[160]

D166b

> The *Uttara*, *Ānanda*, *Patali*, *Duḥkhaskandha*, *Mahī*[*śāsaka*], *Udāyi*, *Śūnyatā*, *Varṣa*, *Pūrṇa*, *Gupta*, *Rampaka*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Rāṣṭrapāla*, and *Gati Sūtra*s were incomplete in the original collection and should be understood as being abbreviated [lit. not extensive].

In the *Uttara Sūtrānta* it says:[161] "Śakra, the Lord of the Gods, said: Reverend Uttara, when I look into the minds of all the Śrāvakas of the Blessed One who are living in Jambudvīpa, there is not a single monk, apart from you, reverend Uttara, who has memorized this Dharma teaching (*dharmaparyāya*). But, reverend Uttara, this Dharma teaching was taught by the Blessed One, so you must memorize it." This leads us to infer that there were no others at that time [who knew this teaching]. Just a short time after the Blessed One's parinirvāṇa, even when the noble Ānanda was still alive, nobody knew or understood this teaching of the Buddha. How much more so today?

In addition, it says in the *Ānanda Sūtra*: "When the Blessed One had grown old, he

159 Compare SN V 437-38.

160 The following passage appears to be a quotation from Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* (VY), although it is possible that both texts quote from a common source. The translations of the two passages are similar, but there are significant textual variants. The most important of these are noted when they occur. Vasubandhu uses the argument in this passage to respond to an objection in which the Śrāvaka argues that "The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it contradicts the generally accepted (*prasiddha*) teachings of the Buddha" (VY 203). Vasubandhu initially responds by pointing out that the Śrāvakayāna itself contains contradictory teachings. The Śrāvaka then argues that there are no contradictions, because only some of these passages contain the Buddha's definitive (*nītārtha*) teaching. Vasubandhu responds by asking why it is not possible to say the same about the Mahāyāna: "In the Mahāyāna, why is there no definitive (*nītārtha*) [teaching] that is definitively grasped as not contradictory? Do the gods know the whole Mahāyāna? If not—if they do not know the whole [Mahāyāna]—how can they know that it has no definitive [teaching]? If something does not appear now, why can it not appear [later]? Similarly, the whole teaching of the Buddha does not appear in the Śrāvakayāna." Bhāviveka's terminology contains echoes of Vasubandhu's. He mentioned several paragraphs earlier, for example, that his objector "does not definitively grasp the meaning of Mahāyāna texts." Otherwise Bhāviveka ignores Vasubandhu's use of the concept of "definitive meaning" (*nītārtha*). His only concern is to show that the objector's reason ("because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth") is inconclusive. This reason was first presented in verse 4.7.

161 Compare AN IV 166 (*Uttara Sutta*), quoted in VY (Skilling 2000: 340).

addressed the noble Ānanda and said: 'Can you memorize the *dharma*s I have taught?' In response to this question, [Ānanda] said: 'I would need to stay in the Blessed One's presence for at least twenty years!'" In the same [sūtra] it says: "I have memorized eighty thousand articles of Dharma (*dharmaskandha*) in the presence of the Blessed One; two [thousand] came from monks."[162] This means that he [Ānanda] did not memorize [every article] that the Blessed One had previously taught. It would not have been reasonable for [the Blessed One] to teach them to him, because the monks had already memorized them. It also would not have been reasonable to teach each small [article] again in a period of forty years.

Someone may say that the noble Ānanda understood everything [taught by the Blessed One]. If so, Śakra, the Lord of Gods, would not have said in the *Uttara Sūtra* that no monk had memorized that Dharma teaching. This should be understood to D167a
mean that Ānanda did not memorize everything. Therefore, the full teaching of the Buddha does not appear in the collection made by those who were taught by [Ānanda] and who collected [his teachings].[163]

In the *Patali Sūtra*,[164] the Blessed One said, among other things: "Patali, when the assembly was few in number, where was the Dharma teaching (*dharmaparyāya*) called 'The Thoroughbred's Fair Colt' taught to the community of monks?"[165] This is not extant as a sūtra.

Moreover, in the *Duḥkhaskandha Sūtra*,[166] the Blessed One said to Mahānāma the

162 Compare *Theragāthā* 1024: *dvāsītiṃ buddhato gaṇhi dve sahassāni bhikkhuto* ("I have learned eighty-two thousand from the Buddha and two thousand from a monk"). Bhāviveka follows a Sanskrit tradition that is attested in the *Avadānaśataka* (242), among other sources: *bhagavato 'ntikād aśītir dharmaskandhasahasrāṇy udgṛhītāni*. Lamotte (1988: 148-49) has a thorough discussion of the traditions connected with eighty thousand and eighty-four thousand articles of Dharma.

163 VY: "The compilers collected what [Ānanda] said. Therefore, the complete teaching of the Buddha does not appear today."

164 VY refers to this sūtra as the *'od sel gyi mdo*. The quotation from this sūtra refers to a text called *rta cang shes bzhon bzangs kyi chos kyi rnam grangs*, corresponding to TJ's *rta cang shes bzang po'i rte'u zhes bya ba'i chos kyi rnam grangs* ("the Dharma teaching called 'The Thoroughbred's Fair Colt'"). A number of Pali suttas mention the qualities of a thoroughbred (Tib. *rta cang shes*; Skt. *ājāneya* or *aśvājāneya*; Pali *ājañña* or *ājāniya*), such as AN II 250-51, 251-52; III 248; IV 188-90, 282-84. But none mentions a text of this name.

165 VY reads: "*Od sel*, when I taught 'The Thoroughbred's Fair Colt' to the assembly of monks, you (pl.) were few in number."

166 Compare MN I 91-95 (*Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta*): *Ekam idāhaṃ mahānāma samayaṃ rājagahe viharāmi gijjhakūṭe pabbate. Tena kho pana samayena sambahulā nigaṇṭhā isigilipasse kāḷasilāyaṃ ubbhaṭṭhakā honti āsanapaṭikkhittā, opakkamikā dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vediyanti. Atha kho 'haṃ mahānāma sāyanhasamayaṃ paṭisallānā vuṭṭhito yena isigilipassaṃ kāḷasilā yena te nigaṇṭhā ten' upasaṅkamiṃ, upasaṅkamitvā te nigaṇṭhe etad avocaṃ: Kin nu tumhe āvuso nigaṇṭhā ubbhaṭṭhakā āsanapaṭikkhittā opakkamikā dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vediyathāti?* PTS translation: "At one time, I, Mahānāma, was staying near Rajagaha on Mount Vulture Peak. Now at that time several Jains on the Black Rock on the slope of (Mount) Isigili

Śākya: "At one time, after staying in Rājagṛha, I went along a mountain path to Suparśva Mountain. There I saw an ascetic (*nirgrantha*) with his head down;[167] I said to him. . . ." This[168] is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Mahīśāsaka Sūtra*,[169] the Blessed One said: "At one time, when I was staying in Rājagṛha, many heretics (*tīrthika*) and wanderers (*parirvrājaka*) met me on the road leading to the mountain. When they had gathered around me, they thought of asking me. . . ."[170] This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Udāyi Sūtra*[171] it says: "There is a method (*paryāya*) by which I teach four feelings." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Śūnyatā Sūtra*[172] it says: "The noble Ānanda said: 'At one time the Blessed One was staying in the market town of the Śākyas. There I understood what the Blessed One meant when he said: "Now I have lived a great deal in emptiness."'" This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Udāyi Sūtra*[173] it says: "The Blessed One said: 'Great king, I remember having

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came to be standing erect and refusing a seat; they were experiencing feelings that were acute, painful, sharp, severe. Then I, Mahānāma, having emerged from solitary meditation towards evening, approached the slopes of (Mount) Isigili, the Black Rock and those Jains; having approached, I spoke thus to those Jains: 'Why do you, reverend Jains, standing erect and refusing a seat, experience feelings that are acute, painful, sharp, severe?'"

167 VY reads "with upraised arms" (Tib. *lag pa bsgreng ba* / Skt. *ūrdhvabāhu*) rather than "with his head down" (*mgo thur du pa stan pa*)."

168 Bhāviveka uses the phrase that is translated *zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgyas par 'byung ba* to indicate that he is abbreviating the text of the sūtra.

169 TJ reads *sa pa'i mdo* (*Mahī Sūtra*?). VY reads *sa ston gyi mdo*, for which the Sanskrit equivalent would be *Mahīśāsaka Sūtra*. This title is not attested in the Sūtra literature.

170 A comparable story is found in DN III 36ff. (*Udumbarikā Sīhanāda Suttanta*).

171 An *Udāyi Sūtra* is mentioned in the commentary on *Kośa* 2.44 and discussed at length in the *Vyākhyā*. On the "methods" for the enumeration of feelings (*vedanā*), compare SN IV 224: *Dve pi mayā ānanda vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // tisso pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // pañca pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // cha pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // aṭṭhārasā pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // chattiṃsā pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena // aṭṭhasatam pi mayā vedanā vuttā pariyāyena*. PTS translation: "There are two feelings, Ānanda, in my way of explaining. There are three feelings, Ānanda, in my way of explaining. There are also five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, there are one hundred and eight feelings in my way of explaining, Ānanda." The number four in Bhāviveka's account of this quotation is puzzling. *Kośa* 1.14 and commentary enumerate three and six feelings. The same system is followed in the *Arthaviniścayasūtra* (Santani 1971: 126).

172 Compare MN III 104 (*Cūḷasuññatā Sutta*): *Ekamidaṃ bhante, samayaṃ bhagavā sakkesu viharati. Nāgarakaṃ nāma sakyānaṃ nigamo. Tattha me, bhante, bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ: Suññatāvihārenāhaṃ, ānanda, etarahi bahulaṃ viharāmīti. Kacci me taṃ, bhante, sussutaṃ suggahītaṃ sumanasikataṃ sūpadhāritan ti.* The Tibetan text of this sūtra has been edited by Skilling 1994-97. Here the Tibetan text mistakenly attributes the words of this quotation to the Buddha.

173 TJ reads *'char ba'i mdo* (*Udāyi Sūtra*?). VY reads c*hu las skyes pa'i mdo*. Skilling notes a reference to MVY 6142, perhaps *Jalaja Sūtra*. It seems that VY is reading *Udaja* and TJ *Udayi* or

said at one time: 'There are no ascetics (*śramaṇa*) or brahmins who know everything and see everything. There have not been in the past, nor will there be in the future. D167b
This is impossible.'" This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Pūrṇa Sūtra*[174] it says: "The elder Ānanda said: 'When I was a newcomer to the order, the monk and elder Maitrāyaṇīputra, now known as the venerable Pūrṇa, gave a very profound Dharma talk." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Gupta Sūtra*[175] it says: "Varṣākāra[176] said: 'At one time, the monk Gautama was staying in Nādikā[177] in a brick residence,[178] and so forth. There the Blessed One Gautama praised meditation (*dhyāna*) in every way." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Rampaka Sūtra*,[179] the Blessed One said to a group of five monks: "Previously, when I had not yet gone forth and was still living at home, I thought and taught that living in a house is harmful."[180] This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*,[181] it says: "The elder Ānanda said to the venerable Aniruddha: 'In the presence of the Blessed One, I heard directly and understood directly that the Blessed Ones,[182] the Buddhas, attain (*samāpanna*) the fourth meditative

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Udaya. On the *Udāyi Sūtra* (*'char ka'i mdo*), see previous discussion of SN IV 224.

174 Compare SN III 105-6: *Puṇṇo nāma āvuso āyasmā mantāniputto amhākaṃ navakānaṃ sataṃ bahūpakāro hoti, so amhe iminā ovādena ovadati. Idañca pana me āyasmato puṇṇassa mantāniputtassadhammadesanaṃ sutvā dhammo ahisametoti.* PTS translation: "The venerable Ānanda thus spoke: 'Puṇṇa, friends, the venerable son of Mantānī, was very helpful to us when we were novices. With this instruction he instructed us.'" On the venerable Pūrṇa, see DPPN 222-23.

175 TJ reads *sbas pa'i mdo* (*Gupta Sūtra*). VY *reads sa 'tsho'i mdo*. Compare MN III 13 (*Gopakamoggallāna Sutta*): *Ekamidāhaṃ bho ānanda, samayaṃ so bhavaṃ gotamo vesāliyaṃ viharati mahāvane kūṭāgārasālāyaṃ. Atha kho ahaṃ bho ānanda, yena mahāvanaṃ kūṭāgārasālā, yena so bhavaṃ gotamo, tenupasaṅkamiṃ. Tatra ca pana so bhavaṃ gotamo anekapariyāyena jhānakathaṃ kathesi. Jhāyī ceva so bhavaṃ gotamo ahosi jhānasīlī ca sabbañca pana so bhavaṃ gotamo jhānaṃ vaṇṇesīti.* PTS translation: "At one time, good Ānanda, the revered Gotama was staying near Vesālī in the Great Wood in the hall of the Gabled House. Then I, good Ānanda, approached the revered Gotama in the Great Wood in the hall of the Gabled House. While he was there the revered Gotama in many a figure talked a talk on meditation. A meditator was the revered Gotama and he was disposed to meditation; and the revered Gotama praised every (form of) meditation."

176 TJ reads *lo byed*; VY reads *dbyar tshul*. Both are equivalents of the name Varṣākāra (Pali Vassakāra).

177 The place names in this passage can be clarified by comparing the Pali *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 91) with the Sanskrit *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (abbreviated MPS) II 162.

178 For "brick residence," TJ reads *gu 'dzi ka'i bsti gnas na*; VY reads *'ol ma se can gyi nang na*; the Sanskrit MPS reads *kuñjikāvasatha*; the Pali reads *giñjakāvasatha*.

179 TJ reads *ram pa ka'i mdo*; VY reads *chu shing gi mdo*. Compare MN I 160-219 (*Ariyapariyesana Sutta*), which starts in the hermitage of the brahmin Rammaka.

180 For "harmful," TJ reads *gnod pa* and VY reads *nyam nga*. Both are equivalent to *saṃbādha*.

181 MPS II 394-97 (sect. 42.14-17). The parallel passage in Pali is found in DN II 156.

182 Compare MPS III 396: *saṃmukhaṃ me āyuṣmann aniruddha bhagavato 'ntikāc chrutam saṃmukham udgṛhītam*.

state (*dhyāna*) and achieve immovable peace, then as Seers[183] they enter parinirvāṇa.'" This is not extant as a sūtra.

[In the *Rāṣṭrapāla Sūtra*] the noble Rāṣṭrapāla said:[184] "Great king, the Blessed One who sees and understands correctly, the Tathāgata, Arhant, Samyaksaṃbuddha, spoke of four ways of becoming weary [with saṃsāra]. . . ." The last of these is: "Great king, this world is a slave of insatiable desire." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the *Gati Sūtra* it says: "Anāthapiṇḍada[185] said: 'In the presence of the Blessed One
D168a I heard directly and understood directly that, when a certain person creates a grove and dedicates it, after death he is reborn among the gods in heaven. . . .'" This passage concludes by saying: "There is a statement of praise and there is a reason to praise generosity."[186] This is not extant as a sūtra.

Other sūtras can be understood in the same way. In the *Tuṣṇīṃbhāva Sūtra*,[187] it says: "As was said earlier in the Buddha's teaching to Maudgalyāyana, you, Maudgalyāyana, should practice a noble silence; you should not be careless." And in the *Sthātavya Sūtra*[188] it says: "In this noble state you should not be careless." The sūtras that contain these statements are not extant.

Also, many sūtras that exist today, such as the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, contain variant readings. From this it is clear that these and many other sūtras do not now appear as the Buddha's extensive teaching in the Śrāvakayāna.

[It also is clear that sūtras] collected by the compilers of the root collection,[189] who were Arhants such as Mahākāśyapa, have now been lost, because there are different

183 TJ reads *mig dang ldan pa*; VY reads *spyan dang ldan pa*.

184 Compare MN II 68 (*Raṭṭhapāla Sutta*): *Atthi kho, mahārāja, tena bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena cattāro dhammuddesā uddiṭṭhā; ye ahaṃ ñatvā ca disvā ca sutvā ca agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajito. Katame cattāro? . . . Ūno loko atitto taṇhādāso ti kho, mahārāja, tena bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena catuttho dhammuddeso uddiṭṭho; yaṃ ahaṃ ñatvā ca disvā ca sutvā ca agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajito.* PTS translation: "There are, sire, four expoundings of dhamma expounded by the Lord who knows, who sees, perfected one, fully Self-Awakened One; because I have known and seen and heard these, I have gone forth into homelessness. What are the four? . . . The fourth expounding of dhamma expounded by the Lord who knows, who sees, perfected one, fully Self-Awakened One is that: 'the world lacks and is unsatisfied, a slave to craving.'"

185 On Anāthapiṇḍada (Pali Anāthapiṇḍika), see MN III 258-64. TJ reads *kun dga' ra ba byas nas sngo bar byed pa*; VY reads simply *kun dga' ra ba phul ba* ("when someone gives a pleasure grove"). See also AN V 185-89 and the story of Anāthapiṇḍada in the *Śayanāsanavastu* (Gnoli 1978: 11ff.).

186 The meaning of this sentence is unclear. VY reads *yon bsngo ba byas pa'i rgyus*. The reference to "dedication" may reflect the "dedication" mentioned at the beginning of the TJ version.

187 For references to the "noble silence" (*āriyatuṇhībhāva*) in Pali literature, see SN II 236, 273 and MN I 161. TJ reads *mi smra ba'i dngos po'i mdo*; VY reads *cang mi smra ba'i mdo*.

188 TJ reads *gnas par bya ba'i mdo*; VY reads *gnas pa'i mdo*.

189 For "compilers of the root collection," both TJ *rtsa ba'i sdud par byed pa po* and VY *yang dag par bsdus pa'i gzhi po* seem to be the equivalent of *mūlasaṃgītikāraka*.

recensions of these sūtras in the Āgamas of different schools (*nikāya*), and because sūtras collected in different Āgamas contain different topics (*padārtha*).[190] [We] also see other sūtras that were not included [in these Āgamas] and do not contradict them, whose names are *Garbhāvakrānti* (*mngal du 'jug pa*),[191] *Nandin* (or *Nandaka / dga' ba can*), and *Āyuḥparyanta* (*tshe'i mthar thug pa*).[192] If this is the case and even the compilers are confused, how can anyone be confident that these are the complete[193] teaching of the Buddha? We hear that up to a hundred [texts] can come from hearing a single [text] passed on by a lineage of transmission.[194]

Furthermore, if the teachings in the Mahāyāna are different, why would the other compilers have collected them? If [teachings] are contradictory, they must have different compilers. This is why the noble Sāṃmitīyas do not accept sūtras that deal with D168b no-self such as the *Paramārthaśūnyatā* [*Sūtra*].[195] Schools such as the Mahīśāsakas do not accept [sūtras] that deal with the intermediate realm (*antarābhava*) such as the *Saptabhava* [*Sūtra*]. Similarly, in the Vinaya, according to the Vātsīputrīyas, one is prohibited from eating such things as molasses at the wrong time, while, according to the Sarvāstivādins, it appears that one can eat and enjoy them.[196] A sūtra of these [Vātsīputrīyas] extols the existence of the self, while the Sarvāstivādins reject it.

Similarly, some say that there is no self, while others say that there is a person. Some think that all conditioned states are momentary, while some think that they last for two

190 The translation of this sentence follows VY, where the syntax is more clear.

191 The *Garbhāvakrānti Sūtra* has a complex textual history. A *Garbhāvakrānti* is quoted in the commentary on *Kośa* 1.35. Two independent versions of a sūtra with this name are found in the *Ratnakūṭa*; another version is included in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*. J. W. de Jong (1977) has commented on the textual issues connected with this sūtra.

192 The *Āyuḥparyanta Sūtra* is edited in Matsumura 1989. This sūtra exists in Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation but not in Pali. There is no indication that it was part of a particular Āgama. Apparently such sūtras circulated independently in Buddhist circles but were not part of specific canonical collections.

193 Follow VY; TJ reads "extensive."

194 This sentence concludes Bhāviveka's quotation of the VY. At the end of his version of this argument, Vasubandhu returns to the point about whether the Mahāyāna contains the Buddha's definitive meaning (*nītārtha*): "Therefore one cannot definitively grasp (*nges par gzung bar mi bya'o*) that there is no definitive meaning in the Mahāyāna, simply because a sūtra with definitive meaning does not now appear (or simply because one does not now see such a sūtra)."

195 Vasubandhu quotes the objectionable passage in his discussion of the *pudgala-vāda* at the end of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*Kośa:* 468): *iti hi bhikṣavo 'sti karmāsti vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhyate* ("O monks, there is a karma and there is a result, but no agent is to be found.")

196 Shayne Clarke has identified a passage that discusses this point in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*: "Then the Blessed One said to the monks: . . .whether it is the right time or not, or whether one is sick or not, one can enjoy molasses without having to repent": *de nas bcom ldan 'das kyis dge slong rnams la bka' stsal pa / de lta bas na rjes su gnang ste / dus sam dus ma yin pa'am / na ba'am mi na bas / bu ram la longs spyad par bya ste / 'di la 'gyod par ni mi bya'o //* (sDe-ge 'Dul ba, Ga, folio 16b).

moments, and others think that this earth lasts until the end of a kalpa. Some think that nirvāṇa is substantially real (*dravyasat*), while others think that it is only a name (*nāmamātra*). Some think that there is an intermediate realm (*antarābhava*), while others do not. Some think that the Blessed One's understanding occurs in a single moment, while others think that it takes sixteen moments. Therefore, since the teachings of the separate schools (*nikāya*) contradict one another in these ways, they are different, and it is difficult to establish their authority (Tib. *gtsug lag nyid* / Skt. **śāstratva*). So [the opponent is arguing that] the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching simply because it was collected by different compilers.

The Eternal Tathāgata[197]

Furthermore, the claim that Tathāgata is eternal (*nitya*) means that the Tathāgata's understanding (*abhisamaya*) is eternal, and that the Tathāgata is identical to this understanding. It does not mean, however, that [the Tathāgata] does not change. Someone who wants to understand [this point] in more detail, should consult the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. The word "eternal" can refer to something that functions as a continuum (*santāna*) but is dissolved at every moment, like a river that constantly flows or a fire that constantly
D169a burns. Thus [the teaching that the Buddha is eternal] does not contradict the statement that all conditioned states are impermanent (*anitya*).

Pervasion by the Tathāgatagarbha

To say that there is "pervasion by [the essence of] the Tathāgata" means that [the Tathāgata's] knowledge encompasses[198] all objects of cognition, not that he is omnipresent like Viṣṇu. To say that [sentient beings] have the essence of the Tathāgata means that emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*animitta*), wishlessness (*apraṇihita*), and so forth, are present in the continuum[199] of all sentient beings, but this [essence of the Tathāgata] is not like an all-pervasive, eternal, inner soul (*puruṣa*). As it is said: "All *dharma*s are empty, signless, and wishless, and emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness are the Tathāgata." Furthermore, the appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*) causes the

197 Here Bhāviveka takes up the miscellaneous objections that were introduced after the discussion of the eighteen schools, just before verse 4.9. Bhāviveka refers to a discussion of the "eternal" (*nitya*) Tathāgata in chapter 5 of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* ("On the consequences of the eternal and non-eternal Tathāgata"). The sūtra explains why the Tathāgata is neither eternal (*nitya*) nor non-eternal (*anitya*). On the concept of the eternal (*nitya*) Buddha in Bhāviveka's own work and in other Mahāyāna sources, see Eckel 1992: 109-13.

198 "Pervade" and "encompass" represent the same term (Tib. *khyab pa* / Skt. *vy-āp*).

199 The Tibetan *rgyud* represents the Sanskrit *santāna*.

ebb and flow[200] of saṃsāra. Since it flows like the stream of a great river, it clearly is active, but it is active as a continuum of moments. It is not like a self (*ātman*), so this does not contradict the seal of the Dharma that consists of no-self.

The Buddha Does Not Attain Complete Nirvāṇa

[The Mahāyāna] says that the Buddha does not attain complete nirvāṇa,[201] but he certainly has removed the obstacles that consist of defilements and the obstacles to knowledge. For the sake of beings who need to be disciplined (*vineyajana*), he is born naturally.[202] For some he continues to burn, but wherever there is no one who needs to be disciplined he displays extinction (*nirvāṇa*).[203] In some states of existence, he is like a fire without fuel. In others he displays the acts of a Buddha, including nirvāṇa, whenever he wishes. But he has not definitively attained complete nirvāṇa. This is because he made a vow (*praṇidhāna*) to carry the entire realm of sentient beings to completion.[204] Even though he has not attained nirvāṇa, he displays nirvāṇa so that those who need to be disciplined will feel disgust [with saṃsāra]. There is either a literal (*paryāya*) nirvāṇa or D169b
a nirvāṇa that is located neither in saṃsāra nor in peace (*śānti*).[205] This is why it says:

> I do not attain nirvāṇa as an existing thing, as an action, or as a dis-

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200 Other possibilities might be "rising and falling" or "starting and stopping." The Tibetan *'jug pa dang ldog pa* might represent the Sanskrit *pravartana* and *nivartana*. Note, however, that *'jug pa* is translated as "active" in the next sentence.

201 The word translated as "does not attain complete nirvāṇa" (Tib. *mya ngan yongs mi 'da'* / Skt. *na parinirvāti*) is the verbal form of the word parinirvāṇa. Another translation might be "pass completely away" or "become completely extinct."

202 Literally "his birth is attained through the nature of things" (Tib. *chos nyid kyis thob pa'i skye ba* / Skt. *dharmatāpratilabdhajanma*). On *dharmatā-pratilambha* as "natural," see BHSD (s.v. *dharmatā*). The compound *dharmatā-pratilabdha* occurs twice in Haribhadra's AAA (77, 162) in discussions of the *gotra* of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Compare also the account of great Śrāvakas after the prediction of the Tathāgata in the next section of this chapter.

203 Literally "wherever there is no field of beings who need to be disciplined." The meaning is clarified by a comparable passage in Haribhadra's AAA (147): "If there is no one in a particular world system who needs to be disciplined by the display of a Buddha's form, he displays cessation (*nirvṛtti*) to benefit those who need to be disciplined by the display of nirvāṇa." Here Bhāviveka's words play on the contrast between the burning of a fire and nirvāṇa as the extinction of a flame.

204 The same terminology occurs in a slightly different form in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (11): "He carries out these great vows with ten completions. What are these ten? The completion of the realm of sentient beings. . ." (*tāni ca mahāpraṇidhānāni daśabhir niṣṭhāpadair abhinirharati / katamair daśabhiḥ / yad uta sattvadhātuniṣṭhayā*).

205 On the synonyms (*paryāya*) of nirvāṇa, see the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Tatia 1976: 74-75). On Bhāviveka's understanding of *apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* (the nirvāṇa that is not located in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa), see MHK 1.20-21 (Gokhale 1985: 98-99) and MHK 3.293-95 (Eckel 1992: 173).

> tinctive characteristic. I attain nirvāṇa by transcending the distinction between subject and object.[206]

Therefore, [we] accept a nirvāṇa that is free from concepts, and [our view of] nirvāṇa does not contradict [the seal of the Dharma that consists of] peace.

THE MAHĀYĀNA PREDICTS THE AWAKENING OF ŚRĀVAKAS AND INSULTS ARHANTS

It is wrong [to say] that the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) of great Śrāvakas is not the Buddha's teaching. Predictions are made about the lineages (*gotra*) of Śrāvakas. One lineage of sentient beings has sharp faculties (*indriya*) and the skill-in-means (*upāyakauśalya*) to achieve the welfare of others. They seek to achieve a distinctive, superior goal. Because they seek this excellent goal, they become excellent, like Bodhisattvas. Another lineage of sentient beings have dull faculties and seek their own welfare. Since they meditate on the selflessness of persons, their goal is inferior and they attain inferior distinction, like Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Some lineages of sentient beings seek a distinctive goal, but attain an inferior one. For example, the Pratyekabuddhas who live in isolation have collected the requisites (*sambhāra*) of awakening for a hundred eons (*kalpa*), but then, for some reason, turn back from great awakening.[207] Some lineages of sentient beings have sharp faculties but seek to distinguish themselves in an inferior way, do not have skill-in-means, and start to remove defilements. When the Tathāgata sees that they are suitable[208] for great awakening, he makes a prediction. Then they remove karma and defilements and are born naturally.[209] When they have collected the distinctive requisites of

206 This verse is almost identical to *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 2.177 (2.179 in Suzuki's translation): *nāhaṃ nirvāmi bhāvena kriyayā lakṣaṇena ca / vikalpahetuvijñāne nivṛtte nivṛtto hy aham //*. Instead of "when the consciousness that causes concepts ceases (*vikalpahetuvijñāne nivṛtte*)" in the third *pāda*, Bhāviveka reads "when concepts of subject and object cease (*jñānajñeya-vikalpe nivṛtte*)." In the *Laṅkāvatāra* this verse is accompanied by an explanation: "Once again, Mahāmati, there are four kinds of nirvāṇa. What are the four? The nirvāṇa that is the absence of an entity (*bhāvasvabhāvābhāva*), the nirvāṇa that is the absence of diversity of characteristics (*lakṣaṇavicitrabhāvābhāva*), the nirvāṇa that is the understanding of the absence of particular characteristics (*svalakṣaṇabhāvābhāvāvabodha*), and the nirvāṇa that cuts off the stream of the particular and universal characteristics of the aggregates (*skandhānāṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇasantatiprabandhavyuccheda*). These four kinds of nirvāṇa are associated with the heretics (*tīrthika*), not with my teaching. According to my teaching, O Mahāmati, nirvāṇa is the cessation (*vyāvṛtti*) of the mental awareness (*manovijñāna*) that causes concepts (*vikalpaka*)." Lindtner (1992: 259) discusses this passage in an article on the relationship between the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and early Madhyamaka. A more extensive discussion of heretical views of nirvāṇa can be found in *Laṅkāvatāra* 3.69-78.

207 On the Pratyekabuddhas who live in isolation (lit. "like a rhinoceros"), see *Kośa* 3.94d and commentary.

208 Read *skal pa* (as in *sabhāga* or *bhavya*) rather than *bskal pa*.

208 On *dharmatā-pratilabdha-janma*, see note 202.

great awakening, they achieve a distinctive awareness (*adhigama*), like great Śrāvakas such as Śāriputra. This has been explained in the *Daśadharmaka Sūtra*.[210] Or they remove the obstacles that consist of defilements, then remove the obstacles to knowl- D170a
edge. When they have been completely purified in this way, they attain omniscience.

It is not reasonable to say that this [awareness] is like a sprout, which does not arise when its seed has been burned. We do not think that it arises like a sprout, in the same way that defilements arise.[211] However, in order to remove the undefiled obstacles to knowledge, the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, train [their students] by admonishing them. They start at a level of pure aspiration (*adhimukti*), then engage in a Bodhisattva practice that seems defiled; but it should be seen as a Bodhisattva practice that is not defiled.[212]

It is said that [a Bodhisattva] in the seventh stage (*bhūmi*) neither has defilements nor does not have defilements. The explanation is that [this Bodhisattva] is undefiled in the sense that his defilements are not active, and is not undefiled in the sense that he has not fulfilled the desire to have a Tathāgata's knowledge (*jñāna*).[213] During the second immeasurable eon (*asaṃkhyeyakalpa*) in the eighth perfect stage (*bhūmi*), [the Bodhisattva] becomes absolutely perfect due to all the actions that arise from his practice. The moment he perfects the [final] activity that still has defilements, the Bodhisattva obtains a position in the profound and isolated Bodhisattva state (*vihāra*).[214] When he, like an Arhant who has achieved *nirodhasamāpatti*, abides in conviction with regard to *dharma*s that do not arise (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*),[215] then, if the Buddhas,

210 Otani no. 760/9; Taishō no. 314; cited in the *Bodhisaṃbhāra* attributed to Nāgārjuna (Lindtner 1982: 239); also cited three times in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

211 The meaning of these two sentences is unclear. Bhāviveka seems to be saying that nothing, including omniscience, can arise from the ultimate point of view.

212 On Bhāviveka's understanding of the stages of the Bodhisattva path, see Eckel 1992: 172-88 (on MHK 3.292-345) and accompanying notes. He divides the path into four stages: the first arising of the mind of awakening (*prathamacittotpādika*), the practice of the six perfections (*ṣaṭpāramitācaryā*), the irreversible stage (*anivartanīya*), and the stage that is one birth away from awakening (*ekajātipratibaddha*). The first of these stages corresponds to the *adhimukticaryā-bhūmi* (the stage for the practice of aspiration), the second corresponds to *bhūmi*s 1-7, the third to *bhūmi*s 8-9, and the fourth to *bhūmi* 10.

213 Compare Bhāviveka's description of nirvāṇa-without-foundation (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) in MHK 1.20-21 and 3.293-95 (as mentioned in note 205).

214 Compare *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (42): *gambhīraṃ bodhisattvavihāram anuprāpto bhavati . . . sarvavivekābhimukhībhūtam*.

215 *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (43): "O Jinaputra, I say to you and make it known that, unless the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, cause a Bodhisattva to enter the gates of the accomplishment of omniscience, his whole body will come to an end, and he will pass away" (*ārocayāmi te bho jinaputra prativedayāmi / te ced buddhā bhagavantas taṃ bodhisattvam evaṃ sarvajñajñānābhinirhāramukheṣu nāvatārayeyuḥ tadevāsya parinirvāṇam bhavet sarvasattvakāyapratiśrabdhiś ca*). On "conviction with regard to *dharma*s that do not arise" (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*), see the commentary on MHK 4.29.

the Blessed Ones, do not cause him to arise [from *nirodhasamāpatti*], he passes away right there. These are the words of the [*Daśabhūmika*] *Sūtra*. [A Bodhisattva who has] conviction with regard to *dharma*s that do not arise has abandoned the obstacles that consist of defilements, becomes cool like an Arhant, and obtains the ten masteries (*vaśitā*),[216] which begin with mastery over life-span (*āyuḥvaśitā*) and are free from saṃsāra. When he has these masteries, he intensively cultivates the four bases of power (*ṛddhipāda*) and
D170b defeats the four Māras. Concerned only about the welfare of sentient beings, he abides in unlimited kindness. With a body like a wishing jewel (*cintāmaṇi*), a healing post,[217] or a wishing tree (*kalpataru*), he accomplishes whatever any sentient being desires, like *mig dug can*.[218]

This point is made in *The Perfection of Wisdom*:[219] "Those gods who have not generated the mind of supreme awakening but who have sharp faculties, and so forth, should generate the mind of supreme awakening. Those [Arhants] who have entered a fixed state (*samyaktvaniyāma*)[220] cannot generate the mind of supreme awakening. Why? Because they are confined by the stream of saṃsāra. But I rejoice if a solitary practitioner or someone who belongs to an inferior lineage generates the mind of supreme awakening."[221] Those who belong to the superior lineage are considered superior to those who are below them, even if they abandon defilements without any skill-in-means. Why? Their qualities (*dharma*) are more noble, transcendent, and excellent than the qualities of the Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas], because they apprehend the *dharma* of omniscience. Therefore, it is reasonable [for the Buddha] to make a prediction about [the awakening of] Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas].

Alternatively,

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216 On Bhāviveka's account of the ten *vaśitā*s, see Eckel 1992: 178-84.

217 As in BCA 9.36, where the Buddha is compared to someone who consecrates a post. The post continues to cure snake bite even after the person is gone.

218 The meaning of the term *mig dug can* is unclear. A possible solution may lie in *Avadānaśataka*, ch. 51 (*kṛṣṇasarpaḥ*), where a black snake known as *dṛṣṭiviṣaḥ* ("one who has poison in his glance") lives in a garden and protects a buried treasure. If so, *mig dug can* could be emended to *mig gdug can*, as in MVY 5223, which lists *mig gdug pa* as an equivalent of *dṛṣṭiviśa*. Another, less likely possibility might be a Bodhisattva or deity who has six eyes (*mig drug can*).

219 Compare *Aṣṭa* (17): *yair devaputrair anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau cittaṃ notpāditaṃ tair utpāditavyam / ye tv avakrāntāḥ samyaktvaniyāmaṃ na te bhavyā anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau cittam utpādayitum / tat kasya hetoḥ baddhasīmāno hi te saṃsārasrotasaḥ / abhavyā hi te punaḥ punaḥ saṃsaraṇāya anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau cittam utpādayitum / api tu khalu punas teṣām apy anumode / sacet te 'py anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau cittāny utpādayeran.* Translations of this passage are found in Conze 1973b and 1975.

220 The Tibetan translates this term incorrectly as *skyon med pa la zhugs par gyur pa* ("entered into a faultless state"). On the correct interpretation of this term, see Nattier 2003: 221.

221 Evidently the quotation ends at this point, although the Tibetan translation treats it as if it continues.

> Through the power of compassion, a Tathāgata displays any form that will discipline sentient beings.

A Bodhisattva in the eighth stage is free from defilements like an Arhant, but only he can use skill-in-means to manifest the five kinds of sense pleasure (*kāmaguṇa*) and consult with Bodhisattvas. He displays many different kinds of seemingly defiled activities. D171a He even renounces the world of four continents so that sentient beings will feel aversion [toward saṃsāra]. This has been described by Vararuci in *The Deeds of the Buddha*:[222]

> Although he is only one, he manifests many excellent deeds. Not being many, he is said to delight in himself. He accompanies those who are intoxicated but is not intoxicated or proud. He transcends desire but plays with those who are drunk with desire. He has burned desire with the fire of yogic knowledge, but he displays what seems to be the birth of desire. His activities are like a dream or an illusion, and he plays with the longings of those who are intoxicated. He remains immovable and, among many, is just one. By good actions he has given up sleep, yet he seems to sleep.

Therefore, even though he has no desire, he compassionately displays the manifestation[223] of defiled actions.

The Mahāyāna Pays Homage to Householders and Exalts Bodhisattvas[224]

Some say that the Bodhisattva, in his last birth, took delight in love and fathered a child. According to them, [the Bodhisattva] was not a Buddha, because he violated moral precepts (*duḥśīla*), as it is said: "If someone has no perfection of moral conduct (*śīlapāramitā*), then, without the perfection of moral conduct, he can have no perfections at all. For someone who violates moral precepts has no generosity (*dāna*), patience (*kṣānti*), fortitude (*vīrya*), concentration (*dhyāna*), or wisdom (*prajñā*)." They conclude that [the Bodhisattva] had no perfection and cannot be a Buddha.

There are many other unreasonable claims.[225] It is not reasonable to say that [a

222 On the identity of Vararuci (here translated as *'bar ra ru ces*) see note 149. With no other source for this quotation, the translation is quite conjectural. The passage as a whole reflects the rhetorical contrasts that characterize the supermundane Buddha in the *Lokānuvartana Sūtra* and parallel passages in the *Mahāvastu* (Harrison 1982).

223 Literally "a dance of manifestations" (*sprul pa'i gar stabs*).

224 The text reverses the order of these two points. It first responds to the Śrāvakas' claim that the Mahāyāna exalts the status of Bodhisattvas, then discusses the relationship between monks and householders.

225 This paragraph and the four paragraphs that follow quote arguments found in VY: 242-44. Here the objector argues that, if a Bodhisattva has eliminated defilements before his last

Bodhisattva] who is close to omniscience and in full possession of power[226] enters his
D171b mother's womb and is born, while the entire universe is illuminated by extraordinary radiance,[227] yet [the Bodhisattva] has not mastered the powers of learning (*śruta*), concentration (*samādhi*), and attainment (*samāpatti*) and has not abandoned defiled activities. It is not reasonable to say that defilements cause such [a Bodhisattva] to seek rebirth in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), enter the womb, and stay there. It is not reasonable to say that, not long after he was born, the Bodhisattva took seven steps without being supported by anyone, surveyed the four directions, and said, "This is my last birth!"[228] then, when he had grown up physically and his senses had matured, enjoyed the pleasures of love and was heedless.

It also is not reasonable that [the Bodhisattva], who naturally remembered many past lives, lived a holy life (*brahmacaryā*) under the Blessed One Kāśyapa,[229] and practiced the path to awakening, could have arrived here, after living among the six kinds of gods in Tuṣita, not known that he and others were subject to old age, sickness, and death, sought out the path to awakening from others who were heretics (*tīrthika*), thought that the path lay in the practice of self-torment, and suffered the pain of asceticism.

There also are cases in which [a Bodhisattva] does not remember past lives. It is not reasonable for a text to say that [a Bodhisattva] collects the requisites of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*) for many eons and attains immense powers of recollection (*smṛti*) and intellect (*mati*), then loses his memory when he enters the womb and is born. Nor is it reasonable to claim that a Bodhisattva in his final birth generates meditation (*dhyāna*) and formless attainment (*ārūpyasamāpatti*), then falls back. If he does not fall back, it is not reasonable for him to seek to become pure by practicing austerities, to engage in sense pleasures and clings to the realm of sense desire, or that he overestimates rites and
D172a observances (*śīlavrataparāmarśadṛṣṭi*).

What if a Bodhisattva deliberately displays all [the actions] that have just been described as a means to discipline sentient beings? [The Bodhisattva] still does all these

birth (as the Mahāyāna claims), it is impossible to explain a Bodhisattva's defiled actions in his last birth. Bhāviveka responds by applying the same argument to the Śrāvakas' accounts of the Buddha. He concludes that these apparent lapses must be attributed to manifestations (*nirmāṇa*).

226 The phrase is: Tib. *mthu phun sum tshogs pa* / Skt. *balasaṃpanna*. VY contains a longer expression that refers to a Bodhisattva's power to pervade the whole world with a great light (*'jig rten thams cad snang ba rgya chen pos khyab par gyur pa de lta bu'i mthu phun sum tshogs pa yin la*).

227 Compare MN III 118-24 (*Acchariyabbhutadhamma Sutta*).

228 Bhāviveka's account of the Bodhisattva's birth is similar to the account found in the *Saṃghabhedavastu*: *bodhisattvaḥ saptapadāni prakrāntaḥ parigṛhīto na kenacit; caturdiśaṃ ca vyavalokayati; vācaṃ ca bhāṣate . . . mama paścimaṃ janma bhaviṣyati* (Gnoli 1977: 44).

229 A reference to the story of Jyotipāla (or Uttara) the brahmin boy who was ordained under the Buddha Kāśyapa. The Pali version of the story is found in MN II 45-54 (*Ghaṭīkāra Sutta*). Jyotipāla and Uttara are discussed further in note 231.

things as manifestations (*nirmāṇa*). In that case, it is not reasonable for him to take birth by chance (*āgantuka*). And, if that is not reasonable, one should not say that he devotes himself to desire and merit, or that he devotes himself to self-mortification.

Someone may say: If all this is a manifestation, why was the practice of austerities the result of karma?[230] Why did [the Blessed One] say: "When I previously was the brahmin Uttara,[231] I said about the perfectly awakened one Kāśyapa: 'How can a bald ascetic be awakened? Awakening is very difficult to attain.' As a result of these words, I practiced austerities for six years."

Now these extremely murky arguments must be clarified. How can a faithful person be satisfied in the presence of someone who thinks like this?[232] It is said that when the householder Anāthapiṇḍada heard the word "Buddha," which he had not heard before, his hair stood on end, he felt great happiness and pleasure, and he wanted very much to see him.[233] It also is said that the young brahmin Uttara insulted a Buddha, but became a Buddha himself in his third birth thereafter.[234]

The word "nirvāṇa" also is celebrated everywhere, and the conqueror of Māra's hosts, the Tathāgata, became victorious over the four Māras with the sound of a great bell.[235] He completely defeated the Lord of Death and in so doing brought harm to his deadly enemy. After performing an action that made his body appear great and small in size, the Blessed One spoke as if his body were the same size as other men, as if he were under the power of the Lord of Death and were an ordinary person. He said: "Ānanda, D172b
this Jambudvīpa is delightful. This *ri'i lam gyi ri* is delightful.[236] Every desire and every

230 VY begins with an shorter version of this sentence: "If all this is a manifestation, why does he perform difficult practices (*gal te de thams cad sprul pa yin na ci'i phyir dka' ba spyad pa na*)?" This sentence refers to the results of karma mentioned at the end of the paragraph. This episode in a previous life of Śākyamuni is discussed by Sally Mellick Cutler (1997: 73).

231 TJ reads *bram ze bla ma zhe bya bar gyur pa'i dus na*; VY reads *bram ze'i khye'u bla ma'i gnas skabs na*. In the Pali version of this story, the Buddha identifies himself as "Jotipāla (Skt. Jyotipāla) the brahmin boy." The story is found in MN II 45-54 (*Ghaṭīkāra Sutta*). In the Sanskrit version, preserved in the Gilgit manuscript of the *Śayanāsanavastu* (Gnoli 1978b: 14ff.), he is identified as Uttara, as he is in the *Vinayavastu* (Hofinger 1982: 102ff.).

232 This sentence is missing in VY.

233 This is a common account of Anāthapiṇḍada's first encounter with the Buddha. Compare *Śayanāsanavastu* (Gnoli 1978b: 14): *anāthapiṇḍadasya gṛhapater buddha ity aśrutapūrvaṃ ghoṣaṃ śrutvā sarvaromakūpāny āhṛṣṭāni; sa āhṛṣṭaromakūpas taṃ gṛhapatim idam avocat*: *ka eṣa gṛhapate buddho nāma*?

234 This sentence concludes the apparent quotation from VY that began with the sentence "There are many other unreasonable claims."

235 In *Traité* 339-46, the four Māras are identified as the *kleśa-māra*, *skandha-māra*, *mṛtyu-māra*, and *devaputra-māra*. The last is the anthropomorphic evil one. See also BHSD and DPPN (s.v. "Māra").

236 This sentence is part of the narrative in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 128-29), as is the story of the Buddha's request for water. The phrase *ri'i lam gyi ri*, however, is not found in the extant versions. The parallel passage in Sanskrit occurs in MPS II 264-68. A story about

variety of pleasant, beautiful, and agreeable thing is now at hand." This statement is well known. [The Buddha] said that he was tired of painful sensations when he was sick, and he said that the monks should not stay in his presence. He also expressed displeasure when he said that Ānanda took too long fetching water. At this, about a thousand Arhants grew weak with grief and lamentation; their sighing darkened them; and they covered their faces. They emitted various sounds of distress, and they wept. A group of about a hundred thousand ordinary monks wept, and the endless community of monks discarded their . . . .[237] A group of about a thousand laymen (*upāsaka*) and laywomen (*upāsikā*) threw away their upper garments and ornaments; their heads and bodies were covered with sweat; and their faces were wet with tears. They pulled their hair, threw away their topknots, wept pitifully, and wailed with miserable faces. A hundred thousand gods threw away their ornaments, garlands, body ornaments, diadems, bracelets, garments, and head-ornaments. They lifted their arms and swung them like sticks, and they grieved at the thought that they had no protector. The wind of impermanence struck them like a wind that strikes the flickering flame of a lamp, and death left them in the belly of the crocodile of impermanence. All these statements contradict [the opponent's argument].

If an individual abstains from violence and is generous, he acquires two benefits (*sampad*): the benefit of great wealth and the benefit of a long life.[238] With regard to these [two benefits], the Blessed One has become pure by completely abandoning any
D173a kind of violence, and he has made a great offering by giving away a vast number of possessions, including external objects and parts of his own body (lit. things that are external and internal). But this accumulated karma does not seem to have resulted in a body that lived very long. If this [karma] had been accumulated for three innumerable [eons], it is unreasonable for it to have had no result in forty-five years.

Can this be due to the power of the Blessed One's karma? If the Blessed One was completely fearless, it is not reasonable to say that he had anything to fear from his karma. The karma that results in a body that lives a long time—[a body] that is uninterrupted and immeasurably large and expansive—may be suppressed by some bad karma, so that it matures as the karma of a body with a short life. But only fools would say that [the Buddha's good karma] was suppressed by other [karma] and matured with

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Ānanda's search for milk is reported in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, where the story is part of Vimalakīrti's critique of the Śrāvakas' literal-mindedness. Lamotte's translation (1976: 80-84) gives extensive references to the canonical sources.

237 The meaning of this sentence is unclear. There are various references to lamentation at the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, as in DN II 158 and MPS III 404, but they do not correspond to the description here. Apparently Bhāviveka is working with a different tradition.

238 Compare *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* (4): *uktaṃ caiva bhagavatā dvau hetū ca pratyayau dīrghāyuṣkatāyām / katamau dvau prāṇātipātaviramaṇaṃ bhojanapradānaṃ ca*. ("The Blessed One said that there are two causes and conditions for a long life. What are these two? Refraining from violence to living beings and making donations of food.")

only [a short life]. The body of the Blessed One was as unbreakable as a diamond[239] and abandoned all unwholesome qualities (*akuśaladharma*), but it did become ill. When Maudgalyāyana made a request of Jīvaka, he [Jīvaka] said "melted butter. . . ."[240] It was not reasonable for the Omniscient One to make a request of Jīvaka. It also is well known that elder Bākula[241] said to his co-ascetics (*sabrahmacārin*): "Venerable Ones, it has been more than eighty years since I was ordained, and I do not remember having even the slightest headache." There also is the well known lion's roar (*siṃhanāda*): "By giving a sick person this myrobalan fruit as medicine, his appearance has become such and such." If giving just one myrobalan fruit to a sick man had this kind of result, how much more could be said of the Blessed One's fulfillment of the perfection of generosity. This also is a contradiction.

All of these [episodes] are the manifestations (*nirmāṇa*) of the Blessed One for the D173b
sake of sentient beings. Thus the predictions (*vyākaraṇa*) apply to himself, manifested as a Śrāvaka, or the predictions apply to Bodhisattvas who take on the appearance of Śrāvakas and bear the names Śāriputra and so forth. As it is said:

> To attract some and retain others, the perfect Buddhas taught one vehicle (*ekayāna*) to those who are uncertain.[242]

Others are liberated by removing any connection with the traces (*vāsanā*). This only applies to the Tathāgata, not the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, because they have undefiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*). On this point it is said: "Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas attain the non-conceptual knowledge of a Tathāgata when they become free from traces by removing obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). With this non-conceptual awareness and without effort, they continue to bring about the welfare of sentient beings as long as there is saṃsāra, through the power of their previous vows (*praṇidhāna*)." This

239 The commentary on *Kośa* 7.34 lists *vajrasārāsthi* (bones as hard as a diamond) as one of the benefits (*sampad*) of the Form Body.

240 This is another example of Bhāviveka's use of an ellipsis to abbreviate a quotation. According to the DPPN, Jīvaka was a well-known physician. When the Buddha was sick, Jīvaka said that he should be rubbed with fat and given fragrant lotuses. Jīvaka forgot to say that the Buddha also should be given a bath, but the Buddha was able to read his mind and took the necessary bath. Perhaps that aspect of the story is reflected here by the mention of the "Omniscient One."

241 On Bākula, see MN III 125-28 (*Bakkula Sutta*) and *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* (ed. Lévi, p. 76), also the story of Vākula in Hofinger 227-29. According to the DPPN, the Buddha declared Bakkula (Bākula or Vakkula) to be the foremost in good health. (See also AN I 25 and Mil 215ff.)

242 MSA 11.54: *ākarṣaṇārtham ekeṣām anyasaṃdhāraṇāya ca / deśitāniyatānāṃ hi saṃbuddhair ekayānatā*. The same verse is quoted in AAA 331. Compare also MS 10.31. These sources explain that the word "some" refers to Śrāvakas and "others" to Bodhisattvas. "Uncertain" (*aniyata*) means that they are uncertain in their lineage (*gotra*).

means that the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) of the Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas] is appropriate and reasonable, since they are eternal, possess the essence of the Tathāgata, and do not attain parinirvāṇa.

The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* points out throughout the text: "There is one vehicle, not two or three."[243] The *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* says: "The letter (*vyañjana*) teaches how a vehicle is defined; the meaning (*artha*) is the one approach (*naya*) to the knowledge (*jñāna*) that enters the indivisible Dharma realm (*dharmadhātu*)."[244] Likewise, it says in the *Sāgaramati Sūtra*[245] and others: "All vehicles are included in one vehicle." It
D174a also says in the *Sumatidārikā*[246] that the difference between a Śrāvaka and a Bodhisattva is like the difference between a mustard seed and Mount Meru, between a firefly and the sun, between a fox and a lion, between a castor oil plant and a sandalwood tree. These are statements of fact; they do not insult or praise anyone. If someone says that a wishing jewel (*cintāmaṇi*) is more radiant than a glass bead, is this an insult to the glass bead or praise for the wishing jewel? Deluded people might compare the great ocean to the water in a cow's hoofprint, but to say that the water in a cow's hoofprint is the ocean would be ridiculous. Here the followers of the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna are deficient in purpose (*artha*) and in action (*kriyā*). They neglect the welfare of others, discipline themselves, focus on peace, and rely on a small seed of liberation. It is not an insult to say that they attain pure knowledge (*anāsravajñāna*) that is as large as the space eaten by a worm inside a mustard seed. Bodhisattvas have accumulated wholesome roots for ten million hundred thousand immeasurable eons (*asamkhyeyakalpa*), and they sympathize with the suffering of others. In order to liberate all sentient beings, with faithful minds, they have achieved pure knowledge as large as the entire realm of space. It is not flattery to say that they possess such infinite power. As it is said:

> Even a small seed produces a large result, so the infinite cause of a Buddha produces an infinite result.[247]

Someone may say that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it accepts

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243 *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* 31 (ch. 2, vs. 54): *ekaṃ hi yānaṃ dvitīyaṃ na vidyate*.

244 Tibetan text in Braarvig 1993: vol. 1, p. 115, with English translation in vol. 2, pp. 441-42. Braarvig's text follows a different word order in the second part of the sentence: "the meaning is the knowledge that enters the one approach to the indivisible Dharma realm" (*chos kyi dbyings dbyed med cing tshul gcig pa la 'jug pa shes pa'o*).

245 *Ārya Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā Sūtra*, Otani no. 819. The *Sāgaramatiparivarta* is included in the *Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra* (Braarvig 1993, vol. 2, p. xxvii).

246 *Ārya Sumatidārikā Sūtra*, Otani no. 760/30 (no. 30 of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection), translated in Chang 1983: 256-61. Bhāviveka is summarizing a passage from the *Ārya Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa Sūtra*, Otani no. 760/32 (no. 32 of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection), translated in Chang 1983: 115-33.

247 Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī* 3.11.

that [monks] pay homage to householders. Lokeśvara[248] and other Bodhisattvas are not householders, because they have removed all attachment, have taken the *prātimokṣa* vow, D174b
and are bound by their Bodhisattva discipline until they sit on the throne of awakening (*bodhimaṇḍa*). Furthermore, they show the form of a householder, and so forth, as manifestations (*nirmāṇa*). Since they do this to ripen sentient beings, it is right to pay them homage, even though they are not householders. For example, the Sage manifested himself as a *cakravartin* king to discipline King Kapphiṇa,[249] but he was not a householder, and it was right to pay him homage. When he was in the form of a great king, the Blessed One wore ornaments. Some say that he had no arrows, but he took a bow and arrow, and strung the bow. All of the great Śrāvakas assumed the forms of ministers and wore a variety of ornaments that are not permitted for renunciants (*parivrajaka*). In Śrāvastī, when the time came to discipline a brahmin named *rgyu can*,[250] the Blessed One wore the crown of the four-faced form of Brahmā. To discipline a brahmin woman of the Vasiṣṭha lineage (*gotra*), also in Śrāvastī, the Blessed One assumed the form of a brahmin and held the corpse of a woman, saying: "This is my wife." To discipline dancers in Kosala, the Blessed One assumed the form of a dancer and beat a clay drum. To discipline Pañcaśikha the Gandharva,[251] the Blessed One assumed the common form of a Gandharva, took a stringed instrument, and strummed it. So, even if the Blessed One and the Śrāvakas assumed the form, behavior, and mode of speech of vulgar householders, such as potters, blacksmiths, wrestlers, and hunters, all of which contradict the life of a renunciant and are prohibited in the Vinaya, they still were worthy of homage. As D175a
it is said:

> Even though he is adorned by ornaments, he practices the Dharma;
> he is calm, tamed, controlled, and practices the religious life.

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248 Presumably *'jig rten dbang phyug* is another name for Avalokiteśvara.

249 On the story of King Kapphiṇa, see *Avadānaśataka* 219-23. In Haribhadra's AAA, cited in Inagaki 1987: 359, King Kapphiṇa is described as having "intense greed, anger, stupidity, and arrogance" and being as difficult to discipline as Ārya Sundarananda, Aṅgulimāla, and Uruvilvā Kāśyapa (Pali, Uruvela Kassapa).

250 The Tibetan reads *bram ze rgyu can zhes bya ba* ("a brahmin named *rgyu can*"). A possible equivalent for *rgyu can* is Hetuka. A monk by this name is mentioned in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* (Hofinger 278-82). In his previous life as a brahmin, he was converted by the Buddha Vipaśyin. The word *rgyu* could also be a misreading for *g.yo* or *sgyu*. MVY (2487-89) lists *g.yo can* and *sgyu can* as equivalents in a series of words that mean "tricky" or "deceitful."

251 According to DPPN, Pañcaśikha the Gandharva (Pali, Pañcasikha the Gandhabba) was a favorite of the Buddha and played a role in several Pali suttas. A version of his story is found in the *Mahāgovindīya Sūtra* of the *Mahāvastu* (vol. 3, pp. 197-224), but the story of his conversion is not mentioned. A story like the one mentioned here is found in the commentary on *Śatapañcaśatka* 62 (Bailey 80-81): the Buddha adopts the art of a musician to tame the pride of a Gandharva king named Supriya. Both Pañcaśikha and Supriya figure in a story about an encounter with the Buddha in *Avadānaśataka* 43-45.

> He has given up harm toward all sentient beings; he is a true brahmin, an ascetic, and a monk.[252]

Someone may say that only a householder should pay homage to someone who has the form of a householder, and a renunciant should not. But if someone deserves homage for the excellence of his virtues, then a renunciant should pay him homage. It is not [wrong] to show signs of homage to a person who has excellent virtues, but it is extremely blameworthy to pay homage to a person who has no virtue. As it is said:

> Those who have been ordained but are uncertain in every respect, who wear saffron robes but do not abandon mental faults, who carry alms bowls but are not vessels of virtues are neither householders nor monks, no matter what they imagine. The Sugata said that failed monks are like a cloud without rain, a well without water, a failed harvest, a seed without a sprout, and a picture of a lamp; they neither are nor are not [monks].

Why would anyone be proud of merely wearing the signs [of renunciation]? There is a big difference between Bodhisattvas and the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who wear the signs of renunciation and have perfect moral conduct. It is as if one group were rich and the other poor. [Bodhisattvas] generate the mind of awakening (*bodhicitta*), then accumulate the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*) of the six perfections (*pāramitā*). They are like great caravan leaders (*sārthavāha*) whose great vehicles carry the Mahāyāna and who share their riches with many people. They are not like the Śrāvakas, who by comparison seem poor and lazy, to say nothing of others who merely wear the signs [of renunciation]. This is why renunciants who are poor in virtue should definitely pay homage to virtuous householders.

It also is generally accepted in the texts of most of the eighteen schools (*nikāya*) that
D175b [monks] should pay homage to Bodhisattvas.[253]

For instance, it says in the *Vidyādharapiṭaka* of the Siddhārthika Mahāsāṃghikas:

> "If a monk [seeks] pure, supreme, perfect awakening, has faith in Maitreya, and pays homage to him, he has paid homage to and worshipped me, the supreme, perfectly awakened Buddha. Those for whom I am the teacher and the supreme focus of worship should pay homage to the Bodhisattva Maitreya

252 *Udānavarga* XXXIII.2 (Bernhard 1965-68: 460).

253 The following seventeen quotations are discussed in Skilling 1997. On the *Vidyādharapiṭaka* of the Siddhārthika Mahāsāṃghikas (the source of the first quotation) and its affinities with divisions in other canonical collections, see Skilling 1992: 114-15. Candrakīrti's response to the problem of monks paying homage to Bodhisattvas is discussed in Sørensen 1986: 44-47.

> and worship him. All four groups—monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen—should pay homage to the crown prince Maitreya." When one thousand two hundred and fifty Arhants heard the Blessed One's words, they exclaimed at once with a single voice: "Let each of us pay homage to all Bodhisattvas who have been consecrated crown prince. Let us also pay homage to those [Bodhisattvas] who reside in *lha sbas dang lam sbas*."[254]

It says in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* of the Pūrvaśaila Ārya Mahāsāṃghikas, who also are said to be located in *las kyi yul 'khor*:[255]

> Then crown prince Mañjuśrī said to elder Subhūti: "Elder Subhūti, do you know, understand, or see the 84,000 preoccupations[256] of sentient beings which the Blessed One knows? Can you teach in accordance with them?" [Subhūti] replied: "Mañjuśrī, I cannot." [Mañjuśrī said:] "Elder, it is possible to enter and remain in a concentration in which one sees all sentient beings and sees the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings. When one has understood them, it is possible to teach the Dharma in an appropriate way. Can you enter this concentration?" [Subhūti] replied: "Mañjuśrī, I cannot." Then elder Subhūti said to crown prince Mañjuśrī: "Mañjuśrī, is there any Bodhisattva who knows the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and can expound D176a
> the Dharma in accordance with them?" Mañjuśrī replied: "Elder Subhūti, please ask the Blessed One; the Blessed One will explain." The elder Subhūti then asked the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, is there anyone who can really understand the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and expound the Dharma in accordance with them?" The Blessed One replied: "Subhūti, there

254 The meaning of *lha sbas dang lam sbas* is unclear. Perhaps these are place names corresponding to the Sanskrit **devagupta* and **mārgagupta*.

255 The following quotation has close affinities with a comparable passage in the *Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Tōhoku no. 160, Ba, folios 23a-100b; T 586, 15.44a and 15.50c-51a). The parallel passage begins in folio 73a, line 6. The *Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā* has the same two interlocutors (Subhūti and Mañjuśrī) and reproduces many of the same narrative elements, but it expands the story considerably and addresses different questions (including the Bodhisattva's ability to teach the Dharma while maintaining a noble silence). The parallel between these two passages has important implications for the textual relationship between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Mahāyāna. The history of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (either as a single text or as a canonical collection) is complex. For a discussion of the problems, see Pagel 1995: 5-6. Unfortunately the meaning of the phrase *las kyi yul 'khor* is unclear. A possible Sanskrit equivalent might be **karma-rāṣṭra*.

256 *Kośa* 1.26cd and commentary explain that 80,000 *dharma-skandha*s are prescribed as antidotes to 80,000 preoccupations or practices (*carita*) of sentient beings. The number 84,000 is attested in other sources, including sūtras and śāstras of the Mahāyāna. For a full discussion, see Lamotte 1988: 148-49.

> is a concentration called 'all *dharma*s have the same nature.'[257] Any Bodhisattvas who obtain this concentration will correctly understand the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and expound the Dharma in accordance with them. But Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot do this, no matter how much they understand." Then elder Subhūti said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas behave wonderfully. O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas are extraordinary. The range of Bodhisattvas is beyond the range of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Bodhisattvas have powers that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas do not have. O Blessed One, this is why one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas."

It says in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* of the Aparaśaila Ārya Mahāsaṃghikas:[258]

> Then the elder Mahākāśyapa asked the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, of what
> D176b is this a vision?" The Blessed One replied: "Mahākāśyapa, it is the color of the Bodhisattva Jālinīprabha. His retinue has a golden color, and his followers have a single aspiration: they aspire to omniscience. Among them, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are not even mentioned, but only Buddhas with a great congregation of Bodhisattvas." Then the elder Mahākāśyapa said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, the Bodhisattvas are marvelous. O Blessed One, the Bodhisattvas are wonderful. O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas can do things that are not possible for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Bodhisattvas have powers that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas do not have. O Blessed One, this is why one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas."

It says in the *Vaipulyapiṭaka* of the Bhadrayānīya Mahāsāṃghikas who live in the
D177a city of *dpal yon can*:[259]

> He asked the Blessed One: "O yogin, having obtained the powers (*bala*), superknowledges (*abhijñā*) and faculties (*indriya*), you are the sun among sages (*muni*). With Samantabhadra and others, you have dwelt in the tenth stage (*bhūmi*). The Dharma is permanent among the doctrines of the triple world. It surpasses all [other] doctrines and is beyond the range of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. O Preacher of Dharma, please teach this Dharma to sentient beings."

257 *Sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipañcita* is another name for the *Samādhirāja Sūtra* (Tōhoku no. 127).

258 Like the preceding quotation from the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* of the Pūrvaśailas, this quotation also has parallels in the *Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Tōhoku no. 160, Ba, folios 53a-53b).

259 The identity of the city *dpal yon can* is unclear. A possibility might be Śrīdhānya(kaṭaka). The meaning of the following verses also is unclear.

Then the venerable Mahā-Maudgalyāyana said to the Blessed One: "For those who [see] the Buddha as Protector, the sight of Dharma, O Blessed One, is very far away. Even for the Bodhisattvas, it has not become a personal possession. O Blessed One, this is why we pay sincere homage to powerful Bodhisattvas. Let us bow down and pay them homage."

It says in the *Jātakapiṭaka* of the Haimavata Mahāsāṃghikas:

"Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot fathom the secrets of the Bodhisattvas' body, speech, and mind. Ānanda, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot understand even five hundred of the Bodhisattvas' births. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot [understand] the inconceivable deeds of Avalokiteśvara. Ānanda, if sentient beings just remember his name, all of them will be free from any kind of fear."[260]

After [the Blessed One] had spoken, the venerable Ānanda said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, he is a hero, he is fearless, and he is the essence of compassion. I bow before the great sage Avalokiteśvara."

It says in the *Sūtrapiṭaka* of the Ārya Mahāsāṃghikas:

Mahākāśyapa said: "Protector of the World, when you sought a medicine for all sentient beings, you removed your eye and offered it as a gift. Homage to the one who is worthy of homage! Homage to the succession of births of the Protector, the great Sage, of whose deeds and exploits in former lives we have heard.[261] O Sage, I joyfully praise your [deeds] when you were in Tuṣita, when you were born in the Śākya clan and became a perfect Buddha."

The preceding [quotations] come from [the Mahāsāṃghikas]:

Six are rooted in the Mahāsāṃghikas: peaceful Lokottaras and Siddhārthas, those who live on the two Mountains, Bhadrayānas and Haimavatas.[262]

The *Dvādasasahassabuddhavaṃsa* of the Ārya Sthavira Abhayagirivāsins says:[263]

260 Compare the *Praṇidhānasaptati* (Lindtner 1984b).
261 The last part of this sentence is unclear.
262 Skilling (1997: 611) cites a similar Sanskrit verse from the *Śrīghanācārasaṃgrahaṭīkā*: *vādinaś cārthasiddhārthāḥ śailadvayanivāsinaḥ / bhādrāyanā haimavatāḥ ṣaḍbhedā mūlasāṃghikāḥ*.
263 The title of this text follows Skilling's tentative reconstruction (1993a: 170).

As a son of the Buddhas, a Bodhisattva should be respected by the entire world. His wisdom is as boundless as his moral conduct and liberative
D177b wisdom. He wears great armor as his protection, and he has attained inconceivable power. He has completed the ten perfections and realized the qualities of a Buddha. As a shrine for the whole world, the whole world should respect him. In wisdom, moral conduct, and concentration, no Saṃgha is his equal. The whole world should pay homage to him. Apart from the omniscient Buddhas, everyone in the world, including the gods, should pay homage to him.

It says in the *Mahāprātihārya Sūtra* of the Prajñaptivādin Bahuśrutīyas:

Then, when the venerable Śāriputra saw the Blessed One perform the great miracle at Śrāvastī, his mind was infused with deep faith. He put his hands together to pay homage to the Blessed One, and he praised him with these verses: "You have overcome all faults together with their traces; you have defeated all heretics without exception. With this miracle, you have delighted the minds of gods as far as Akaniṣṭha. As many salutations to the great Hero as there are particles of dust in the world! I pay homage to the Great Seer from the moment when he first generated the mind of awakening. Homage to anyone who generates the mind of awakening! Homage to the fully awakened Buddha! Homage to the one who turns the wheel of the Dharma! Homage to those who have become cool!"

It says in the *Mahāprātihārya Sūtra* of the Ārya Caitikas:

Then, when the venerable Pūrṇa saw the Blessed One perform the great miracle at Śrāvastī, his mind was filled with faith, and he said: "Blessed One, as a Bodhisattva you performed 100,000 miracles. Homage to you! Homage also to those births as Bodhisattvas that were the foundation for these 100,000 miracles! Homage to you, Protector, when you go away! Homage to you, Protector, when you remain! Homage to you, Protector, whenever your
D178a body moves! In all their modes of behavior, all the Buddha's actions are medicine for all sentient beings. Homage to you who are worthy of homage!"

It says in the *Mahāprātihārya Sūtra* of the Ārya Gokulika Mahācaitikas:

Then, when the venerable Kumārakāśyapa saw him perform the great miracle at Śrāvastī, his mind was filled with faith. He put the palms of his hands together to pay homage to the Blessed One, and he praised the Blessed One

in these verses: "Descending from Tuṣita Heaven, you entered the womb and were born. When you were born, you displayed miracles. You who are worthy of homage were honored by all. Homage to you, Great Hero and supreme Caravan Leader. O Sage without impurity, expert in the way, you have left birth behind and will not be reborn. Having crossed beyond, you have escaped the wilderness. Homage to the Bodhisattva who displays miracles!"

Mahākāśyapa said: "O Hero, I prostrate myself at your feet and pay homage to you who have no fear. O Protector, I pay homage to your birth! Homage to unsurpassed, perfect awakening and to the wheel of Dharma. Homage to the Sage who achieved nirvāṇa, to all former births, to all enshrined relics, and to all protectors!"

It says in the *Pāramitāmārga* of the Ārya Kāśyapīyas:

Noble Śāriputra said: "O Sage, from the time when you first aspired to awakening, from that time on, I bow my head to you and pay homage, O Best of Men! You lead beings to happiness. You have attained awakening and become omniscient. Folding my hands and bowing my head, I praise you with many hundreds of salutations! When you gave your own flesh to someone who was eager to have it, you were worthy of praise. You are the Blessed One, an object of worship! With the great insight of the six superknowledges, you are the greatest of the great conquerors. Homage to you and worship!" D178b

It says in the *Buddhavacana* of the Ārya Tāmraśāṭīyas:

Venerable Revata said: "Great Hero, I pay homage to all your deeds! You are worthy of homage in the three realms. I pay homage to your former births!"

According to the Ārya Kaurukulla Sāṃmitīyas:[264]

Venerable Ānanda said: "After illuminating Tuṣita Heaven with beautiful light,[265] the Bodhisattva arrived here. Homage to Śākyamuni! Born as a prince in the Śākya clan and adorned with ornaments, he was mindful and aware. Homage to Śākyamuni! When he sat in the shade of the rose-apple tree and the sun began to set, the shadow did not leave the incomparable one. Homage to Śākyamuni!"

264 Translated by Skilling (1997).
265 On the radiance that accompanied the Bodhisattva's descent from Tuṣita Heaven, see MN III 120; *Lalitavistara* 28; and *Traité* 1343.

It says in the *Aṣṭavargīya* of the Ārya Mahīśāsakas:

> Venerable Subhūti said: "When he had fully collected the requisites, he was born in the clan of Śākya kings. He is worshipped by groups of gods and men. Homage to the one who is worthy of homage! Seated at the foot of the Bodhi Tree, he defeated Māra and his hosts, and became omniscient. Homage to the one who then was worthy of homage! In the garden of the sages in Vārāṇasī, he understood the deathless state and set the wheel of the deathless [Dharma] in motion. Homage to the one who is worthy of homage!"

It says in the *Buddhavacana* of the Ārya Vibhajyavādins:

> Kālodāyin said: "To heal all beings, you sacrificed your head, along with its precious crown. Homage to you who are the best of all!"

It says in the *Dharmapada* of the Ārya Dharmaguptakas:

> When Dīpaṃkara predicted my [future awakening], I attained the eighth
> D179a stage and the ten masteries.[266] When they heard this prediction directly from the Lord of the World, the world with its gods reverently paid homage to me. When the Buddha stepped with his feet on the locks of my hair, the world with its gods paid homage to me as one who is worthy of homage. Apart from the brothers who dwell on the two stages[267] and the omniscient Buddha, no one here is worthy of homage. It is said that there is none [like him] in this world.

It says in the *Adbhutadharma* of the Ārya Sarvāstivādins:

> Venerable Ānanda said: "When the Blessed One was a Bodhisattva, he descended from Tuṣita Heaven and entered his mother's womb, mindful and fully aware. O Blessed One, I consider this to be an extraordinary and marvelous quality.[268] About this, it is said: 'I pay homage to the one who descended from Tuṣita Heaven and entered his mother's womb, mindful and aware.' When the Blessed One was born as a Bodhisattva, he illuminated the

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266 On Bhāviveka's account of the ten masteries (*vaśitā*) acquired by a Bodhisattva in the eighth and ninth stages of the path, see Eckel 1992: 179-84.

267 The meaning of the phrase *spun zla sa gnyis gnas pa* is unclear. Perhaps it is a reference to Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.

268 Compare MN III 123 (*Acchariyabbhutadhamma Sutta*): *sato sampajāno Bodhisatto Tusitā kāyā cavitvā mātu kucchiṃ okkami, idaṃ p' ahaṃ Bhagavato acchariyaṃ abbhutadhammaṃ dhāremi*.

> universe that consists of a great trichiliocosm with his radiance. O Blessed One, I consider this to be an extraordinary and marvelous quality of the Bodhisattva. About this, it is said: 'When he was born, he illuminated the trichiliocosm with his radiance. Homage to the Blessed One who is like ten million suns.' As soon as the Blessed One was born as a Bodhisattva, he took seven steps. This too, O Blessed One, I consider to be an extraordinary and marvelous quality of a Bodhisattva. About this, it is said: 'As soon as you were born, you took seven steps, standing on lotus flowers. You came playfully like a bull. Homage to Gautama!'"

Thus it is established, according to the authoritative texts of the eighteen schools, D179b that one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas from the first generation of the mind of awakening and thereafter. It is reasonable, therefore, to include the Mahāyāna in the eighteen schools.

Should renunciants pay homage to all householders who have generated the mind of awakening? Yes, they should pay homage to anyone who is said to have entered a [Bodhisattva] stage and received a prediction, even if he is an animal, like a rabbit or a king of geese.[269] This is even more true of a human being. It is said that a monk should pay homage to two [kinds of people]: the Buddha and senior monks. In this context, [a monk] should pay homage to a Buddha in two respects: as the requisites of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*) and as the achievement of the requisites of knowledge (*jñānasambhāra*). The root of both of these [requisites] is the mind of awakening. In the *Ārya Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* it says:[270] "A Tathāgata's moral conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), liberation (*vimokṣa*), view of the knowledge of liberation (*vimokṣajñānadarśana*), and so forth, as well as [the perfections] that begin with generosity, all have the mind of awakening as their root. This is why they are imperishable (*akṣaya*)." Likewise it is said:[271]

> If the merit of the mind of awakening took material form, it would fill the realm of space, and there would be more left over.

Even when someone has no realization of reality but still has the solid mind of awakening that is its foundation, one should pay homage. In the first stage (*bhūmi*), realization (*abhisamaya*) is conviction about oral teaching (*ghoṣānugakṣānti*). In the sixth it is

269 A reference to the *Śaśa* and *Haṃsa Jātaka*s.

270 The Tibetan text is edited in Braarvig 1993: vol. 1, p. 21; the English translation is found in vol. 2, p. 80.

271 The *Vīradattaparipṛcchā*, quoted in *Bhāvanākrama* 1 (Tucci 1956-58: 192): *bodhicittād vai yat puṇyaṃ tac ca rūpi bhaved yadi / ākāśadhātuṃ saṃpūrya bhūyaś cottaritam bhavet.*

conforming (*anulomikī-*); and in the eighth it is conviction about *dharma*s that do not arise (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*).[272] With this realization, [a Bodhisattva] shakes, illuminates, and travels to as many as a hundred world-systems with his power,[273] lives as
D180a long as a hundred eons, enters into the past and future, and so on. Since none of these inconceivable [abilities] is shared by Śrāvakas, there is no Bodhisattva, from the first arising of the mind of awakening, to whom one should not pay homage. How can this be contradicted? One should pay homage to a Bodhisattva in the same way that one pays homage to a Buddha, because they belong to the same continuum, just as one pays homage to the sapling of a fig tree and to the son of a Cakravartin, as if both were fully grown.

> A Buddha comes from a Bodhisattva; the Dharma comes from a perfect Buddha; and the noble Saṃgha comes from the Dharma. From this we have the three jewels. Someone who hates a Bodhisattva hates the three jewels. Someone who rejects the three jewels is not a monk and has not taken a vow.[274]

Mātṛceṭa and other hymn-writers for the most part praise the greatness of the Blessed One by referring to his previous deeds. For example:[275]

> O Hero, only you know the essence of the jewel of the mind, which is the seed of perfect awakening. Others are far away from it. Should I praise you first or the great compassion that long held you in saṃsāra, even though you knew its faults?

Also, in the *Buddhānusmṛtibhāvanā*,[276] it is said that one should recollect the virtues (*guṇa*) of the previous deeds (*pūrvayoga*) of the Tathāgata.[277] The previous deeds begin with the first arising of the mind [of awakening], and that is the Bodhisattva practice (*bodhisattvacaryā*). If someone recollects the Tathāgata by recollecting his previous deeds, how can this be homage to a Buddha, rather than to a Bodhisattva? In some sūtras of the Mahāyāna, Bodhisattvas address Śrāvakas with terms of respect such as

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272 On the three forms of *kṣānti*, see note 150.

273 Compare Bhāviveka's account of the mastery of power (*ṛddhivaśitā*) in MHK 3.313ff.

274 "Someone who has taken a vow" represents the Tibetan *sdom pa*; the most common Sanskrit equivalent is *saṃvara*.

275 *Śatapañcaśatka* 19 (*samyaksambodhibījasya cittaratnasya tasya te / tvam eva vīra sārajño dūre tasyetaro janaḥ //*) and 59 (*kiṃ nu prathamato vande tvāṃ mahākaruṇām uta / yayaivam api doṣajñas tvaṃ saṃsāre dhṛtaś ciram //*). Quoted from Bailey 48 and 78.

276 Perhaps *Ārya Buddhānusmṛti*, Otani no. 945. *Mahāvastu* I 163 refers to a "Dharma teaching" (*dharmaparyāya*) called *Buddhānusmṛti*.

277 On the term *pūrvayoga* see BHSD.

"honorable one" (*bhadanta*) and pay them homage, and Śrāvakas use terms such as "son of good family" (*kulaputra*) [to address Bodhisattvas]. This follows social conventions D180b (*lokasaṃvṛti*).

Thus Arhants should pay homage to [Bodhisattvas] who have attained conviction (*kṣānti*), who have attained concentrations (*samādhi*) such as the heroic (*śūraṃgama*), and who are able to display Buddha-manifestations. If Bodhisattvas displays manifestations of the Buddha, they do not consider homage to be directed to themselves, as was the case with Upagupta, when he spoke to Māra and Māra manifested himself as the Buddha.[278] Someone who seeks a distinctive attainment should not speak these nasty words. They begin with hatred and lead to bad rebirths. Instead he should see the profound teaching of the Mahāyāna.

It is said that the merits that produce the marks (*lakṣaṇa*) of the Tathāgata are equal to the grains of sand in seventy-two Ganges rivers and also are equal to the merits that produce the marks of the noble Avalokiteśvara. This is said in the *Ratnakūṭa Sūtra*,[279] which extols Bodhisattvas with the simile of the waxing moon, because from these [Bodhisattvas] the noble [Buddha] arises, because they pass beyond, because their generation of the mind of awakening makes them the primary preceptors (*kalyāṇamitra*), and [because] the seed of awakening is referred to as going-forth (*pravrajyā*).

The Vows of Bodhisattvas like Gaganagañja Are Just Words

Furthermore, the vows (*praṇidhāna*) of [Bodhisattvas] like Gaganagañja[280] are not just words, because [we] see that they have a result. Why do [we] not see [this result] now? When there is a result in the continuum of someone who has few wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*), it may be diminished, or it may be seen incorrectly, just as [some beings] see the Ganges as dry, as pus, or as fire.[281] For example, many hundreds of thousands of hungry ghosts may be standing on the bank of the Ganges, but because of their own lack of good fortune, they see the Ganges as if it were totally dry, as pus, or as fire. In a similar way, a shower of wealth comes from the Bodhisattva vow (*praṇidhāna*), but it D181a

278 The story of Upagupta and Māra is found in the *Aśokāvadāna* (Strong 1983: 185-98). Upagupta asks Māra to show him the form of the Buddha. Māra agrees, but only if Upagupta promises not to pay homage to him. When Māra does as Upagupta asks, Upagupta is so overwhelmed by the sight that he pays homage anyway. Upagupta explains that he bows to the form of the Buddha, not to Māra himself. For further discussion of the story, see Strong 1992: ch. 5.

279 When Bhāviveka refers to the *Ratnakūṭa*, he has in mind the *Kāśyapaparivarta*. The comparison of the Bodhisattva to a waxing moon is found in Staël-Holstein 129: *tad yathāpi nāma kāśyapa navacandro namaskṛyate sā ceva pūrṇacandro na tathā namaskṛyate / evam eva kāśyapa ye mama śraddadhaṃti te balavaṃtataraṃ bodhisattvaṃ namaskartavya / na tathāgataḥ tat kasya heto bodhisattvanirjātā hi tathāgatāḥ tatredam ucyate*. Compare also *Traité* 246-55.

280 On the Bodhisattva Gaganagañja, see note 113.

281 Vasubandhu uses the same comparison in *Viṃśatikā* 3.

does not fall on sentient beings who have not accumulated wholesome roots. Either it does not fall at all, or it falls like a thunderbolt and so forth. It is as if the rising sun were sending a thousand rays of light in a cloudless sky, but people whose previous karma has made them blind cannot see even a single ray. It is as if a heap of jewels were falling from the sky, but people who have little merit because of a deficiency in their previous karma cannot enjoy any of them.

Someone may say that a Bodhisattva vow has no power, regardless of one's previous karma. But it does have power, because its benefit to others arises from a complex of causes. For example, a sprout grows from a complex of causes, consisting of earth, water, fire, wind, and space, but if one of these conditions is missing, [the sprout] does not grow. Similarly, [Bodhisattvas] cultivate a great deal of renunciation, freedom from avarice, and lack of desire; they seek equanimity and perfect generosity; they do not hope for any reward and generate no desire for any result; and they are equally generous to all sentient beings. By doing so, they gain a result (*vipāka*) that consists of a shower of wealth, and they make [this result] manifest, but this does not happen if even one of the conditions is missing. Therefore, the vows of [Bodhisattvas] such as Gaganagañja definitely have results.

Śākyamuni Is a Manifestation

It also is reasonable that Śākyamuni is a manifestation (*nirmāṇa*), because [this manifestation] arises from the Enjoyment Body (*sambhogakāya*), which is based on the Dharma Body (*dharmakāya*) and located in Akaniṣṭha. Someone may ask: If the Dharma Body and Enjoyment Body are non-conceptual, what do the Manifestation Bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*)
D181b arise from, since these [bodies] are non-conceptual? The answer is that the Blessed One made this vow while he was a Bodhisattva: "When I have attained the non-conceptual Dharma nature, even though I make no conceptual effort, may I engage in any action, form, or voice that will discipline sentient beings." From the root Tathāgata Body (*mūlatathāgatakāya*), by the force of this vow, comes the means to benefit sentient beings, beginning with [the actions of] staying in Tuṣita and ending with nirvāṇa. Without the Manifestation Body, it is impossible to discipline the sentient beings who need to be disciplined by displaying a billion births in Jambudvīpa, entrance [into a mother's womb], birth, being taught the arts, living in the harem, going forth, defeating Māra, awakening, turning the wheel of Dharma, and achieving parinirvāṇa.[282]

Even in the texts of the different schools (*nikāya*), there are accounts of the Buddha's manifestations. For example, to discipline someone who was attached to hunting, [the Buddha] manifested the form of a hunter, and to discipline king "Lotus-Person" (*padma skyes bu*), he manifested the form of an old man. When Aniruddha was asked what he

282 For another list of the Buddha's deeds, see MHK 3.268 and commentary (Eckel 1992: 160).

saw with his clairvoyance (*divyacakṣuḥ*), he said: "I see the Tathāgata's manifestations and innumerable sentient beings in the intermediate state."[283] These manifestations discipline sentient beings and are active as manifestations. Śākyamuni's manifestations act in the same way and are not false like an illusion (*māyā*). While the Tathāgata Vairocana remains in a pure abode (Tib. *gnas gtsang ma* / Skt. **śuddhāvāsa*), his sustaining power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) displays Buddha-manifestations, but these Buddha-manifestations are not different from the Buddha, because they have the same basis (*āśraya*), like rays that come D182a
from the sun or people whose actions are derived from a king. Even though there are many manifestations, we do not think that there are many Tathāgatas, because there is only one action.[284] Therefore, this does not contradict the claim that it is impossible[285] for many Buddhas to appear in a single universe (*lokadhātu*). This statement refers to the universe that consists of a great trichiliocosm (*trisāhasramahāsāhasra*), not to all universes.[286] The Dharmaguptakas recite the following:

> Homage to the Buddhas, the Buddhas' Śrāvakas, and the bodies of the illustrious perfect Buddhas, to the place where the perfect Buddha was born, where he realized awakening, where he turned the wheel of Dharma, where he attained nirvāṇa without outflows. I pay homage also to the place where the Tathāgata stood, walked, and sat, and to the place where he lay down like a lion. The best of bipeds who dwells in the eastern and northern directions, the Conqueror named "Hard to Approach" (*duṣprasaha*)[287] spoke these verses. One who praises the Tathāgatas with these four verses will not go to a bad rebirth for ten billion eons.

Furthermore, when the elder Maudgalyāyana did not have the power (*ṛddhi*) to lift

283 Aniruddha, a first cousin of the Buddha, was known as "foremost among those who have clairvoyance" (*aggo dibbacakkhukānam*), as in AN I 23. His clairvoyance is the key to the story about him in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (Lamotte 1976: 65-68). For a more extensive account of his life, see DPPN s.v. "Anuruddha."

284 The Tibetan term *mdzad pa* (honorific for *byed pa*) is normally used to refer to a Buddha's actions, but here it might refer to the Buddha as a single agent.

285 Literally "out of place" (Tib. *gnas med*) and "irrelevant" (Tib. *skabs med*). On the impossibility of many Buddhas in a single universe, see MN III 109 and *Kośa* 3.95-96.

286 On the different universes (*lokadhātu*) in Buddhist cosmology, see Lamotte 1976: 275-84.

287 In the sDe-dge and Peking, this Buddha is called *brten dka'* ("Hard to Rely"), but the MVY lists no Buddha by this name. A more likely possibility is Duṣprasaha (*bzod par dka' ba*, MVY 6574). Lamotte (1976: 111) explains that Duṣprasaha ("Hard to Approach") is a contemporary of Śākyamuni and lives in the Marīci universe, sixty-one great chiliocosms away from this universe. As a Buddha who lives at the same time as Śākyamuni, Duṣprasaha fits the context well. One way to accommodate this change would be to emend the text from *brten* to *bzod*, but the next paragraph shows that the correct reading is *bsten* in the sense of "approach." For further discussion of the Buddha Duṣprasaha, see Nattier 1991: 23.

a sash worn by the elder Śāriputra, the Blessed One said: "Maudgalyāyana, you have not lost your power; the monk Śāriputra can use the power of his wisdom (*prajñābala*) to tie the end of his sash to the throne of the Tathāgata Hard to Approach and approach
D182b him."[288] It should be understood that the stories of the goldsmith and the carpenter show the universe with and without Buddhas.[289]

It also is said:[290]

> The perfect Buddhas of the past and future, along with the Buddha of the present—all of whom who remove sorrow—paid respects to the Dharma in the past, do so in the present, and will do so in the future. This is the nature of the perfect Buddhas.

Therefore, those who think that there is only one Tathāgata in all universes do not understand the meaning of the teaching. It is said that there are many past Buddhas, such as Dīpaṃkara and Ratnaśikhin,[291] and there will be many in the future such as Siṃha and Puṣya.[292] This point also is repeated in the sūtras of the Āgama. How so? "How many Tathāgatas have there been in the past? As many as there are grains of sand in the Ganges. How many will there be in the future? As many as there are grains of sand in the Ganges and so forth." Therefore, it is reasonable that many [Buddhas] arise in many world systems, not just one.

The Buddha Is Always in Concentration

It is said: "Even though the Tathāgata is always in concentration (*samāhita*), he sees,

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288 A version of this story is found in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* (Hofinger 181-83). Xuanzang also tells this story in the account of his visit to Śrāvastī. The Buddha asks Maudgalyāyana to summon Śāriputra to an assembly. Śāriputra asks him to wait. Maudgalyāyana threatens to use his power to transport both of them into the Buddha's presence. Śāriputra takes off his sash, throws it on the ground, and challenges Maudgalyāyana to lift it. When Maudgalyāyana cannot, he returns to the assembly, only to find that Śāriputra has arrived before him. The story is used to illustrate the superiority of Śāriputra's wisdom over Maudgalyāyana's supernatural power.

289 The meaning of this sentence is unclear.

290 *Udānavarga* 21.11-12: *ye cābhyatītāḥ saṃbuddhā*. . . . For other equivalents, see Skilling 1997: 613. Skilling's references are taken from Bernhard 1965-68. A similar verse is quoted in the *pudgalaviniścaya* section of the *Kośabhāṣya* (*Vyākhyā* 1204): *ye cābhyatītāḥ saṃbuddhā ye ca buddhā anāgatāḥ / yaś ca etarhi saṃbuddhā bahunāṃ śokanāśanāḥ*. A corresponding verse is found in *Mahāvastu* III 327.

291 Ratnaśikhin is mentioned as a Buddha of the past in the *Lalitavistara*, *Divyāvadāna*, and so forth. See BHSD, s.v. "Ratnaśikhin."

292 Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. "Maitreya") mentions several different lists of future Buddhas. The *Mahāvastu* contains a short list in which Siṃha is listed as the first Buddha after Maitreya and Puṣya as the last.

because he sees in the past, present, and future."[293] This means that [the Buddha] acts in conformity with the world. He is in concentration, but he acts by the power of his previous vow. He performs all these actions, but he does not act in a conceptual way. He is like a gardener who sends water into various small furrows: after he has released the water in the desired directions, he sits still and does nothing. Therefore, it is not true that this [claim about the Buddha's concentration] is not the Buddha's teaching.

Mahāyāna Sūtras Teach Useless Mantras

Some say that the sūtras of the Mahāyāna are praised for their many benefits, but these results generally come later and have few benefits in this life. These people are deficient in faith (*śraddhā*) and aspiration (*adhyāśaya*); they also reject what is wholesome and practice what is not. They are overcome by the power of evil habits in this life. When their D183a
faith diminishes and they give up their aspiration, it is as difficult for them to see their own benefit as it is to see the stars when the sun rises and sends out myriads of rays.

Some give up the true Dharma, slander the noble ones, and harm the three jewels. While they may have accumulated many wholesome roots, it is as if they were covered with dust, and they stay on the path of the three evil destinies (*apāya*). How can these people gain any benefit? Others fear even the slightest evil and practice nothing but virtue. They exert themselves in the practice of ten tasks: copying texts of the Mahāyāna, memorizing them, reading them, reciting them from memory, thinking about them, meditating on them, listening to them, donating them, promulgating them, and worshipping them. Since they are not overwhelmed by contrary tendencies, why should they not gain the benefit that has just been described? They are like people who base their practice on the three kinds of śāstras[294] and are certain to attain an immortal place (*amṛtapada*) where they are free from the afflictions of birth, old age, sickness, and death.

If this is the case, [the Mahāyāna] is not like [Vedānta],[295] for someone who bases his practice on the Tripiṭaka's teaching of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to awaken-

293 On the claim that the Buddha is always in concentration, see *Kathāvatthu* bk. 18, sec. 2 (not exact) and Bareau 1955: 60, where this point is the twelfth thesis of the Mahāsāṃghikas. On the significance of this point in Bhāviveka's theory of the Buddha, see Eckel 1992: Part II.

294 The BBh (68) explains that a Bodhisattva should study the *bodhisattva-piṭaka*, the *śrāvaka-piṭaka*, three additional śāstras, and several different varieties of arts and crafts. The three additional śāstras are logic (*hetu*), grammar (*śabda*), and medicine (*cikitsaka*).

295 The text simply says that "there is no similarity." The context does not make clear what is dissimilar to what. The most likely possibility is that the Mahāyāna is not similar to Vedānta, since this section of the chapter has been a response to the Śrāvakas' argument in verse 4.7 that "the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, like the Vedānta view."

ing (*bodhipākṣikadharma*),[296] will realize awakening and have no difficulty destroying defilements.

Some might say: In the Mahāyāna it says that that *dhāraṇī*s, mantras, and *vidyā*s have many benefits, even though their syllables and meanings are unintelligible.[297] These teachings mislead foolish people, like the opponents' Vedas. Without practice (*bhāvanā*), it is impossible to destroy even the slightest fault (*doṣa*). When someone has accumulated defilements and the roots of these [defilements] are still present, how can
D183b that person destroy evil (*pāpa*)? A *dhāraṇī* cannot destroy evil, because it does not counteract its cause, like violence (*hiṃsā*). Similarly, a mantra cannot destroy evil, because it is a foreign language, like the languages of the barbarians (*mleccha*).

To those who think that the *dhāraṇī*s of the Mahāyāna are merely combinations of syllables, we reply as follows: First of all, a *dhāraṇī* is a form of practice (*bhāvanā*).[298] As it is said in the *Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇī*:[299] "A Bodhisattva who practices this *dhāraṇī* does not conceptualize conditioned or unconditioned *dharma*s. He does not grasp them, does not settle in them, does not adhere to them, and does not refer to them. He practices the recollection of the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛti*) alone." Likewise, in the *Sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra* it says:[300] "Nāgarāja, that which is imperishable (*akṣaya*) in all teachings is the *dhāraṇī* called *akṣayakaraṇḍā*.[301] It is the source of four

296 The thirty-seven *bodhipākṣika-dharma*s often serve as a standard outline of the path. For a comprehensive account of this system, see Gethin 2001.

297 Bhāviveka's explanation of the use of mantras has been discussed in Braarvig 1994 and Kapstein 2001: 233-55.

298 In his account of the *dhāraṇī-mukha*s (Traité 1854-69), Lamotte cites a passage from the BBh on the four kinds of Bodhisattva *dhāraṇī*s (*dharmadhāraṇī*, *arthadhāraṇī*, *mantradhāraṇī*, and *bodhisattvakṣāntilābhāya dhāraṇī*). While the subject matter is similar, Bhāviveka's account of *dhāraṇī*s does not show any direct relationship with the BBh.

299 Chapter 9 of the *Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇī* introduces the *dhāraṇī* from which the text gets it name, beginning *tad yathā ane ane*. Chapter 10 then explains it significance. Here Bhāviveka seems to be paraphrasing the opening lines of chapter 10. The full version reads as follows: "O Śāriputra, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who holds onto this *dhāraṇī* does not take pride in any conditioned or unconditioned *dharma*s. He does not apprehend them, disparage them, overlook them, receive them, or make effort toward them. He does not treat them as things to be obtained, avoided, practiced, or nourished. He does not see them as things to do, accomplish, or strive for. He does not see them as things not to [strive for]. He does not see *dharma*s arise. He does not see them cease. He does not see *dharma*s in the past. He does not see *dharma*s in the future. He does not see *dharma*s in the present. He does not see them increasing or diminishing. He does not collect them. He does not lose them. He is not conscious of them. In this way he practices the recollection of the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛti*) alone." The Tibetan translation has been edited by Inagaki (1987: 153).

300 Bhāviveka is paraphrasing a passage that is found in the Peking (Otani no. 820), Pu, folio 147aff. The *Sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra* is quoted twice in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* (Lindtner 1982a: 177) and frequently in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

301 On the concept of the "imperishable" (*akṣaya*) in Mahāyāna literature, see Braarvig 1993, vol. 2. The term *akṣayakaraṇḍā* means "imperishable basket" or "basket of imperishables."

imperishables, namely, analytical knowledge (*pratisaṃvid*), knowledge (*jñāna*), wisdom (*prajñā*), and eloquence (*pratibhāna*). In a similar way, it is the source of four unfathomables (*duravagāha*) and four grounds of self-confidence (*vaiśāradya*), which glow with insatiable energy, and are limitless, invisible, unreliable, inexpressible, and impossible to subdue.[302] It also is the source of four treasures: the essences, penetrations (*nirvedha*), radiances (*avabhāsa*), and powers (*bala*). A Bodhisattva who enters this *akṣayakaraṇḍā dhāraṇī* knows the entrance into all syllable-methods, names, terms (*saṃketa*), and *dharma* terms. For all *dharma*s are pure from the beginning."[303] Similarly: "A Bodhisattva who is established in this *dhāraṇī* seeks awakening from these syllables and enters it in the D184a following way. The syllables (*akṣara*) are power (*bala*); their arrangement is the body; the head-view[304] that leads into the door of Dharma is the forehead; and wisdom is the eye." The root of this and similar practices is wisdom. When wisdom is present, there cannot be any delusion, and desire or hatred cannot exist when they have no source. Therefore, when [an opponent] says [that a *dhāraṇī* cannot remove evil] because it does not counteract its cause, the point is not accepted.

[The opponent's] point can also be contradicted with a counter-argument (*pratitarka*).[305] A *dhāraṇī* can destroy evil, because it is a form of practice, like the meditation on impure states (*aśubhabhāvanā*), which counteracts the cause [of evil].

Similarly, mantras are able to produce whatever one wants, because they have great power, like a wishing tree. As a combination of hidden (*gupta*) syllables that reveal the secret of the Tathāgata's knowledge, they remain in the continuum of someone who has engaged in this practice (*bhāvanā*).

In general, *vidyā*s also show how to destroy defilements with syllables (*akṣara*) and meanings (*artha*) that convey the six perfections, the noble truths, and the auxiliaries to awakening (*bodhipākṣikadharma*). For example: "*śamaya śamaya dānte śānte dharmarāja*

Akṣayakaraṇḍo (sic) is listed in MVY 603 as the name of a *samādhi*. In MVY 750, *akṣayakaraṇḍā* is listed as the name of a *dhāraṇī*.

302 Unfortunately these epithets, beginning with "glow with invincible energy," do not appear in the text of the sūtra. It is unclear whether they are adjectives that modify "grounds of self-confidence" or are meant to be categories in their own right.

303 The construction of the first part of this sentence is unclear, and the parallel passage in the sūtra is not much help: *klu'i bdag po sems can gyi brda'i rjes su jug pa'am / chos kyi brda'i rjes su 'jug pa'i yi ge gang yin pa de dag thams cad ni mi zad pa'i za ma tog kyi gzungs kyi rjes su 'jug pa'i tshul gyis byang chub sems dpas yi ge de dang de rnams kyis tshul kyi dgongs pa rab tu shes te / 'di lta ste / chos thams cad bzod ma nas dag pa na chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin la slu bar mi byed do* (Pu, folio 149a / 2-3).

304 Kapstein (2001: 248) suggests that this term (*mgo bo blta ba ni*) refers to an elevated form of vision.

305 Bhāviveka has just pointed out a flaw in the opponent's argument: "A *dhāraṇī* cannot destroy evil, because it does not counteract its cause, like violence." Now he goes on the offensive and states an argument of his own to prove that a *dhāraṇī* can destroy evil.

bhāṣite mahe mahāvidyā sarvārthasādhana."[306] Similarly, "*tāre*" comes from the highest Dharma (*agradharma*), "*tuttāre*" comes from the original Dharma (Tib. *dang po'i chos* / Skt. *ādidharma*), and "*ture*" comes from the inexpressible Dharma (*anabhilāpyadharma*).[307] These [*vidyā*s] show understanding (*abhisamaya*). Since they are free from ignorance (*avidyā*) about the self, they can generate knowledge (*vidyā*) in others. Therefore, if someone relies on them, they can destroy evil along with its foundation,[308] because they have power, like kindness (*maitrī*). The words of a *vidyā* [destroy evil] even for those who do not understand the meaning, because they may be spoken in a supermundane (*lokottara*) language, and because they may be spoken in the language of Devas, Nāgas, Yakṣas, and
D184b so forth. These [*vidyā*s] definitely show the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*), so [the Dharma nature] is accessible to those who obtain a *samayavidyā* and a *dhāraṇī*. As it is said in the *Guhyamati Sūtra*: "Here the four noble truths are '*īne mīne dapphe daḍapphe*' [in the language] of the four great divine kings (*caturmahārājikā devāḥ*)."[309] How can anyone compare *vidyā*s that convey a mundane meaning, such as those of Cāmuṇḍā, who spreads irresistible defilements, with ultimate (*paramārtha*) *vidyā*s, such as those of Tārā?[310] Therefore, the example is not accepted, because it lacks the point to be proved.[311]

It is possible to say: *dhāraṇī*s, mantras and *vidyā*s can remove evil along with its causes, when they are recited, pondered, and put into practice, like the Tathāgata's teaching. This is because they are consistent with the path, like the teaching of the Sūtrāntas and so forth.

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306 The text of the sDe-dge reads: *śamaya śamaya dante śānte dharmarāja bhaṣite mahe mahāvīdya sarvārthasādhana*. Braarvig (1997: 36) corrects the spelling to: *śamaya śamaya dānte śānte dharmarāja bhāṣite mahe mahāvidyā sarvasādhana*.

307 The term "highest Dharma" (*agradharma*) occurs several times in the AAA. See Conze 1973a, s.v. *agradharma*. The other two terms are hypothetical reconstructions. Braarvig (1997: 36) notes that these syllables belong to the ten-syllable mantra of Tārā: *oṃ tāre tuttāre ture svāhā*. Braarvig points out that this passage gives the earliest known reference to the Tārā mantra (assuming that this text was written by the sixth-century Bhāviveka). Tārā and Cāmuṇḍā are discussed later in this paragraph. For a more general discussion of the cult of Tārā, see Beyer 1973.

308 Lit. "why can they not destroy. . . ?"

309 The Tibetan transcribes these syllables as *ene*, *mene*, *dampo*, and *dadampo*. Braarvig (1997: 34) identifies the mantra as *īne mīne dapphe daḍapphe*. Bernhard (1967) has noted that the words of this mantra may have a Dravidian origin and refer to the four noble truths.

310 Bhāviveka is comparing two female deities, one of whom is useful in removing defilements while the other is not. (Camuṇḍa should be emended to Cāmuṇḍā.) The description of Cāmuṇḍā, however, is unclear. The phrase *bzod par dka' ba'i nyon mongs pa bdo bas 'khrigs pa* could mean someone who is "sticky with increasing hard to bear (or resist) defilements," but *'khrigs pa* also could have a sexual reference.

311 The opponent has not actually formulated a syllogism about the effectiveness of *vidyā*s. It seems that Bhāviveka is suggesting his own example, namely *vidyā*s associated with Tārā. This example would not support the opponent's *sādhya-dharma*, which is "do not destroy evil."

Even Great Evil Can Be Uprooted

Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to say that one can uproot even great evil (*pāpa*). In the statement "karmas are not destroyed for hundreds of eons,"[312] the words "*kalpaśatair*" ("hundreds of eons") and the second "*api*" indicate that [karmas] are destroyed. How? This is accomplished by restraint, by applying antidotes (*pratipakṣa*), by confessing (*deśanā*) evil, and by strength of reliance (*āśrayabala*). As it is said:[313] "Maitreya, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who possesses four qualities (*dharma*) can overcome even evil that has already been committed and accumulated. What are these four? They are: (1) the habit of criticism (*vidūṣaṇa*) which multiplies regrets about unwholesome (*akuśala*) karmas that already have been committed, (2) the habit that serves as an antidote (*pratipakṣa*) adds wholesome karmas that greatly outnumber the unwholesome karmas that already have been committed, (3) the strength of turning away (*pratyāpatti*) means that one restrains oneself and promises not to commit [evil], and (4) the strength of reliance (*āśraya*) means that one takes refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha and does D185a not relinquish the mind of awakening. With these four qualities, a Bodhisattva removes all remaining evil and does not experience any result."

In the *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhi Sūtra* it says:[314] "When the right time and conditions are present (*sāmagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca*)." This means that, if the power of a seed is unimpaired, it produces a sprout when the right time and conditions are present: namely, earth, water, fire, wind, and space. But if a seed is burned, rotten, or damaged, it will not produce a sprout, even if the right conditions are present. The same is true if any of the conditions are missing. Similarly, when sentient beings have been helpful or

312 Bhāviveka is referring to a verse that occurs in the Avadāna literature and is quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (220): *na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api / sāmagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām* ("Karmas are not destroyed for hundreds of *koṭi*s of eons; when the right time and right conditions are present, they bear fruit for sentient beings"). The verse itself is commonly cited in the *Avadānaśataka* in passages that comment on the inevitability of karmic retribution. Bhāviveka's version of the quotation omits the word *koṭi*. Bhāviveka also seems to read *nāpi* for *na pra* and indicates that the double use of the particle *api* has the force of a double negative. A few lines below, he apparently quotes another portion of the verse and identifies the source as the *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhi Sūtra*.

313 Compare *Caturdharmaka Sūtra*: *catubhir maitreya dharmaiḥ samanvāgato bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ kṛtopacitaṃ pāpam abhibhavati / katamaiś catubhiḥ / yad uta vidūṣaṇāsamudācāreṇa pratipakṣasamudācāreṇa pratyāpattibalena āśrayabalena ca / tatra vidūṣaṇāsamudācāro 'kuśalaṃ karmādhyācarati tatraiva tatraiva ca vipratisārabahulo bhavati / tatra pratipakṣasamudācāraḥ kṛtvāpy akuśalaṃ karma kuśale karmaṇy atyarthābhiyogaṃ gataḥ / pratyāpattibalaṃ saṃvarasamādānād akaraṇasaṃvaralābhaḥ / tatrāśrayabalaṃ buddhadharmasaṃghaśaraṇāgamanam anutsṛṣṭabodhicittatā ca / subalavatsaṃniśrayeṇa na śakyate pāpenābhibhavitum / ebhir maitreya catubhir dharmaiḥ samanvāgato bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ kṛtopacitaṃ pāpam abhibhavatīti* (quoted in *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 89-90).

314 *Ārya Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhi Sūtra*, Otani no. 885; T 1494.

harmful and the power of their wholesome or unwholesome karma is unimpaired, [this karma] will produce the appropriate effect, when the conditions of level (*gati*), place (*viṣaya*), and body are present, and when the appointed time has arrived for [karma] that is to be experienced in this life (*dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya*), to be experienced in the next life (*upapadyavedanīya*), and to be experienced in a subsequent life (*aparaparyāyavedanīya*).[315] But when wholesome [karma] is impaired by wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) and malevolence, or when unwholesome [karma] is weakened by antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) such as curses (*śāpa*), restraints (*saṃvara*), and confessions (*deśanā*),[316] how can wholesome or unwholesome seeds have any result when their power has been impaired, even when the right conditions are present?

If the right conditions are not present and the timing has changed, why is it impossible [for a great evil] to be uprooted? As it is said: "The evil that this upholder of the true Dharma is definitely going to experience (*niyatavedanīya*) will be experienced in this life." It also says: "Furthermore, any karma that leads to bad rebirth may here be just a headache."[317]

[Objection:][318] If [a great evil] only results in a headache, in what sense has it been uprooted?

[Reply:] When the results of unwholesome karmas are completely fulfilled by experiencing the sufferings of hell, and those karmas no longer cause even the slightest experience of the sufferings of hell, then they have been completely uprooted. Here, if [unwholesome karma] produces something like a headache, there certainly has been a result.[319]

D185b

[Objection:] If unwholesome karma can be completely eliminated, why do [sūtras] say: "with the exception of the result of previous karma"?[320]

Reply: This statement refers to the experience of results in the continua (*santāna*) of people who are blind, one-eyed, lame, maimed, mute, or deaf, because the results of actions that are in the process of maturation cannot be totally eliminated. Something

315 These three forms of karma (*trikarmākāra*) are listed in MVY 2308-10. Bhāviveka reverses the order of the second and third items on the list. For a more complete discussion, see *Kośa* 4.50ff. The MVY calls the third form of karma *lan grangs gzhan la myong bar 'gyur ba*, rather than the *rnam grangs gzhan* of our text.

316 These antidotes do not seem to constitute a standard list, at least in MVY and related dictionaries. Perhaps *dmod pa* is a promise never to do something evil, while *sdom pa* is a promise definitely to do something good, and *'chags pa* is what you do when you fail.

317 Lit. "just a hot head" (*mgo bo tsha ba tsam*).

318 The logical structure of this passage is difficult to follow. I have attempted to identify the objections and responses, but obscurities remain.

319 Lit. "how can there be no result at all?"

320 Skilling (1992: 148) refers to the phrase "with the exception of the result of previous karma (*varjayitvā paurāṇaṃ karmavipākam*)" as the "escape clause" that limits the effect of mantras and other forms of protection. He notes that the phrase occurs widely in Buddhist literature.

that has been performed by a thought that is still in its causal state may be succeeded by another distinctive thought and be completely eliminated,[321] as in case of Aṅgulimāla, Ajātaśatru, who killed his father,[322] Aśoka, and so forth.

If Ajātaśatru and the one who was determined to kill his mother[323] generated other, virtuous intentions, why were they reborn in Avīci without eliminating their karma?

Reply: It is taught that they were reborn in Avīci and so forth in order to generate confidence in the law of karma (lit. karma and result), but their karma was completely eliminated. They were born there [in Avīci] and then were liberated, like a silk ball that falls down and rises up.[324] They were not touched by the flames of hell. In this way, evil can be uprooted without denying the law of karma.

Scholars of the Mahāyāna think that karmas can only be uprooted when there is application of an antidote; they will not be eliminated unless they are overpowered by an antidote. Just as it is seen that even a small evil brings a result (*vipāka*) for someone

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321 The syntax of this sentence is unclear. It would help the parallelism in the sentence to read *rgyur gyur pa'i sems pa* for *rgyur gyur pa'i sems pas*. Then one thought could "attain" or be succeeded by another. Left as it is, it seems best to assume that the implied object of *mngon par 'dus byas pa* is evil karma, since that is what needs to be eliminated. Bhāviveka is clearly describing the mechanism of conversion, as the examples in the next sentence demonstrate.

322 The Tibetan reads "Ajātaśatru, Svaka, and pig-killer" as if they were separate names (*ma skyes dgra dang / sva ka dang / phag gsod pa dang*). A possible way to make sense of the names "Svaka and pig-killer" is to emend the text from *phag gsod pa* (pig-killer) to *pha gsod pa* (father-killer) and interpret *sva ka* (the equivalent of the Sanskrit "own") as modifying *pha gsod pa* ("father-killer"). DPPN explains that Ajātaśatru (Pali Ajātasattu) was encouraged by Devadatta to seize the throne from his father, king Bimbisāra. When Bimbisāra learned of the plot, he abdicated the throne, but Ajātaśatru was not satisfied until Bimbisāra was killed.

323 A reference to Aṅgulimāla. When the king of Kosala sent a detachment of men to seize Aṅgulimāla, Aṅgulimāla's mother attempted to warn him. Aṅgulimāla was determined to kill his mother and collect her fingers. The Buddha intervened and prevented the murder. See DPPN, s.v. "Aṅgulimāla."

324 The comparison in this passage is unclear. A similar point is made in Sthiramati's *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya* on MSA 3.8: "It is as if, because of the power of their lineage, they experience the suffering of a hell-being only as great as being bound by a silk ball, like King Ajātaśatru" (*de yang dper na rgyal po ma skyes dgra lta bu tshams med pa lnga byas kyang rigs kyi mthus sems can dmyal ba'i sdug bsngal dar gyi pho long bsdams pa tsam zhig myong ba lta bu'o*). The problem lies not only in the term *dar gyi pho long* (silk ball or flower), for which the available dictionaries offer no decisive Sanskrit equivalent, but also in the action attributed to it. The Tibetan text of TJ reads *brdabs pa las 'phar ba* ("fall down and rise up"); the Tibetan of Sthiramati's *bhāṣya* reads *bsdams pa* ("bound"). A solution may lie in the 'Jig rten mgon po Bka' 'bum as cited in "The Online Tibetan to English Dictionary and Translation Tool" (www.thdl.org/reference/translation-tool.html): "Because of this karma, someone who comes to Avīci is only struck by a silk ball" (*las des mnar med du song ba dar gyi pho long gdabs pa tsam yin*). If this reference is to be trusted, the "fall down and rise up" of the TJ can be interpreted as an act of striking, and the term *bsdams pa* of Sthiramati's *bhāṣya* as a copyist's error. Tsong kha pa quotes this passage in the *Lam rim chen mo* (Cutler 2000: 256).

who lacks skill-in-means (*upāyakauśalya*), as in the case of Mahāmaudgalyāyana[325] and
D186a so forth. Even though they have collected great wholesome roots, it is as if their mental flaws have turned them to dust, like the monk who was the attendant (*vaiyavṛtyakara*) of the Tathāgata Sarvābhibhū.[326] In the past, this [monk] was the first to honor the great Arhants, but he subsequently was overcome by strong desire. He stole the property of the community and, with a spiteful mind, abused it with angry words. As a result he was born as a filth-eating worm in a place that is very hard to escape, and not even a fraction of his wholesome roots remained. In the *Avadāna* it says: "Bodhisattvas and others have the power of skill-in-means to eliminate a great heap of evil and do not fail to obtain a small wholesome root." It also says in a sūtra:[327] "O monks, it is like this: If a man pours an ounce of salt into a small amount of water, the water becomes undrinkable. But if another man pours an ounce of salt into a large amount of water, it cannot be tasted, and the water does not become undrinkable. Why? O monks, it is because there is so much water. O monks, in a similar way, an individual who commits a sin remains [secure] in the second respect." Thus it is said:

> If someone pours an ounce of salt into a large pond, the water is not undrinkable. But, if someone pours an ounce of salt into a handful of water, the handful of water is undrinkable. Similarly, if someone collects a lot of merit and commit a little poison of evil, the result is insignificant and does not lead to a bad rebirth. But if someone does not collect even a little good and collects a lot of evil, just a little evil will lead this defiled person to a lower rebirth.

In other words, this person is like someone who has eaten unwholesome food.

D186b [Objection:] If all karmas are eliminated by the first production of the mind [of awakening], why did the perfectly awakened Buddha have karmic results (*vipāka*) such as being wounded by the thorn of an acacia tree,[328] [being accused of] the murder of

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325 Because of his previous resentment against his parents, Mahāmaudgalyāyana was not able to prevent his own death (Hofinger 200-1). DPPN notes that Moggallāna's death resulted from a plot by the Nigaṇṭhas.

326 Sarvābhibhū is mentioned in a list of previous Buddhas in *Mahāvastu* III 240ff.

327 Compare AN III 99 (*Loṇaphala Sutta*), where the Buddha uses the salt comparison to explain why a small evil action can have a large effect on an ordinary person, while a much greater evil action has little effect on someone who has developed good qualities. La Vallée Poussin discusses this and similar comparisons in a note on his translation of *Kośa* 6.34ab. He considers the larger issue of differences in karmic retribution in a note on *Kośa* 4.50.

328 Bhāviveka's account of the unfortunate effects of the Buddha's previous karma is related to the "ten karmic connections" in part three of the *Upāyakauśalya Sūtra*, although he does not reproduce the list in exactly the same order. Tatz's translation of this sūtra contains the full list. For a discussion of the relationship between this list and its traditional sources, see

Sundarīkā, being slandered by a mad woman, returning with an empty begging bowl, teaching the Dharma by [eating] barley for three months, being insulted by the angry Bhāradvāja, becoming sick, [being injured by] a rock thrown by Devadatta, and so forth?

[Reply:] All these [karmic results] are displayed with skill-in-means in order to discipline sentient beings. The Blessed One does not have even the slightest bit of karma. As it says in the *Upāyakauśalya Sūtra*[329] and the *Lokottaraparivarta*:[330] "O son of good family (*kulaputra*), one should understand that the Tathāgata's teachings of the ten karmic results are skill-in-means and have a hidden meaning (*abhisaṃdhi*).[331] These [karmic results] are impossible.[332] As long as a Bodhisattva has unwholesome roots, even as small as the tip of a hair, it is impossible for him to approach the Bodhi Tree. A Tathāgata has all the wholesome roots and has abandoned all the unwholesome roots. How can a Tathāgata who has removed any connection with traces (*vāsanā*) possibly have any bad karmic obstacle? Most sentient beings waste karmic results, however, and the Tathāgata teaches [that he has] karmic results in order to teach karmic results to those who have no confidence in karmic results. He teaches: 'If even I, a king of Dharma, have a karmic result, why shouldn't you have a karmic result?' But the Tathāgata does not have the slightest karmic obstacle. A skilled doctor who is not sick D187a may prescribe [medicine] for himself as if he were sick, and by prescribing bitter and hot [medicine], he may completely cure the sick people who follow his advice. As the king of physicians, the Tathāgata cures all ailments in the same way. Even though he has no [karmic] obstacles, he teaches karma by saying: 'This is the result of my karma.'" When sūtras like the *Upāyakauśalya* say, "When sentient beings are terrified by karma, they purify their body, speech and mind," are they not like liberators, for they sustain the mind by freeing it from ignorance and so forth?

Others see someone on the verge of committing a heinous crime (*ānantarya*), know that this action will cause suffering for a long time, and kill that person out of compassion.[333] They certainly know that they will be born in hell, but they adopt a wholesome

Cutler 1997: 63-82; Skilling 2006; and Xing 2005: 106ff. Lamotte has a helpful discussion of traditional interpretations of the illness and other difficulties suffered by the Buddha's physical body (1976: 294-98).

329 The *Upāyakauśalya Sūtra* is translated in Chang 1983 and in Tatz 1994. The passage quoted by Bhāviveka is translated by Tatz on pages 71-72.

330 Ichigo (Gómez and Silk 239) identifies the *Lokottaraparivarta* as Otani no. 761/26 (number 26 of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*). It is more likely that Bhāviveka is referring to the *Lokānuvartanā* (see Harrison 1982).

331 "Hidden meaning" represents the Tibetan word *ldem dgongs*. See the *catvāro 'bhisaṃdhayaḥ* (*ldem por dgongs pa bzhi'i ming la*) in MVY 1671-75.

332 Literally "out of place" and "irrelevant," a stock expression of impossibility.

333 The account of a Bodhisattva who kills out of compassion immediately follows the passage just quoted from the *Upāyakauśalya Sūtra* (Tatz 73-74). This paragraph occurs in an

or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) motivation (*citta*)[334] and kill in order to protect [others]. They accept their own rebirth in hell, but their wholesome [motivation] is sustained by wholesome thoughts like: "This is great suffering, but it will not last long." This [motivation] is wholesome, because it is like a thought that is free from desire and so forth.

Objection: Even if a killer is sustained by [a thought] that is free from desire and so forth, this [killing] is contemptible and denies the distinction between abusive and friendly words.[335]

Reply: In sūtras such as the *Udāyi* and the *Kimpa*,[336] the Blessed One does not prohibit abusive words. For example, he calls Devadatta a fool and Mara evil.[337] It is possible to say: A Bodhisattva who commits murder out of compassion, cannot be reproached for this action, because it is not generated by hatred, like the Tathāgata's own words.

D187b In many sūtras of the Mahāyāna, such as the *Ratnaketu*[338] and the *Candrapradīpa*,[339] it says that even a very great evil can be uprooted. In a sūtra belonging to other schools (*nikāya*), it says:[340] "In the future, monks will, if they wish, pay homage to and travel to shrines (*caitya*), thinking: 'Here the Tathāgata was born; here the Tathāgata was perfectly awakened; here the Tathāgata set the wheel of the Dharma in motion; and here the Tathāgata attained parinirvāṇa.' They will be born among the gods in heaven as if they were giving up a heavy burden, even if they die immediately. Others, with the exception of those who are in their final birth, will not be left out,[341] even if they have committed a heinous crime."

Furthermore, in the Vinaya of your own view (*darśana*), the teachings about rising from moral failure (*āpattikarma*) contradict [your argument]. For it says: "There are

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identical form in VY, but it plays a different role in the text. Vasubandhu uses it to support his argument in favor of the Buddha's manifestations (*nirmāṇa*).

334 Lit. "they are firm in a thought that is wholesome or indeterminate" (*dge ba'am lung du ma bstan pa'i sems la gnas par byas nas*).

335 TJ reads *gshe ba* (Skt. *adhikṣepa*) *dang mdza' ba* (Skt. *priya*) *dbye ba la sogs pa*. Compare VY *rtsub po'am mdza bo dang dbye bar byed pa* (VY 245).

336 The identity of these sūtras is unclear.

337 See *Traité* 1661ff.

338 As in the *Mahāsannipātaratnaketudhāraṇī Sūtra* (Dutt 1984: 39): *yaś cāsya dṛṣṭadharmasāṃparāyikaḥ kāyavāṅmanoduḥkhapratisaṃvedanīyo duṣkṛtānāṃ vāṅmanaḥkarmaṇāṃ phalavipākaḥ saparikṣayaṃ gacchati*.

339 *Candrapradīpa* is another name for the *Samādhirāja Sūtra*.

340 Compare MPS III 388: *āgamiṣyanti bhikṣavo mamātyayāt caityaparicārakāś caityavandakās ta evaṃ vakṣyanti / iha bhagavāñ jātaḥ / iha bhagavān anuttarāṃ samyaksaṃbodhim abhisaṃbuddhaḥ / iha bhagavatā triparivartaṃ dvādaśākāraṃ dharmyaṃ dharmacakraṃ pravartitam / iha bhagavān anupādhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātau parinirvṛtaḥ / atrāntarā ye kecit prasannacittā mamāntike kālaṃ kariṣyanti te sarve svargopagā ye kecit sopādiśeṣāḥ*. While the sense of the passage is the same, Bhāviveka's quotation differs in significant details. The parallel passage in Pali is found in DN II 140-41.

341 The term is *bsal zhing* [*cing* P] *bor ba med do*.

two kinds of people who die with no moral failure: those who do not send forth[342] any moral failure, and those who, according to the Dharma, confess any moral failures that may occur." There is a reason [for this]. We see that someone who has powerful skill-in-means (*upāya*) can diminish evil and eventually eliminate it completely, as if he were putting salt in water or butter in fire. Someone who knows this skill-in-means has a powerful antidote and can completely eliminate all the evil that has accumulated for a thousand incalculable eons, just as a blazing fire immediately removes darkness from a very dark place. For someone who lacks skill-in-means, the good also can be eliminated, like darkness without the light of the sun. But if [good] is accumulated every day, it will certainly grow and not be lost, like the honey collected by honey bees or like the shape of the waxing moon. Whether karma is damaged or not depends on causes; it is not D188a
established by nature. Therefore, it is established that one can minimize and uproot even terrible evil by personally repenting it, criticizing it, confessing it, announcing it, and vowing not to do it again.

The Vaipulya Has a Different Teaching

[The opponent] claims that the Vaipulya has a different teaching, but the word [Vaipulya] refers literally to something that is extensive.[343] The Mahāyāna is far more extensive than the Śrāvakayāna. If you think that the Vaipulya is something other [than the Mahāyāna], this is nothing but words. We think that the entire teaching of the Mahāyāna is called "Vaipulya," because its texts (*grantha*) and its meaning (*artha*) are extensive. The Blessed One did not make a clear distinction by saying: "This is Vaipulya, and that is not." Therefore, when [we] say that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching, and you respond with hatred, your response is not authoritative (*pramāṇa*) for us. In this way, it is established that the Mahāyāna is the Vaipulya.

The Mahāyāna is Not Mentioned in the Dream of King Kṛkin

Objection: When the Blessed One Kāśyapa was asked about King Kṛkin's dreams, he said: "The Tathāgata Śākyamuni will appear when human beings live a hundred years, and his teaching will be divided into eighteen schools (*nikāya*)." The Mahāyāna is not mentioned in this division of the teaching.

Reply: The Mahāyāna has to do with the inclinations of those who aspire to

342 The word for "send forth" is *'byin pa*, the same word that has been translated as "uproot." It would make sense to say that this first group of people "uproot" their *āpatti*, but it would not fit the point of the argument.

343 On the role of the *vaipulya-aṅga* ("extensive part") in the various accounts of the Buddhist canon, see note 114. The grammatical analysis of this sentence and much of the rest of this passage is unclear. The Peking repeats a line by dittography.

something profound and vast, while the teaching in the eighteen schools is common, like the teaching in śāstras that make no distinction in birth, age, color, country, and time.

Furthermore, there is definitely a distinction between the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyeka-
D188b buddhayāna, and Mahāyāna in the teachings of all Buddhas. But there also is a distinction about particular teachings that belong only to Śākyamuni and not to others.[344] Tathāgatas such as Krakucchanda[345] distinguished different vehicles, but Kāśyapa did not. So [this] does not [prove] that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching.

Soon after the Blessed One's parinirvāṇa, the Śrāvakas and others became attached to the teachings that had been made to each one of them, and they became divided. Their compilers collected [these teachings] accordingly. Since there was no suitable vessel for the Mahāyāna at that time, none of them collected it. [The Mahāyāna] was collected [instead] by Nāgas and so forth, who delighted in the Sugata, and it was taken to the world of the Nāgas and so forth.[346] Then the noble Nāgārjuna, whom the Blessed One had predicted would be a suitable vessel [for the Mahāyāna], collected it from them and spread it widely in the human world.

The teaching of the Mahāyāna is consistent with the attainment of the knowledge of all modes (*sarvākārajñatā*) and does not belong to Māra, so it is not right to reject or refute the Mahāyāna. If one is capable of analysis,[347] one should rationally investigate it.

[This topic] has been adequately discussed. We now return to the point at hand.[348]

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344 A literal translation would read: "Furthermore, in the teaching of all Buddhas, there definitely is a distinction of the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna. And a distinction of particular teachings belongs only to Śākyamuni, but not to another. And Tathāgatas such as Krakucchanda made a distinction between different vehicles, and Kāśyapa did not teach [it]. Therefore. . . ." The logical connection between clauses is unclear. It is not obvious what it means to say that the distinction of vehicles is present in the teaching of all the Buddhas, but Kāśyapa did not teach it.

345 MVY 90 lists *log pa dang sel* as the name of Krakucchanda. Edgerton (BHSD s.v. "Krakucchanda") notes that the more common equivalent for Krakucchanda is *'khor ba 'jig* ("Destroyer of Saṃsāra"). According to Edgerton, Krakucchanda (also known as Krakutsanda and, in Pali, Kakusaṃdha) is often listed as the third Buddha before Śākyamuni. The two intervening Buddhas between Krakucchanda and Śākyamuni are Kanakamuni and Kāśyapa.

346 On traditional accounts of the transmission of Mahāyāna sūtras, see Lamotte 1954.

347 Lit. "capable of analysis with the mind" (*blos dpyod par nus pa*), an echo of MHK 3.22 (*vicaryamānas tu dhiyā*).

348 Bhāviveka has just completed his response to the first argument in verse 4.7 ("The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrantas and so forth, like the Vedānta view"). He also has responded to the "Miscellaneous Objections" that immediately preceded verse 4.9. After this long prose digression, he now returns to the second argument in verse 4.7:

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching,
> because it teaches a different path,
> like the Vedānta view.

4.36 The reason is unaccepted, because the eightfold path to omniscience is taught in the Mahāyāna.

The majority of Mahāyāna sūtras,[349] such as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, the *Akṣayamati*, the *Sāgaramati*, the *Gaganagañja*, the *Dhāraṇīśvararājā*, the *Ratnacūḍa*, and the *Sāgaraparipṛcchā*, teach that this eightfold path is the cause of perfect awakening, and they do not teach a different path. Therefore, the reason, "because the Mahāyāna D189a teaches a different path," is unaccepted.

Objection: Doesn't [the Mahāyāna] have a different teaching about bathing on the banks of [rivers] such as the Ganges, fasting, and so forth?

Reply: This is true. It teaches that evil and so forth are removed by the power of a Bodhisattva vow, when people bathe in four rivers, the Ganges, the Sindhu, the Pakṣu, and the Sītā,[350] drink from them, immerse themselves in them, and so forth. But the power to remove evil does not reside in the water. In the *Anavatapta Sūtra*[351] it says: "The Nāga king Anavatapta gained power over karma and rebirth and was born in a great lake called Panasa. He vowed that if any sentient beings bathe in the rivers that flow from his lake, drink from them, and immerse themselves in them, these [actions] would bring about their awakening. He said that he would eventually take all of them to Buddhahood." It is not a contradiction for them to become Buddhas with the help of a spiritual friend (*kalyānamitra*). Fasting and so forth are taught in order to make a *vidyā* effective by purifying the body of the person who practices the *vidyā*. They are not taught out of a desire for liberation. There is no reason for these [practices] to be a different path. Therefore [the opponent] cannot avoid the fault of an unaccepted reason.

Objection: Even if this is true, the teaching of the Mahāyāna about these paths is useless. [According to the Mahāyāna], the knowledge of suffering does not lead to nirvāṇa, so [the Mahāyāna] contradicts the vision of the four noble truths.

Reply: In this case, you first should examine the following statement by the Teacher: "Purification is the equality (*samatā*) of the four noble truths." What is equality? The D189b emptiness of all *dharma*s, because they have a single taste, which is absence. The emptiness of the four noble truths is analyzed as follows:[352]

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349 In addition to the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, which is widely available in its various versions, the sūtras in Bhāviveka's list can be consulted in the following sources: *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (Pagel 1995); *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* (Braarvig 1993); *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Otani no. 819); *Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Otani no. 815); *Dhāraṇīśvararājā Sūtra*, identified by Takasaki (1966a: 146) as the *Tathāgatamahākaruṇā Sūtra* (Otani no. 814); *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Otani no. 760/47); and *Sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra* (Otani nos. 820-22).

350 On these four rivers see note 41.

351 *Ārya Anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra*, Otani no. 824.

352 In the next verse, the opponent claims that suffering must arise because of traditional statements about the arising and ceasing of suffering, Bhāviveka responds in verses 4.37-38ab

4.37 If someone thinks that suffering arises, because suffering is said to arise and cease, why not hold that, if it arises, it must be empty of the identity of suffering?

[We] have denied that anything arises from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all, so how can the truth of suffering apply to [suffering] that does not arise? The thesis is the following: "Why not hold that the five aggregates (*skandha*), which someone sees as arising or originating from causes and conditions, are empty of the identity [of suffering]"?

The reason and example are:

4.38ab Because it is conditioned, like illusion or like the pure aggregates.

"If suffering arises and ceases, it is empty of the identity [of suffering]" should be supplied. Therefore, since [suffering] has this identity [namely, to be empty of the identity of suffering],

4.38cd What do you think is the truth of suffering, and what is right vision?[353]

[Suffering] is a truth (*satya*) in the sense that it is free from error (*avitatha*), but it does not have even a trace of the identity (*svabhāva*) of suffering. It is free from error in the sense that this [no identity] is its identity.[354] This is the truth of suffering. Right vision is to see this correctly, because it too is free from error.

Furthermore,

4.39ab A painful feeling is suffering, but why are birth and so forth suffering?

People want to be free from a painful feelings as soon as they arise, but why are other

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with the following syllogism: "If suffering arises and ceases, it is empty of the identity [of suffering], because it is conditioned, like illusion (*māyā*) or like the pure aggregates." The commentary restates the syllogism in a slightly different form: "The five aggregates are empty of the identity of suffering, because they are conditioned, like illusion or like the pure aggregates."

353 On Bhāviveka's understanding of *samyag-darśana* (right vision), compare his commentary on MMK 24.14: To see the non-arising and so forth of entities that are ultimately illusory is to see the noble truths" (Eckel 1980: 276).

354 The sDe-dge adds "in the sense that it is empty of identity" (*'di ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyis*). This addition is not necessary to make sense of the passage. The Peking version can be understood as an example of the standard, paradoxical use of the word *svabhāva* (here translated as "identity"): It is the identity of things to have no identity (*niḥsvabhāva*) or to be empty of identity (*svabhāvaśūnya*).

feelings that are not like this, such as birth, old age, sickness, death, and sorrow, suffering?

4.39cd If impermanence is suffering,[355] then the cause [of suffering] and the path [to the cessation of suffering] also are suffering.

Whatever is impermanent is suffering, so it follows that the origin [of suffering] and the path [to the cessation of suffering] also are suffering. If this is the case, there are only two truths: suffering and cessation.

4.40ab If [birth and so forth] are suffering because they are the causes [of suffering], then the origin [of suffering] also is suffering.

Someone may think that birth and so forth are suffering because they are the causes D190a
of painful feelings, and because it is possible to attribute the effect to the cause. If so, if the cause of painful feelings is suffering, it follows that the ignorance, thirst, and karma that are said to be the origin [of suffering] also are suffering, since they also are the cause of painful feelings. If this is the case, there are only three truths: suffering, cessation, and the path.

Furthermore,

4.40cd And if suffering is only a word, how can a cognition of suffering be knowledge of this [truth of suffering]?

Nominal (*prajñapti*), only a word (*vākya*), relative (*saṃvṛti*), and metaphorical (*upacāra*) [are synonyms]. To be only a word is to be nothing more than a way of speaking. If birth and so forth do not have the identity of suffering, but are called suffering by the conventional application of a word, then the knowledge that birth and so forth are suffering is metaphorical. If [this knowledge that birth is suffering] is not correct, however, it is not consistent with the truth.

It is possible to prove by means of argument that the knowledge of the four noble truths is not true (*yathārtha*).

4.41 [We] do not think that any knowledge that has suffering as its object is really true, because it is knowledge that a certain thing is suffering, like the cognition that something like a stab wound is suffering.

355 The words *vināśas tasya* in the first *pāda* could be emended to something like *vināśataś ca* to be consistent with *mi rtag phyir na* in the Tibetan.

When knowledge of the form "this is suffering" arises, it is not really (*tattvataḥ*) true, because it is knowledge that something has a painful aspect (*ākāra*),[356] like the unpleasant and painful cognitions experienced by the inhabitants of hell or by those who enter a battlefield and are pierced, slashed, and struck by arrows, spears, and swords.[357]

When the truth of suffering has been negated in this way, one should start to negate the truth of the origin [of suffering].

> 4.42 The cause [of suffering] cannot be the origin [of suffering] because it is the
> D190b cause of suffering, like a sword blow and so forth, or because it is a mental phenomenon, like the path.[358]

The ignorance, thirst, and karma that are considered the cause (*hetu*) of suffering cannot be called the origin (*samudāya*) [of suffering],[359] because they are the cause of suffering, just as a sword blow and so forth are the cause of suffering, or because the origin [of suffering] is a mental phenomenon (*caitta*), like the eightfold path, which is not the cause of suffering.[360]

Likewise,

> 4.43 [We] do not think that a cognition that has the cause of suffering as its object is true, because it is a cognition of the form (*ākāra*) of suffering and so forth, like a different cognition of a cause of suffering.

A cognition that has the cause of suffering as its object is not true, because it is a cognition of the form, "Suffering arises from a painful cause," like the cognition that something like a sword blow is a cause of suffering.

Now that the origin [of suffering] has been negated in this way, [the next verse] negates the truth of cessation.

> 4.44ab If there is no arising, there is no cessation, because of the negation stated earlier.

356 Bhāviveka may have in mind the argument that any cognition of an object is ultimately false, as in the appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 72).

357 The sDe-dge makes better sense of this passage than the Peking.

358 The Tibetan of the verse reads: "The cause cannot be the cause of suffering because it is the origin." The reason for this reversal is made clear in the commentary.

359 There is a redundant expression in the Tibetan of this sentence that seems best omitted in English.

360 The Tibetan translator reversed the reason (*hetu*) and the point to be proved (*sādhya*) in the verse in order to make sense of these two examples (*dṛṣṭānta*).

Earlier in this text [we] negated all arising and then proved that if something does not arise, it does not cease. If there is nothing [to cease], there ultimately cannot be any cessation, and there cannot be any way for the truth [of cessation] to be correct.

Therefore,

> 4.44cd Something that arises can cease, but something that does not arise cannot [cease], like a flower in the sky.

Arising can be the cause of cessation conventionally (*saṃvṛtyā*), just as one observes that a lamp arises from the combination of a vessel, oil, and a wick, and ceases when these conditions are absent. But if something does not arise, like a flower in the sky, it certainly cannot cease. How can something that does not arise ever cease?

Furthermore,

> 4.45 When we do not think that there is anything to arise or cease, how can you, as a scholar, claim that the other [i.e. cessation] is true?

When something arises and ceases, it is possible to speak of its cessation. One uses the D191a
word "cessation" when something comes to an end. But we have already proved that whatever arises does not arise. How can you, who are so proud of your wisdom, claim that [cessation] is really true (*satya*)?

If you think that something that does not arise really (*tattvataḥ*) ceases, the following inference can be constructed to negate that [position] as well.

> 4.46 The cessation of something that has not arisen is ultimately not cessation, because it is the cessation of something that has not arisen, like cessation that is not due to discernment.

Cessation that is not due to discernment, which is present when [its conditions] cease, is not real (*satya*), because everything that is compounded (*saṃskṛta*) is momentary, even if it is not realized (*sākṣātkṛta*) through wisdom.[361] Cessation that is due to discernment is a cessation that is attained through discernment by wisdom. This is real in the sense that it causes one to be free from [defilements], because it is preceded by wisdom. Neither of these [two forms of cessation] has the nature of something that arises (*utpannasvabhāva*), so their cessation is imagined. It is reasonable that the cessation that is due to discernment is not ultimate, like the cessation that is not due to discernment.

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361 "Cessation that is not due to discernment" (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), as defined in *Kośa* 1.6 and elsewhere, is a complete cessation of arising attained not through wisdom but through an absence of the conditions that cause arising.

Now that the truth of cessation has been negated in this way, [the next verse] negates the truth of the path.

> 4.47 If there cannot be any cessation, where does your path lead? And if [the path] does not arise, how can it be a path, and whom does it cause to attain this [cessation]?

If [you] think that the path causes someone to attain cessation, then, if this is what [you] think, and cessation is impossible,[362] what is being sought and what is being attained when [you] use the word "path"? And if the path does not arise in its own right, who is a practitioner (*yogin*) and what truth of cessation does [a practitioner] attain, when neither [a practitioner nor cessation] arises?

This is proved by the following argument:

> 4.48 The path does not cause anyone to attain liberation (*apavarga*), because it is conditioned, like another [path], or because it has cessation as its object, like another cognition of cessation.

[The prefix] *apa* [in the word *apavarga*] refers to something that is lower, namely,
D191b thoughts that are based on the realms of desire, form, and formlessness. Because it removes (*vṛj*) [these thoughts], *apavarga* is liberation (*mokṣa*). The path does not cause someone to attain this [liberation],[363] because it is conditioned, like the path to heaven that is called "the ten virtues" (*daśakuśala*). Or [the path does not cause someone to attain liberation], because it has cessation [as an object] to be realized (*sākṣātkṛtya*), that is, because the path of practice (*bhāvanāmārga*) objectifies cessation and thus has cessation as an object, like a cognition of the cessation that is not due to discernment.

To negate the eightfold path in detail, [we] say:

> 4.49 [Right] vision of the four noble truths should be considered false, because it has universals as its object or because it is conditioned, like a false cognition.

Right vision (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) is knowing that suffering is suffering,[364] that origin is origin, and that cessation is cessation. Here vision of the four noble truths is the subject. Its inferred property is to be false. "Because it has universals (*sāmānya*), such as impermanence,

362 Interpret *sambhava* as "possible" even though the Tibetan translates it as *svabhāva*.

363 It is often necessary to translate sentences of the form B *ni* A *yin te* as "A is B," assuming that the subject and predicate are often reversed in Sanskrit. Here the change in order is justified by the fact that the path is the subject of the syllogism in the verse. The practice cannot be generalized, however, since it often is necessary to follow the Tibetan word order.

364 Literally to know the sufferingness (*duḥkhatva*) of suffering.

no-self, and emptiness, as its object (*ālambana*) or because it is conditioned by causes and conditions" are the reasons. "Like a false cognition" is the example.

> 4.50 Ultimately it is not reasonable for the truth of the path to be true, because right thinking, right effort, and so forth are false.

Right thinking, right effort, right livelihood, right action, right mindfulness, and right concentration are relative (*sāṃvṛta*), but ultimately they are false, because they have universals as their objects or because they are conditioned, like a false cognition. This is the way to prove that the truth of the path is not ultimately true.

Then how should the path be truly understood?

> 4.51 It is not reasonable to practice it in this way, but it is reasonable [to practice it] by not seeing the four noble truths, because the actual state of the thing that is seen is always to be unseen.

According to the Mahāyāna, it is not reasonable to practice the path as you who are attached to real things explain it in the Śrāvakayāna, because of the sequence of analy- D192a
sis of the [eight] aspects [of the path] beginning with right vision. This is because the practice of not seeing the four noble truths is reasonable. Why? The thing that is to be seen is not established as having the identity of the four noble truths.[365] To be "unseen" is to be an absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*). This is always the case. That is, the actual state of things is always like this.

The next verse takes up the opponent's idea and presents it as an objection.

> 4.52 Someone may say: "An idiot cannot be liberated, because he does not see the truth, like a fool, and the same is true of you."

"The adherents of the Mahāyāna hate the vision of the four noble truths and cannot be liberated, because they do not see the truth, like a fool." The adherents of the Śrāvakayāna make this claim because they want to hurt us.

To respond to them [we] say:

> 4.53 If there is no suffering and no one who suffers, who wants liberation from

365 The construction of the Tibetan translation makes it difficult to give a better translation of this sentence. Perhaps "the four noble truths" (*sdug bsngal la sogs pa*) can be taken as a gloss of "the thing that is to be seen" (*dṛśyasya*). If so, the sentence could be translated as follows: "The thing that is to be seen, namely the four noble truths, does not have an established identity." Note that the commentary turns *dṛśyasya* (sg.) into a plural (*rnams kyi'o*).

> what? People speak of liberation erroneously,[366] like a product of illusion.

Since suffering does not arise, because of the argument stated earlier, the one who suffers from this suffering also does not arise. Who then thinks that someone escapes from the bondage of saṃsāra, when neither [saṃsāra nor bondage] arise? Those who are bound by the bondage of false concepts, which depend on causes and conditions and are deceptive in nature, speak of liberation erroneously, like a product of illusion. Ultimately, however, there is neither bondage nor liberation.

Likewise,

> 4.54 [We] think that liberation is the complete no-vision of the four noble truths, so the example is impossible and the reason is unaccepted.

The position of the Mahāyāna stated here is that liberation is the complete no-vision of the four noble truths. The no-vision of these [truths] is beyond the reach of the Śrāvakas and others who see nothing but *dharma*s. Therefore, the example, "like the
D192b awakening of a student," stated in the objection is impossible.[367] Similarly, the Teacher's omniscient insight is produced by the excellence (*atiśaya*) of his practice of the path rather than by the excellence of his faculties.[368] Therefore, as far as we are concerned, the reason, "[because of] the excellence of his faculties,"[369] is unaccepted.

The reason, "[because the Mahāyāna] teaches a different path,"[370] also is unaccepted. Why?

> 4.55 This very same path, beginning with right vision, is taught in the Mahāyāna, so the reason is unaccepted.

From a relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*) one should practice the eightfold path literally, but when one understands reality (*tattva*), one should practice it as no-vision and so forth. So a distinctive practice is taught in the Mahāyāna, but not a different path. Therefore, the reason, "because [the Mahāyāna] teaches a different path," is unaccepted. This is why,

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366 The Tibetan translation of the verse and commentary reads *'khrul pa'i dbang gis*, putting the reading of *bhrāntyāvedhān* in question. It might be better to read *āveśa* for *āvedha*.

367 This example is found in verse 4.3.

368 Bhāviveka here takes up the Śrāvaka's claim in verse 4.4 that the Buddha's omniscience comes from the "excellence" (*atiśaya*) of his faculties (*indriya*). Read *phul du byung ba* (D) to correspond to the word *atiśaya* in verse 4.4. The translation of verse 4.4 uses another Tibetan equivalent of *atiśaya*: *khyad 'phags*.

369 This reason is found in verse 4.4.

370 This reason is found in verse 4.7.

> The Buddhas' teaching is based on two truths: ordinary relative truth and ultimate truth.[371]

The Blessed One seeks the welfare of the world, so he does not always favor reality. For sentient beings whose minds are unstable, he teaches an antidote that leads to freedom from defilements. Its meaning is not true, but ultimately it is consistent with purification. What kind [of teaching is this]? It is like the following statements: "O monks, if you perceive a woman as a mother, then think of her as a mother; likewise, if you perceive a woman as a sister or daughter, then think of her as a daughter." "There are spontaneously born (*upapāduka*) beings."[372] "A single person arises in the world."[373] "All sentient beings live by food."[374] "I am old and weak."[375]

A concept (*vikalpa*) can be beneficial or harmful, just as dirt—such as earth, ashes, D193a
or cow dung—can remove some impurities—such as smoke, oil, and mud—and increase others. It is beneficial to think of one's teacher's wife as a mother or a sister. This false concept about the [teacher's] wife removes desire for her.[376] It is said:

> For a wise person to be free from impurity, an impurity can provide purification. In this way, the relative (*saṃvṛti*) is best to free one from things in a relative sense.[377]

Furthermore, the Tathāgata uses various manifestations (*nirmāṇa*) to make correct teaching known in the world. Accordingly,

> 4.56 Everything that is well spoken (*sūkta*) in the Vedānta is taught by the Buddha. Therefore, either the example is deficient or one should analyze its ambiguity.[378]

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371 MMK 24.8.

372 See commentary on *Kośa* 3.8cd. For references, see La Vallée Poussin's translation.

373 Quoted in *Kośabhāṣya* (468): *ekaḥ pudgalo loka utpadyamāna utpadyate*. See also AN I 22: *ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno*.

374 DN III 211 (*Saṃgīti Sutta*): *sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā*.

375 The likely Skt. is *vṛddho 'ham*.

376 The last part of this sentence could also be translated: "To imagine falsely that she is [your] wife leads to an undesirable [result]." This translation duplicates the parallel construction of the previous sentence, in which a beneficial result is contrasted with a non-beneficial result.

377 This verse contains a number of obscurities that might be cleared up by locating the Sanskrit. The word *gos*, for example, can be taken as the instrumental of the noun *'go ba* ("stain") or as the perfect of the verb *'go ba* ("to stain"). If it is taken as a verb, the first part of the verse means that one is first stained and then purified.

378 Bhāviveka is referring to the example in verse 4.7: "like the Vedānta view." The term "well spoken" (*sūkta*) is an allusion to the conventional term for a Vedic hymn. Gombrich (1990)

Earlier [the opponent] said: "The Mahāyāna is not the teaching of the Buddha, like the Vedānta view." The claim that the Vedānta is an example must be accepted,[379] so [the argument suffers] the fault of an unaccepted example.

Objection: This is not the case. The parts of the Vedas that contain faulty teachings about killing, stealing, and so forth are the example.

Reply: This is not a fault, because the Mahāyāna does not have such teachings. The Mahāyāna does not contradict the teachings of the three śāstras,[380] and it has no teaching that contradicts the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*), as has previously been established. The [parts of the] Vedas that are well spoken and do not contradict the teaching of the Buddha should be accepted, and those that are not well spoken should not be accepted. When one analyzes this ambiguity, [the part of the Veda] that is reasonable according to this [analysis] should be accepted, and [the part] that is not reasonable should not be accepted.

[The next verse] responds to the claim that the Mahāyāna is like a nihilistic view, because it denies cause and effect.[381]

> 4.57 If [we] practice wisdom in a way that excludes the concepts of being and
> D193b non-being, to whom and for what reason do [you] attribute the view that denies cause and effect?

If we avoided the position of being (*bhāva*) and accepted the position of non-being (*abhāva*), then [our position] would be nihilism (*nāstikatva*), and there would be no substance to the claim that we avoid the extremes of being and non-being and establish a middle [way]. If we know this [middle way] directly (*svasaṃvedya*), by practicing wisdom without any concepts of being and non-being, how can [you] assert that we are nihilists?[382] When [we] avoid the extremes of being and non-being, what false view (*dṛṣṭyabhiniveśa*) or thing (*bhāva*) can there be [for us] to grasp? If [we] avoid the extremes

speculates that early Buddhist poems were called *sūkta*, a term that became sutta in Pali and was re-Sanskritized as sūtra.

379 Bhāviveka means that it must be accepted for the argument to be valid.

380 Presumably *hetu-śāstra* (logic), *śabda-śāstra* (grammar), and *cikitsaka-śāstra* (medicine), as mentioned earlier in the text.

381 This argument is found in verse 4.8ab:

> The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching,
> because it improperly denies cause and effect,
> like a nihilistic view (*nāstikadarśana*).

382 The commentary explains the sentence "[our] practice of wisdom avoids the concepts of being and non-being" with another sentence that is virtually identical. To avoid redundancy, it has been omitted.

of improper reification (*samāropa*) and improper denial (*apavāda*), then ultimately [we] do not hold a view that denies cause and effect.

From a relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*),

4.58 The reason is unaccepted, because [we] do not deny the connection between cause and effect as it is understood in the world.

We reject the following false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*): "This word does not exist, the other world does not exist, and there are no results from good and evil karma." We also do not deny the following claims as they are accepted in the world: "This world exists, and good and evil actions bring results," and "[people] acquire the karmic results that they have accumulated." Therefore, the reason [for the claim that] we deny cause and effect is unaccepted. It is said:

> In brief, the view of non-being (*nāstitādṛṣṭi*) is the false view that karmas have no result, no merit, and no bad rebirth. In brief, the view of being D194a
> (*astitādṛṣṭi*) is the right view that karmas have a result and merit brings a good rebirth.[383] A nihilist (*nāstika*) goes to a bad rebirth; the opposite (*astika*) goes to a good rebirth. Those who avoid both [extremes] and rely on non-duality are liberated.[384]

Therefore, we hold a doctrine of non-duality (*advayavāda*) and are not nihilists. The proof of this has been given in *The Root* [*Verses*] *on the Middle Way* (*mūlamadhyamaka*).

One should investigate whether the claim that Mādhyamikas (*madhyamavādin*) are like nihilists (*nāstika*) is made from a conventional (*vyavahāra*) point of view or from the point of view of reality (*tattvadarśana*). In the first case, a nihilist is attached to the improper denial (*apavāda*) of cause and effect conventionally; he casts off all that is wholesome and enters every unwholesome path. In this way, he violates correct conventional truth. We [Mādhyamikas] do not enter any unwholesome path, because we do not deny that there is a connection between cause and effect, as long as it is understood merely as illusion (*māyā*) or a mirage. We think that aggregates are reborn from defiled aggregates, so we accept that aggregates arise in the present and future from other aggregates that precede them. Therefore, because we think that [the connection between cause and effect] is like an illusion or a dream, we are not like nihilists from a conventional point of view.

383 *Ratnāvalī* 1.43-44: *samāsān nāstitādṛṣṭiḥ phalaṃ nāstīti karmāṇām / apuṇyāpāyikī caiṣā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ smṛtā // samāsād astitādṛṣṭiḥ phalaṃ cāstīti karmāṇām / puṇyā sugatiniṣyandā saṃyagdṛṣṭir iti smṛtā //*.

384 *Ratnāvalī* 1.57: *nāstiko durgatiṃ yāti sugatiṃ yāty astikaḥ / yathābhūtaparijñānān mokṣam advayaniśritaḥ //*. For 1.57c, Bhāviveka reads "those who avoid both," corresponding to something like *tathā dvayaparihārān*. For Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, see Hahn 1982.

[We] also are not [nihilists] from the point of view of reality. The nihilists' non-being (*abhāva*) generates a cognition (*vijñāna*) that has non-being as its object (*viṣaya*) and denies all things. Because of this false cognition, they are stained by the impurity of immorality (*duḥśīla*) and do not relieve suffering. According to our vision of reality, [we] understand the emptiness of such things as material form, which previously gave rise to cognitions that objects such as material form were true. As a result, [we] rule out the idea that things such as material form are true. [We] also do not engage in a cognition of non-being (*abhāva*), which is a cognition that arises from an object. The cognition, "The objects that consist of such things as material form do not exist," is not
D194b the ultimate ultimate (*yathāparamārthaparamārtha*), because it is a cognition, like the cognition that [such things as material form] exist. This is the refutation [of the claim that we are like nihilists].

Furthermore, when [we] negate the arising of a cognition of an apparent object, there is an opportunity for a cognition of the non-existence of that [apparent object]. [But], because [the object] that is negated has no identity, [we] understand that [the cognition of the non-exstence of this object] is false. Thus [we] also rule out the cognition of non-existence. The cognition of non-existence does not arise when one resides in the practice of wisdom that cannot be removed;[385] it also does not [arise] in isolation. So the Mādhyamikas do not even share the word "non-existence" with the nihilists. According to [our] teaching, [the word "non-existence"] is merely a denial of existence, not an assertion of non-existence. So [nihilists and Mādhyamikas] are as different as a mustard seed and Mt. Meru. As it is said,

> [We] deny existence and do not maintain non-existence. Why should the statement "it is not blue" imply "it is white"?[386]

Therefore, both of these views (*dṛṣṭi*) are painful to scholars who seek the pleasure of peace by removing all conceptual diversity (*prapañca*). Why? It is appropriate conventionally to do certain things to attain wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate [qualities], which relate to [the realms of] form and no-form (*arūpāvacāra*) and beyond (*lokottara*).[387] But if wholesome and unwholesome qualities exist ultimately in their own

385 Negi lists *apahāra* ("removal" or "theft") as one of the Sanskrit equivalents of *'phrog pa*. Because of the parallel between the two sentences, perhaps **anapahāra* is equivalent to the *sadasatkalpanāpoḍha* of 4.57.

386 According to Avalokitavrata, the commentator on Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, this verse comes from a lost work of Nāgārjuna called the *Lokaparīkṣā* (*'jig rten brtag pa*). See Lindtner 1982a: 14.

387 *Kośa* 2.66 and commentary divide the mind (*citta*) into three categories: wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*), and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The "indeterminate" occurs in two forms: defiled (*nivṛta*) and undefiled (*anivṛta*). The *Kośa* then associates these categories of mind with the three realms (*kāma*, *rūpa*, and *arūpa*) and also with a state that it refers to as

right, it is useless to try to generate or not to generate them. If they truly exist, like a real pot or cloth, the pleasurable ones would not cease to be pleasurable, and the painful ones would not cease to be painful. They also would be attached to particular living beings, according to their caste (*jāti*), age, size, and posture (*īryāpatha*), like paint on a wall. On the other hand, if wholesome and unwholesome qualities are absences (*abhāva-svabhāva*), it is equally useless to try to generate or not generate them, either in the three realms (*dhātu*) or beyond (*lokottara*). If there is no being (*sattva*), conventional usage is annihilated, as if one were arguing that a rabbit's horn is sharp. D195a

Concerning those whose wisdom-eye has been damaged by the disease (*timira*) of false views (*kudṛṣṭi*), it is said,

> Those who have inferior intelligence see existence and non-existence, and they do not see the blessed cessation of things as objects of vision.[388]

It also is said in a sūtra:

> Since there is no reason to assert existence, to claim that there is existence and non-existence is to hold wrong views. But when people see this world as neither existing nor not existing, thoughts cease and they understand no-self.

Similarly,

> O Kāśyapa, existence is one extreme, and non-existence is another. The middle between these two extremes is formless, invisible, unattainable, without appearance, unknowable even by a superior person, not a basis, and not a support. The middle path is correct penetrative insight into *dharma*s.[389]

Similarly,

"pure" (*anāsrava*). The commentary explains that the "pure" state corresponds to the stages of "instruction" (*śaikṣa*) and "no-instruction" (*aśaikṣa*). According to the commentary on this verse, unwholesome states of mind belong only to the realm of desire. Later in this paragraph, Bhāviveka speaks of generating wholesome and unwholesome qualities in the three realms, not just in the realms of form and no form. It is likely that this sentence was intended to refer not just to the realms of form and no-form, but also to the realm of desire.

388 MMK 5.8: *astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ / bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivam*.

389 *Kāśyapaparivarta* 60 (Staël-Holstein 90), quoted (in a more extensive version) in *Prasannapadā* 270: *astīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'nto nāstīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ / yad enayor dvayor antayor madhyaṃ tad arūpyam anidarśanam apratiṣṭham anābhāsam aniketam avijñaptikam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmāṇāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣeti*.

> O Kātyāyana, what do they grasp, who seek to be truly superior in this world? The *dharma*s, which are based on existence and non-existence, do not exist and do not not exist.[390]

Similarly,

> O Ānanda, to say "it exists" falls into the extreme of permanence; to say "it does not exist" falls into nihilism. Avoiding these two extremes and accomplishing the middle path, the Tathāgata teaches the Dharma. That is: "When this exists, that arises," and so forth.[391]

The Mahāyāna is based on the middle path; its followers hold the doctrine of the middle and are not nihilists. Therefore, the example is not established and is not concomitant with the point to be proved.

It is not reasonable to argue that "the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching because it contradicts perception."[392] Why?

4.59 The object of perception that ordinary people grasp is relative. The reply
D195b to this [objection] is the same as before, so this contradiction is not a contradiction.

If [an opponent] wants to generate a contradiction with perception, it is reasonable to respond by asking what is meant by "perception." Ultimately the senses are unconscious, because conditioned states (*saṃskāra*) are inanimate; and sense consciousness has no power to apprehend objects, because it is momentary. However, so-called "visual consciousness" arises in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*), by depending on the eye and material form. Its object is relative. What ordinary people grasp is called perception. But the vision of reality ultimately is no vision, as has already been established in [verses] such as the following:

> Material form ultimately is not apprehended by visual consciousness, because it is a combination, like sound, or because it consists of gross elements.[393]

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390 Compare MMK 15.7: *kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam / pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā //.*

391 Compare SN II 15 (*Nidāna Saṃyutta*).

392 In verse 4.59, Bhāviveka responds to the argument in verse 4.9, where the opponent pointed out two separate flaws in the doctrine of no-arising (*ajātivāda*): If a cognition has an object, then the denial of external objects contradicts perception, and if a cognition is aware of itself, then the claim that cognition does not arise contradicts common sense.

393 MHK 3.40.

[The next verse] explains why [our position] is not contradicted by common sense.

4.60 Common sense does not contradict the analysis of a sage,[394] as is true with the claim that *dharma*s have no self and are momentary.

If our claim that all *dharma*s ultimately do not arise is contradicted by common sense, then the claim made by the other side that all *dharma*s have no self and are momentary also is contradicted by common sense. If [the opponent] says that this [claim] is not contradicted by common sense, why should our claim that *dharma*s do not arise be contradicted by common sense?

[The next verse] shows by inference that [our position] is not contradicted by common sense.

4.61 Ordinary people do not have as their object the reality of material form, because they do not develop inner wisdom, just as [they do not have as their object] emptiness of the self and so forth.

Ordinary people do not have as their object the ultimate reality of material form, because they do not develop inner wisdom. "Inner" (*adhyātma*) means with reference to the self, D196a
that is, with reference to the [five] bodily senses plus the mind. To "develop" means to practice. Ordinary people who do not develop inner wisdom do not have [the reality of material form] as their object, just as [they do not have] the emptiness of the self and so forth [as their objects]. Ordinary people are proud, self-deluded, and attached to themselves. They are habitually attached to the idea of a real self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), and they are influenced by the concept of a self (*ātmagraha*). How can they have any cognition in which the object is the emptiness of the self and so forth?

Similarly,

4.62 Ordinary people do not have an ultimate cognition of the reality of material form, because they are blinded by the impediment of ignorance, just as [they do not have a cognition] in which nirvāṇa is the object.

The thesis is "ordinary people do not have an ultimate cognition of the reality of material form." The reason is "because they are blinded by the impediment of ignorance." Ignorance consists of a lack of knowledge about action and its effects, the [four] truths and the [three] jewels. This is an impediment because it causes blindness. To be blinded by this is to be blinded by the impediment of ignorance, that is, to be blinded by the

394 Lit. "analyis according to the approach of a sage" (*vidvannītivicāre*), an unusual use of the word *nīti*.

impediment of the ignorance that has this nature. "Just as [they do not have a cognition] in which nirvāṇa is the object" is the example. Just as ordinary people do not have a cognition in which nirvāṇa is the object, they also do not have a cognition in which the reality of material form is the object. Because [ordinary people] are blinded by the impediment of ignorance, [our position] is not contradicted by common sense.

> 4.63 Because of the qualification "in reality things do not arise," perception and common sense do not contradict it. So where is the contradiction?

This answers the previous [objection]. [Our] thesis contains the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) "in reality" (*tattvataḥ*) and is not contradicted by perception and common sense.[395] [Our
D196b opponents] habitually accuse [us] of unreal faults and repeatedly claim that [our positions] are contradicted, but we are not contradicted, for the reasons[396] that have just been stated. This is the intention [of the verse].[397]

[The next verse] answers the objection that begins "it would ultimately be correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden."[398]

> 4.64 Since there ultimately is no female identity, when *dharma*s are as peaceful as space, how can [you] think that this example contradicts anything?

A woman is someone who conceives a child. But ultimately there is no agent, action, or goal. So, when *dharma*s are like space, where all action is excluded, there can be no [woman]. If there is no [woman], why do [you] think that this example proves anything?

Thus,

> 4.65 If [you] want to refute [us], [you] have to prove that there can be sex with a woman who is permissible for sex, just as [you have to prove] that there is a woman who is permissible for sex, a man to have sex with her, and the action of having sex with her.[399]

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395 The commentary reads *mngon sum du grags pa* rather than *mngon sum dang grags pa*, as in the verse. It is clear from the argument of the preceding verses and from the use of the dual in the verse that the compound should be taken as a *dvandva*.

396 The term *sun 'byin pa* (*dūṣaṇa*) refers to Bhāviveka's answer to the opponent's attempted refutation.

397 The Tib. *zhes bya ba'i bsams bas so* / Skt. *ity abiprāyaḥ* indicates that Bhāviveka has just paraphrased the meaning of the verse.

398 Verse 4.64 responds to the opponent's objection in verses 4.10-11: "If he says that he does not contradict perception and common sense, because he uses the qualification "In reality things do not arise," then this faulty argument would be correct: "It is ultimately correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another [woman]."

399 Bhāviveka is engaging in some amusing word-play on the terminology of the MMK. The

A woman who is permissible for sex (*gamyā*) is one with whom one is allowed to have sex. To have sex with her is to approach and unite with her. The man who has sex with her is her lover. It is generally accepted (*lokaprasiddha*) that these three [categories] exist. If you want to refute us by saying, "It is ultimately correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden," what kind of proof (*sādhana*) do you have?

> 4.66 It is true that this [assertion] contradicts common sense, but [we] do not accept that this applies to this qualification. So this fake [inference] is incapable of contradicting our thesis.

It is true that the statement, "it is correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another woman," contradicts common sense. But this does not apply to [a thesis] that contains the qualification "ultimately," because ultimately there is no woman at all. Therefore your fake inference is incapable, or powerless, to prove that we contradict common sense.

[The next verse] responds to [the objection] that begins: "If [he says that] the vision D197a
of the [four noble] truths is not true, then that is not true."[400]

> 4.67 Scholars know reality as free from conceptual diversity, directly known, free from the stain of concepts, not one, not many, and peaceful.[401]

It is free from conceptual diversity (*niṣprapañca*) because it cannot be explained in words. It is directly known (*svasaṃvedya*) because it is understood by perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣajñāna*). Therefore it also is free from conceptual defilements, in the form of discrimination (*nirūpaṇa*) or memory (*anusmṛti*).[402] It is not many because all *dharma*s have the flavor only of absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*). It is not one because an absence is nothing at all. It is peaceful because it is free from arising, cessation, going, coming, and so forth. A reality (*tattva*) of this kind is ultimate (*paramārtha*). Sages have exceptional knowledge. [Their] knowledge comes either from the Tathāgata or from his teaching. We do not have any truth that is different from the [four] noble truths, as long as they

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word for having sex is the word for "going" (*gamana*), the topic of MMK chapter 2. Verse 4.65ab echoes MMK 2.25cd: "Therefore there is no goer, nothing to be gone to, and no act of going" (*tasmād gatiś ca gantā ca gantavyaṃ ca na vidyate*).

400 Bhāviveka turns next to the argument in verse 4.12: "If [he says that] the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then that is not true. Otherwise, the teaching of Yonāka Deva would be true, and that is not acceptable."

401 An echo of the opening verse in the MMK: "I praise the perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught dependent origination as no cessation, no arising, no destruction, no permanence, not one, not many, not coming, not going, the blessed pacification of conceptual diversity" (*Prasannapadā* 11).

402 On this definition of concepts (*vikalpa*), see the note on verse 5.14.

are properly defined. But Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas understand only the individual truths of suffering and so forth. The Tathāgata understands the equality (*samatā*) of the four noble truths, and this is exceptional. As is said in *The Perfection of Wisdom*, "[Nirvāṇa] is not the nirvāṇa of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. I say that nirvāṇa is the equality (*samatā*) of these four noble truths."

> 4.68 So it is not reasonable for the teaching of Yonāka Deva to be reality, because they say that this god comes from the first god, Brahmā.

Out of devotion (*bhakti*) to Yonāka Deva, they say: "The god called Brahmā is the first god, Yonāka Deva is created by the power of Brahmā, and [Brahmā] teaches that it is
D197b correct to kill cows and so forth." Brahmā is habitually attached to the view of his own excellence and thinks: "I create living beings." He does not understand reality (*tattva*). Since Yonāka Deva follows his [i.e. Brahmā's][403] view, how can he understand reality? Therefore, the teaching about reality, as defined in the Mahāyāna, is not like the teaching of Yonāka Deva.

From a relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*),[404]

> 4.69 [We] think that the existence of the sense media that begin with material form is knowable. If you are arguing that these [sense media] exist in a general sense, we agree.

We think that these [sense media] are knowable by visual consciousness and so forth. If you are arguing that the sense media that begin with material form [exist] in general, without qualifications such as "actually" (*vastutaḥ*) or "truly" (*satyataḥ*), then we agree. In other words, you are proving something that [we] accept.

But if you accept the qualification,

> 4.70 If you argue that the sense media, beginning with form, exist and are

403 A reference to the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, DN I 7-19.

404 Verse 4.69 responds to the opponent's syllogism in 4.13: "The external sense media exist, because a cognition arises with their image, just as the mind exists (*cittāstitvam*)." The Tibetan translator has read *astitvam* as if it were *ābhāsatvam* (*snang ba nyid*) and interpreted the verse as follows: "We think that the imageness of the sense media, beginning with material form, is the object of cognition." This makes sense of Bhāviveka's use of the phrase "object of cognition" (*buddhiviṣaya*), but it is not consistent with the objection that provokes the verse. This substitution continues in the translation of the commentary, which simply analyzes the compound *rūpādyāyatanābhāsatvam*: "Material-form-and-so-forth-sense-media-image is the image of the sense media that begin with material form. The abstract state of this (*tadbhāva*) is material-form-and-so-forth-sense-media-image-ness." This explanation is redundant in English and has been omitted.

derived from the gross elements and so forth, there is no example, and [the argument] is contradicted by a counter-argument.

[If you argue that] the sense media, beginning with form, exist and are derived from the gross elements and so forth, because they are real things (*vastutvāt*), because they are objects of knowledge (*jñeyatvāt*), and because they are objects of speech (*vācyatvāt*), there is no example, because everything is included in the point to be proved.

Others may say: It is possible to use an example of something that is different, so the point can be proved through the possession of the contrary property (*vaidharmyāt*). Whatever is not a derivative of the gross elements [and so forth] does not exist, like the horn of a rabbit, a flower that grows in the sky, and so forth.

We refute this argument with a counter-argument:

4.71 [We] think that the sense media, beginning with material form, are not defined as gross elements or as derivatives of the gross elements, because D198a they cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities, like the mind.

The sense media that begin with material form are the subject. "Not defined as gross elements or as derivatives of gross elements" is the inferred property. Their own identites (*svātman*) are color and shape in the case of material form, to have human origin or not to have human origin in the case of sound,[405] and to be pleasant or unpleasant in the case of odor. A cognition of the appearance (*nirbhāsa*) of identity (*svātman*) is a cognition of the distinctive form (*ākāraviśeṣa*) of such an identity. To say that a cognition of the appearance of an identity is born is to say that a cognition of the appearance of an identity arises.[406] To say that the sense media, beginning with material form, cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity is to say that they give rise to the birth of the cognition of the appearance of an identity. Because it is the nature of these [sense media] to cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity, [the verse] says "because they cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities." Anything that causes the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity is not defined as a gross element or a derivative of the gross elements. For example, they are like the sense medium mind (*manas*). Ultimately [the opponent's argument] is refuted

405 Bhāviveka mentions the same categories in the commentary on MHK 3.44. For an explanation of the term *upātta* see *Kośa* 1.10 and commentary.

406 In this sentence and the one that follows, Bhāviveka paraphrases the words "cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities." Apparently this passage uses a close synonym for the word "birth," since both words are translated by the Tibetan *bskyed pa*. The next sentence seems to use a synonym of the word "cause" (both translated by the Tibetan *rgyu*).

by a [counter-] argument in which the position, reason, and example are faultless.

[The opponent] said: If [you] take the world as the subject of the claim "The triple world is mind-only," there is no reason, and there is no example.[407] [We] first [respond] to this [objection] from the relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*):

> 4.72ab It is generally accepted that mind and mental phenomena have the nature of mind and mental phenomena.

And ultimately,

> 4.72cd Practitioners have no position, so they have no reason or example.

The ultimate is not accessible to words, so we do not hold a position of existence, nonexistence, or both. Therefore, in reality (*tattvataḥ*) we have no position.[408] With no position, how can a practitioner (*yogin*) who understands the ultimate have any reason or example?

D198b Someone may say: This is not the case. If the relative (*saṃvṛti*) is not authoritative (*pramāṇa*) because it is known by mundane (*lokasādhāraṇa*) knowledge, and if the ultimate (*paramārtha*), as understood by a practitioner, is beyond words, how is it possible, for you to state an inference to refute a point that your opponent imagines, and for your inference (*anumāna*) to prove its point?

Reply: For us there are two kinds of ultimate.[409] The first is effortless (*anabhisaṃskāra*), supermundane (*lokottara*), pure (*anāsrava*), and free from conceptual diversity (*niṣprapañca*). The second is accessible to effort; it is called "purified mundane

407 Bhāviveka is referring to the opponent's objection in verse 4.14.

408 This sentence echoes Nāgārjuna's statement in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29: "I have no thesis" (*nāsti ca mama pratijñā*). In verses 22 and 23, Nāgārjuna explains that his statements can still have practical effect, even though they are empty of identity. The two sides of Nāgārjuna's argument are reflected in Bhāviveka's use of the two truths to explain his logical procedure. This point is discussed at greater length in the Part 1 of this book.

409 Bhāviveka is repeating a distinction that he introduced in the commentary on the syllogism in verse 3.26: "There are two kinds of ultimate: The first is effortless, supermundane (*lokottara*), free from impurity, and free from conceptual diversity (*niṣprapañca*). The second is accessible to effort, consistent with the requisites of merit and knowledge, accessible to conceptual diversity (*saprapañca*) and is called 'purified mundane (*laukika*) knowledge'": (*don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / de la gcig ni mngon par 'du byed pa med par 'jug pa 'jig rten las 'das pa zag pa med pa spros pa med pa'o // gnyis pa ni mngon par 'du byed pa dang bcas par 'jug pa bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi rjes su mthun pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes zhes bya ba spros pa dang bcas pa ste*). The Tibetan is quoted from Iida 1980: 86; the translation is mine. The distinction between two kinds of ultimate played an important role in eighth-century Madhyamaka, in the works of authors such as Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita, and it was elaborated further in Tibet. See Eckel 1987: 112-13 for further discussion of this point.

knowledge" (*śuddhalaukikajñāna*); it is impure (*sāsrava*); and it is subject to conceptual diversity (*saprapañca*). Because this [second] ultimate is used as the qualifier (*viśeṣa*) in [our] assertions, [our] points are proved.

Furthermore,

> 4.73 [We] reject the claim that "mind-only" is meant to deny the existence of external objects, so how can there be a problem with [our] position?

Some argue that the statement, "O son of the Conqueror, all of this triple world is mind-only,"[410] is meant to deny external objects (*bāhyārtha*). But, according to us, it is meant to deny that there is an agent or a knower, and so forth. We reject the claim that [this statement] is meant to deny external objects, so how can our position be unaccepted? We accept the existence of external sense media.

Therefore the opponent's objection as formulated at the beginning [of this chapter] is incorrect. Accordingly,

> 4.74ab One does not calm the mind without using words.

Even someone who is not an excellent debater (*vādin*) can follow tradition and reason to express a correct argument. Now that we have stated our reply, if it does not please you, set partiality aside and

> 4.74cd Let scholars understand which words have substance and which do not.

From long practice, the evil-minded become attached to their own position and do not D199a
trust anyone else, even someone who says something that is true and good. Those who are wise and honest[411] and who understand the meaning of debate should analyze which words have substance and which do not, and they should speak accordingly. Now it is best to say no more. Let our words stand as a means of protection. In this rational way, scholars will amuse themselves by analyzing whether your words or ours have substance or not.

Adherents of the Mahāyāna are superior, because their intentions are compassionate, even if their conduct is deficient. Adherents of the Śrāvakayāna cannot compare, even if they conduct themselves well, because their intentions are inferior. Even if a

410 Bhāviveka's interpretation of this quotation from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* is discussed in more detail in verses 5.28-29 and in the accompanying notes. In chapter 5 and in the text of the sūtra, "son of the Conqueror" appears in the plural and refers to the congregation of Bodhisattvas to whom the sūtra is addressed.

411 The phrase *yid gtod kyang / rung mi gtod kyang / rung la gzu bor gnas pa* is unclear.

radiant jewel sits in excrement, it is better than a piece of shiny glass in a golden bowl. Even if someone who rides the good vehicle is stained by karma and defilements, no followers of the other vehicle can surpass him, just as the sun, even when it is covered by clouds, cannot be surpassed by a firefly in a cloudless sky.

This has been "The Introduction to Reality According to the Śrāvakas," the fourth chapter of *The Flame of Reason*, the commentary on *The Heart of the Middle Way*.

Chapter 5: Analysis of Reality According to the Yogācāras

Now, here begins the fifth chapter, the introduction to the analysis of reality according to the Yogācāras.[1]

Introduction

5.1 Other scholars, who are proud of their own approach, say that the Yogācāras have given the correct explanation of the introduction to the ambrosia of reality.[2]

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1 The term *yogācāra* can be used in a generic sense to refer to a "practitioner of discipline." Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Bodhisattva path as a form of *yoga* ("discipline") and to the Bodhisattva as a *yogin* ("practitioner of discipline"), as in the commentary on MHK 3.292. In this respect, he follows the terminology of the Perfection of Wisdom literature as found, for example, in *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* 10.9; 22.10, 13; and 26.3. The Bodhisattva practice is referred to as *yoga* in other Madhyamaka works, such as Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, whose long title in the Tibetan bsTan-'gyur is B*odhisattva-yogacaryā-śāstra-catuḥśataka-kārikā* ("A Text on the Practice of the Bodhisattva Discipline in Four Hundred Verses"). The title of Āryadeva's text is discussed in Lang 1986 and Ruegg 1981: 52-53. For examples of this usage in the work of Candrakīrti, see May 1959: 229. In this chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, however, Bhāviveka uses the term *yogācāra* to refer not just to a generic "practitioner of discipline" but to the adherent of a rival Mahāyāna tradition, just as he uses the term Śrāvaka to refer to the member of a rival non-Mahāyāna tradition. The commentary on verse 5.1 identifies the Yogācāras as "Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth." It is likely that Bhāviveka's use of the term *yogācāra* in this chapter comes from the title of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the text that defines this rival tradition's scholarly identity. For further discussion of this point, see Part 1 of this book.

2 Verse 5.1 uses a number of different technical terms that play a key role in Bhāviveka's argument.

In the commentary on 5.1, Bhāviveka explains that the word "scholar" (*dhīra*) refers to a "Mahāyāna master (*ācārya*)." The Tibetan translators give the term an ironic twist when they translate it as *mkhas par rlom* ("those who consider themselves scholars"). For further discussion of the term *dhīra*, see the note on the introduction to verse 4.3.

Verse 5.1 introduces the argument with the Yogācāras as a dispute about the correct "approach" (*nīti* or *naya*). In verse 5.7, Bhāviveka specifies that this approach has to do with the Perfection of Wisdom. Haribhadra makes a similar point when he refers to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* as a clarification of the "approach" (*naya*) of the Perfection of Wisdom

The noble Nāgārjuna, whose awakening was predicted[3] by the Tathāgata and who

(AAA: 1). The word "approach" is used again in relation to the Yogācāras in verses 5.46, 88, and 99. On the significance of this term as a device to classify the differences between different philosophical views, see Part 1 of this book.

At the beginning of the MHK, Bhāviveka explains that the purpose of the text is to "introduce the ambrosia of reality (*tattvāmṛtāvatārāya*)" (verse 1.4). Here in verse 5.1, the Yogācāras claim that they give the correct "introduction to the ambrosia of reality." Bhāviveka uses the term "ambrosia" (*amṛta*) to refer to both the subject and the object of a cognition of reality. In MHK 1.14 he explains that "the ambrosia of reality" is "the ambrosia that consists of the understanding of reality as object" (*tattvārthādhigamāmṛta*). In 3.354 he refers not to the ambrosia of reality, but to the "ambrosia of wisdom" (*prajñāmṛta*). This usage is consistent with his understanding of the term "ultimate" (*paramārtha*) as referring not just to an object of cognition, but to cognition itself. Compare also MHK 3.136 ("When a scholar understands that things do not have the self that is imagined in our own and in others' doctrinal systems, he drinks the ambrosia of the knowledge of reality"; MMK 18.11 (where the term refers to the Buddhas' teaching); *Lokātītastava* 23 and *Acintyastava* 56 (Lindtner 1982a: 58-59, 136-37). In a note on "Perfumed Amṛta and the Sacred Meal," Lamotte (1976: 307-14) distinguishes Buddhist views of ambrosia from their Hindu counterparts by pointing out in particular that Buddhist *amṛta* comes from above rather than being churned up from below.

The Tibetan translation interprets *avatāra* ("introduction") as "lead, guide, or insert" (*gzud bya ba'i phyir* in verse 1.4 and commentary) or "enter" (*'jug pa* in verse 5.1 and commentary). It also indicates that one is led "into ambrosia" (*bdud rstir* or *bdud rtsi la*). This usage reflects the beginning of Vasubandhu's commentary on MAV 1.6 (quoted in MHK 5.4), where Vasubandhu explains that his verse gives "the means to enter the definition [of reality] as absence" (*asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāya*).

It is likely, however, that Bhāviveka is using the term *avatāra* to refer not only to an "introduction" or "entrance" into ambrosia but also to a "crossing down" or "descent" (*ava-tṛ*) of ambrosia, reflecting the Hindu concept of the "descent" or "incarnation" of God. As V. V. Gokhale (1972: 40-45) has shown in his discussion of MHK chapter 2, Bhāviveka makes rich use of imagery drawn from Hindu tradition, often with ironic intent. To interpret the word *avatāra* here as "descent" would be consistent with Bhāviveka's representation of the Bodhisattva path as an ascent of the "mountain of wisdom" (*prajñāmeru* in MHK 3.296) or the "palace of reality" (*tattvaprāsāda* in MHK 3.12) followed by the "descent" of compassion toward the beings who suffer below, as in MHK 3.296: "[The Bodhisattva] climbs the mountain of wisdom and is free from grief but looks with compassion on ordinary people who suffer and are burned by grief." To help suffering beings, this Bodhisattva "sends forth rivers with the lovely water of pure merit from the mountain of the perfections" (MHK 3.303). Understood in this way, the *avatāra* of the title would represent the "descent" of a river of compassion from the mountain of wisdom. But this descent does not leave readers or practitioners standing metaphorically at the bottom of the mountain: it gives them the ability to climb and "enter" the "ambrosia of reality" that is "as clear as the autumn sky" (MHK 3.300). Bhāviveka pictures his work as a "descent" of ambrosia, consisting of the knowledge of reality, which then allows Bodhisattvas to "ascend" and "enter" the knowledge of reality for themselves. For further discussion of Bhāviveka's use of such spatial metaphors, see Eckel 1992: chs. 1-2, and Part 1 of this book.

3 In the commentary on *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.3, Candrakīrti cites two scriptural sources for the "prediction" (*vyākaraṇa*) of Nāgārjuna. A passage in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* predicts that

attained the [first] stage (*bhūmi*) [of the Bodhisattva path], properly understood the approach (*nīti*) of the Mahāyāna. Other Mahāyāna masters, beginning with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, have misinterpreted it. Without shame or embarrassment, they think D199b that they understand it correctly, even though they misunderstand its meaning. Proud of their own knowledge, they say: "We alone have given the correct introduction to the ambrosia of reality, while the Mādhyamikas (*madhyamavādin*) have not."

Yogācāra Objection

Reality is defined as follows:[4]

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he will appear in the south, in Vidarbha, destroy the extremes of being and non-being, teach the Mahāyāna, attain the first stage of the Bodhisattva path, and enter the Pure Land. A passage in the *Ārya Daśasahasramahāmegha Sūtra* predicts that four hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, the Buddha's disciple Ānanda will be born as a monk named Nāga and provide an extensive version of the Buddha's teaching. The sūtra goes on to say that this monk will eventually become a Buddha named Jñānākaraprabha in a world system called Suviśuddhaprabhābhūmi. In his translation of *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.3, La Vallée Poussin notes that the *Lankāvatāra* prediction is missing in the first Chinese translation of the text. Other references to a prediction about Nāgārjuna are found in MRP 8 and in the prose passage that precedes MHK 4.36 in the *Tarkajvālā*. Bu-ston cites the prediction from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sutra* along with a similar prediction in the *Mañjuśrīmūla Tantra* (Obermiller 1932b: vol. 2, p. 111).

4 Bhāviveka divides the Yogācāra definition of the ultimate (*paramārtha*) into two parts: the ultimate as object and the ultimate as subject (or as cognition itself). This distinction is common in Bhāviveka's works (as in his use of the term "ambrosia"). Bhāviveka's most thorough explanation of the term *paramārtha* is found in the commentary on MHK 3.26 (Iida 1980: 82-83; Eckel 1992: 117, 217), where he explains that the compound *parama-artha* ("ultimate-object") can be interpreted three ways. As a *karmadhāraya* it means "ultimate object"; as a *tatpuruṣa* it means "the object of the ultimate [cognition]"; and as a *bahuvrīhi* it means "[the cognition] whose object is ultimate." Bhāviveka explains that he uses the term "ultimately" (*paramārthataḥ*) in the third of these three ways. The distinction between "reality" (*tattva*) and the "awareness" (*bodha*) of reality also frames his discussion of the concept of the Buddha in MHK 3.266ff. The distinction was developed further by Jñānagarbha and later Tibetan authors (Eckel 1987: 71-72, 112-13).

Akira Saito (1998) has noted that Bhāviveka's analysis of the term *paramārtha* is similar to MAV 3.11ab (*arthaprāptipratipattyā hi paramārthas tridhā mataḥ*). The commentary explains: "The *paramārtha* that is an object (*artha*) is Thusness, the object of an ultimate cognition. The *paramārtha* that is an attainment (*prāpti*) is nirvāṇa, the ultimate object (or goal). The *paramārtha* that is an understanding (*pratipatti*) is the path (*mārga*) whose object (or goal) is ultimate."

The Yogācāra definition of the ultimate in verse 5.2 follows the form of MAV 1.13ab: "Emptiness is defined as the absence of duality and as the existence of this absence" (*dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇam*). Vasubandhu's commentary explains the verse as follows: "Emptiness is defined as the absence (*abhāva*) of the duality of subject and object and as the existence (*bhāva*) of that absence. This means that emptiness is defined as the existence of an absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*)." Vasubandhu's explanation continues in the

5.2 [The Yogācāras] think that the ultimate is the object of cognitions of existence and [absence], because it is the existence of the absence of duality or because it is the absence of duality. This is their opinion.

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commentary on 1.13cd: "And this existence of an absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*) is 'neither existence (*bhāva*) nor absence (*abhāva*).' Why is it not existence? Because it is the absence of duality. Why is not an absence? Because it is the existence of the absence of duality. This is the definition of emptiness."

The formula "existence of an absence" (*abhāvabhāva*) defies easy translation. The key to the formula, of course, lies in the symmetry of the two terms: "absence" (*abhāva*) is the negation of "existence" (*bhāva*). To follow the middle path is to avoid falling into either of these two extremes. To say that ultimate reality is only an "absence" (*abhāva*) would involve the extreme of improper denial (*apavāda*); to say that the ultimate is only an "existence" (*bhāva*) would involve the extreme of improper reification (*samāropa*).

The symmetry of these words might be preserved by translating *abhāva* as "absence" and *bhāva* as "presence." Other possibilities might be "nonentity" and "entity" or "nonexistence" and "existence." To say "entity of nonentity," however, gains nothing in clarity, and *abhāva* has a more specific meaning in Indian epistemology than a general concept of nonexistence. In Bhāviveka's intellectual setting, the word refers to the absence of a particular thing in a particular place, like the absence of a pot on a table. According to some schools of Indian thought, an absence can function as an object of cognition in its own right. Even if a school denies this possibility, it still has to offer its own theory of how the cognition of an absence can be constructed out of the cognition of existing entities. To say that ultimate reality can be cognized as an absence seems obscure, but it is consistent with accepted Sanskrit terminology. For a thorough discussion of the concept of "absence" in Indian epistemology, see Matilal 1968: 52ff.

Assuming that *abhāva* is translated as "absence," what should be done with the term *bhāva*? *Bhāva* can refer to the "presence" of an object like a pot on a table; it can refer to the "existence" or "reality" of the object; or it can refer to the object itself as a real "entity." In Bhāviveka's text these meanings blend into one another. It is plausible to translate *abhāvasya bhāva* in 5.3 as "presence of an absence." But as the argument develops, Bhāviveka treats the word *bhāva* as referring to an "existing thing" or "real entity." To preserve the possibility of this semantic shift from "presence" through "existence" to "entity," I have chosen to use the word "existence," the middle term on the spectrum. An attentive reader should watch for places where the word "existence" seems closer in meaning to "presence" and other places where it comes closer to naming a real "entity." When Bhāviveka uses the word to refer to an "entity," he is preparing to accuse the Yogācāras of falling into the extreme of "improper reification" (*samāropa*), the extreme that the doctrine of emptiness is meant most explicitly to avoid.

In the commentary on 5.2, Bhāviveka explains *dvayābhāvasya sadbhāva* ("the existence of the absence of duality") as "the constant existence and the absence of the duality of subject and object)." It is likely that the phrase "constant existence" (Tib. *rtag tu yod pa nyid*) represents the Sanskrit *sadābhāva*, corresponding to the *sadbhāva* of the verse, but it also calls to mind the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of "constant" or "absolute" (*atyanta*) absence, as in Annaṃbhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha*, section 9. The concept of constant or absolute absence is mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* of Kaṇāda. On this type of absence, see Potter 1977: 146 and 219.

Duality is [the duality] of subject and object, like [the duality] of visual cognition (*cakṣurvijñāna*) and material form (*rūpa*). Absence (*abhāva*) is the absence of this duality. The existence of this absence (*abhāvasya sadbhāva*) is the constant existence of the absence of the duality of subject and object. [The existence of this absence] is the object (*viṣaya*) of a cognition (*buddhi*) of existence, because it is the existence of the absence of duality, and it is the object of a cognition of absence, because it is the absence of duality. We Yogācāras think that the ultimate (*paramārtha*) is like this. This is the intention (*abhiprāya*) [of the verse]. "This is their opinion" (*kila*) means that the author himself does not agree, because subsequent analysis will show that the ultimate cannot be established in this way.

According to these [Yogācāras], the ultimate has the following synonyms:[5]

> 5.3 [The ultimate] is the existence of an absence, no-self, thusness, the actual state of things, and the object of non-conceptual cognition. It also is the realization of this object.

Here the existence of absence (*abhāvabhāva*) is the existence of the absence of the imagined duality of subject and object. No-self (*nairātmya*) is the absence of self in persons (*pudgala*) and *dharma*s. Thusness is a lack of distortion (*aviparyāsatva*). The actual state of things (*tathāsthiti*) is the way things always are. The object of non-conceptual cognition (*nirvikalpamatigrāhya*) is the non-duality (*advaya*) that is free from all concepts and therefore is the object of non-conceptual cognition. These are [synonyms of] the ultimate.

[The ultimate] also is the realization (*adhigama*) of this object, as follows:[6]

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5 A comparable list of the "synonyms" (*paryāya*) of the ultimate is found in MAV 1.14: "In brief, the synonyms of emptiness are thusness, reality-limit, signlessness, the ultimate, and the Dharma essence" (*tathatā bhūtakoṭiś cānimittaṃ paramārthatā / dharmadhātuś ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ*). Compare *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 71 (Lindtner 1982a: 207).

6 Bhāviveka introduces the ultimate (*paramārtha*) as cognition, or as consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself, by quoting the last *pāda* of verse 5.3 ("it also is the realization of this object"). Verse 5.4 then quotes MAV 1.6. Vasubandhu explains the verse as follows: "From apprehension of ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*), comes no-apprehension of objects (*artha*). From no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of ideation-only." Bhāviveka follows Vasubandhu with only small changes in terminology: "From apprehension of mind-only (*cittamātra*), comes no-apprehension of objects (*viṣaya*). . . . From no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject."

Since the topic of this verse is consciousness, Bhāviveka uses his commentary to introduce the Yogācāra concept of store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). As Paul Hoornaert points out in his translation of this chapter, Bhāviveka's account of the store-consciousness follows the structure of the *Triṃśikā* but expands and elaborates it in distinctive ways. Bhāviveka begins with a list of the major features of the store-consciousness, then gives an account of the three transformations (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness (following *Triṃśikā* 1-19 and 26-30).

D200a 5.4 From apprehension comes no-apprehension; from no-apprehension comes no-apprehension.

Here the so-called store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) has existed from time immemorial (*anādikālāt*)[7] and contains the traces (*vāsanā*) of discursive ideas (*prapañca*) that also have existed from time immemorial. It embraces (*pari-grah*) object (*ālambana*) and image (*ākāra*) indiscriminately (*aparicchinna*).[8] It is continuous and immeasurable. With its arising and ceasing come many states of rebirth (*jāti*). It acquires endless, distinctive potentialities (*śaktiviśeṣa*),[9] and it has the ability to generate the six forms of consciousness, in connection with the aspect [of consciousness] that experiences (*darśanabhāga*) innumerable objects, such as blue and so forth. The defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*)[10] imagines that this [store-consciousness] is a self (*ātman*), free from arising and cessation. [This store consciousness] contains the seeds of all realms (*dhātu*), levels (*gati*), and circumstances (*yoni*) [of rebirth], because of the presence of meritorious, unmeritorious,

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Aspects of Bhāviveka's terminology can also be traced to other Yogācāra works, particularly Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (MS). Useful explanation of the three transformations can be found in the commentaries on the *Triṃśikā*, including Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* and Xuanzang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Siddhi*). Schmithausen's study of the *ālaya-vijñāna* (1987) provides an authoritative guide to these sources.

7 Bhāviveka begins with a formula that echoes the first line of Asaṅga's account of the store-consciousness in MS chapter 1. Asaṅga himself begins by quoting a well-known verse from the *Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra*, in which the store-consciousness is described as a "beginningless" container of the seeds of rebirth. Bhāviveka quotes the sūtra directly in the commentary on verse 5.46 below. It also is quoted in the *Triṃśikābhāṣya* (37) and *Siddhi* (159). For other occurrences of this quotation, see also Eckel 1985: 55.

8 The claim that the store consciousness embraces (*pari-grah*) object (*ālambana*) and image (*ākāra*) indiscriminately (*aparicchinna*) derives from *Triṃśikā* 3ab, "[The store consciousness] has an indistinct (*asaṃviditaka = aparicchinna*) awareness (*vijñapti*) of appropriation (*upādi*) and location (*sthāna*)." Sthiramati introduces this verse by saying: "If the store consciousness is distinguished (*vyatirikta*) from the active consciousnesses, then one should state its object (*ālambana*) or its form (*ākāra*), since there can be no consciousness without an object or form. We do not think that this [store consciousness] has no object or form. But its object and form are not discriminated (*aparicchinna*). Why? Because the store consciousness proceeds in two ways, internally as the awareness (*vijñapti*) of appropriation (*upādāna*) and externally as the awareness of a container (*bhājana*) whose form is indistinct. Here internal appropriation consists of the traces of attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to imagined identity, the sense organs with their support (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and the mental constituents of personality." Schmithausen (1987: 104-8) gives a thorough account of the problems involved in the interpretation of this passage, including the problem of Sthiramati's own inconsistencies. See also *Siddhi* 124-42.

9 Bhāviveka discusses the view that store consciousness acquires potentialities (*śakti*) that lead to the perception of objects in verses 5.22cd, 39, and 42.

10 The defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*) is discussed in *Triṃśikā* 6 as part of the category of cogitation (*manana*), the second transformation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness. Bhāviveka discusses it more fully in his account of cogitation below.

and neutral seeds.[11] It is associated with three transformations:[12] maturation (*vipāka*), cogitation (*manana*), and ideation (*vijñapti*).

In this [store consciousness], things that arise are connected (*ālīyante*) as results.[13] It also is called the "appropriating consciousness" (*ādānavijñāna*). It is associated with contact, mental activity, feeling, thinking, and ideas, all of which are neutral. It is not an object of ordinary knowledge in the form "This belongs to that" or "This is there," so it is indistinct (*asaṃvidita*). It is of two kinds: initiating (*ākṣepa*) and resulting (*phalābhinirvṛtti*). "Initiating" is initiated by consciousness, and "resulting" is brought about as a result of the maturation (*vipāka*) [of karmic influences]. The stream of the store-consciousness flows like the stream of a river, which is made up of different bits of water. As long as there is saṃsāra, it is accompanied by meritorious (*puṇya*), unmeritorious (*apuṇya*), and neutral (*āniñjya*) traces (*vāsanā*). In accordance with the traces of

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11 Sthiramati discusses the process by which store consciousness produces different levels of rebirth in his commentary on *Triṃśikā* 19. The levels are caused by meritorious (*puṇya*), unmeritorious (*apuṇya*), and neutral (*aneñjya*) seeds. Bhāviveka discusses karmic traces in the same terms just a few lines later.

12 The three transformations (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness are introduced in *Triṃśikā* 1d-2ab: "Consciousness has three transformations: maturation, the one called cogitation, and ideation concerning objects."

13 Bhāviveka's account of "maturation" (*vipāka*), the first transformation, begins with the first of Asaṅga's two explanations of *ālaya* as "connection" in MS 1:13-14. Asaṅga says: "Why is this called store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*)? Because in it all arising, defiled *dharma*s are connected (*ālīyante*) as results, and in them it is connected as cause." Sthiramati develops this point in the commentary on *Triṃśikā* 2cd: "It is *ālaya* because it is the location (*sthāna*) of the seeds of all defiled *dharma*s. *Ālaya* and *sthāna* are synonyms. Or all *dharma*s are tied (*ālīyante*) or connected (*upanibadhyante*) here as effects (*kāryabhāvena*). Or the *ālaya* can be tied or connected with all *dharma*s as cause." This account of the term *ālaya* corresponds to the first definition in *Siddhi* 96. On the diversity of explanations in other Yogācāra sources, see Schmithausen 1987: 273-76.

Bhāviveka follows the order of Asaṅga's text by moving from *ālaya-vijñāna* to *ādāna-vijñāna* ("appropriating consciousness"). Compare MS 1:14-15: "It is called appropriating consciousness. The scriptural source is the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra*: 'The appropriating consciousness is profound and subtle; like a flood, it flows with all seeds. I did not reveal it to fools, lest they imagine it to be a self.' Why is it called appropriating consciousness? Because it is the cause of material sense organs and the place for the appropriation of all bodies." For further discussion of this category, see Schmithausen 1987: 49ff.

Bhāviveka's account of "maturation" goes on to consider *Triṃśikā* 3-5a: "It has an indistinct (*asaṃviditaka*) awareness (*vijñapti*) of appropriation (*upādi*) and location (*sthāna*), and it is always associated with contact, mental activity, feeling, thinking, and ideas. The feeling (*vedanā*) in it is neutral (*upekṣā*). It is unobstructed (*anivṛta*) and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The same is true for contact (*sparśa*) and so forth. It flows (*vartate*) like the flood of a river (*srotasaughavat*). It ceases (*vyāvṛtti*) when one is an Arhant." Bhāviveka's elaboration of the *Triṃśikā* is reflected in Sthiramati's commentary on these verses and on verse 19, where Sthiramati (following Vasubandhu) explains the mechanism for the maturation of karma. On maturation as the first transformation of consciousness, see also *Siddhi* 97-224.

D200b karma and with the traces of the duality of subject and object that are present in it, it produces the appropriate maturation, such as the bodies of gods and human beings. The stream of appropriating consciousness comes to an end when one attains the status of an Arhant, because [at that time] all the seeds of defilements are eliminated. This is called maturation (*vipāka*) and is the first transformation (*pariṇāma*).

[The store consciousness] also is called *ālaya-vijñāna* because sentient beings cling (*ālīyante*) to it as a self.[14] That is, they perceive it as being their selves and things that belong to their selves. It always is accompanied by the four defilements (*kleśa*)—delusion about the self (*ātmamoha*), false view of the self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*), pride in the self (*ātmamāna*), and love of the self (*ātmasneha*)—and by contact, mental activity, and so forth, which arise at the same level (*bhūmi*). But an Arhant has no defiled mind, because he has removed all defilements. This is called cogitation (*manana*) and is the second transformation.

It also is called store-consciousness because it contains the potential [to produce] all the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) and is associated with mental phenomena (*caitta*) such as desire (*chanda*) and conviction (*adhimokṣa*).[15] It also is called the root con-

14 Bhāviveka's explanation of the term *ālaya* as "clinging" corresponds to the third explanation in *Siddhi* 96. Here his account of "cogitation" (*manana*), the second transformation of consciousness, follows *Triṃśikā* 5b-8a: "(5bcd) Based on this (*tadāśritya*) [store-consciousness], there occurs (*pravartate*) the consciousness that is called mind (*manas*). It has this [store-consciousness] as its object (*ālambana*), and it consists of cogitation (*mananātmaka*). (6) It is always acompanied by the four defilements (*kleśa*), which are obstructed (*nivṛta*) but indeterminate (*avyākṛta*)—namely false view of the self, delusion about the self, pride in the self, and love of the self—which arise at the same level. . . . (7bcd) But it is not [accompanied by them] when one is an Arhant, in the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), or on the supermundane path (*lokottaramārga*). (8a) This is the second transformation." On the second transformation of consciousness, see also *Siddhi* 225-88.

15 Bhāviveka's account of the term *ālaya* as the container of the potentiality for active consciousness corresponds to the second explanation of the term in MS 1:13, *ālaya-vijñāna* as cause. His explanation of "ideation" (*vijñapti*), the third transformation of consciousness, follows *Triṃśikā* 8b-9 and 15-19: "(8bcd) The third [transformation of consciousness] is the apprehension (*upalabdhi*) of the six kinds of objects (*viṣaya*). It is wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome, and neither. (9) It is associated with pervasive (*sarvatraga*), specific (*viniyukta*), and beneficial mental phenomena (*caitta*), also with defilements (*kleśa*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*), and three kinds of feeling (*vedanā*). . . . (15) The five [sense consciousnesses] arise in the root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*), according to their conditions, either simultaneously or not, like waves in water. (16) Mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) coincides (*sambhūti*) [with it] except among unconscious (*asaṃjñika*) [gods], in two forms of attainment (*samāpatti*), in sleep (*middha*), and in a fainting spell (*mūrchana*), where one becomes unconscious (*acittaka*). (17) This transformation of consciousness is conceptual (*vikalpa*). Nothing that is conceptualized (*vikalpyate*) by it exists. Therefore everything is ideation-only (*vijñaptimatra*). (18) The [store] consciousness is the seed of everything. It is transformed in certain ways, and, through a process of mutual influence, certain concepts (*vikalpa*) arise. (19) When the previous result (*vipāka*) is exhausted (*kṣīṇa*), the karmic trace (*vāsanā*), along with the trace of the grasping of subject and object, produces another result (*vipāka*)." On ideation as the third

sciousness (*mūlavijñāna*). When conditions such as the eye, material form, light, space, and mental activity coincide, the six forms of active consciousness arise from it. The store-consciousness is like an ocean in which waves are stirred up by the movements of such things as the wind and crocodiles. It is neither identical to active consciousness nor different from it, like the ocean and the waves. For [the gods] who are unconscious (*āsaṃjñika*) or for those who have attained a state of unconsciousness (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*) in the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), in sleep, in drunkenness, or in a fainting spell, there is no reason for any apprehension of objects. This third transformation is called ideation (*vijñapti*). D201a

According to the Yogācāra, the mind (*citta*) is transformed and appears in the form (*ākāra*) of the self-image (*svābhāsa*), or subject (*grāhaka*), and the object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*), or object (*grāhya*). There are no external objects (*bāhyārtha*). Therefore, from the apprehension of mind-only (*cittamātra*), comes no-apprehension of objects (*viṣaya*). If there are no objects (*grāhya*), there also can be no subject (*grāhaka*). Therefore, from no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject.

As long as one does not take one's stand in the store-consciousness,[16] which is the true nature of the mind (*svacittadharmatā*) and is called "ideation," but takes one's stand instead in apprehension, one does not eliminate the seeds of grasping, does not remove the seeds of the perception of marks (*nimitta*), and, as a result, does not abandon the two [kinds of] traces (*vāsanā*). But when one no longer apprehends objects (*ālambana*) such as material form as different from the mind, one stands in the true nature of the mind (*svacittadharmatā*). With this change of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*), all obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) are removed. A person then controls all *dharma*s and attains non-conceptuality (*nirvikalpadharmatā*).

No one attains ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*), or the insight (*jñāna*) of the Tathāgatas in which there is no concept of any object, without understanding the three identities.[17]

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transformation of consciousness, see *Siddhi* 289-415.

16 The last paragraph in Bhāviveka's commentary on verse 5.4 follows the account of the "change of basis" (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) in *Triṃśikā* 26-30. "(26) As long as consciousness does not stand in ideation-only, the propensity for two kinds of grasping does not cease. . . . (28) But when consciousness does not apprehend objects, it stands in consciousness-only, because that [consciousness] is not grasped [as a subject] if there is no object. (29) This no-apprehension, in which there is no subject, is supermundane insight. The change of basis is of two kinds depending on the obstacles that are removed. (30) This is the pure element that is inconceivable, virtuous, permanent, and pleasurable. It is the liberation body and also the [body] called Dharma that belongs to a Great Sage." On the much-discussed parallel between *Triṃśikā* 28 and *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 169.3ff., see Schmithausen 1992: 392-97.

17 The commentary on the three identities in verse 5.5 returns to the account of the three identities in *Triṃśikā* 20-25: "(20) Anything that is conceptualized by any concept is imagined identity and does not exist. (21) But the concept (*vikalpa*) itself is dependent [identity] and arises from causes. Absolute [identity] is the constant absence of the former in the latter.

For this reason, it is said:

> 5.5 Those who see reality see absolute identity when they do not apprehend imagined [identity] and do not grasp dependent [identity].

The three identities—imagined (*parikalpita*), dependent (*paratantra*), and absolute (*pariniṣpanna*)—are included in the store-consciousness.

Of these [three identities], imagined identity (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) consists of anything—from material form to awakening—that is conceptualized (*vikalpyate*) by any concept (*vikalpa*) that distinguishes between subject and object. [Imagined things] do not exist in this way [as they are imagined], because they are imagined (*kalpita*) by improper reification (*samāropa*).

The imagination of what is unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*),[18] consists of mind (*citta*) and
D201b mental phenomena (*caitta*) in the triple world (*traidhātuka*), and is divided into the categories that begin with the wholesome (*kuśala*). It is dependent (*paratantra*) identity because it arises from (*utpadyate*) and is controlled (*paratantryate*) by something else. Or it is dependent (*paratantra*) because it has control over the arising of other things. It also is dependent identity because it is the basis (*āśraya*) on which imagined [identity] is imagined and absolute [identity] is achieved.

Absolute identity (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is the absence (*rahitatā*) of imagined subject

(22) It is said that [absolute identity] is neither different from that [dependent identity] nor identical to it, just as impermanence and so forth [are neither different from nor identical to conditioned states]. If one is not seen, the other is not seen. (23) All *dharma*s are said to be empty (*niḥsvabhāva*) in three ways, corresponding to the three identities. (24) The first is empty of characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). The next is empty with respect to self-existence. The last is emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), (25) because it is the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) of *dharma*s. It is Thusness, because it is always thus. It also is ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*)." Bhāviveka quotes *Triṃśikā* 20-21 in his commentary on verse 5.10. Compare also the final verse of the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, MAV 1.5, AM 135, and parallel passages in the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra*.

18 Bhāviveka introduces "dependent identity" (*paratantrasvabhāva*) as "the imagination of what is unreal" (*abhūtaparikalpa*), as in MAV 1.1. Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* 21 defines "the imagination of what is unreal" as "mind (*citta*) and mental phenomena (*caitta*) in the triple world (*traidhātuka*)," quoting MAV 1.8cd for support. Sthiramati goes on to explain that the imagination is "divided into categories that are wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate." His explanation of the term "dependent" (*paratantra*) corresponds to the first of Bhāviveka's definitions: "Dependent [identity] arises (*utpadyate*) and is controlled (*paratantryate*) by other causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*). In other words, it cannot be anything in its own right without causes and conditions that are different from itself."

On the "no-apprehension" (*anupalambha*) of imagined identity, see also MSA 9.78: "Nonexistence (*avidyamānatā*) is the supreme existence, and complete no-apprehension is considered the supreme apprehension." The commentary explains: "The nonexistence of imagined identity is the supreme existence of absolute identity, and the complete no-apprehension of imagined identity is the supreme apprehension of absolute identity."

and object in dependent identity. This [absolute identity] is neither identical to nor different from dependent [identity]. If it were different, the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*) would be different. If it were identical, [the Dharma nature] would be defiled (*saṃkleśātmaka*) and could not be the cause of purification (*vyavadāna*).

[Question:] If there are three identities (*svabhāva*), in what way are they empty (*niḥsvabhāva*)?

[Reply:] Imagined [identity] is empty of characteristic (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva*)—that is, it is empty of any characteristic of its own (*svalakṣaṇaśūnya*)—so it should not be apprehended. Dependent [identity] is empty of arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāva*)—that is, it does not arise by itself (*svātmanā*)—so it should not be grasped. Absolute [identity] is the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) of imagined *dharma*s, and it is emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). [Absolute identity] is the object (*artha*) or sphere of activity (*gocara*) of the ultimate (*parama*), or the knowledge of the noble ones (*āryajñāna*). It is empty in the sense that it is the emptiness that constitutes the ultimate (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*). Those who see reality (*tattvadarśin*), or who know the ultimate (*paramārtha*), see absolute identity as the equality (*samatā*) of subject and object. This is because supermundane insight (*alaukikajñāna*) arises without any concepts.

For Śrāvakas, the change of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is defined as the liberation body (*vimuktikāya*), because they free themselves from passions (*āsrava*) and remove the obstacles that consist of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*). For Tathāgatas, it is the Dharma Body, because they are free from all the traces (*vāsanā*) of karma and of subject and object and have removed all obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).

Objection: If imagined identity is the object (*viṣaya*) of mundane knowledge and
absolute identity is realized directly (*pratyātmavedya*) as the object (*viṣaya*) of a Sage's D202a
(*muni*) supermundane knowledge, what kind of knowledge has dependent identity as its object, and how does one know that it exists?

Reply:[19]

19 Verse 5.6 also appears in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and receives extensive commentary from Bhāviveka's commentator Avalokitavrata (Eckel 1985: 52). It is likely that Bhāviveka had in mind Yogācāra arguments like the one made by Asaṅga in the *Tattvārtha* chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (31): "If the aggregates exist, the designation (*prajñapti*) 'person' is possible. If they do not exist, the designation 'person' is not possible, in the absence of a real thing (*nirvastuka*). Similarly, if the *dharma*s of the aggregates exist as real things (*vastumātra*), it is possible to designate the *dharma*s of the aggregates metaphorically. If they do not exist, it is not possible to designate them metaphorically. In that case, the designation would not refer to a real thing, and there cannot be any designation without some basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Some people who hear the difficult and profound Mahāyāna sūtras that deal with emptiness and convey a hidden meaning (*ābhiprāyika*) do not discern the correct meaning. They develop false concepts, have unreasonable views (*dṛṣṭi*) based only on logic (*tarka*), and say: 'All this reality is nothing but a designation. Whoever sees in this way sees correctly.' For these people there is no real thing to serve as the basis of designation. If so, there could not be any designation at all. How can reality be nothing but a designation? By saying this, they deny

5.6 [We] think that dependent identity exists, because designations have causes, because otherwise neither would not exist, and because one apprehends defilements.

It is possible to infer that dependent identity exists, because designations (*prajñapti*) about the existence of mind and mental phenomena appear to have erroneous causes (*nimitta*). [We] also think that dependent identity exists, because otherwise—if dependent identity did not exist—it would follow that imagined and absolute [identity], or designations and their causes, would not exist, because both depend on dependent [identity], and because, if dependent identity did not exist, one would not apprehend any defilements. Defilements are apprehended, because they depend on mind and mental phenomena, and because their removal is liberation.

[Dependent identity] is the object (*viṣaya*) of supermundane (*alaukika*), non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge and is perceived (*dṛṣṭa*) when absolute identity is perceived (*sākṣātkṛta*). This is because dependent [identity] is realized by pure, mundane, subsequent knowledge (*pṛṣṭalabdhaśuddhalaukikajñāna*).

5.7 This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is [the means] to attain omniscience, and the one that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not.[20]

(*apavāda*) both designation and reality. Someone who denies designation and reality should be known as the worst kind nihilist (*nāstika*). Those who are wise and practice a religious life should not speak or share living quarters with this kind of nihilist. [Such a nihilist] causes himself to fall, and those who agree with his false views fall as well." Bhāviveka discusses this argument in more detail in verses 5.82-84 below.

Hoornaert points out that the word "both" in the reason "because both depend on dependent [identity]" allows several different interpretations. Two interpretations are given here: "both" imagined and absolute identity and "both" designations and their cause. Bhāviveka refutes the second interpretation explicitly in verse 5.84 below. The first is refuted implicitly by his critique of the three identities. A third possibility is that "both" refers to defilement and purification, as in Bhāviveka's parallel argument in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Eckel 1985: 54-56). Bhāviveka outlines his own view of defilement and purification in verse 5.81 below. On this argument compare MAV 1.21 ("If it were not defiled, no beings would be liberated. If it were not purified, effort would be in vain.") A fourth possibility is that the word "both" refers to the duality of subject and object (Eckel 1985: 53).

As Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāra position, arguments for the existence of dependent identity lead directly to an attack on unnamed "nihilists" (*nāstika*). In verse 5.7, Bhāviveka shows that he understands this attack to be directed against the Mādhyamikas.

20 In verse 5.7, the Yogācāras make an exclusive claim for the validity of their own position. A comparable claim can be found in verses 27-29 of Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* ("Epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom"): "The teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom is based on three [identities]: imagined, dependent, and absolute. The words 'do not exist' rule out everything that is imagined. Examples such as illusion (*māyā*) teach dependent [identity]. The fourfold purification teaches absolute [identity]. The Buddha has no other

When [the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*] says,[21] "When he thus by means of these *dharma*s softens the *dharma*s, fulfills, and clarifies, and perfects them, then [he realizes that] there is no self and nothing that belongs to the self," it means that the store-consciousness evolves through concepts of a self and of something that belongs to the self, as well as through the absence of habitual attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to such things. When it says, "mind is no mind," it means that there is neither subject nor object. When it says, D202b
"No-mind is inconceivable," it is referring to ideation-only (*vijñaptimātratā*). When it says, "Thus material form is a cognitive sign (*nimitta*), and everything up to awakening is a cognitive sign," it is referring to imagined identity, because it mentions names (*nāman*) and conventions (*saṃketa*), and it is referring to dependent identity, because it mentions *dharma*s that are repudiated, received, and perceived, in addition to the auxiliaries of awakening (*bodhipākṣikadharma*). Words such as "thusness" (*tathatā*), "reality limit" (*bhūtakoṭi*), "isolation" (*vivekatā*), "result" (*phala*), and "omniscience" (*sarvajñatva*) refer to absolute identity. This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom, which we present, is the means (*upāya*) to attain omniscience. The one that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation—which belongs to the Mādhyamikas (*madhyamavādin*)—is tantamount to nihilism (*nāstikadṛṣṭi*) and is not the means to attain omniscience.

This is the statement of the Yogācāras' objection (*pūrvapakṣa*).

Bhāviveka's Response:

5.8 In response, we say: All the Tathāgatas' teachings are authoritative for us, because they are the authoritative teaching of a reliable person. Clearly a good person understands.[22]

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teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom."

Verse 5.7 clearly shows that Bhāviveka thought the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka was provoked by the Yogācāra interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom. For more discussion of this point, see Part 1 of this book.

21 A Sanskrit version of Bhāviveka's first quotation from the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* is found in Kimura 1971: 160-59: *evaṃ dharmeṇa dharmān abhiṣyandayan pariṣyandayan paripūrayan parispharan pratyavekṣate nirātmakā hy ete sarvadharmā ātmātmīyavigataḥ*. The Tibetan version in the *Tarkajvālā* differs somewhat from Kimura's Sanskrit. "He realizes that" is supplied on the basis of the Sanskrit; otherwise the translation follows the Tibetan. For a translation of Kimura's Sanskrit, see Conze 1975: 205. The next two quotations (*cittaṃ tad acittam* and *yad acittaṃ tad acintyam*) appear widely in the text of the sūtra.

22 Verse 5.8 echoes the opening verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: "To the one who is the personification of authority (*pramāṇabhūta*), who seeks the welfare of the world, the teacher, the Sugata, the protector, I pay homage." Hattori explains: "Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of tradition. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid. This critical attitude he inherited from the Buddha, who used to exhort His disciples not to accept any of His words merely out of reverence but to examine them carefully, just as

All the teachings of the Buddhas (*sugata*) are authoritative (*pramāṇa*) for us, because

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people examine the purity of gold by burning it in fire, cutting it, and testing it with a touchstone" (Hattori 1968: 73).

According to Dignāga, there are only two reliable epistemological authorities or means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Dignāga considers *āgama* (tradition) or *śabda* (verbal testimony) to be a form of verbal knowledge and treats it as part of *anumāna*: "Verbal testimony is not a different *pramāṇa* from *anumāna*" (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5.1).

Here Bhāviveka seems to differ from Dignāga by treating the teaching of a Buddha as a *pramāṇa*. To say that a Buddha's teaching is "authoritative" (*pramāṇa*) and that a Buddha is a "reliable person" (*āpta*) follows the definition of *śabda-pramāṇa* in *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.1.52: "Verbal testimony (*śabda*) makes possible the comprehension of an object, because the teaching of someone who is reliable has force." In *Tarkasaṃgraha* 59, Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines *śabda* as "the teaching of someone who is reliable (*āptavākya*)."

But the appearance of this verse is somewhat deceiving. Bhāviveka follows Dignāga more closely than the verse suggests. In MHK 9.16-17, a Mīmāṃsaka objects to the Buddha's authority by saying: "The Buddha's teachings are not authoritative (*pramāṇa*), because they are created, like those of someone else; and the Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a human being, like someone else. The Buddha's teachings are not authoritative, because they criticize the three Vedas, like the view of a Jain ascetic."

In MHK 9.19-20ab, Bhāviveka responds by saying that the authority of the Buddha's teaching can only be established by rational analysis (*yukti*): "If tradition (*āgama*) is tradition because its transmission (*sampradāya*) is unbroken, then everything has to be tradition. Why not hold onto the truth (*tattva*)? A statement is tradition if it can stand up to rational analysis."

Bhāviveka often cites traditional sources for his views, and he clearly expects his view of reality to be consistent with tradition, but in the end, he believes that tradition can only be correctly understood when it is examined by reason. For an example of Bhāviveka's use of *āgama* and *yukti* together, see 5.113 below, where Bhāviveka describes "reality" (*tattva*) as "consistent with reason and tradition" (*yuktyāgamopeta*). Shotaro Iida has discussed Bhāviveka's approach to tradition and inference in Iida 1966.

In 5.8-9 and elsewhere in the MHK and TJ, Bhāviveka uses the verbs *prati-pad* and *prati-i* to combine a sense of motion along a path with a sense of understanding. As Franklin Edgerton points out in his definition of *pratipatti* (BHSD), these two meanings sometimes come together to mean "behavior, practice, or performance." In MHK 4.3 the verb *prati-i* has both *mārga* ("path") and *bodhi* ("awakening") as its objects: "The Buddhas' great awakening is arrived at (*pratīyate*) by someone who has followed (*pratīta*) the path that begins with right views." In 5.107, *prati-pad* has *tattva* ("reality") as its object: "Reality is not understood (*pratipadyate*) as an object of inference." In MHK 9.93 a deficiency in understanding (*pratipad*) is associated with an inability to lead others on the right path: "Because [the Hindu gods] are deficient in understanding (*pratipad*), they cannot lead anyone to peace. They are like someone who has fallen off a cliff and leads others along the same path." Compare also MHK 2.1, where the Buddhist ascetic "practices the right path" (*pratirūpāṃ pratipadaṃ pratipanno*), and MHK 2.11 where the same ascetic worships the Buddha with "the flowers of understanding" (*pratipatpuṣpa*). The combination of motion with understanding is a common feature of Sanskrit verbs to "go," as in the common words *abhisamaya* and *adhigati* (to "arrive at" or "understand"). The Tibetan translators use *sgrub par byed* ("complete," "accomplish," or "achieve") for *pratipadyate* in 5.8 and *sgrub tu gzhug pa* ("enter into completion") for *pratipatti* in 5.9.

those who taught them have seen reality (*tattvadarśin*). Those who have good dispositions understand this and do not go astray.

> 5.9 But the opponent, whose mind is confused and misled by other traditions, does not.[23] For this reason, one should follow a rational approach so that he will understand.

Other traditions (*āgama*) are traditions that differ from this tradition. To be confused by them is to doubt whether this [tradition] is correct. To be misled is to wander into another doctrinal systems (*siddhānta*) and, without relying on this one, to be misled about whether it is correct. Those who have minds such as this have minds that are confused and misled by other traditions. These opponents state refutations and claim victory. They do not understand that this is authoritative (*pramāṇa*). Therefore, a debater (*vādin*) should follow a rational (*yuktiman*) approach (*naya*), which has faultless theses (*pakṣa*), reasons (*hetu*), and examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) and ends by avoiding the refutations (*doṣasthāna*) of the opponents, so that they will understand. D203a

The Ultimate as an Object of Cognition

The superimposition (*kalpanāpravacana*) and improper denial (*apavāda*) that you stated earlier cannot stand up to reason.[24]

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23 This verse is a continuation of 5.8: "Clearly a good person understands, but the opponent does not." The phrase "confused and misled by other traditions" appears again in the commentary on 5.108, where Bhāviveka explains that "other traditions" consist of "363 doctrines." These are discussed in Part 1 of this book.

At the end of the commentary on 5.9, Bhāviveka gives a summary of his logical method. Generally it involves two separate components: a criticism of the opponent's syllogisms (with their "theses, reasons, and examples") and a defence of the syllogisms that support his own position. For further commentary on Bhāviveka's logical method, see Part 1 of this book and Lindtner 1986: 62: "In order to silence the opponent for good we should give a *hetudṛṣṭāntābhidhāna* and a *paroktadoṣaparihāra*." When Bhāviveka says that he ends by avoiding the opponents' refutations, he means that he is not mentioning all the details of his method, since he has already done this in MHK 3.26ff.

24 Once Bhāviveka has said that he intends to follow a "rational" (*yuktiman*) approach, he turns to the substance of the Yogācāra position. Verses 5.10-11 respond to the Yogācāra claim (stated in the first *pāda* of 5.2) that the ultimate (*paramārtha*) is "the existence of the absence of duality (*dvayābhāvasya sadbhāva*)." Bhāviveka argues that the two parts of the definition are contradictory: if the ultimate is an absence (*abhāva*), it cannot exist (*bhāva*), and if it exists (*bhāva*), it cannot be an absence (*abhāva*). This argument, like the one that follows, has the form of a *prasaṅga*: Bhāviveka takes the opponent's assertion and reduces it to an absurd conclusion.

The term *kalpanā* (translated as "superimposition") in the introduction to 5.10 should be taken as a synonym of *samāropa* ("improper reification"), one of the two extremes avoided by

5.10 The existence of the absence of duality is clearly unreasonable, because it is contradictory. You should not imagine that this [absence] exists unless the absence of a flower in the sky[25] also exists.

First, if the absence (*abhāva*) of duality exists (*bhāva*), how can it be an absence? If it is an absence (*abhāva*), it cannot exist (*bhāva*). The existence of the absence of duality is unreasonable, because it is a contradiction in terms. If [you] say that this absence exists because it is always present in the form of the absence of duality, then the absence of a flower in the sky also must exist. You should not imagine that the absence of duality exists, unless you think that the absence of a flower in the sky exists.

[Objection:] If you think this, our approach is:[26]

> Anything that is conceptualized by any conceptual thought is imagined identity and does not exist. But conceptual thought is dependent [identity] and arises from causes. Absolute [identity] is the constant absence of the former in the latter.

Absolute identity is the constant absence of the former, which is imagined identity, or the imagined [duality of] subject and object, in the latter, which is dependent identity. With respect to imagined and dependent [identities], it is an absence (*abhāva*). With respect to absolute [identity], it exists (*bhāva*). In this case, there is no difference between absence
D203b and existence: the two are indistinguishable. For this reason, there is no contradiction.

Assuming that this is the opponents' intention, [we] reply:

5.11 If [the opponents] think there is no difference between reality (*tattva*) and the absence of imagined [identity], this is not an answer, because there is the same [contradiction] when the definition is applied to the thing that is being defined.

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the middle path. The other extreme is *apavāda* ("improper denial"). Bhāviveka argues that the Yogācāra definition of ultimate reality as "existence" (*sadbhāva*) and "absence" (*abhāva*) falls into both extremes. To say that ultimate reality exists "superimposes" reality on something that is ultimately unreal, and to say that it is an absence "denies" the reality of something that is conventionally real. On *apavāda* as a denial of external objects, see verse 5.19 below.

25 A "flower in the sky" (*khapuṣpa*), like the hair of a tortoise or the son of a barren woman, is a common example of something that does not exist.

26 To explain the Yogācāra position in the commentary on 5.10, Bhāviveka quotes *Triṃśikā* 20-21: *yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate / parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate // paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaṃ pratyayodbhavam / niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā*. A portion of *Triṃśikā* 20 was quoted earlier in the commentary on verse 5.5. Hoornaert follows Yamaguchi in pointing out that the terminology of the Yogācāra objection (particularly the claim that absence and existence are indistinguishable) is similar to verses 18-21 of the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (La Vallée Poussin 1932-33b: 155).

Even if there is no difference between absolute [identity] and the absence of imagined and dependent [identities], there is the same contradiction. When the definition is applied to the thing that is being defined—that is, when reality is defined as the existence of the absence of duality—the absence of duality cannot be an absence if it exists, and it cannot exist if it is an absence. For this reason, the opponents' answer is unsatisfactory.

Furthermore,[27]

> 5.12 If [the opponent] thinks the nature of [reality] does not cease to be [an absence], then it cannot exist, if it does not cease to be [an absence].

If the opponents say that it is the nature (*bhāva*) or identity (*svabhāva*) of reality not to cease to be the absence of duality—in other words, if it is simply the absence of duality—then [we] say: Do not imagine that it exists, if it does not cease to be [an absence].

Therefore,[28]

> 5.13 If so, the Buddhas'[29] knowledge would have an absence as its object, and this [object] would not be the selflessness of *dharma*s, because the cognition of an absence has a cognitive mark (*nimitta*).

According to the doctrinal approach (*siddhāntanaya*) of the Mahāyāna, the Buddhas' knowledge is considered free from the extremes of existence and absence. It is a contradiction of tradition if you think that it has an absence as its object (*ālambana*).

[Objection:] It is not a contradiction. Why? You also think that selflessness (*nairātmya*) is the selflessness of imagined *dharma*s, and [this selflessness] is an object.

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27 After he has pointed out the contradiction between "existence" (*bhāva*) and "absence" (*abhāva*), Bhāviveka considers the possibility that the ultimate is simply an absence. This possibility corresponds to the second *pāda* of verse 5.2: "or because it is the absence of duality" (*abhāvād vā dvayasya ca*). The interpretation of verse 5.12 turns on a change in the meaning of the term *bhāva*. In verses 5.10-11, Bhāviveka has treated *bhāva* as meaning "existence" or "existing entity." Here he treats it as a synonym of *svabhāva* or *svarūpa* ("nature" or "identity"). To say that reality (*tattva*) is *abhāvasya bhāva* means, according to this interpretation, that it has the identity of being an absence. This line of interpretation corresponds to the first part of MAV 1.13, as explained by Vasubandhu's commentary: "The absence (*abhāva*) of the duality of subject and object and the existence (*bhāva*) of that absence is the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of emptiness. This means that emptiness is defined as having the identity of an absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*)."

28 In verses 5.13-14, Bhāviveka takes up the claim in 5.2c, that the ultimate is the "object of a cognition of existence and so forth" (*sadādibuddhiviṣaya*), and in 5.3c, that the ultimate is "the object of a non-conceptual cognition" (*nirvikalpamatigrāhya*). On the meaning of the terms *grāhya*, *viṣaya*, and *ālambana*, see the notes on verse 5.4.

29 The commentary on verse 5.13 treats *tattvadarśin* ("one who sees reality") as *buddha*.

[Reply: We] think that the selflessness of *dharma*s is free from all cognitive marks.
D204a If something is an absence and functions as the object of a cognition of an absence, it cannot be the selflessness of *dharma*s. The word "self" refers to identity (*svabhāva*), and selflessness means that there is no identity (*niḥsvabhāva*), whether it is the identity of something that exists (*bhāvasvabhāva*) or the identity of an absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*).

The opponents think that concepts (*vikalpa*) are called bondage, and freedom from concepts is liberation.

> 5.14ab If [the opponents] think that a cognition whose object (*ālambana*) is an absence has no concept,

If [the opponents] say: All *dharma*s have the same taste, which is [the taste of] absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*). A cognition whose object (*ālambana*) is an absence (*abhāva*) would be conceptual if it had a concept of anything, but it has no concept, so it is correct.

The Master[30] replies:

> 5.14cd then a non-conceptual cognition of material form[31] must be correct.

If non-conceptual cognitions are correct, then mundane (*laukika*) cognitions that arise from causes such as material form and are free from the concepts that consist of discrimination (*nirūpaṇa*) and memory (*anusmaraṇa*)[32] must also be taken as correct.

Objection: The only truly correct cognition (*buddhi*) is one that is free from the concept of subject and object. Even a non-conceptual cognition of material form is false, because it has the image (*ābhāsa*) of an object (*grāhya*), like the cognition of a double moon.[33]

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30 On Bhāviveka's use of the word "master" (Tib. *slob dpon* / Skt. *ācārya*) to refer to the author of the verses, see the discussion of Bhāviveka as author in Part 1 of this book.

31 "Material form" is used to translate the term *rūpa*, the object of visual perception. *Kośa* 1.10 explains that *rūpa* is characterized by color (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṃsthāna*). The word "form" will be reserved to translate the word *ākāra*, the mental representation of an object.

32 According to the Sarvāstivāda, there are three kinds of concepts (*vikalpa*): concepts about the thing itself (*svabhāva*), concepts that consists of discrimination (*abhinirūpaṇa*), and concepts that consists of memory (*anusmaraṇa*). A non-conceptual perceptual cognition is considered free from the last two kinds of concept, but not free from the first. On this aspect of the Sarvāstivāda theory of perception, see *Kośa* 1.33ab and Cox 1988: 36-37.

33 In the introduction to verse 5.15, the opponent presents the first formal syllogism of the chapter:

> Even a non-conceptual cognition of material form is false,
> because it has an image (*ābhāsa*) of an object (*grāhya*),
> like the cognition of a double moon.

Reply:

5.15 If [the opponent] thinks that a cognition of material form is incorrect because it has the image of an object, the reason is mistaken, and the thesis fails.

Mistaken (*vyabhicārin*) means contradicted (*viruddha*). A cognition of material form cannot have any other nature than to have the image of an object. To infer that "having the image of an object" (*grāhyābhāsatā*) excludes "correctness" is contradicted, because it proves the opposite of the nature of the subject. Here the thesis is that a cognition of material form is false. But how can a cognition of material form be false in this context? Perception (*pratyakṣa*), tradition (*āgama*), and common sense (*lokaprasiddha*) all D204b
contradict the falsehood of a cognition of material form. For this reason, the inference is contradicted.

The same fault applies to the claim that "those who see reality only see absolute identity."

5.16 If the Teacher's awakening has [absolute] identity as its object (*ālambana*), it must be a conceptual cognition, it must have an object, and it must not be non-conceptual.[34]

If the Teacher's awakening, or the Tathāgata's knowledge (*jñāna*), has [absolute] identity as its object—that is, if it has as its object the absolute identity that is known directly

The subject of the thesis is literally "a non-conceptual cognition of material form and so forth" (*rūpādidhiḥ*). In his discussion of the syllogism, Bhāviveka abbreviates it to "a non-conceptual cognition of material form." For the sake of simplicity, this abbreviation is followed here as well.

In verse 5.15 and in the following commentary, Bhāviveka argues that the reason (*hetu*) in this syllogism is "contradicted" (*viruddha*) because it proves the opposite of the subject (*dharmin*) of the thesis. If a cognition is genuinely a cognition of material form, it must be correct. To infer otherwise would contradict the nature of the subject. Bhāviveka presents his own position about the cognition of external objects in verses 5.34-36.

34 Verse 5.16 applies the "same fault" to the opponent's thesis: "Those who see reality only see absolute identity." This thesis was part of the Yogācāra objection in verse 5.5 and was expanded in the commentary that followed. The fault is that the inference is "contradicted" in one or both of the senses mentioned in the commentary on verse 5.15. To infer that the Buddha's vision of reality (or "the Teacher's awakening" in the text of verse 5.16) sees absolute identity (or "has absolute [identity] as its object") is contradicted by the nature of the subject, because the Buddha's vision cannot have an object or see anything at all. To say that a Buddha sees absolute identity as an object is also contradicted by several points of tradition that both Bhāviveka and the opponent accept. Verse 5.16 is quoted in the commentary on verse 5.81, and the point of the verse is discussed at length in verses 5.85-113.

by the Tathāgata and is not accessible to words—it must be conceptual. But awakening is not considered conceptual. If it has [absolute identity] as its object, it must have an object, and it is impossible to argue that it has no object. But awakening is not considered to have an object. And if [awakening] conceives of reality as emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), it must not be a non-conceptual cognition. This is the construction [of the verse].

The Ultimate as Consciousness

The next verse responds to the thesis: "It is like this: the three worlds are mind-only (*cittamātra*), and external objects (*bāhyārtha*) do not exist."[35]

> 5.17 It is not true that apprehending mind-only implies that one does not grasp material form and so forth. This thesis is contradicted by a point that has already been accepted and also by common sense.

It is contradicted by a point that has already been accepted, because it contradicts the traditional statement, "the arising of visual consciousness depends on the eye and material form." It also is contradicted by common sense, because it is contradicted by the ordinary view that visual consciousness does not arise unless it has material form as an object (*artha*).

Objection: [We] observe that consciousness arises even without objects (*artha*) such as material form, because it arises with the image (*ābhasa*) of such [objects], just as the cognition of material form arises in a dream.[36]

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35 In the introduction to verse 5.17 Bhāviveka moves from the ultimate as an object of cognition to the ultimate as cognition itself. This leads inevitably to the Yogācāra doctrine of "mind-only" (*cittamātra*). The discussion of mind-only began in verse 5.4 with the quotation of MAV 1.6: "From apprehension comes no-apprehension; from no-apprehension comes no-apprehension." Vasubandhu's commentary expands this verse as follows: "From apprehension of consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātra*) comes no-apprehension of objects (*artha*); from no-apprehension of objects (*artha*) comes no-apprehension of consciousness-only. This is the way to enter the non-existence (*asallakṣaṇa*) of the object and subject (*grāhyagrāhaka*)."

Bhāviveka traces the docrine of mind-only to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (32): "The three worlds are mind-only (*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*)." He discusses this quotation at greater length in the commentary on verse 5.28.

The traditional statement (*āgama*), "The arising of visual consciousness depends on the eye and material forms" (*cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam*), is quoted in chapter 9 of the *Kośa* (465). A similar quotation is found a few lines earlier (*cakṣurvijñānaṃ sarvaṃ tac cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi ca*). In his translation, La Vallée Poussin identifies the source of the second quotation as the *Saṃyukta Sūtra*. While this source represents a Vaibhāṣika point of view, the quotation lends itself naturally to a Sautrāntika interpretation.

36 When Bhāviveka challenges the Yogācara thesis that there are no external objects (*bāhyārtha*), the objector is required to give a syllogism to support it. The syllogism takes the following form:

Reply: To refute this point, [we] say:

5.18 It is not reasonable to say that consciousness (*vijñāna*) of material form and so forth has no object, because it arises with the image of such [an object] (*tathābhāsodayād*), like the cognition of material form and so forth in a dream. D205a

The opponents' inference is unsatisfactory.

Why?

5.19 [We] think that dream-consciousness and so forth have *dharma*s as their objects (*ālambana*), so [the opponent's inference] has a deficient example and improperly denies objects (*viṣaya*).[37]

When the mind's eye is stained from time immemorial by the traces of subject and object, it sees in dreams. It sees [objects] such as material form, and it does not not see. Dream-consciousness and so forth have objects (*ālambana*), because they repeat

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A cognition of material form and so forth has no object (*vinā arthena*),
because it arises with that kind of image (*tathābhāsodayāt*),
like the cognition of material form and so forth in a dream.

The source of this argument is the first verse of the *Viṃśatikā*. With commentary, this verse reads: "In the Mahāyāna, the three worlds are defined as ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*), because a sūtra says: 'O Jinaputra, the three worlds are mind-only.' Mind (*citta*), the mental organ (*manas*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), and ideation (*vijñapti*) are synonyms. Here 'mind' is intended to include its associations. 'Only' is a negation of objects (*artha*). [Verse 1:] This is ideation-only, because it has the image of unreal objects (*asadarthāvabhāsanāt*), like the vision of unreal networks of hair and so forth, when someone has an eye disease."

The first verse of the *Viṃśatikā* helps clarify an important point in Bhāviveka's argument: when he says "that kind of image" (*tathābhāsa*), he means "an image of unreal objects" (*asadarthāvabhāsana*). To find the source of Bhāviveka's example of the dream, we need to look only as far as *Viṃśatikā* 3, where the example is used to respond to an opponent's objection to *Viṃśatikā* 1. Compare also *Viṃśatikā* 16a: "Perceptual cognition is like a dream and so forth."

The opponent's syllogism is valid only if it has an example that is accepted by the other party to the argument (who in this case is Bhāviveka). Bhāviveka criticizes the example by claiming that dreams are based on real, external objects and therefore do not illustrate the point that sense cognitions lack external objects. This means that the opponent's inference is "deficient" (*nyūna*) with regard to the example. In other words, it lacks the "inferred property." Sthiramati criticizes an argument like Bhāviveka's in MAVT (25-26).

37 In verse 5.19d, Lindtner reads *vastuno 'py apavāditā* ("an improper denial of real things") rather than *viṣaye cāpavāditā* ("an improper denial of objects"). This reading is consistent with the terminology of verse 5.56, but the Tibetan translation of verse 5.19 and its commentary require the word *viṣaya*.

[objects] that have been seen previously, like memory. The traces of things that were seen in previous lives cause a variety of material forms to appear in dreams, with different colors and shapes, even for those who are blind and have lost the use of their eyes. Objects are not absent even in such cognitions. For it is said, "O Bhadrapāla, a blind man sees material form in a dream with his mind's eye; he does not see with physical eyes." The mind's eye has a *dharma* as its object (*ālambana*), so dream-consciousness and so forth have objects. Your argument, therefore, has a deficient example. It also improperly denies (*apa-vad*) objects (*viṣaya*) when it rejects real objects (*artha*) such as material form.

You may say: Consciousness (*vijñāna*) arises with two images: the image of itself (*svābhāsa*) and [the image of] an external object (*bāhyaviṣaya*), which is the object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*) of consciousness. When consciousness is transformed into the form (*ākāra*) of the external object, it serves as the object (*viṣaya*) for the image of itself (*svābhāsa*).[38]

Reply:

> 5.20 If [the opponent] thinks that the object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*) is the object (*ālambana*) of the mind (*citta*), how is the mind itself different from the object-image?

We see how consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself might arise with the image of objects such as
D205b material form, but we do not see how there can be another, self-image that is different from
the object-image. If consciousness is different from the object-image, explain what it is.

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38 Verse 5.20 gives another Yogācāra syllogism to explain how the mind can take on the image of an object (*viṣayābhāsa*) and still continue to be itself. Bhāviveka responds in verse 5.21 and continues the discussion through the end of verse 5.26.

> The nature of consciousness is two-fold: it has a self-image (*svābhāsa*) and an
> object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*),
> because it continues to be itself while it also appears as something else,
> like a piece of crystal.

This formulation of the Yogācāra position about the two "images" (*ābhāsa*) of consciousness follows Dignāga's explanation in the commentary on PS 1.9a: "Consciousness arises with two images: the image of itself and the image of the object (*dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca*), discussed in Hattori 1968: 28 and 101. Dignāga takes up the same point in AP 6abc, but not in the same words: "The material form that is the internal object of cognition but appears as if it were external is the object (*yad antarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvad avabhāsate / so 'rthaṃ*)." The Sanskrit text of this verse is quoted by Tola and Dragonetti in AP: 107.

The example of the crystal does not appear in Dignāga, but it fits his point nicely. In *Sandhinirmocana* 6.8-9, dependent identity (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is compared to a crystal and imagined identity (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) to the crystal's color. Sthiramati mentions the same comparison (MVT: 21) but rejects it as inappropriate.

[Objection:] It can be explained as follows: The nature of consciousness is two-fold: it has a self-image and an object-image, because it continues to be itself while it also arises as something else, like a crystal. A crystal naturally is clear, but it can appear blue if something that has a blue color is placed nearby. Similarly, the mind has its own image, but when it evolves into the form (*ākāra*) of an object, it also takes on the image (*ābhāsa*) of the object.

[Reply:] The point to be proved is incompatible with the example. Why?[39]

5.21 [We] do not think that the mind has a double image like a crystal, because it arises in the form of the other [i.e. the object]. The moment (*kṣaṇa*) of crystal that arises when [an object] is placed nearby is not the same as the moment from which it arises.

It is true that a crystal loses its natural clarity and becomes blue when something blue is placed nearby. But the previous moment of clear crystal ceases; it does not change into blue.

5.22ab [We] think that, when one [moment of crystal] ceases, another arises, so it is wrong to think that one is the other.

The moment of clear crystal ceases and the [moment of] blue [crystal] arises because something [blue] is placed nearby.[40] To think that [the blue moment] is clear is wrong.

39 Bhāviveka argues that the example of a crystal does not support the point to be inferred (*sādhyadharma*). Bhāviveka admits that a crystal can appear clear at one moment and blue at another, but he does not admit that it has "a double nature." In verses 5.21-22ab, he argues that the clear moment of crystal ceases as the blue moment arises. For a similar argument about the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of a crystal, see Mimaki 1976: 91.

40 The commentary on verse 5.22ab carries the argument against the "double nature" of consciousness further by scrutinizing the Yogācāra example of the crystal. The first argument has to do with the "self-image" (*svābhāsa*) of consciousness: Bhāviveka says that a crystal may appear "exactly as it did before" (lit. "with precisely its former nature") when there is no colored object nearby, but consciousness cannot be grasped or objectified (*grāhya*) in the same way. Even when the "aspect of the object" (*vijñeyākāra*) is removed, consciousness cannot be grasped as an object in its own right. This argument is consistent with a common Madhyamaka criticism of the self-reflexive aspect of consciousness: consciousness cannot grasp itself, just as a sword cannot cut itself and fire cannot burn itself. Compare, for example, Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.72. For a similar argument against "self-cognition" in later Madhyamaka literature, see Eckel 1987: 72-75. Compare also MHK 5.93.

The second argument in the paragraph has to do with the "object-image" (*viṣayābhāsa*) of consciousness. Bhāviveka argues that a crystal only seems colored because a colored object has been placed nearby. If consciousness assumes the image of an object, it cannot be due simply to the evolution of consciousness itself. Otherwise consciousness would become the object, and the object would become consciousness.

[The mind] does not have a double nature. Why? A crystal appears exactly as it did before when no [colored object] is placed nearby. But, while the crystal can be [grasped] when there is no [colored object] nearby, consciousness can never be grasped when it lacks the form of the object (*vijñeyākāra*). And even if consciousness (*vijñāna*) does not experience its own self-image (*svābhāsa*), it is unreasonable for it to appear as an object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*) through the influence of the object-form (*vijñeyākāra*). In the example, it is possible for a crystal to take on the appearance of [a colored object] when
D206a [the crystal] is next to it and is colored by it. But the crystal does not become the thing that is nearby, and the thing that is nearby does not become the crystal. If they did, the crystal would be identical to the colored object, and the colored object would be identical to the crystal. Similarly, consciousness may, in certain conditions, take on the image of a nearby object, but there is no way for consciousness to become material form and material form to become consciousness. If there were, earth would become conscious and consciousness would become as unconscious as earth. This is why it is unreasonable for consciousness to have two images like a crystal, because [the example] contradicts the claim that [consciousness] is both the subject and the object.

Objection: To produce a result that is consistent with itself, the image of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*) gradually (*krameṇa*) transfers potential (*śakti*) into the continuum of consciousness. Sometimes it remains merely the potential of the form of that [object]. At other times, when the potential comes to fruition, consciousness takes on the image of the object. It is impossible to say whether consciousness is identical to or different from these two—namely, the potential (*śakti*) and the image of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*). Consciousness appears as both the potential and the object.

Reply:[41]

> 5.22cd [Consciousness] does not have a double image, because it is not different from its potential, just as [it is not different from] the object-image.

Here the position is that consciousness does not have a double image. The reason is "because it is not different from its potential (*śakti*)." The example is "just as [it is not

41 In verse 5.22cd, Bhāviveka takes up the idea that the object-image is a "transfer of potential" (*śaktyarpaṇa*). In doing so, he follows the terminology of AP 7b and commentary: "Alternatively, it is not a contradiction to say that by a transfer of potential, the object-image gradually causes a potential to reside in consciousness. [This potential causes] an effect to arise in a form that is consistent with [the object-image] itself" (*atha vā śaktyarpaṇāt krameṇāpi so 'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṃ vijñānācārāṃ karotīty avirodhaḥ*). The Sanskrit of this pasage is quoted in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*: vol. 2, p. 710. Dignāga goes on to explain in AP 7cd and 8 that the senses are not physical organs but potentials to perceive objects: the potential and the object-image are mutually dependent and have been so from time immemorial. On the theory of "potential" or "seed" in earlier sources, see Jaini 1959: 236-49. See also MHK 5.41-42, and 98 below.

different from] consciousness itself as object-image." [The opponent] may say that the self-image of consciousness is different [from the object-image], but when it arises, consciousness arises only with the image of the object. This is because the object-form (*viṣayākāra*) appears distinct and because the object-image is not erroneous. When [the object-image] ceases, it implants (*arpaṇa*) a potential in the continuum of consciousness, and this [potential] has the ability to generate the object-image of consciousness. When D206b this ceases and comes to fruition, [another] object-image of consciousness arises. But no potential is implanted to generate the self-image of consciousness. Why imagine that the self-image appears as the object-image of consciousness?

Objection: Consciousness has two images, because [these two images] are accompanying factors (*sahakāra*), like material form and its reflection.[42] When something occurs together with something else, it is its accompanying factor. That is, it occurs at the same time. When an accompanying factor occurs, the thing that it accompanies also occurs, just as a reflection occurs at the same time as the material form [of which it is a reflection]. Here, the self-image (*svābhāsa*) [of consciousness] is like the material form, and the object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*) is like the reflection.

Reply:

> 5.23 [We] do not think that the mind has images of itself and something else like a reflection, because its accompanying factor (*sahakāra*) is an imitation (*anukāra*).[43] Thus [the mind] does not have a double image.

[The mind] may contain an accompanying factor (*sahakāra*) that is an imitation (*anukāra*),

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42 The introduction to verse 5.23 states another formal syllogism to support the claim that consciousness has two images:

> Consciousness has two images,
> because [these two images] are accompanying factors (*sahakāra*),
> like material form and its reflection.

On the term *sahakāra* ("accompanying factor"), see the commentary on AP 7cd: "If internal form (*antarjñeyarūpa*) is the only object (*ālambanapratyaya*), in what way does the arising of visual consciousness depend on the eye? The senses and the potential of the senses are accompanying factors (*sahakārin*). [We] infer from their results that the senses are potentials. They do not, however, evolve from the elements."

43 The commentary seems to interpret *anukāra* as "unreal resemblance" or "imitation." For an example of this use of the term, see *Vākyapadīya* 1.6 and 88. It would be more consistent with Bhāviveka's earlier argument about the sequence of moments in the appearance of a crystal, however, to interpret *anukāra* as "subsequent factor," suggesting that by the time the reflection arises in a mirror the moment of "material form" that caused it has already ceased. If so, a better translation of the verse would be: "[We] do not think that the mind has images of itself and something else like a reflection, because the accompanying factor (*sahakāra*) is [actually] a subsequent factor (*anukāra*)."

but this does not prove that it has a double image, because a reflection is not a real thing, and a cognition of it is erroneous.

Objection: Consciousness definitely has a double image, because it is both a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and a result (*phala*).[44] A means of knowledge is the means by

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44 In the introduction to verse 5.24, the opponent formulates another argument for the double image (*dvyābhāsa*) of consciousness:

> Consciousness definitely has a double image,
> because it is both a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and a result (*phala*).

This time the argument is based on the distinction between the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the result (*phala*). The opponent says that a single act of knowing must have two distinguishable images in order to contain both of these components. In verses 5.25-26, Bhāviveka gives a different explanation. He argues that an act of knowing (*jñāna*) functions as the means of knowledge while it is in the process of arising (*jayamāna*) and bearing (*bibhrat*) the image of the object (*viṣayābhatā*). The cessation (*nirvṛtti*) of this act of knowing then constitutes the result.

The source of the opponent's argument seems to be Dignāga, although the argument does not represent Dignāga's primary position, and Bhāviveka seems to develop it in ways that Dignāga does not anticipate. In PS 1.8cd, Dignāga equates the *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) with the *pramāṇa-phala* (result of knowledge): "The means of knowledge is the result, because it is understood to include the act [of knowledge] (*savyāpārapratītatvāt*)." In the commentary on this verse, Dignāga says: "Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the result of knowledge (*pramāṇaphala*) differs from the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)." This passage is found in Hattori 1968: 28 and 97. The position presented by Bhāviveka is closer to Dignāga's alternative position in PS 1.9a, but it is not identical: "Or self-cognition is here the result" (*svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra*). The commentary explains: "A cognition arises with a double image, the self-image and the object-image. Of these two images, self-cognition is the result (*phala*)."

Here the objector says that the "means of knowledge" is "the self-image of consciousness" (*svābhāsavijñāna*). Clearly this does not follow Dignāga's position in PS 1.9a that self-cognition (*svasaṃvitti*) is the result of knowledge, but it is based on the same distinction.

The objector goes on to say that the "means of knowledge" is "the means by which an inference occurs." This is not the phrase that we would expect. It would be more consistent with the context to say that the "means of knowledge" is the means by which knowledge occurs (*anena pramīyate*) rather than the means by which an inference occurs (*anena anumīyate*). Yamaguchi emends the text by adding the word "perception" (*pratyakṣa*), to read "the means by which perception and inference occur." It is possible that the text is corrupt.

This argument about the means and result of knowledge corresponds to the second of three arguments for the doctrine of mind-only in chapter 4 of the MRP (Lindtner 1986b: 193; 1986c: 248-50). Several sentences in the objection and reply are repeated verbatim. The last sentence of the objection (". . . it cannot be both the means of knowledge and the result") raises a textual question about the relationship between the TJ and the MRP. The text of TJ ends the objection with *'thad par dka'o* ("it cannot be"). This is omitted in the MRP but is essential to the meaning of the objection. The objector is arguing that it is impossible to have both *pramāṇa* and *phala* if consciousness appears only as "object-aspect" (as Bhāviveka has just been arguing in the preceding section of TJ). The MRP does not have the advantage of the preceding section of the TJ to make the meaning clear. It is possible that this crucial

which an inference occurs, and it is the self-image of consciousness. The result (*phala*) is the knowledge of the object, and it is the object-image. If consciousness only occurs as the object-image, it cannot be both the means of knowledge and the result.

[Reply:]

> 5.24 If [the opponent] thinks that [the mind] has a double image because it has a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and a result (*phala*), [we] do not agree, because they are established another way.

[We] do not agree, because the means and result of knowledge are established another way—that is, without a double image. What is the other way to establish the means and D207a
result of knowledge?

> 5.25 [We] think that the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the cognition that knows the object of knowledge (*prameya*), when [this cognition] is arising (*jayamāna*) and bearing the image of the object.[45]

At the time when a cognition is in the process of arising, bearing the form (*ākāra*) that is called consciousness as object-image, it causes the cognition of the object-form. Therefore, [we] think that the means of knowledge is this cognition while it is arising.

> 5.26ab [We] think that the conclusion (*nirvṛtti*) of this [cognition] is the result (*phala*), because [the object] has been seen when this conclusion occurs.

When the cognition has concluded (*nirvṛtta*), the object has been seen, so the conclusion of the cognition is the result.[46] Therefore, [we] think that the means of knowledge

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element of the sentence has been omitted by an author who misunderstood the meaning of the passage, or it could have been lost in the textual transmission of the MRP itself.

45 The translation of verse 5.25 follows the Tibetan of the verse and commentary. The Sanskrit of the verse would be more easily translated: "[We] think that the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the object of knowledge (*prameya*) that is known (*pramīyate*) by a cognition (*jñāna*) at the time when [that cognition] arises (*jayamāna*) and bears the image of the object." It seems unlikely, however, that Bhāviveka is arguing that the *prameya* constitutes the *pramāṇa*.

46 The Tibetan translator of verse 5.26ab translates *nirvṛtti* ("conclusion") in two different ways: as *skyes pa* (the past form of the verb *skye ba*, to "be born or arise") and as *grub pa* (the past form of the verb *'grub pa*, to "be accomplished, established, or fulfilled"). Bhāviveka clearly means that a moment of cognition achieves its result (*phala*) when that moment of cognition has finished and has accomplished its effect.

In the commentary, the Tibetan translation (*shes pa des mngon par grub pa*) suggests that the result of the cognition is the conclusion (or accomplishment) [of the object] by the cognition rather than the conclusion of the cognition itself. To support the translation offered

and the result are both related to the cognition of the object-image, just as an axe, by being raised and lowered on a tree, causes an act of cutting and two pieces to be cut.[47]

5.26cd This is because [the conclusion of a cognition] is the apprehension as such of an inexpressible particular (*anirdeśyasvarūpa*).

Perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣajñāna*) apprehends only the particular characteristic of a thing (*vastusvalakṣaṇamātra*) and is free from discrimination (*nirūpaṇa*) and memory (*anusmaraṇa*).[48] Material form and so forth are inexpressible (*anirdeśyasvarūpa*) in that they cannot be described as being blue and so forth.[49] They are apprehended as such, that is, they are directly realized (*svasaṃvedya*), without being [expressible]. Therefore, because the means of knowledge and the result belong only to a single cognition of an object-image (*viṣayābhāsa*), the reason is unaccepted,[50] and there is no reason to think that consciousness has a double image.

[The next verse] refutes another of the opponents' ideas.

5.27 If [the opponents] want to say that external objects (*bāhyārtha*) have the nature of mind (*cittasvabhāva*), because they are objects of cognition, like an immediately preceding [condition] (*samanantara*). . . .[51]

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here, *des* can be emended to *de'i*. The commentary on verse 5.26 is quoted in MRP (193-94). Variants are not significant.

47 The axe in Bhāviveka's example corresponds to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the cut pieces correspond to the result (*phala*). According to Hattori (1968: 99), the Nyāya commentator Vātsyāyana defines *pramātṛ*, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramiti* in such a way that *pramiti* (the cognition itself) is considered the *pramāṇa-phala*. Kumārila compares the *pramāṇa* to an axe and the *pramāṇa-phala* to the cutting (*chidā*) of a tree. Kumārila argues that this distinction between means and result is a matter of common knowledge (*Ślokavārttika* 4.74-75). Bhāviveka's position comes closest to Kumārila's.

48 On the Sarvāstivāda view of perceptual cognition as free from discrimination (*nirūpaṇa*) and memory (*anusmaraṇa*), see note 32 on the commentary on verse 5.14cd.

49 Bhāviveka's explanation of 5.26cd shows some similarity to Dignāga's definition of perception. According to Dignāga (PS 1.2-3), perception has the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object, in contrast to inference (*anumāna*), whose object is the universal (*sāmānya*). He also considers perception to be free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Conceptual construction has to do with the real or potential connection of particulars with words (PS 1.3d). In PS chapter 5, Dignāga says: "The object of the senses (*indriyagocara*) is a material form that is inexpressible (*anirdeśya*) and directly realized (*svasaṃvedya*)." Dignāga's commentary does not explain the meaning of *svasaṃvedya*, but it is reasonable to assume that he means the particular is understood in and of itself, without reference to any other thing. In the commentary that follows verse 5.26cd, Bhāviveka explains the term by relating it to the term "inexpressible": to know something as it is is to know it as inexpressible.

50 When Bhāviveka says that "the reason is unaccepted," he is referring to the reason ("because it has a means of knowledge and a result") in 5.24.

51 Verse 5.27 takes up another argument for mind-only. This time "external objects" (*bāhyārtha*)

Here the subject is external objects. The property to be proved is "have the nature of mind." The reason is "because they are objects of cognition." The example is "like an immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*)." The term "immediately preceding condition" refers to similar mind and mental phenomena that have just ceased and serve as the condition for the arising of mind and mental phenomena that are different from themselves. If [the opponents] say that an external object has the nature of mind, because it is an object of cognition, like this [immediately preceding condition], which has the nature of mind because it is an object of cognition, D207b

5.28ab the reason is inconclusive with regard to individual mental phenomena.

First, the fact that an external object is an object of cognition may mean that an external object has the nature of mind, like an immediately preceding condition, or it may mean that it does not have the nature of mind, like individual mental phenomena, such as feeling (*vedanā*), which do not have the nature of mind. In this respect the reason is inconclusive.

Or [the opponents] may think that this [thesis that external objects have the nature

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function as the subject.

External objects have the nature of mind (*cittasvabhāva*),
because they are objects of cognition (*vijñānaviṣayatvena*),
like an immediately preceding [condition] (*yathā samanantaraḥ*).

This is the third of three arguments for mind-only in MRP (Lindtner 1986b: 193). The Sanskrit speaks of "external object" in the singular, but the intention is to speak of all external objects, not just one. This is more accurately expressed in English by using the plural.

An "immediately preceding condition" (*samanantarapratyaya*) is defined in the commentary on *Kośa* 2.64a as "previous mind and mental phenomena which have already arisen and are not separated by other mind and mental phenomena" (*samanantarapratyayaḥ pūrvakāś cittacaittā anyair avyavahitāḥ*). This means that an immediately preceding condition can be either the mind itself (*citta*) or a mental phenomenon (*caitta*). If it is the mind, the opponent's example is valid. If it is a mental phenomenon, considered individually, as an entity in its own right, the example does not hold, since mental phenomena have the nature of mental phenomena, not the nature of mind. Bhāviveka makes this point in verse 5.28ab, where he says that the example is "inconclusive" (*vyabhicārin*) with respect to individual mental phenomena.

Following Yamaguchi, Hoornaert explains that this verse should be read in relation to the argument in verse 5.45-49, where Bhāviveka takes the position that the word "mind" (*citta*) refers to a collection (*samūha*) of mental phenomena, beginning with feelings (*vedanādi*). Bhāviveka's position about the nature of mind is identified with the Sautrāntikas. For a discussion of the sources of this position, see Cox 1988: 42. Here, in verses 5.27-28ab, Bhāviveka is arguing that the opponents contradict their own position about the difference between mind and mental phenomena, not the position that he holds himself.

of mind] is established by the traditional statement: "It is like this: the three worlds are mind-only." But this [argument] is unreasonable, because [the opponents] do not fully understand the meaning of the tradition. Why?[52]

> 5.28cd Because the traditional teaching of mind-only is meant to deny that there is an agent (*kartṛ*) and a subject of experience (*bhoktṛ*).

Buddhas and Bodhisattvas teach mind-only to deny the agent and subject of experience that others, namely heretics (*tīrthika*), imagine to be different from consciousness. [This teaching] is not meant to deny external objects. Why? In the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* it says:

> In the sixth Bodhisattva stage, a Bodhisattva thoroughly considers dependent origination and thinks: "The mass of suffering arises from the twelve items that begin with ignorance, it has no agent or subject of experience, and it reproduces itself as the tree of suffering."

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52 In verse 5.28cd and commentary, Bhāviveka gives his own interpretation of the concept of "mind-only" in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*. He argues that the term is not meant to deny the existence of external objects, but to deny that there is any "agent" (*kartṛ*) or "subject of experience" (*bhoktṛ*). He makes a similar point in response to the Śrāvakas' objections in 4.70-73. In strictly logical terms, Bhāviveka's interpretation of the sūtra should be read as part of his response to the opponent's syllogism in verse 5.27: "External objects have the nature of mind, because. . . ." In the introduction to verse 5.28cd, the opponent argues that the quotation from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* supports the thesis in this syllogism.

Bhāviveka's quotations from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* occur in identical form in the MRP (Lindtner 1986b: 192), and in a similar form in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 64). Apparently Bhāviveka is paraphrasing the sūtra rather than quoting directly, since his quotations do not correspond directly to the Sanskrit text of the sūtra as edited by Rahder and re-edited by Vaidya.

The parts of the quotation can be assembled from Vaidya's edition (32-33). "A Bodhisattva thoroughly considers dependent origination" (*pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyavekṣate 'nulomapratilomam*) "and thinks" (*tasyaivaṃ bhavati*): "the mass of suffering reproduces itself as the tree of suffering with no agent or subject of experience" (*duḥkhaskandho duḥkhavṛkṣo 'bhinirvartate kārakavedakarahito*)." "The three worlds are mind-only" (*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*). The short form of the quotation is also found in the introduction to Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikāvṛtti*: *cittamātraṃ bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam*.

The most significant difference between this passage and the same passage in the MRP is the reference in the MRP to "provisional meaning" (*neyārtha*), a concept that does not play a significant role in the *Prajñāpradīpa* or *Tarkajvālā*. The Bhāviveka who is known to us in these texts does not think of the Yogācāra understanding of mind-only as a position to be "interpreted" or "led to" (*neya*) another meaning: he thinks of it as mud to be avoided (as in verse 5.54 below). Compare *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.84-87, where Candrakīrti follows Bhāviveka's interpretation of the *Daśabhūmika* but argues that other scriptural passages on mind-only should be treated as having "provisional meaning" (*neyārtha*).

With this in mind, it says:

> O sons of the Conqueror, the three worlds are mind-only. They are created by the mind. They are crafted by the mind. There is no agent or subject of experience other than the mind. D208a

This quotation does not establish the non-existence of external objects.

[Objection:] But it says in *The Perfection of Wisdom*:[53]

> O Maitreya, a Bodhisattva should classify material form in three ways: as imagined (*parikalpita*) material form, as conceptualized (*vikalpita*) material form, and as material form that is the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*). What is imagined material form? Imagined material form is the concept (*parikalpanā*) of the identity of material form that is based on the name, idea, designation, or conventional term "material form." This does not really exist. What is conceptualized material form? It is what the name, idea, designation, or conventional term "material form" refer to, and it is based on conceptual thought (*vikalpa*). This is real, because the conceptual thought on which it is based is real, but it is not self-existent. What is the material form that is the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*)? It is the constant emptiness of imagined material form in conceptualized material form, the selflessness of *dharma*s, the reality-limit (*bhūtakoṭi*), and so forth. It does not exist, and it does not not exist, because it is empty of conceptualized objects, and because conceptual thought exists.

[Reply:]

> 5.29 And, if [the opponent] argues that consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects, this does not rule out objects, because there is an object that is not conceptualized.[54]

53 In his quotation from the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*, Bhāviveka again seems to be paraphrasing the text rather than quoting directly. With the exception of the last sentence, the Sanskrit of Bhāviveka's quotation can be pieced together from Iida 1968: 237-38: *trībhir maitreya ākārair bodhisattvena rūpaprabhedaprajñaptir anugantavyā. yad uta idaṃ parikalpitaṃ rūpam, idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpam, idaṃ dharmatārūpam iti. katamat parikalpitaṃ rūpam? rūpam iti nāma-saṃjñāsaṃketaprajñaptivyavahāran niśritya rūpasvabhāvatayā parikalpanā idaṃ parikalpitaṃ rūpam. idam adravyam. katamad vikalpitaṃ rūpam? vikalpapratītya abhilāpanatā tatra idaṃ nāma-saṃjñāsaṃketaprajñaptivyavahāro rūpam iti idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpam. . . . idaṃ vikalpitaṃ sadravyaṃ na tu svatantravṛttitaṃ. katamad dharmatārūpam? yat tena parikalpitarūpena tasya vikalpitarūpasya nityaṃ niḥsvabhāvatā dharmanairātmyaṃ bhūtakoṭir idaṃ dharmatārūpam. tan naiva adravyaṃ na sadravyam. . . .*

54 Hoornaert questions whether Bhāviveka would actually accept the reason in verse 5.29

Consciousness may be empty of objects that are conceptualized (*vikalpitārtha*), but the material form that is the Dharma nature and is directly perceived by the Tathāgata exists. Therefore, there is an object that is not conceptualized, an object that is not expressed in
D208b words. If this object exists, consciousness cannot be completely empty of objects.

Furthermore,

> 5.30ab It it is uncertain whether dream-consciousness has [an object] that is not conceptualized.

When [the opponent argues that] "The three realms are mind-only, because [consciousness] is empty of objects such as material form, like dream-consciousness and so forth," the reason is inconclusive.[55] Even in a dream there may be part of the cognition

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("because there is an object that is not conceptualized") and suggests that the reason should be identified only as the opponent's position. Bhāviveka is certainly using terminology drawn from the opponent's interpretation of the "Maitreya Chapter," but there is no reason to think that Bhāviveka intends this to affirm the ultimate existence of objects. As he indicates in his commentary on verse 5.15, he accepts the cognition of material form conventionally. Even the ultimate (*paramārtha*) can be understood as an object conventionally.

lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje seems to have understood the point correctly when he said: "The meaning of this scriptural passage is to prove that cognition has the image of emptiness as an improperly reified (= Skt. *samāropita*) object, not to prove that cognition has the image of no object. Thus there exists an object that has the form that is the nature of things and is directly known by the Tathāgata. Therefore, since it is not a negation of objects that are not improperly reified, omniscient consciousness is not empty of objects different from itself. To explain this, [Bhāviveka] says: [in verse 5.29] 'And, if [the opponent] argues that consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects, this does not rule out objects, because there is an object that is not conceptualized.'"

lCang-skya explains: "I do not think that this passage means that the object just described, namely the material form that is the nature of things and is directly known by the Tathāgata, truly exists (Tib. *bden par yod*) and exists as an entity that is not improperly reified. For this teacher accepts external objects, but does not accept true objects. The statement in the commentary that 'the form that is the Dharma nature exists' asserts that there is an object that is different from cognition. It does not assert that the Dharma nature is an external object or accept that it truly [exists]. And the statement in the commentary, 'an object exists that is not expressed in words,' means that there is an object whose nature is improperly reified. It should not be taken to refer to an inexpressible entity as held by the idealists." This explanation is found in lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje 1970: 341-42. The text is translated in Lopez 1987: 313. The translation given here is my own.

55 The logical function of verse 5.29 becomes clear when Bhāviveka gives the opponent's syllogism in the commentary on verse 5.30ab.

> The three worlds are mind-only,
> because consciousness is empty of objects (*artha*) such as form,
> like dream-consciousness and so forth.

This syllogism restates the thesis in verse 5.27 ("external objects have the nature of mind"),

that is not conceptualized. Thus [the example] "like dream-consciousness and so forth" can mean either that consciousness is empty of an object that is conceptualized, such as the "person" (*pudgala*), or that it is not empty of an object that is not conceptualized, namely, the object whose part is cognized.

> 5.30cd If [the opponent] thinks that [dream-consciousness] has no object, this is not [true] because the example is not accepted.

[The opponent] cites dream [-consciousness] as the example for [the argument that the three realms are mind-only] "because [consciousness] is empty of conceptualized objects." But this [example] only rules out conceptualized objects; it does not rule out the remaining objects that are not conceptualized. Thus [the example] does not prove mind-only. It is wrong to think that [dream-consciousness] has no object (*ālambana*), because [we] accept that the example has partial possession of [the property] to be inferred. Dream-consciousness does have an object (*ālambana*), because it grasps as an object (*artha*) the material form that is the Dharma nature. In other words, a dream cannot function as an accurate example to show the unreality [of objects].

Objection:[56]

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with a new reason, based on the quotation from the "Maitreya Chapter": "because consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects (*vikalpitārtha*)." Bhāviveka responds to this new syllogism by attacking the example ("like dream-consciousness"). He says that some dream objects may be unreal, but some are not. (On Bhāviveka's understanding of the origin of dream-objects, see the commentary on verse 5.19.) This means that the reason is inconclusive.

The opponent's syllogism corresponds to the first of three arguments in favor of mind-only in the MRP. It is not clear why the author of the MRP moved this argument to the top of the list. Since verses 5.18-19 discussed the example of dreams, it is possible that the author of the MRP wanted to group all the arguments about dream-consciousness together to expand the point in 5.18-19.

56 In verse 5.31 Bhāviveka turns to a discussion of Yogācāra arguments against the existence of external objects. The objector begins with a *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*): If there were objects (*viṣaya*) of cognition, they would have to be either single atoms or collections (*samūha*) of atoms, and neither option is acceptable. The objector then goes on in verses 5.32-33 to formulate separate syllogisms in support of these two assertions.

> The material form of a single atom is not the object of a cognition of form,
> because it does not have the appearance of that [object] (*atadābhatayā*),
> like the material form of the eye.

> The form of many atoms is not the object of the mind,
> Because it is not a real thing (*adravyatvāt*),
> like a double moon (*dvicandravat*).

These arguments can be understood as a further defence of the reason in the syllogism in

5.31 If there is an object (*viṣaya*) of cognition (*dhī*), it is either a single [atom] or a collection (*samūha*), but when these are examined rationally, neither is reasonable.

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verses 5.29-30:

> The three worlds are mind-only,
> because consciousness is empty of objects (*artha*) such as form,
> like dream-consciousness and so forth.

Bhāviveka has attacked the example by saying that dream-consciousness is based in part on real objects. The opponent responds by saying that if consciousness were not empty of objects (or if it actually had real objects), this would lead to unacceptable consequences. Bhāviveka starts by attacking the Yogācāra syllogisms in verses 5.32-33, then he gives his own account of the existence of external objects.

The Yogācāra arguments in 5.32-33 have roots in *Viṃśatikā* 11: "Why should it be understood that the Blessed One's teaching about the existence (*astitva*) of external objects (*rūpādyāyatana*) was delivered with a hidden meaning (*abhiprāya*) and was intended to mean that the particular objects (*viṣaya*) of ideas of material form do not exist? [Verse 11:] 'The object is not a single thing, it is not many atoms, and it is not a collection (*saṃhata*), because no atom can be established.' What does this mean? The external object (*rūpādyāyatana*) that serves as the particular object of ideas of form might be a single thing, like the form of a composite whole (*avayavin*) as imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas, it might be many atoms, or it might be a collection of atoms. In the first case, a single thing cannot be the object (*viṣaya*), because the form of the whole is not grasped as different from the parts. It cannot be many [atoms], because the atoms are not grasped individually. And a collection cannot be an object, because no atom can be individually established."

A more immediate source for the arguments in verses 5.32-33 can be found in the opening verses of Dignāga's AP: "Those who think that the object (*ālambana*) of sense cognition is an external object (*bāhyārtha*) think either that it is an atom, because that [atom] is the cause [of the cognition], or that it is a collection [of atoms], because the cognition has the appearance of that [collection]. Of these [two options], first, [verse 1]: 'If an atom (*grāhyāṃśa*) were the cause of a sense cognition, it could not be its object (*viṣaya*), because it does not have the appearance of that [object], like the eye (*akṣavat*). An object (*viṣaya*) is defined as [the thing] whose actual identity (Tib. *rang gi ngo bo nyid* / Skt. *svarūpa*) is grasped by a cognition, when [a cognition] arises with the aspect (*ākāra*) of that [thing]. Atoms may be the cause of that [cognition], but they do not have the appearance of these [objects], like the sense organs. Therefore, atoms are not the object (*ālambana*). A cognition may have the appearance of a collection (*'dus pa*), but [verse 2a]: '[The object] that appears as that [collection] must be something else [other than a collection].' An object (*artha*) can be considered an object (*ālambana*) if it produces the appearance (*ābhāsākāra*) of itself and is the condition (*pratyaya*) for the production of that [appearance]. But a collection does not function in this way, [verse 2b:], 'because it is not a real thing, like a double moon.' A person whose senses are damaged may see a double moon. But, while there may be the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of this [double moon], it is not the object (*viṣaya*). A collection is not an object (*ālambana*), because it is not a real thing; that is, it is an illusion (*māyā*). [Verse 2cd:] 'Thus neither kind of external object can be an object (*viṣaya*) of the mind.' Because something is missing [in both cases], no external object (*artha*), whether it is called an atom or a collection (*tshogs pa*), can be an object (*ālambana*)."

The opponents say: Those who say that an external object (*bāhyārtha*) exists can conceive of an object (*viṣaya*) of cognition in two ways. They can think that a single atom (*paramāṇu*) is the object (*viṣaya*) or that a collection (*samūha*) of atoms is the object (*viṣaya*). Neither [option] is reasonable or satisfactory, because both lead to contradiction when they are examined rationally. Why? To explain, [the opponents] say: D209a

> 5.32 Of these [two options], the material form of a single atom is not the object (*gocara*) of a cognition of material form, because it does not have the appearance of that [object], just as the material form of the eye is not the object.

Here, an atom (*aṇu*) is the most subtle unit of material form. The word "single" means "alone." The material form of a single atom is the subject. "Not the object of a cognition of material form" is its property. The combination of the subject and the property is the thesis. "Because it does not have the appearance of that [object]" is the reason. This reason is explained as follows: "the appearance of that" means "the appearance of the object (*viṣayasvarūpa*)." To say that [an atom] does not have that appearance means that it does not appear in a cognition of that [object]. In other words, it is not the object. "Just as the material form of the eye is not the object" is the example. The word "eye" refers to the five senses. [The sense organs] are objects and have subtle color and shape, but they do not appear as that [object]. Thus an atom is not the object of a cognition of material form, just as [sense organs] are not objects of a cognition of material form.

> 5.33 Similarly, [the opponents] think that the material form of many atoms is not the object (*gocara*) of the mind (*citta*), because it is not a real thing (*adravyatvāt*), like a double moon.

[The opponents] think that the material form of many atoms, or a collection (*samūha*) [of atoms], is not the object of the mind. Why? Because it is not a real thing (*adravyatvāt*). This is because only the material form of a single atom is considered a real thing, and collections, like an army or a forest, are not real things. They may appear to be the objects of the mind, but they are not. They are like the double moon that is mistakenly perceived by someone who suffers from an eye disease.

Reply:[57]

57 In verses 5.34-38, Bhāviveka argues that the object of perceptual cognition is a "combination" (Skt. *saṃcita* / Tib. *bsags pa*) of atoms rather than a "collection" (Skt. *samūha* / Tib. *'dus pa*). (The Tibetan *'dus pa* can also translate the Sanskrit *saṃhata*, as in *Triṃśikā* 11, and *saṃghāta*.) Bhāviveka explains this distinction in the commentary on verse 5.38: "What is the difference between a combination (*saṃcita*) and a collection (*samūha*)? Homogeneous [*sajātīya*, lit. in the same continuum] atoms that are located in the same place are called a combination. A collection is a collection of such things as elephants and horses or *haridru*

and *khadira* trees that are referred to by the terms 'army' or 'forest.' They are not in the same continuum and are [located] in different places."

Bhāviveka's distinction between a combination and a collection is similar to a position attributed to the Vaibhāṣika author Saṅghabhadra (4th-5th centuries). Collett Cox (1988: 74) explains that Saṅghabhadra responded to criticism from the Sautrāntika author Śrīlāta (330-410) by arguing that atoms form a combination (*saṃcita*) rather than a collection (*saṃghāta*), and that this combination makes direct perception possible. For an account of this Vaibhāṣika position, see the commentary on *Kośa* 1.10cd: "Sometimes a visual cognition of that [form] is caused by a single substance (*dravya*), when it is limited to that form (*prakāra*). Sometimes it is caused by many [substances], when it is not limited, as, for example, when one sees, from a distance, a multicolored army (*senāvyūha*) or a heap (*samūha*) of jewels. The same is true of auditory cognitions and so forth. . . . Objection: In that case, the object (*viṣaya*) of the five kinds of sense cognition is a whole (*sāmānya*), because the object (*ālambana*) is a composition (*samasta*), and the object (*viṣaya*) is not a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). [Reply:] This is wrong, because [we] think that [sense cognitions] have particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) as their objects (*viṣaya*) in the sense that the particulars are cognizable supports (*āyatana*) rather than substances (*dravya*)."

The distinction between a combination and a collection appears in the commentary on *Kośa* 1.35d: "Which *dhātu*s are combined (*saṃcita*) and which are not combined? The ten that have material form are combined. The *dhātu*s that consist of the five senses and their five objects (*viṣaya*) are combined. The rest are not combined, because they are collections (*saṃghāta*) of atoms."

Bhāviveka's position can be traced elsewhere in Buddhist philosophy, as, for example, in Hattori's discussion (1968: 119) of PS 2: "Thus, when the atoms, which are represented in a cognition, are homogeneous ones, there appears in the cognition as the totality of their representations the form of an object, as in the case of the 'cognition of blue.' But when the collection of heterogeneous atoms is taken to be the object, the form that appears in a cognition is not the sum total of representations of atoms but is the product of *kalpanā*: as, for instance, the 'cognition of a jar.'" According to Hattori, this view is discussed in the *Dvādaśāra-Nayacakra* of Mallavādin and is ascribed to Vāgbhaṭa and Śubhagupta. Matilal (1986: 368) points out that Śubhagupta's position is discussed in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1971-78: "When there is a succession of similar moments, there is the illusion of continuity, so also, when one grasps [atoms] that are homogeneous (*sajātīya*) and not separated [in space], there is the illusion of a gross form (*sthūla*)."

Sthiramati (510-70) discusses and rejects the distinction between a combination and a collection in his commentary on *Triṃśikā* 1: "Why do [we] think that consciousness (*vijñāna*) arises with an object-form (*arthākāra*) without any external object (*bāhyārtha*)? An external object (*bāhyārtha*) can be considered the *ālambana-pratyaya* of consciousness if it produces a cognition of its own appearance (*svābhāsavijñānajanakatvena*), not if it is merely a cause, because that would lead to the conclusion (read *prasaṅga* rather than *aprasaṅga*) that any individual *samanantara-pratyaya* [is an *ālambana*]. [Some say that] the five kinds of sense cognition have combinations as their objects, because they have the form of that [combination]. But a combination (*saṃcita*) is nothing more than a collection (*saṃhati*) of parts, because there is no cognition of the form of the combination (*saṃcitākāra*) apart from the whole (*tadavayavān apohya*). Therefore, cognition arises with the aspect of a combination (*saṃcitākāra*), without any external object (*bāhyārtha*). And combined (*saṃcita*) atoms are not the object (*ālambana*) of that [cognition], because these atoms do not have the form of that [object] (*atadākāratvāt*). For atoms that are in a combined state (*saṃcitāvasthāyām*) have no additional factor (*ātmātiśaya*) other than what they have when they are in an uncombined

5.34 If the opponent argues that the material form of uncombined [atoms] is not an object of the mind, he proves something that we already accept.

If the opponents argue that the material form of uncombined or single atoms is not an object of the mind, we agree and the opponents' position proves something that we already accept. D209b

5.35 If [the opponents are arguing about] the material form of a combination (*saṃcita*), [we] do not accept the reason, because a cognition arises with the appearance of that [combination] when [atoms] are combined with the material forms of others.[58]

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state. Someone else thinks: individual atoms are not perceptible (*atīndriya*) if they are not connected with others (*anyanirapekṣya*), but many [atoms] that are connected to one another (*parasparāpekṣyā*) are perceptible (*indriyagrāhya*). But these [individual atoms] have no additional factor when they are connected, other than what they have when they are unconnected, so they either are perceptible individually or they are not perceptible at all. If atoms are the object (*viṣaya*) of cognition when they are connected to one another (*parasparāpekṣa*), there can be no distinction between the cognitions of a pot and a wall (*kuḍya*), because atoms do not have the form (*atadākāratvāt*) of that [pot or wall]. And a cognition with one image (*anyābhāsa*) cannot have an object (*viṣaya*) that has another form (*anyākāra*), because that would lead to an unacceptable conclusion (*atiprasaṅgāt*)."

Dharmakīrti takes up the point in *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.194-96: "[Objection:] If [the object of the senses] is a combination (*saṃcita*) or a collection (*samudāya*), it must be a whole (*sāmānya*), and a sense cognition of it must be a cognition of a whole (*sāmānyabuddhi*) and must be accompanied by a concept. [Reply:] The atoms that arise from connections with other atoms are called combinations (*saṃcita*) and also are the cause (*nimitta*) of the arising of cognition. The particular characteristics (*viśeṣa*) of these atoms do not exist without the other atoms. Since the cognition is not limited to a single [atom], it is said to have a whole as its object (*sāmānyagocara*)."

58 In 5.35, Bhāviveka states his own position about the existence of external objects: from the relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*), a combination (*saṃcita*) of homogeneous (*sajātīya*) atoms functions as the object (*viṣaya*) of cognition.

In the commentary on 5.35, when Bhāviveka says "[we] think that atoms are real (*dravya*) as collections (Skt. *saṃghāta* / Tib. *'dus pa*) of eight things (*aṣṭadravyaka*)," he is echoing a position reported in *Kośa* 2.22ab: "An atom (*paramāṇu*) is composed of eight things (*aṣṭadravyaka*). [Comm.] Here 'atom' means the most subtle collection (*saṃghāta*) of material form." The eight things are the four gross elements (*mahābhūta*), plus material form, smell, taste, and tangibility. Bhāviveka does not attempt to change the term *saṃghāta* ("collection") to conform to his use of the term *saṃcita* ("combination"). Perhaps he intends to conclude this stage in his argument by saying that a pot, which he earlier called a combination (*saṃcita*), finally is nothing more than a collection (*saṃghāta*). It seems more likely, however, that he is simply following the inconsistent usage of his own sources.

The term "homogeneous" (Tib. *rigs mthun pa* / Skt *tulyajātīya*) in the commentary on 5.35 is used in 5.62 to mean "of the same genus or type." On this use of the term *jāti*, see PS 1.3d (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*), PS 5.2ff., and *Vākyapadīya*, ch. 3 (*jātisamuddeśa*). The Nyāya tradition developed a distinction between two types of "universal" (*sāmānya*): the *jāti* and

If [the opponent] takes the material form of a combination of homogeneous (*tulyajātīya*) atoms as the subject, and gives "not a real thing (*adravyatva*)" as the reason, one of us does not accept (*anyatarāsiddha*) the reason. Why? [We] accept that [a combination of homogeneous atoms] is the object (*viṣaya*) when [atoms] are combined or associated with the material forms of other, homogeneous atoms. A cognition arises with the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of that [combination], that is, with the form (*ākāra*) of a combination of atoms. We think that a combination of similar atoms, such as a pot, is real (*dravya*) in a relative sense (*sāṃvṛta*). This also is true of atoms themselves, because [we] think that atoms are real (*dravya*) as collections (Skt. *saṃghāta* / Tib. *'dus pa*) of eight things (*aṣṭadravyaka*). Pots and so forth are real in a similar way, even though they are collections. [We] do not accept that [atoms] are real by themselves.

> 5.36 [We] think that this [combination] is the object (*ālambana*), because it causes a cognition that has the image of that [combination], like [an object of] passion. Therefore, the thesis is refuted by inference.[59]

[We] think that the material form of a combination of homogeneous atoms is the object (*ālambana*). Why? A combination of atoms is the cause of a cognition that has the appearance of that combination. If it causes the cognition of the appearance of [the object], this combination is the object (*ālambana*). For example, desire is defined as desire for an object (*viṣaya*), and this desire is directed toward an object (*ālambana*), such as a woman,
D210a that is a combination of [aggregates] such as material form. Therefore, your thesis,

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the *upādhi*. Matilal calls the *jāti* a "real universal" and the *upādhi* a "nominal universal." He explains that the word *jāti* comes close to the meaning of "natural kind" (Matilal 1986: 402).

59 Verse 5.36 applies Bhāviveka's position about external objects to the concept of the *ālambana* ("object"). According to Dignāga the object (*ālambana*) has to fulfill two conditions: it has to be the cause of a cognition, and it has to possess the same form (*ākāra*) that appears in the cognition. Here Bhāviveka focuses on the first of these two conditions and says that his "combination" is capable of causing a cognition. Compare Dignāga's commentary on AP 1: "[An object] (*viṣaya*) is defined as [the thing] whose actual identity (Tib. *rang gi ngo bo nyid* / Skt. *svarūpa*) a cognition grasps, if [the cognition] arises with the form (*ākāra*) of that [thing]." Compare also Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* 1: "An external object (*bāhyārtha*) is considered the *ālambana-pratyaya* of consciousness if it produces a cognition of its own image (*svābhāsavijñānajanakatvena*)." Both sources are discussed at more length in the note on verse 5.31.

Bhāviveka concludes his discussion of external objects in verse 5.36 with a reference to tradition (*āgama*): "The location and objects of the five forms of consciousness are combinations." Dignāga quotes a similar line in the commentary on PS 1.4cd, as does Sthiramati in the commentary on *Triṃśikā* 1: "the five kinds of sense cognition have combinations as their objects" (*saṃcitālambanāḥ pañcavijñānakāyāḥ*). In the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Bhāviveka quotes *Kośa* 1.35d (*saṃcitā daśa rūpinaḥ*) to make the same point (Eckel 1985: 66). The word "location" (*āśraya*) in this quotation refers to the five sense organs, as in *Kośa* 1.9cd.

"The form of a combination is not the object (*ālambana*)," is contradicted by inference. It also is contradicted by the traditional (*āgama*) statement, "The location and objects of the five forms of consciousness are combinations."

Objection: A cognition arises without an object, because it arises from the seeds (*bīja*) of the appearance of consciousness itself (*svābhāsavijñāna*), like mental cognition.

Reply:

> 5.37 If [you] argue that cognition has no object (*ālambana*) because it arises from its own seeds, like mental cognition, then surely your [cognition] must have an object, because [mental cognition] has a non-conceptual [object].[60]

Even in mental cognition, there is a part that has the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of the non-conceptual object (*artha*) of [the cognition] itself, so your cognition must have an object (*ālambana*).

Furthermore,

> 5.38 Or the inference that [cognition] has no object excludes the possibility that it can be a cognition. [And we] do not maintain the thesis that a collection (*samūha*) [is the object of cognition], so denying this [thesis] does not refute [us].[61]

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60 Verse 5.37 returns to the argument that began with the syllogism in 5.29:

> The three worlds are mind-only,
> because consciousness is empty of objects such as material form,
> like dream-consciousness and so forth.

Previous analysis of this syllogism focused on the reason: "consciousness is empty of objects." In verses 5.31-36, the Yogācāra objector defended this reason by using a *prasaṅga*: "If consciousness were not empty of objects, then. . . ." Here the objector states an independent syllogism in support of the same point:

> A cognition arises without any object,
> because it arises from the seeds of the appearance of consciousness itself,
> like mental cognition.

Dignāga treats the object of cognition as a manifestation of the mind in AP 6, as discussed in the notes on verse 5.20 above. On the seeds of consciousness, see the notes on verse 5.41. To say that "the thesis fails, because it contradicts the nature of the subject" can be taken as a "contradiction in terms" (*svavacanaviruddha*).

61 The second half of verse 5.38 restates Bhāviveka's response to the Yogācāra *prasaṅga* in verses 5.31-36, using terminology that refers directly to the arguments in AP 1-2 and *Triṃśikā* 1 (discussed in the notes on verse 5.31). This shows that Bhāviveka considered the syllogism in

If a cognition is defined as something that cognizes an object (*ālambana*), then the inference that [a cognition] has no object rules out the possibility that this cognition is a cognition, because it proves that what you considered to be a cognition is not a cognition. Therefore, [your] thesis fails, because it contradicts the nature of the subject (*dharmin*).

You may say that a collection (*samūha*) is not an object (*ālambana*), but we do not hold the thesis that a collection is an object. What kind of thesis do we hold? Our thesis is that a combination (*saṃcita*) of atoms is an object. So, when you deny that a collection is an object, this does not harm us. What is the difference between a combination (*saṃcita*) and a collection (*samūha*)? Homogeneous [*sajātīya*, lit. in the same continuum] atoms that are located in the same place are called a combination. A collection is a collection of such things as elephants and horses or *haridru* and *khadira* trees that are referred to by the terms "army" or "forest." They are not in the same continuum and are located in different places.

[Objection:] In the treatise [entitled] *The Investigation of the Object* (*Ālambanaparīkṣā*), I [Dignāga] have firmly established the following position:[62]

D210b 5.39abc Even without external objects, the potential (*śakti*) and the material form of the object (*viṣaya*) cause each other,

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the introduction to verse 5.37 to be an extension of the argument in 5.31-36. It also indicates that verse 5.38 marks the conclusion of the argument that began in verse 5.29.

62 In verse 5.39, Bhāviveka takes a Yogācāra thesis like the one discussed in verses 5.37-38 ("cognition arises without any object") and makes it the subject of a *prasaṅga*: If consciousness evolves without external objects and has done so from time immemorial, how can there be any way for a yogin to develop supermundane (*alaukika*), non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge?

The thesis comes from Dignāga and is found in AP 8bcd: "Thus the object and the potential cause each other and continue from time immemorial" (*de ltar yul gyi ngo bo dang / nus pa phan tshan rgyu can dang / thog ma med dus 'jug pa yin*). Bhāviveka includes the content of AP 8bc in his own verse and adds 8d ("they continue from time immemorial") in the commentary.

This verse could be interpreted as the final salvo in Bhāviveka's attack on the argument that began in verse 5.29. The commentary on this verse suggests, however, that he is beginning a new discussion of mind-only as a "means of entering" (*praveśopāya*) non-conceptuality. The terminology comes from Vasubandhu's introduction to MAV 1.6 ("From apprehension comes no-apprehension"). Vasubandhu explains that this verse is meant to give "the means of entering the definition [of reality] as an absence" (*asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāya*). Similar terminology is found in AM 135.

Bhāviveka quoted MAV 1.6 in verse 5.4 and used it to introduce his argument against the concept of mind-only in verse 5.17. Up to this point, Bhāviveka has concentrated on the question of external objects. Here he asks whether it is possible for the doctrine of mind-only to function as the Yogācāra says it does, to free a person from conceptual thought and bring about liberation.

and "they continue from time immemorial."

[Reply:] The fourth part of the verse says:

5.39d Then what do you think causes their cessation?

This point should be analyzed in the following way: If external objects (*bāhyārtha*) exist, it is reasonable for there to be supermundane (*alaukika*) non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) insight (*jñāna*) when a yogin who seeks to purify consciousness of the image of objects (*viṣaya*) understands that objects are empty and brings both the subject and the object to an end. But if you say that there are no such objects, how can [a yogin] bring [the subject and the object] to an end by entering (*praveśa*) the absence of external objects and then [entering] the absence of subject and the object? There is no way for there to be supermundane, non-conceptual [insight]. If [you] say that objects (*viṣaya*) do not exist, there is no way (*upāya*) for there to be a path of supermundane [insight]. If consciousness consists of potentials and the forms of objects (*viṣayasvarūpa*) and continues from time immemorial, explain how it can ever come to an end.

If you think:

5.40ab Non-conceptual cognition should not be abandoned, because it is noble and because it is free from concepts.

[You] may think: The concepts of subject and object that cause the activity of saṃsāra should be abandoned, but non-conceptual thought itself should not be abandoned, because it is noble and because it is free from concepts. That is, [non-conceptual thought] arises and does not cease.

Reply:

5.40cd As long as [consciousness] arises and the seeds[63] of [consciousness] are not destroyed, how can there there be any liberation?

If [you] think that saṃsāra is due to the activity of the seeds of consciousness, and if [you] also think that liberation comes from the destruction of [the seeds of consciousness], how can there be any liberation as long as consciousness arises, whether it has concepts or not. If you say that there is only the mind, you can have no liberation.

[You] may think that when conceptual thought arises, there is bondage, and when non-conceptual thought arises, there is liberation. Why? For the following reason: D211a

5.41 The image of the world (*viśvābhāsa*) is born when an idea (*saṃjñā*) be-

63 On the "seeds" (*bīja*) of consciousness, see the note on verse 5.41.

comes active in a dualistic way, because that [idea], which has the image of the world, arises along with [the self-image of consciousness] from its own seeds.[64]

The image (*ābhāsa*) whose form (*ākāra*) is the world (*viśva*), or objects (*viṣaya*) such as material form, is born when there is consciousness (*vijñāna*) of the duality of subject and object. What is the image of the world that has this form? It is the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness into the object-form (*viṣayākāra*). This arises along with the self-image (*svābhāsa*) of consciousness, from its own seeds—that is, from the image (*ābhāsa*) or form (*ākāra*) of the object (*viṣaya*).

5.42ab This [world] is dissolved (*laya*) through a transfer (*arpaṇa*) of potentiality (*śakti*) with respect to itself and with respect to the other.[65]

This [verse] should be interpreted as follows: When the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) cease or are dissolved, they enter the root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*), where they continue through a transfer of their own potentiality (*svaśaktyarpaṇa*). This [world] is dissolved when it ceases with respect to itself—that is, with respect to the cognition of the subjective part (*svāṃśa*) [of consciousness]—and with respect to the other—that is, with respect to consciousness that has the image of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*).

[Reply:] This may be true on a naive level, but there is a problem.

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64 The process described in this verse closely parallels *Viṃśatikā* 9: "The Sage said that, when a *vijñapti* becomes active (*pravartate*) with a particular appearance (*ābhāsā*) from one of its own particular seeds (*svabīja*), then they are two of its sense media (*dvividhāyatanatvena*)." The commentary explains: "When a *vijñapti* has the appearance of material form, it arises from its own seed (*svabīja*), after [the seed] has undergone a specific transformation. The Blessed One said that the seed is the eye-medium (*cakṣurāyatana*) and the appearance [as form] is the form-medium (*rūpāyatana*) of that *vijñapti*."

If we follow the structure of *Viṃśatikā* 9, *saṃjñā* ("idea") is parallel to *vijñapti* and functions as the logical subject of the verse. "World-appearance" (*viśvābhāsa*) is parallel to "material-form-appearance" (*rūpapratibhāsa*) in the commentary on *Viṃśatikā* 9. The translation then reads: "The world-image of an idea is born when [the idea] is active dualistically, because that [idea], which has the image of the world, arises as that from its own seeds." The only remaining challenge is to identify the meaning of "that." This problem is solved by the commentary, which explains that "that" is "the self-image (*svābhāsa*) of consciousness."

As the commentary on the next verse makes clear, the word "world" (*viśva*) is treated as a synonym of the five forms of active consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*). On this usage, see AM 46 and 48: "From what does the world (*viśva*) arise, and into what is it dissolved? [It arises] from its trace-seeds (*vāsanābīja*) located in the store-consciousness. . . . The world is known as the active forms of consciousness. Although it is not different from the store-consciousness, it is dissolved into that [store-consciousness] again."

65 The subject of verse 5.42 is the "world" (*viśva*) mentioned in 5.41. On the "transfer of potentiality" (*śaktyarpaṇa*), see AP 7b, as discussed in the commentary and notes on verse 5.22.

5.42cd Surely the word "consciousness" represents nothing more than a self.[66]

Those who hold the doctrine of a self also think that all potentialities are accumulated in a single self that gives rise to the world. You use the term "consciousness" deceptively[67] to represent nothing more than a self, so you give up the doctrine of no-self.

Furthermore, your concept of liberation is no different from saṃsāra. Why? A yogin who holds a doctrine of mind-only thinks of the mind in saṃsāra and liberation in the following way:

5.43 When someone understands that a dualistic, illusory, fragmented, disturbed, and selfless [mind] is non-dualistic, imperishable, true, immortal, and the ultimate state,

5.44 then [subject and object] are equally absent and concepts cease. Therefore, liberation (*mukti*) is not different [from saṃsāra], when it is under- D211b
stood by non-conceptual cognition.

"Dualistic" refers to [a mind that] stands in the duality of subject and object. This [mind] is understood as illusory, fragmented, disturbed, and selfless. It is "illusory" in the sense that it is generated by false conceptuality. It is "fragmented" in the sense that it is subject to decline. It is "disturbed" in the sense that it is affected by the process of arising, ceasing, and so forth. It is "selfless" because the self that is imagined by heretics (*tīrthika*) does not exist and because it is empty (*niḥsvabhāva*). "Non-dualistic" refers to a non-dualistic mind (*citta*) that stands in its own true nature, when cognitions of material form and so forth no longer appear as external to the mind. This [non-dualistic mind] is understood as imperishable, true, immortal, and the ultimate state. "Imperishable" means that it is not subject to decline. "True" means that it is not false. "Immortal" means that it is free from birth, death, and so forth. "The ultimate state" means that it is the final resting place. To "understand" is to understand dualistic and non-dualistic [mind] in this way.

"Then [subject and object] are equally absent" means that, from a non-dualistic point of view, subject and object are just as absent in the state of saṃsāra as they are in the state of liberation. When it says "concepts cease," it means that concepts cease

66 Bhāviveka mentions the similarity betwen the Yogācāra position and the doctrine of a self (*ātmavāda*) in his discussion of dependent identity in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Eckel 1985: 57-58). See also verse 5.50.

67 The word "deceptively" translates the Tibetan *rgyu thabs kyis*. In *Prasannapadā* 246.6-11, where the opponent accuses the Mādhyamika of giving a deceptive explanation of the Buddha's teaching, *rgyu thabs kyis* is used to translate *vyājena* ("deceptively"). Perhaps *rgyu thabs* was *sgyu thabs* at an earlier stage in the transmission of the text.

because duality is equally absent. Someone who "understands by non-conceptual cognition" is a yogin who understands absolute identity (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) perceptually (*pratyakṣajñānena*), that is, with a cognition that is not accessible to language and is not conceptual.

It is a mistake to say that for this [yogin] "liberation is not different" [from saṃsāra]. If this [liberated cognition] is the same as the previous [cognition], which arises and has
D212a an object, liberated [cognition] is no different from the previous conceptual cognition, and there is no difference between bondage and liberation.

Furthermore,

> 5.45 To prove that there is mind-only, you have to accept that there is no difference between mind (*citta*) and mental phenomena (*caitta*), or you have to accept that there is not ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*).[68]

If you think that there is mind-only, then, to prove that there is nothing but mind, [you] have to accept that there is no difference between the mind and mental phenomena, which are distinguished by having different objects (*ālambana*) and forms (*ākāra*). Otherwise, if you think that mental phenomena are different from the mind, you no longer accept ideation-only (*vijñaptimātra*), because there are many mental phenomena.

> 5.46 Or if [you] think that the word "mind" refers to the collection (*samūha*) of feeling and so forth, [you] agree with [your] opponent and abandon your own approach.

If you accept that the term (*prajñapti*) "mind" refers to a collection [of mental phenomena] that begin with feeling (*vedanā*), thinking (*cetanā*), contact (*sparśa*), and mental activity (*manasikāra*), like a bundle of reeds, a collection of such things as earth, water, fire, and wind, or the material form, smell, taste, and touch that make up something like a pot, then you agree with your opponent, the Mādhyamika (*madhyamavādin*), and abandon your own approach. This is because [your approach is to] accept that the five consciousnesses only arise from the store-consciousness, with the appropriate conditions,

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68 Verse 5.45 seems to introduce a new argument against the doctrine of mind-only, but it is best read as an extension of the previous argument about the difference between saṃsāra and liberation. If someone adopts the non-dualistic point of view expressed by the Yogācāra, not only is there no difference between saṃsāra and liberation, there is no difference between mind (*citta*) and the mental phenomena (*caitta*) that are different from mind.

As Bhāviveka develops this argument, he makes clear his own view about the nature of the mind. In 5.46 and in the accompanying commentary, he says that the word "mind" refers to a collection (*samūha*) of [mental phenomena], beginning with feeling (*vedanādi*). This position is clearly associated with the Sautrāntikas. For a discussion of the Sautrāntika sources, see Cox 1988: 42 and note 51.

and that mental phenomena are transformations [of the mind].[69]

[Objection:] If [the word] "mind" refers to the collection of feeling and so forth, then the mind is not substantially real (*dravyasat*) and there is no basis (*āśraya*) for defilement (*samkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*).[70] Feeling and so forth are different, but it is possible for them to be the basis of defilement or purification if [the mind] is substantially real in each of them, as is said in the following [sūtra]:

> An element that has no beginning contains all seeds. Because it exists, all states [of rebirth exist], as well as the attainment of nirvāṇa. D212b

Reply:

> 5.47 [You] may think that the mind is substantially real because there is defilement and purification, but this is not a refutation, because [we] accept that they come from the arising of mental phenomena in a certain way.

[We] think that when mental activities (*manasikāra*) are defiled by primary and secondary defilements and are connected to the mind, there is bondage, and when freedom from defilements and wisdom (*prajñā*) are connected to the mind, there is liberation. So mental phenomena are just words for various states of mind. [Mental phenomena] are substantially real (*dravyasat*) only in relation to the mind, and mind and mental phenomena cannot exist apart from one another.

Therefore, since mental phenomena (*vedanādi*) arise in the form (*ākāra*) of bondage and liberation, [we] accept that [bondage and liberation] arise from collections and exist as collections of mind and mental phenomena. Your concept of the reality of the mind, therefore, does not refute us.

[Objection:] If the mind is a collection and not substantially real, how can it give

69 This Yogācāra position is found in *Triṃśikā* 15: "The five consciousnesses arise in the root consciousness, with the appropriate conditions, either simultaneously or not, like waves in water" (*pañcānāṃ mūlavijñāne yathāpratyayam udbhavam / vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgānāṃ yathā jale*). In the commentary on *Triṃśikā* 15, Sthiramati explains that "root consciousness" is another name for "store-consciousness." Bhāviveka has already discussed these issues in his commentary on verse 5.4. He quotes *Triṃśikā* 15 directly in his commentary on verse 5.49.

70 The objection that introduces verse 5.47 repeats the argument in verse 5.6: "Otherwise [if dependent identity did not exist], neither [defilement nor purification] would exist." The opponent quotes a verse about a "beginningless element (*dhātu*) that contains all seeds." A different version of this verse, with the word *dharma* substituted for *bīja*, is quoted in MS (1:12), *Triṃśikābhāṣya* (37), and *Siddhi* (159): *anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ / tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi vā*. It also is quoted in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Eckel 1985: 55).

rise to the stream of existence and also to the attainment of liberation?

Reply:

> 5.48 Just as a stream of leaves and flowers comes from a powerful lotus root, the different streams of [rebirth] come from the mind, even though it is not substantially real.

The word *śālūka* refers to the root of a blue lotus. Even though the root is not connected to anything else, it has enough power to cover a large lake with a stream of leaves and flowers. In a similar way, the different streams of the saṃsāra of sentient beings, with their realms (*dhātu*) and levels (*gati*), come from the mind, even though it is not substantially real.

These different streams

D213a

> 5.49ab do not arise if there is an antidote; but they do arise if there is a cause.

The antidote is the noble eightfold path. When that arises, the streams [of rebirth] do not arise. If the cause [of the streams of rebirth], namely the impurities (*āsrava*), is present, they do arise.

Furthermore, you say: "The five [consciousnesses] arise in the root consciousness, with the appropriate conditions." But, even without any root consciousness, [the five consciousnesses] do not arise when there is an antidote (*pratipakṣa*) that counteracts these conditions (*pratyaya*) in the collection that comprises the mind. They do arise, however, when there are conditions such as material form, light, space, and mental activity.

> 5.49cd Here [we] do not accept the idea that diversity comes [from the mind], because [the mind] is not a real thing.

We do not accept that diversity—namely maturation, cogitation, and ideation—comes from the transformation of consciousness, as you think. Why? Because the mind is not a real thing. [We] do not think that particular states of mind[71] justify this designation.

Furthermore,

71 Hoornaert follows Yamaguchi in pointing out that the term "particular states of mind (*cittāvasthāviśeṣa*)" represents Bhāviveka's own Sautrāntika-based view of the mind. To say that these states of mind do not justify "this designation" means that the Yogācāra categories cannot be justified on the basis of the Yogācāras' own position. On the three transformations of consciousness, see the commentary on verse 5.4.

5.50 There is no liberation for someone who apprehends this [mind], but there is for someone for whom cognition ceases; he is not like someone who holds the doctrine of a self in either a relative or a real sense.[72]

To "apprehend this" is to think that there is only the appearance of the mind itself. "No liberation" means from the stream of rebirth. "Cognition ceases" means that cognition definitely ceases for someone who understands that things have no absolute identity and does not imagine a store-consciousness. This is why we say that the mind is a collection, rather than a real thing. [We] are not like someone who says that there is a self, in either a relative (*saṃvṛtyā*) or an ultimate (*paramārthataḥ*) sense. In contrast, you have these problems when you say that there is mind-only. You say: "From apprehension comes no-apprehension; from no-appehension comes no-apprehension," but we do not think D213b
that one should practice no-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) indirectly.

How [should one practice it]?[73]

5.51 "Material form and so forth are empty, because they do not arise in their own right, are not real things, and are destroyed, like an illusion." By practicing in this way, one is free from attachment.

External objects such as material form only arise from the appearance of causes and conditions, and they are empty. Because they do not exist apart from the combination of causes and conditions, they do not arise in their own right; because they are collections, they are not real; and because they do not continue very long, they are destroyed. Illusion is the example. By practicing no-apprehension in this way, one becomes free

72 In verse 5.50, Bhāviveka returns to the problem of the "apprehension" (*upalabdhi* or, in this case, *ālambana* in the verbal sense) of mind-only. (See the commentary on verses 5.4 and 17 above.) The first *pāda* of the verse presents Bhāviveka's criticism of the Yogācāra position: "There is no liberation for someone who apprehends this [mind]." The final three *pāda*s present his own position: "but there is for someone for whom cognition ceases. . . ."

The Yogācāra verse that is quoted again at the end of the commentary on verse 5.50 ("From apprehension comes no-apprehension") is MAV 1.6. Bhāviveka quoted this verse in verse 5.4 and made it the focus of his criticism of the doctrine of mind-only beginning in verse 5.17.

73 In verses 5.51-54, Bhāviveka presents his own understanding of the "practice" (*abhyāsa*) of "no-apprehension" (*anupalabdhi*). It is worth noting that his presentation of the practice in verse 5.51 takes the form of a syllogism. For Bhāviveka "practice" involves logical analysis. Bhāviveka has discussed the practice (*abhyāsa*) of no-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) earlier in the text. Compare MHK 3.292 ("When [a yogin] practices this [*brahmacaryā*] and dwells [in the *brahmavihāra*s] with no-apprehension, what can his mind desire, hate, or be ignorant of?") and 4.23-24, where he identifies the practice of no-apprehension as the distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna.

from attachment. But external objects are not completely non-existent.

Furthermore,

> 5.52 If material form and so forth are real, then, when someone understands them correctly, the apprehension of their unreality eliminates them. But what is accomplished if they are not real?

For example, when someone thinks that an illusion is a real man, then understands that this [real man] is an illusion and does not exist in his own right, it is possible to eliminate the cognition of the man. But it is not possible [to eliminate the cognition of] a rabbit's horn that does not exist from the start. Similarly, if material form and so forth are real—that is, if one thinks, with a relative cognition (*saṃvṛtijñāna*), that form and so forth exist in their own right—then, someone who understands them correctly, as not existing in their own right, can understand that they are not real and decisively eliminate the error. What do you accomplish if you teach ordinary people, who do not yet understand reality, that material form and so forth do not exist as external objects from the start?

Similarly,

D214a

> 5.53 If dualistic concepts belong only to the mind and mental phenomena, they ought to continue after material form and so forth are negated.

You think that concepts of the subject-object duality belong to mind and mental phenomena, and you do not think that they are connected to external objects such as material form. If so, dualistic concepts will not stop functioning when you negate external objects such as material form. Why? [Dualistic concepts] will continue, because there has been no change; they are just as independent of external objects such as material form afterwards as they were before.

Objection: To remove dualistic concepts that are not connected with external objects such as material form, we use another argument (*paryāya*) to show that external objects are defined as a part of consciousness. Then, when non-conceptual cognition arises, the subject and object aspects [of consciousness] are eliminated, and both the object and the cognition of that [object] cease.

Reply:

> 5.54 If you think that you adopt another argument to negate this one, it would be better to avoid the mud altogether than to wash it away.[74]

74 Bhāviveka also uses "the maxim of washing away mud" (*paṅkaprakṣālananyāya*) in the parallel passage in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 70).

If you sincerely think that external objects do not exist, why do you imagine that they are part of consciousness? If you think that you begin by defining them as part of consciousness, then use another argument, different from [the argument] that they are part of consciousness, to negate them, it would be better to avoid the mud altogether than to wash it away. The example provides an analogy. If a fool leaves a clean road and enters a muddy river, others would ask him, "Why did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?" If he says, "So that I can wash the mud away," the others would say: "You fool! If you are determined to wash it away, you should avoid the mud from the very beginning." D214b

Imagined Identity

You say that imagined identity (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is empty of characteristic (*lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāva*).[75] If [you] argue that imagined identity is empty of characteristic, because it is imagined, like the snake that is imagined in place of a rope, [we] reply:

> 5.55 [We] do not accept [the argument] that imagined [identity] does not exist, because it is imagined, like the snake. [The reason] is inconclusive with regard to the rope, and [the thesis] is contradicted by common sense.

[The reason] is inconclusive in the following way: either imagined identity does not

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75 From verse 5.55 to the end of the chapter, Bhāviveka discusses the Yogācāra system of "three identities" (*trisvabhāva*), beginning with "imagined identity" (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). The structure of the argument follows Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogācāra in *Prajñāpradīpa* chapter 25 but includes several important new elements, not the least of which is his discussion of Dignāga's *apoha* theory and the concept of universals (*sāmānya*) in verses 5.60-66.

Bhāviveka's argument begins with a Yogācāra syllogism that is intended to support the claim that "imagined identity" (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is "empty of characteristic" (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva*). This claim comes from the Yogācāra position explained in the commentary on verse 5.5 and based on the emptiness of the three identities as explained in *Triṃśikā* 23-25 and other sources. (See the notes on verse 5.5.) The Yogācāra syllogism takes the following form:

> Imagined identity is empty of characteristic,
> because it is imagined,
> like the snake that is imagined in place of a rope.

Bhāviveka points out two faults in this syllogism. First, the reason is "inconclusive" (*anaikāntika*) because, according to his analysis, it can be used to prove either that something exists or that it does not exist. Second, the thesis is "contradicted by common sense" (*lokaviruddha*) because it is generally accepted that at least one variety of imagined identity exists, namely a rope. For a Yogācāra analysis of the example of the snake and the rope, see MS 2: 163.

exist, because it is imagined, like the snake; or it exists, because it is an object of conceptual thought, like the rope. To say that the rope also does not exist is contradicted by common sense, because there is general agreement that a rope exists, made by hands and human effort from water, fiber, and other materials.

To further strengthen this point, [we] say:

> 5.56ab [Imagined identity] is not completely illusory, because [we] see that this [example] has more than one part.

Imagined identity is not completely illusory, as the opponents think. Why? Because [we] observe that the example, "like the perception that a rope is a snake," has more than one part. First someone thinks that a rope is a snake, then, after investigating its accuracy, realizes that it is a rope and not a snake. When the correct cognition of the rope arises, the snake part [of the cognition] is eliminated, and the rope part is seen. There are thus two parts in the example, an illusory part and a correct part, and it is not exclusively [an example of] illusion. This means that imagined identity, which is the
D215a topic under discussion, is not exclusively illusory.

If you think that imagined identity is completely illusory, there is another big fault:[76]

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76 In verse 5.56cd Bhāviveka returns to an argument mentioned briefly in verse 5.19: If the opponent denies that "imagined" (*kalpita*) things have any reality at all, he engages in an "improper denial" (*apavāda*) of relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). In verse 5.95, Bhāviveka argues that the Yogācāra understanding of "absolute identity" (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) constitutes an "improper reification" (*samāropa*). On the relationship of *samāropa* and *apavāda* in Bhāviveka's thought, see Part 1 of this book, also Eckel 1985: 25-54 and the sources quoted in the notes on verses 5.10-11.

The commentary on verse 5.56cd states a possible Yogācāra response: We may deny the reality of imagined objects, but we do not deny the reality of "real things (*vastu*) that are not accessible to words (Tib. *sgra ji bzhin* / Skt. *yathāruta*) and are directly known (*svasaṃvedya*)." This response recalls Dignāga's definition of the object of perception in PS 1.5cd: "The object of the senses is a material form that is directly known and inexpressible (*svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocaraḥ*)." Bhāviveka responds by saying that this "inexpressible object" is not consistent with the understanding that relative truth is expressible in words.

The connection between relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and language has strong traditional roots. *The Questions of King Milinda*, for example, discuss the name "Nāgasena" in a way that mirrors Bhāviveka's understanding of relative truth. The monk Nāgasena explains that his name is a "denomination" (*sankhā*), a "designation" (*samaññā*), a "conceptual term" (*paññatti*), "conventional usage" (*vohāra*), and a "mere name" (*nāmamattam*). Later in the same passage he calls it a "conventional term" (*sammuti*). The terms "conventional usage" (Pali *vohāra*, Skt. *vyavahāra*) and "conventional term" (Pali *sammuti*, Skt. *saṃvṛti*) are widely used in Mahāyāna literature to name conventional or relative truth. For a Madhyamaka example, see *Prasannapadā* 493: "All conventional usage, such as words and the objects of words, as well as knowledge and the objects of knowledge, is called ordinary relative truth" (*sarva evābhidhānābhidheyajñānajñeyādivyavahāro 'śeṣo lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ity ucyate*).

5.56cd By negating all objects, you make an improper denial of real things.

If you affirm the existence of something that is not accessible to words and is only known directly, you contradict the definition of relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). In the text (*sūtra*), it says that it is impossible to understand the ultimate without a *dharma* that is relative.

Objection: External objects (*bāhyaviṣaya*) do not exist, but defilements (*saṃkleśa*) come from concepts (*kalpanā*) of the cognitive marks (*nimitta*) of objects (*artha*) based on names and conventions.[77]

Reply:

5.57ab It is not true that defilements come from the application of words to objects, even when [these objects] do not exist.

Why?

5.57cd Because [we] observe that animals have defilements even though they are not conscious of language.

[We] observe that animals, such as deer and birds, have many defilements, such as desire, hatred, and ignorance, even though they are not conscious of the various components of language. Therefore, [we] know that external objects such as material form, on which defilements are based, must exist.

Objection: When a cognition of material form arises, it also has a concept that the object (*viṣaya*) actually exists. Its arising depends on words that refer to material form, and it does not arise without such reference. Thus [objects] such as material form are empty. "Material form" and so forth are merely words.[78]

Bhāviveka's quotation from the "text" (*sūtra*) seems to be a reference to MMK 24.10: "It is impossible to teach the ultimate without relying on conventional usage" (*vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate*). This verse is widely quoted and echoed in Madhyamaka literature, as in MHK 3.12: "It is impossible to climb the tower of the palace of reality without the steps of correct relative [truth]." Jacques May (1959: 229) lists other examples.

77 In the introduction to verse 5.57, the opponent responds to Bhāviveka's argument by returning to the status of external objects. The opponent argues that defilements (*saṃkleśa*) come from the application of words to external objects, even though there are no external objects to which words refer. Bhāviveka responds by giving a counter-example: Animals have defilements (and presumably are conscious of objects) even though they are not conscious of language.

78 The logic of the text unfolds in verses 5.58-59 as it did when the opponent made an assertion about mind-only in verse 5.17. When Bhāviveka has contradicted the opponent's assertion, the opponent is forced to support it with a formal syllogism. The syllogism is stated in the introduction to verse 5.58 and defined more clearly in the verse itself:

Reply:

> 5.58 It will not do to imagine that material form is empty of the identity of material form, because the cognition of material form depends on the words that refer to material form.

Why? [We] observe that animals cognize such things as food without being conscious of language.

Furthermore,

D215b

> 5.59 Material form itself is the object of a cognition in which there is an image of a thing that is distinguished from non-material-form, and since this material form exists, it cannot be empty.

It is unreasonable for "material form" to be merely a word and for material form to be completely empty. Why? Material form itself is the object (*gocara*) of a cognition in which there is an image of a thing that is distinguished from non-material-form. Here "non-material-form" (*arūpa*) is something different from material form, such as sound, smell, taste, and touch. To be different from material form is to be something that is not material form, namely, an object of one of the other senses. [These objects] are received (*upātta*), not received, and so forth. To be distinguished is to be distinguished from whatever is not material form, that is, to have different defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). The thing (*vastu*) [that is distinguished from non-material-form] is an object of the sense of sight, that is, something with color and shape. The "image" (*ābha*) of that [object] is an image in which there is a form (*ākāra*) of that [object]. "Cognition" (*mati*) is cognition of that image. The "object" (*gocara*) is material form. Material form is called

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> Material form is empty of the identity of material form (*rūpasvabhāvaśūnyam*),
> Because a cognition of material form depends on words that refer to material form.

This is another way of saying that material form as such does not exist, because knowledge of material form only comes as a result of language. To attack the reason in this syllogism, Bhāviveka attempts to show that "cognitions of material form" and "words for material form" do not imply the nonexistence of material form as an external object.

Bhāviveka begins with the counter-example cited earlier: Animals know food even when they are not conscious of language. He then goes on to explain how a "cognition of material form" (*rūpadhī*) can have a real object, or can be "a cognition in which there is an image of a thing that is distinguished from non-material-form" (*arūpātmavyavacchinnavastvābhamati*). Bhāviveka has already made his understanding of the nature of such objects clear in verses 5.31-36. Here the discussion focuses on the second part of the opponent's reason: How can "a word for material form" (*rūpābhilāpa*) have a real object? Bhāviveka takes this question up in verse 5.60.

an "object" (*gocara*) because it is accessible to the senses. This material form appears in perceptual cognition, is inexpressible, and is real in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*). Since this exists, how can it be reasonable to say that [material form] is merely a word (*abhilāpa*) and completely empty?

Objection: Words refer to universals (*sāmānya*). These [universals] are words, and they are empty of these [objects].[79]

Reply:

> 5.60 If words refer to universals, and universals are completely non-existent, then it is impossible for them to be empty of the objects to which they refer.[80]

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79 In the introduction to verse 5.60, the opponent claims that "the object to which words refer" (*abhilāpya*) is a universal (*sāmānya*), and universals do not exist. The commentary on this verse identifies the opponent's position with Dignāga's view of universals as "exclusion-by-the-other" (*anyāpoha*). The concept of universals then occupies Bhāviveka's attention until verse 5.68.

The Tibetan translators consistently translate *anyāpoha* as "exclusion by the other," although this is only one of several interpretations of the word in Indian tradition. Ratnakīrti presents three alternatives: "This is excluded from the other (*idam anyasmād apohyate*), the other is excluded from this (*asmād vānyad apohyate*), or the other is excluded in this (*asmin vānyad apohyate*)" (Kajiyama 1966: 122). "Exclusion by the other" corresponds to the first of Ratnakīrti's alternatives. Another set of possibilities is found in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* verses 1007-11. In the commentary on 1007-9ab and again on 1011, Kamalaśīla explains that the term *anyāpoha* refers primarily (*mukhya*) to "the object-image" (*arthapratibimbaka*) that is "excluded from other appearances" (*pratibhāsāntarād . . . apohyate*). In the case of the word "cow," this means that the idea "cow" is excluded by the idea of other things, like horses, that are "non-cow." It is not "cow" that excludes "non-cow," but "non-cow" that excludes "cow." Bhāviveka follows this interpretation in verse 5.66 below, where he treats *anyāpoha* as a property of the "other" (i.e., of the "non-cow") rather than of the thing (i.e., the "cow") itself. The Tibetan translation of *anyāpoha* as "exclusion by the other" is clearly not the translators' innovation. It is Bhāviveka's own interpretation of the term, an interpretation that was shared by subsequent thinkers. For more extensive discussion of Dignāga's theory of *apoha*, see Matilal 1986: 379-425; Hayes 1988; Hattori 2000; and Dunne 1999: 132-64.

80 Bhāviveka opens his argument with a *prasaṅga*: If words refer only to universals, and universals do not exist, then words refer to nothing at all, and the opponent literally has nothing to talk about. This is true in the case of the word "emptiness" (*śūnyatva*), since "emptiness" is a universal.

Bhāviveka's argument will be familiar to readers of Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. In that text, Nāgārjuna's opponent argues that if everything is empty, as Nāgārjuna claims, then words have no meaning and Nāgārjuna's own arguments have no effect. Nāgārjuna responds by saying that, while his words do not ultimately refer to real things, they can have as much conventional (or relative) effect on their listeners as a magician's trick has on its audience. Like Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka is speaking about the "relative" (*sāṃvṛta*) meaning of words, not about their ultimate meaning. (He made this clear in the commentary on verse 5.35, when he said that the cognition of material form as a "combination of similar atoms" is true in only a relative sense.) From the relative point of view, Bhāviveka is comfortable

According to you, words refer to universals (*sāmānya*), and universals are like the universal "cow," which is the exclusion of cow by other things, such as horses, that are not cows. [You also think that] universals, which are [defined as] exclusion-by-the-other
D216a (*anyāpoha*), do not exist and are not real things (*vastu*). If [universals] are not real things, what do words refer to? If they do not refer to anything, it is impossible to say that these [universals] are empty of the objects to which they refer.

Objection: Then what kind of universals do words refer to?[81]

Reply:

5.61 A word refers to a thing that possesses a universal, because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [thing] exists, it is reasonable for a word to refer to it.

A word refers to a thing (*vastu*) that possesses a universal (*sāmānyavat*). To possess a universal is to possess a universal such as material-formness (*rūpatva*) that is independent of attributes (*viśeṣa*) such as blue. This [thing that possesses the universal material-

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trading places with Nāgārjuna's opponent and accusing Dignāga of the same mistake that Nāgārjuna's opponent attributed to Nāgārjuna himself. This is because Bhāviveka is convinced that Dignāga engages in an "improper denial" (*apavāda*) of relative truth when he denies that words refer to real objects in a relative sense.

81 In the introduction to verse 5.61, the opponent challenges Bhāviveka to present his own theory about the meaning of words. This challenge is posed as a question about universals: What kind of universals do words refer to? Bhāviveka responds by defining the object as "a thing that possesses a universal" (*sāmānyavadvastu*). His answer takes the form of a syllogism that would be translated literally as follows:

> A thing (*vastu*) that possesses a universal (*sāmānyavat*) is the referent of a word, because it causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing].

Bhāviveka argues that this "thing that possesses a universal," is the referent, because this thing is capable of producing a cognition of itself. It is grammatically possible that the reason, "because it is the cause of a cognition in which there is an image of that" (*tadābhamatihetutaḥ*), means that the cognition contains an image of the universal. But the word "that" in this compound has been used previously to refer to the subject of the sentence. Here the subject is the "thing" (*vastu*) itself. Compare, for example, verse 5.36: "this [combination] is the object (*ālambana*), because it causes a cognition that has the image of that [combination] (*tadābhamatihetutaḥ*)." The terminology reflects the argument in AP 1-2 and in Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* 1, as discussed in the note on verse 5.31.

Bhāviveka's position is similar to that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, who argue that it is possible to perceive an object in a determinate way (*savikalpaka*) so that the particular and universal are conjoined. It also is similar to a position rejected in PS 5.4, where Dignāga says that words cannot refer to "the one that possesses that" (*tadvat*). In other words, they cannot refer to "the thing that possesses a universal." See Hayes 1988: 255; Hattori 2000: 143-46.

formness] can be blue, long, and so on. Why [does a word refer to a thing that possesses a universal]? Because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [thing] exists—that is, since a material form that possesses a universal exists—why could a word not to refer to it? It is reasonable for a word to refer to it.

[Objection:] If a universal (*sāmānya*) is not exclusion-by-the-other (*anyāpoha*), what is it?[82]

Reply:

5.62 It is clear that a universal is emptiness of that which is dissimilar (*vijātīyena śūnyatvam*), because it is the cause of the occurrence of a similar cogni-

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82 In the introduction to verse 5.62, the opponent continues to interrogate Bhāviveka's understanding of universals. Bhāviveka responds by defining a universal as "emptiness of that which is dissimilar" (*vijātīyena śūnyatvam*).

What is Bhāviveka trying to accomplish with this new definition? One possible answer is suggested by the symmetry of his argument. Bhāviveka explains that the meaning of a word has two aspects, a negative one in which a thing is distinguished from what it is not, and a positive one in which it is identified as what it is. He argues that both of these aspects are present in the same cognition. In the commentary on verses 5.62-63, he says that a universal is both "emptiness of what is dissimilar" and the "thing itself" (*bhāvasvabhāva*). In other words, the universal "cowness" is identical to the cow itself. Jñānagarbha uses the same approach when he says that "the negation of the real arising of a thing (i.e., its emptiness) is not different from the thing itself (*bhāvasvabhāva*)" (Eckel 1987: 76). This way of understanding the relationship between emptiness and the "thing" that is empty is consistent with the concept of absence (*abhāva*) in Buddhist logic more generally. Against an opponent who argues that an absence can be an object of knowledge, Mokṣākaragupta says that the absence of pot is established "by the mere perception that cognizes the locus where there is no pot" (translation adapted from Kajiyama 1966: 78).

In the commentary on verse 5.62, the Tibetan translation uses the word *'dus pa* (Skt. *samūha*, translated as "collection") to refer to the "thing" that possesses the universal. In the commentary on verse 5.38, Bhāviveka made a careful distinction between *'dus pa* (Skt. *samūha*) and *bsags pa* (Skt. *saṃcita*, translated as "combination"). There he explained that the word "combination" (Skt. *saṃcita* / Tib. *bsags pa*) refers to "homogeneous (*sajātīya*) atoms that are located in the same place" and "collection" (Skt. *samūha* / Tib. *'dus pa*) to "the collections of such things as elephants and horses or *haridru* and *khadira* trees that are referred to by the terms 'army' or 'forest.'" Bhāviveka made it clear that he thought "combinations" could function as objects of perception, but "collections" could not. Perhaps we should understand the commentary on verse 5.62 to mean that Bhāviveka is deliberately including "collections" in the category of objects that can possess universals. It also is possible, however, that he is using the word "collection" as a synonym of "combination" in verse 5.38. The commentary on verse 5.35 includes a quotation that blurs the distinction between the two terms. Bhāviveka may be allowing the word "collection" to function here the way "combination" did in verses 5.31-38. It is more likely, however, that Bhāviveka considers the "collection of dewlap and so forth" that constitutes a cow to be a broader category than the "combination of homogeneous atoms" that constitutes an object of perception. In other words, it is possible for the universals "army" and "forest" to be applied to "collections" of different entities, even when they are not "homogeneous (*sajātīya*) atoms located in the same place."

> tion (*tulyadhīvṛttihetu*) and because it is the similarity (*sāmānya*) in similar things (*tulyajātīya*).

A universal is like the universal "cow," which is emptiness of that which is dissimilar (*vijātīyena śūnyatvam*), such as a horse. Why? Because it is the cause of the occurrence of a similar cognition of a cow. And, because [a universal] is the thing itself (*bhāvasvabhāva*), it is the similarity, or similar form, in similar things—that is, in collections of particulars such as dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, and horn, or in particulars that are distinguished as being blue, yellow, and so forth. For the Mādhyamikas (*madhyamavādin*), it is clear that this is a universal.

If emptiness of what is not a cow—that is, of a horse—were considered a property of the collection of dewlap and so forth, one could grasp a cow without grasping the
D216b dewlap and so forth. This would mean, for example, that one could perceive that something is a pot without perceiving its material form and so forth. But, according to the Mādhyamikas, a universal is the cow itself as empty of that which is dissimilar, such as a horse.

> 5.63 A universal is not grasped unless its locus its grasped, because it is grasped when that locus is grasped, like a number. This is why the thing that possesses it can be conceptualized and designated by words. [We] do not think that [a universal] is different [from the thing itself].[83]

"Emptiness of what is dissimilar" refers to the cowness (*gotva*) that is the emptiness of what is dissimilar, such as a horse, and it also is the possession of a dewlap and so forth. This is not grasped unless its locus (*āśraya*), which is the collection of dewlap and so forth, is grasped. How [is it grasped]? It is grasped when its locus is grasped. Why? A universal such as cowness is grasped when [its] locus is grasped. What is the example? It is like a number. In the case of numbers such as one and two, one grasps the existence of one, two, or more pots only when one grasps the pots. The numbers one and so forth are not different from the things themselves. They are not grasped unless the things are grasped. The same is true here as well. [The universal] cowness is grasped when the collection of dewlap and so forth is grasped. Since the thing that is designated by the

83 In verse 5.63, Bhāviveka gives a syllogism to explain how a universal is "grasped" (*grāhya*). The process is similar to the cognition of an absence (*abhāva*) as explained in Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*. (See the note on verse 5.62.)

> [A universal] is not grasped without grasping its locus (*āśraya*),
> because it is grasped when that [locus] is grasped,
> like a number.

universal is an object (*viṣaya*) of cognition, it can be conceptualized (*kalpya*). And, since words can be applied to anything that can definitely be grasped by the mind, [we] think that it can be designated by words (*vācya*). "Cowness" is not different from the dewlap and so forth. Then what is it? It is not different from the thing itself (*bhāvasvabhāva*).

Furthermore:

5.64 [A universal] is one, because it is undivided; it occurs in many places, because it is not a substance; and it is not destroyed when those [substances] are destroyed. Therefore, it is wrong not to think that it can be cognized in another [substance].[84]

"Emptiness of what is dissimilar" is one (*eka*), because it is undivided, that is, because it is common to many individual instances (*ākāra*). It occurs in many places (*anekavṛtti*), because it is not a substance (*dravya*), that is, because it is included in all substances. It D217a
is not destroyed when substances are destroyed, because it is found in all substances in the past, present, and future. Therefore, it is wrong not to think that it can be cognized in another substance when the substance [in which it occurs] is destroyed. Why? [We] definitely think that it can be cognized elsewhere.

[Objection:] If it is one, how can the same universal occur in many places?

Reply:

5.65 Not-blue and not-blue-lotus have a different form, so they are not mutu-

84 In verses 5.64-65, Bhāviveka explains that his definition of a universal as "emptiness of what is dissimilar" successfully accounts for the three fundamental properties of a universal (known as the *jātidharmāḥ*): it is one (*eka*), it is permanent (*nitya*), and it belongs to every member of a class. On Dignāga's account of these three properties, see Hayes 1988: 299-300. Note that *dravya* here means "substance" in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense, not "real thing" in the general Madhyamaka sense.

A verse from Bhartṛhari (*Vākyapadīya* 3.14.8) on "relating to the same thing" (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is quoted in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* on PS 5.2: "Two words for the same substance are accepted as relating to the same thing" (*sāmānādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoḥ*). See also Hattori 2000: 106. On the discussion of "blue" and "blue lotus" in verse 5.65, compare PS 5.15.

Hoornaert points out that *bhinnarūpa* ("different form") in verse 5.65 differs significantly from *med pa'i dngos po* ("absence") in the Tibetan translation. I follow the Sanskrit and interpret *bhinnarūpa* as a reference to the difference between "quality" (*guṇa*) and "substance" (*dravya*) mentioned in the commentary.

In the commentary on verse 5.65, when Bhāviveka says that "universals such as material form exclude what is not material form, because they are the causes of cognitions in which there are images of things," he is referring to the reason in the syllogism in verse 5.61. Since the universal and its locus are grasped simultaneously, each is the cause of the cognition of the object. With this statement, he brings the account of his theory of universals to an end.

ally exclusive. They can relate to the same thing, because they can occur in the same object.

"Not-blue" means white and so forth. "Not-blue-lotus" means white lotus and so forth. "Blueness" is grasped as the absence of what is not blue, such as white, and "blue-lotusness" as the absence of what is not a blue lotus, such as a white lotus. The same is true here as well. "Material-formness" is grasped as the absence of what is not material form, such as sound, and "cowness" is grasped as the absence of what is not a cow, such as a horse. Blue does not exclude blue-lotus, and blue-lotus does not exclude blue. As quality (*guṇa*) and substance (*dravya*), they are not mutually exclusive in location, so they can relate to the same thing. To relate to the same thing is to have a common locus. When blue is present in such things as clouds and collyrium, and blue-lotus is present with [the color] red and so forth, the two do not relate to the same thing. But when blue and blue-lotus do occur in the same place, they can occur in the same object. Therefore, [we] think that universals such as material form exclude what is not material form, because they are the causes of cognitions that have the image of a thing. This [argu-
D217b ment] establishes that a universal is emptiness of what is dissimilar.

A universal cannot be exclusion-by-the-other (*anyāpoha*). Why?[85]

5.66 Exclusion by one thing (*anyāpoha*) cannot be the universal of another, be-

85 After presenting his own theory, Bhāviveka responds to Dignāga's concept of universals as *anyāpoha* or "exclusion-by-the-other." First he argues that "exclusion-by-the-other" is not a property of the thing whose universal it is supposed to designate: it actually is a property of the "other." In other words, the universal "cowness" is a property of horses rather than cows.

> Exclusion by one thing (*anyāpoha*) cannot be the universal of another,
> because it is a property of the former,
> like particulars (*viśeṣa*).

If Dignāga responds by saying that "cowness" is a property of cows, he has to specify what kind of "thing" a cow actually is, and his position becomes indistinguishable from Bhāviveka's.

The second argument, found in verse 5.66, extends the first:

> Exclusion by one thing (*anyāpoha*) is not a specific cognition (*dhībheda*) of another,
> because an absence cannot have particulars.

According to the view of absences in Buddhist logic (as explained, for example, in Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* mentioned in the note on verse 5.62), an absence only involves the specific cognition of the locus where the absence occurs. The absence is not cognized in and of itself. To cognize "cowness" as a horse's exclusion of cows may involve a specific cognition of the characteristics of a horse, but it lacks any specific cognition of the characteristics of a cow.

> cause it is a property of the former, like particulars. This [exclusion-by-the-other] is not a specific cognition of such things as a dewlap, because an absence cannot have particulars.

Exclusion by one thing [or exclusion-by-the-other] is an act of differentiation in which something that is other performs the act of exclusion. For example, horses and so forth, which are other [than a cow], exclude "cowness." This [act of exclusion] cannot be the the universal of another [that is, of the cow]. Why? Because it is a property of the former [that is, of horses and so forth]. What is the example? Like particulars (*viśeṣa*). For example, the particulars of a cow, such as horns, which are other [than the particulars of a horse], exclude the particulars of a horse, such as a mane, but they are not the universal of those [other particulars]. Similarly, while horses and so forth are not cows, are other [than cows], and exclude cowness, they cannot be the universal "cowness." This exclusion-by-the-other is not a specific cognition of such things as dewlap, tail, hump, and hoof. Why? Because the exclusion of something is an absence, and an absence cannot have particulars.

Because this [exclusion-by-the-other] is an absence,

> 5.67ab If this [exclusion-by-the-other] is grasped without grasping the thing itself, it is wrong to think that it is this [thing itself] that is conceptualized and designated by words.[86]

If [you] say that a universal, which is exclusion-by-the-other, is the thing itself (*bhāvasvabhāva*) and do not say that it is an absence (*abhāva*), then it is reasonable for this [thing itself] to be conceptualized (*kalpya*) by the mind and designated (*vācya*) by words. But if you think that exclusion-by-the-other is grasped without grasping the thing itself, and also that it is an act of exclusion carried out by something other than the thing itself,

86 In the introduction to verse 5.61, the opponent asked Bhāviveka to explain what he thinks words refer to. In verse 5.63, Bhāviveka said that the "locus" (*āśraya*) of the universal is conceptualized (*kalpya*) and designated by words (*vācya*). Here in verse 5.67, he argues that, if "exclusion-by-the-other" is not the thing itself, then the thing itself is not what is conceptualized and designated by words.

In the second half of the verse, Bhāviveka considers the possibility that "exclusion-by-the-other," while different from the thing itself, makes it possible for the thing itself to be conceptualized and designated. He responds to this suggestion by saying that it would then be the thing itself that is conceptualized and designated, rather than the universal, which is "exclusion-by-the-other." The only way to solve this problem is to assert, as Bhāviveka does in verse 5.63, that the universal is not different from the thing itself.

When Bhāviveka says "the thesis in your inference is not accepted," he has in mind an inference in which Dignāga argues that it is "exclusion-by-the-other" that is conceptualized and designated, because. . . ." This inference is never explicitly stated in the commentary, although this clearly is Dignāga's point.

then it is wrong to think that it is this [thing itself] that is conceptualized and designated. It is difficult to prove these two points.

Someone may say that the thing itself is conceptualized and designated by means of exclusion-by-the-other.

In reply [we] say:

> 5.67cd If this [exclusion-by-the-other] causes something else to be designated, then it is not this [exclusion-by-the-other] that is designated and [conceptualized].

If exclusion-by-the-other causes the thing that has the universal (*sāmānyavadvastu*) to
D218a be simultaneously grasped, then it is the thing itself that is conceptualized and designated; it is not the universal, or exclusion-by-the-other, that is conceptualized and designated. For this reason, the thesis in your inference is not accepted.

Furthermore,

> 5.68 If the thing itself is different from that [exclusion-by-the-other], then it is not inexpressible. For this reason, this statement of the Yogācāra approach is not reasonable.[87]

If exclusion-by-the-other is different from the thing itself, then, as different from the thing itself, one can have a different idea of it and give it a different name. If so, exclusion-by-the-other cannot be inexpressible. Therefore, when we have rationally investigated this statement of the Yogācāra approach—namely the idea that exclusion-by-the-other (*anyāpoha*) is a universal (*sāmānya*)—we find that it is not established. So the points

87 Bhāviveka seems to be arguing that, if the thing itself is designated by means of a universal or "exclusion-by-the-other" and also is different from that universal, then it cannot be considered inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*), as it is in PS 5.42 (*rang bzhin 'ga' yang brjod mi bya*).

The commentary on the first half of this verse puzzled Hoornaert and Yamaguchi, as it should. It is one of the rare cases where the Tibetan text of the commentary seems to misunderstand the verse. As we have it, the commentary says that it is unreasonable for "exclusion-by-the-other" to be inexpressible. This argument would not concern Dignāga, since he thinks that "exclusion-by-the-other" is expressible; it is just the "thing itself" that is inexpressible. The commentary is so clear in this misunderstanding that it is difficult to attribute the error to a copyist. Perhaps the misunderstanding belongs to the translators, or perhaps this passage suggests that the commentary belongs to someone other than the author who wrote the verses.

The final sentence in the commentary makes clever use of the word "imagined" (*kalpita*) to point out that the idea of "imagined identity" in the Yogācāra system is wrong. Perhaps the author is aware of the distinction found in Candrakīrti (on MA 6.26) and in Jñānagarbha (Eckel 1987: 123) between two kinds of incorrect relative truth: one that consists of false cognition and another that is "imagined" in a doctrinal system.

that the Yogārcāras imagine in their doctrinal system (*siddhānta*) are not reasonable, that is, they are not consistent with reason.

Dependent Identity

Objection: Our approach is not unreasonable, because it does not contradict reason. Why? We think that things are empty (*niḥsvabhāva*), because they are empty of the identity (*ātman*) attributed by words (*abhilāpa*).[88] The identity attributed by words does not arise, and because it does not arise, it does not cease. Anything that is referred to by words (*abhilāpavadvastu*) does not exist at all in the way that it is described, because it is a mere convention (*saṃketamātra*). If the object (*gocara*) of a word were a real thing, then the word "fire" would burn the mouth. So [we] accept the existence of dependent [things], because "imagined things do not exist, but dependent [things] do exist."

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88 Verses 5.69-70 open the discussion of "dependent identity" (*paratantrasvabhāva*), the second of the three identities. In verse 5.6, Bhāviveka gave a Yogācāra argument for the existence of dependent identity:

> Dependent identity exists,
> because designations (*prajñapti*) have causes,
> because otherwise neither [imagined nor absolute identity] would exist,
> and because one apprehends defilements.

We would normally expect Bhāviveka to build his discussion of dependent identity around these three reasons. These reasons are discussed, however, in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 52-59). Rather than repeat these arguments, Bhāviveka starts with a Yogācāra syllogism about the emptiness of dependent identity:

> Things are empty,
> because they are empty of the identity attributed by words.

According to lCang-skya, this reason presupposes "ultimately existing things" as its subject (Lopez 1987: 302; Tibetan in Lopez 1982: 331), yielding the following syllogism:

> Ultimately existing things are empty,
> because they are empty of the identity attributed by words.

The last sentence in Bhāviveka's introduction of the Yogācāra position (in the commentary that precedes verses 5.69-70) ties this argument to a quotation from *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 2.189 that asserts the existence of dependent identity: "Imagined things do not exist, but dependent [things] do exist" (*nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantraś ca vidyate*). Other occurrences of this verse are noted in Lindtner 1982a: 155.

At the end of verse 5.70, the objector says that a *dharma* is not a "thing" (*vastu*). This means that a *dharma* (which lCang-skya identifies as an "ultimately existing entity") is not the "thing" (*vastu*) that serves as the referent of a word (*abhilāpya* in verses 5.60, 61, 68 and *vācya* in verses 5.61, 63, 67) in Bhāviveka's discussion of imagined identity.

Reply:

5.69-70 [The opponents] raise many objections, such as the following: Things are empty, because they are empty of the identity (*ātman*) attributed by words, and, because these [things] do not arise in that way, they do not
D218b arise or cease. Anything that is referred to by a word does not exist in the way it is described, so *dharma*s are not things [that can be referred to by words].

5.71 If [the opponents] are saying that dependent [identity] exists in a relative sense, they are proving something that [we] accept. If [they are saying that it exists] in a real sense, there is no example and the reason is contradicted.[89]

If [the opponents] are arguing that everything is relative (*saṃvṛti*), they are proving something that [we] accept (*siddhasādhana*), because we also think that everything [is real] from the point of view of relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatyanayena*). If they are arguing [that things exist] ultimately (*paramārthena*), there is no example for the argument that dependent [identity] exists ultimately, because this also is empty (*niḥsvabhāva*). And the reason, "because they are empty of the identity attributed [to them] by words," is contradicted. The argument that [things] are empty of the identity attributed [to them] by words proves that things exist that can be referred to by words and thus are not empty. In other words, [the reason] proves that the subject (*dharmin*) is the opposite [of what is intended].

Objection: According to us, dependent identity is empty of arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāva*), because it does not arise from itself, like an illusion (*māyā*). And, because it is empty in this way, the reason [in the preceding argument] is not contradicted.[90]

89 Verse 5.71 discusses the existence of dependent identity by asking the basic Madhyamaka question: Does it exist conventionally or ultimately? If the Yogācāras say that it exists conventionally, there is no disagreement. If they say that it exists ultimately, there are problems. To say that the syllogism has no example means that the opponent cannot point to anything that "ultimately exists" and also is "empty." (For Mādhyamikas, "emptiness" means precisely the lack of "ultimate existence.") To say that the reason ("because they are empty of the identity attributed by words") is "contradicted" means that the reason implies that things exist in a way that cannot be expressed by words. For Mādhyamikas, this means that they are not empty.

90 Verse 5.72 is introduced by another Yogācāra syllogism:

> Dependent identity is empty of arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāva*),
> because it does not arise from itself (*sadbhūta*),
> like an illusion (*māyā*).

This argument follows a syllogism in Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* 24-25ab: "This

Reply:

5.72 If [the opponents say that dependent identity] is empty of arising because it does not arise from itself, this does not contradict [the Madhyamaka doctrine of] no arising, cessation, and so forth.

It simply confirms our position. According to us, things that arise from homogeneous (*sajātīya*) causes and conditions do not arise in their own right (*svātmanaḥ*), so they are empty of identity (*svabhāvaśūnya*) and neither arise nor cease.

This approach also is consistent with tradition. Why?[91]

5.73ab The Sage said that whatever arises from conditions does not arise.

[dependent identity] does not have any nature (*bhāva*) of its own (read *svayaṃ* for *nvayaṃ*), because it arises from other conditions [or conditions other than itself], like an illusion (*māyā*). It is said to be empty of arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāva*) because it does not arise as it appears (*yathā prakhyāti*)."

Sthiramati's syllogism makes it possible to give a more precise translation of the ambiguous word *sadbhūta* in Bhāviveka's version of the Yogācāra syllogism. The word could be translated simply as "real." If so, the reason would mean "because it does not really arise." This would be consistent with Bhāviveka's view that dependent identity does not ultimately arise at all. According to Hoornaert's account of the Yogācāra position, however, it is more accurate to translate *sadbhūta* as meaning "from itself as a pre-existing entity." In other words, to say that something does not arise *sadbhūta* (as in Bhāviveka's verse) is equivalent to saying that it does not arise from itself (as in Sthiramati). Bhāviveka uses the ambiguity in the meaning of *sadbhūta* to steer the Yogācāra position (dependent identity does not arise from itself) toward the Madhyamaka position (dependent nature does not arise as anything in its own right).

When Bhāviveka says that the Yogācāra argument "cannot negate [the Madhyamaka doctrine of] no arising and no cessation," he is using the terminology of verse 5.7, where the Yogācāra opponent said that the Madhyamaka position is wrong to "concentrate on the negation of arising and cessation."

Lindtner reads *nānutpādanirodhādipratiṣedhasamarthanam* ("not capable of negating no arising, cessation, and so forth"), while Hoornaert reads *nanūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhasamarthanam* ("certainly capable of negating arising, cessation, and so forth"). Hoornaert's reading is more consistent with the Tibetan translation of the verse: *skye 'gag la sogs 'gal sgrub yin* ("proves the contradiction of arising, cessation, and so forth"). Lindtner's is more consistent with the commentary.

91 After Bhāviveka has made his argument against the existence of dependent identity, he uses verse 5.73 to claim that his own approach is more consistent with the authority of tradition (*āgama*). The commentary on verse 5.73 alludes to the *Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇa Sūtra*: *yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto // na tasya utpādu sabhāvato 'sti // yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa śūnya ukto // yaḥ śūnyatāṃ jānāti so 'pramattaḥ //*. On the source of this quotation, see Lindtner 1982a: 131. Compare the *Anavataptahrada* cited in *Prasannapadā* 239, 491, 500, 504; see also *Madhyamakāvatāra* 229. For other references, see Lamotte 1976: lxiv.

For what reason?

5.73cd Because he denies that it ultimately arises with its own identity.

D219a The Sage said that whatever arises from conditions ultimately does not arise, because no such thing can be found (*upalabhya*) apart from a combination of causes and conditions. As is said [in the *Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇa Sūtra*], "Anything that is born from conditions is not born and does not arise in its own right. Anything that depends on conditions is said to be empty. Anyone who knows emptiness is a prudent person."

Furthermore,

5.74 Since *dharma*s are not real, it is not contradictory, in a relative sense, for them to be the particular and universal objects of different cognitions and words.[92]

It is precisely because *dharma*s are not real that it is consistent, in a relative sense, for them to be the particular objects (*svalakṣaṇagocara*) of different cognitions, such as "blue" and "material form," and the universal objects (*sāmānyalakṣaṇagocara*) of different words, such as "pot" and "cloth." If they were real things, they would have only one nature, like space and so forth, and they could not be the objects of different cognitions and different words. This clearly is not the case.

On this point another tradition (*āgama*) is accepted by both parties.[93] What is it?

5.75 Any name that is used to designate a *dharma* is not found in it. This is the nature of *dharma*s.

"Any name" means the different names and syllables that refer to particulars and universals. "A *dharma*" means the material form and so forth that are designated [by a name]. "Is not found in it" means that a name is not found in a *dharma* because *dharma*s are not verbal in nature (*anakṣarasvabhāva*). Words from different dialects or with different etymologies can refer (*abhi-lap*) to the same object in different ways. For example,
D219b water can be called *pānīya*, *ap*, *salila*, and *nīra*. If its nature were such that it could be

92 Verse 5.74 summarizes Bhāviveka's understanding of the two truths. According to his position, *dharma*s are ultimately unreal (*abhūta*), but they can still function from a relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*) as the particular (*sva*) objects (*gocara*) of cognitions (*dhī*) and as the universal (*sāmānya*) objects (*gocara*) of words (*śabda*). The first of these two points was explained in verses 5.34-38, the second in verses 5.62-68.

93 Verse 5.75 contains another appeal to the authority of tradition. This verse from the *Bhavasaṃkrānti Sūtra* is quoted in Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (33). Bhāviveka also quotes the verse in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 56).

designated by only a single word, it would be impossible to apply any other words to it, and no [other] words could designate it. But this is not the case. "This is the nature of *dharmas*" means that the ultimate nature (*paramārthatā*) of *dharmas* is inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*). From the relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyā*), one applies names and conventional terms in order to recognize [things]. With these [names], one can develop the discrete cognition (*parijñāna*) that something is a cow rather than a horse or a man, based on the particular qualities (*viśeṣa*) of a thing. The thing itself is the object of cognition. Why? Those who are deaf and dumb are not aware of syllables and words, but they cognize such things as pots. [Animals] such as cows also recognize their own young by smell and sight. This is why objects are completely empty of names, and their actual identities cannot be expressed. On this we both agree.

> 5.76 If [you think that dependent identity] arises from conditions, because it is dependent, then it is as unreal as an illusion, and [you] confirm [our] position.[94]

[You] may think that the identity of dependent identity exists only as an identity that arises from a combination of conditions and, because it arises dependently, is not ultimate. In reply [we] say: If you think that [dependent identity] arises dependently, it is as unreal as an illusion. How, then, can it have any identity? You simply confirm our position.

For the reason that has already been stated,[95]

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94 Verse 5.76 returns to the reason in the syllogism that introduced verse 5.72, arguing again that the Yogācāra position fails to distinguish itself from the Madhyamaka.

95 In verse 5.77, Bhāviveka takes up another aspect of the account of dependent identity in verse 5.5: "Those who see reality see absolute identity when they do not apprehend imagined [identity] and do not grasp dependent [identity]." The claim that imagined identity is not "apprehended" and dependent identity is not "grasped" echoes the terminology of *Triṃśikā* 28: "But when consciousness does not apprehend an object, it stands in consciousness-only, because that [consciousness] is not grasped [as a subject] if there is no object" (*yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ* [for Lévi's *vijñānam*] *naivopalabhate tadā / sthitaṃ vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt*).

Bhāviveka's introductory line ("For the reason that has already been stated") refers to the Yogācāra claim that dependent identity "does not arise by itself." Bhāviveka says that it is possible not to "grasp" dependent identity only if dependent identity "does not arise in its own right" (*svabhāvājāti*). In other words, it is possible only if dependent identity is ultimately empty.

Bhāviveka's reference to "false appearance" (*mithyākhyāna*) in 5.77cd is echoed in the terminology of Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* 24-25ab: "This [dependent identity]. . . is said to be empty of arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāva*) because it does not arise as it appears (*yathā prakhyāti*)." Bhāviveka argues that if something arises ultimately (*paramārthena*), it cannot have a false appearance.

This verse is a reminder that Bhāviveka's argument against the Yogācāra concept of

5.77ab [We] think that dependent [identity] is not grasped, because it does not arise with any identity of its own.

Why?

5.77cd If something arises ultimately, it cannot have a false appearance.

You say that dependent [identity] is not grasped, because it has no subject and object. But, if [dependent identity] arises with an identity of its own, it cannot have a false
D220a appearance. It has a false appearance precisely because it does not arise with any identity of its own.

Furthermore:

5.78 If *dharma*s exist as they appear, that is, if they are what they appear to be, how can they be illusory?[96]

Things appear as objects of the senses, because they depend on causes and conditions. If *dharma*s exist as they appear—that is, if they are what they appear to be—how can they be illusory? An illusion may appear to be a man and so forth, but it is not grasped that way, because such an illusion is empty of the identity of being a man. Thus it is unreasonable to think that dependent identity exists.

It seems very reasonable to say: "because these [things] do not arise in that way, they do not arise or cease."[97]

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dependent identity has two sides. If the Yogācāra opponent says that dependent identity arises in only a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*), he repeats the position of the Madhyamaka. If the opponent says that dependent identity arises ultimately (*paramārthena*), he runs into problems like the one pointed out in verse 5.77.

96 Verse 5.78 extends the argument of verse 5.77 to the example ("like illusion") in the Yogācāra syllogism in verse 5.72: If things arise ultimately, they must arise "as they appear" and cannot be illusory.

97 The introduction to verse 5.79 refers to the Yogācāra objection in verse 5.69. Bhāviveka is being ironic when he says that, after all the intervening discussion, the Yogācāra assertion seems quite reasonable. He means, of course, that it is reasonable only when understood from the Madhyamaka perspective.

The subject of this verse 5.79 (*bhāva*s) is carried down from verse 5.69, the first verse on dependent identity. What does it means to say that "things" (*bhāva*) are not "things" (*vastu*)? lCang-skya suggests that the word *bhāva* in verse 5.69 refers to "ultimately existing things." Verse 5.79 can be interpreted as meaning that "ultimately existing things are not ultimately things." But lCang-skya is interpreting the Yogacāra objection, and the sentence makes little sense. Here the speaker is Bhāviveka himself. It is likely that Bhāviveka is reverting to the logical form that serves him well in his commentary on the MMK: he is assuming "things" conventionally in order to negate them ultimately. The commentary confirms this interpretation when it says that "things" arise from causes and conditions but do not "really"

5.79 [Things] do not arise or cease, are not things, and are empty, because they do not arise from themselves and because they are not substantially real (*dravyasat*).

Things (*bhāva*) arise from homogeneous causes and conditions, but they do not arise from themselves (*sadbhūtena*), because there is not even the slightest identity to be found apart from a combination of causes and conditions at the moment when it is in a state of continuation. Therefore, because they do not arise from themselves, they do not arise or cease, they are not things (*vastu*), and they are empty. Nevertheless, the image (*ābhāsa*) of these things as objects (*ālambana*) is manifested from homogeneous causes and conditions and is a collection (*samūha*) of eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, and touch. But, like an army or forest, they are not substantially real (*dravyasat*). It should be understood, therefore, that they do not arise or cease, are not things, and are empty. This is the meaning [of the verse].

Objection: If you [Mādhyamikas] think that things do not exist, you rule out the designation (*prajñapti*) of *dharma*s. D220b

Reply:

5.80ab [We] agree about awareness-only (*vijñaptimātra*), so [we] do not deny the possibility of designation (*prajñapti*).[98]

Both of us agree that awareness-only is free from concepts of "I" and "mine." Designations (*prajñapti*) refer to external and internal *dharma*s. [These *dharma*s] are not substantially real but are generated by action (*karma*) that is produced by the consciousness

arise. In other words, relative things ultimately are not things.

On the claim that an "object" is "manifested from homogeneous causes and conditions and is a "collection (Tib. *'dus pa* / Skt. *samūha*) of eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, and touch," see the commentary on verses 5.31 and 36 and the notes on verse 5.62.

98 Verse 5.80 takes up the first part of the argument for the existence of dependent identity in verse 5.6:

> Dependent identity exists,
> because designations (*prajñapti*) have causes.

See the notes on verse 5.6 for a discussion of the Yogācāra sources of this argument. For a more extensive discussion of the argument itself, see Avalokitavrata's commentary (Eckel 1985: 52-54). Bhāviveka also is responding to the continuation of the Yogācāra account of the three identities in the commentary on verse 5.5 and in *Triṃśikā* 25. When imagined identity is not apprehended and dependent identity is not grasped, there is a vision of absolute identity as the "equality" (*samatā*) of subject and object. In *Trimśikā* 25, this is referred to as "ideation-only" (*vijñaptimātratā*).

(*vijñāna*) of external objects.[99] So there is no fault in our position.

[The fault is] in your position.

> 5.80cd If what is removed and what does the removing are real, what do you think recognizes [suffering]?[100]

If what is removed—namely, suffering and so forth–and what does the removing—namely, the combination of conditioned states (*saṃskāra*) that practices the cultivation of the path—exist as part of consciousness—that is, as a part of dependent [identity]—then, as things in their own right, they cannot become anything else, and their basis cannot change. So, if you think that the recognition of suffering is the condition for supermundane [cognition] and has dependent identity, what do you think [recognizes] this [suffering]? If there is no change from a mundane to a supermundane state, where and how can [recognition] arise? This is the way to interpret [the verse].

Objection: If nothing is substantially real, as you think, how can there be liberation?

Reply:

> 5.81 Liberation comes from the cessation of concepts and is possible only if [things] are not substantially real. If [things] are substantially real, they cannot arise, so no other possibility can be maintained.[101]

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99 On Bhāviveka's statement that "external objects are generated by action (*karma*) that is produced by consciousness," compare the position in verse 5.48.

100 The reference to the "removal" (*prahāṇa* or *hāni*) of "suffering and so forth" in verse 5.80cd and commentary picks up the third reason in verse 5.6:

> Dependent identity exists,
> because one apprehends defilements.

The commentary explains: "If dependent identity did not exist, one would not apprehend any defilements; but they are apprehended, because defilements depend on mind and mental phenomena, and the removal of [defilements] is liberation." On the "change of basis" (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) mentioned in the commentary on verse 5.80cd, see the commentary on verse 5.5 and *Triṃśikā* 29.

The Sanskrit text of verse 5.80cd reads "aversion (*nirvidā*) and so forth" rather than "recognition (*parijñāna*) and so forth," as in the commentary. "Recognition and so forth" are the four actions that are performed in relation to the four noble truths: a person "recognizes" (*parijñāna*) suffering, "removes" (*prahāṇa*) the arising of suffering, "realizes" (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) the cessation of suffering, and "practices" (*bhāvanā*) the path. These four actions are discussed by Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.26-27. Bhāviveka follows the argument of those verses.

101 Verse 5.81 discusses the Yogācāra concept of liberation found in the commentary on verse 5.5 and in *Triṃśikā* 30: "This is the pure element that is inconceivable, virtuous, permanent, and pleasurable. It is the liberation body and also the [body] called Dharma that belongs to

If things are not substantially real, it is possible for liberation to come from the arising of noble, non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge, after there has been mundane, conceptual knowledge. If [things] are substantially real and do not change, [liberation] is not possible. Liberation can come from the absence of concepts if things are not substantially real. Even if [things] are substantially real in some way [i.e., in a relative D221a sense], they do not arise in their own right, so it is still possible for liberation to come from the absence of concepts. Why imagine that the cognition (*upalambhajñāna*) of absolute identity exists any other way? [We] do not think [that there is any other way of cognizing absolute identity], because [we] have already said [in verse 5.16],

> If the Teacher's awakening has [absolute] identity as its object (*ālambana*), it must be a conceptual cognition, it must have an object, and it must not be non-conceptual.

When we point out the faults in his approach, the opponent is deeply wounded and responds in anger.

> 5.82 If nothing is real, there cannot be any designation. Someone who holds this view is a nihilist, with whom one should not speak or share living quarters.

> 5.83ab This person falls into a bad rebirth and takes others with him.[102]

According to us, the Yogācāras, external objects do not exist, but consciousness-only does exist. External objects are grasped as aspects of the transformation of consciousness, and absolute identity is known directly by the Tathāgata. But in the doctrine (*vāda*) of the Madhyamaka, there is an improper denial (*apavāda*) of ordinary *dharma*s even from the relative point of view (*saṃvṛtyāpi*), because [ordinary *dharma*s] are said to be illusory. And [for the Mādhyamika] nothing exists ultimately either, because neither consciousness nor what is known by consciousness exist. If [the Mādhyamika] improperly denies (*apa-vad*) that anything is real, he cannot make any designation (*prajñapti*) of *dharma*s. Without this, he is just like a nihilist (*nāstika*). No one should speak to him

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a Great Sage."

Bhāviveka's response to the Yogācāra objection is similar to Nāgārjuna's inversion of the objector's argument in MMK 24.1 and 20. The objector says: "If everything is empty, then nothing arises and nothing ceases, and there cannot be four noble truths." Nāgārjuna replies: "If everything is not empty, then nothing arises and nothing ceases, and there cannot be four noble truths."

102 Verses 5.82-83 allude to Asaṅga's comments about the treatment of nihilists (*nāstika*) in the *Tattvārtha* chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. As this passage shows, Bhāviveka took Asaṅga's comments to be directed against the Madhyamaka. Asaṅga's comments are translated and discussed in Part 1 of this book.

or share living quarters with him. This is why the Blessed One said: "O monks, henceforth, you should not rely on, associate with, or accompany the worldly ones (*lokāyatika*) who confidently pronounce various mantras." You [the Mādhyamikas] are evil and will
D221b certainly be reborn in a place that people seek to avoid. By rejecting the true Dharma, you will go to a bad rebirth, and by persuading others to be attached to false views, which are like deadly crocodiles, you will cause them to fall as well.[103]

[Reply:] The Master says:

> 5.83cd These angry words are like vomit: they show undigested pride.[104]

Your angry words show pride just as vomit shows undigested food. Here anger is compared to vomit, your words are compared to the act of vomiting, and pride is compared to undigested food. Someone who vomits shows undigested food. When you express your anger, you show your pride in exactly the same way. But you do not refute our view.

Why are [we] certain that these angry words show pride just as vomit shows undigested food, and that the Madhyamaka does not suffer the same fault?

> 5.84 [We] think that *dharma*s are illusory, because they have no real identity, because they delude foolish people, and because they come into existence after not existing.[105]

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103 The commentary on 5.83ab echoes section 13 of the *Kāśyapaparivarta*: "O Kāśyapa, there are four bad friends and bad companions for a Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva should avoid them. What are these four? A monk who follows the Śrāvakayāna and acts for his own benefit, one who follows the Pratyekabuddhayāna and has little purpose and little left to do, a worldly one (*lokāyatika*) who confidently pronounces various mantras. . . ."

104 Bhāviveka mentions the pride (*abhimāna*) of Yogācāra "scholars" in verse 5.1. In the opening verses of the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, Haribhadra says that Vasubandhu "takes great pride in his knowledge and in his clever position about the distinction between existence and absence" (AAA 1).

Bhāviveka also refers to vomit (*udgāra*) in MHK 3.116: "Those who seek their own benefit and analyze things as they are do not rely on vomit-like words that reek with the illness of false views (*kudṛṣṭyāmayadurgandhasaktodgārā giras*)."

105 Bhāviveka concludes his discussion of dependent identity with a syllogism to establish the certainty of his own position:

*Dharma*s are illusory,
because they do not have real identity,
because they cause foolish people to be deluded,
and because they come into existence after not existing.

The thesis is meant to show that the Madhyamaka position gives a proper and "certain" (*niyata*) explanation of the example in the Yogācāra syllogism in verse 5.72.

We never said that things are completely non-existent. We think that *dharma*s arise in a relative sense from homogeneous causes and conditions, like illusion. This is because they do not have real identity, because they mislead foolish people, and because they come into existence after not existing. Why would there not be designations (*prajñapti*)? There are designations, so the problem you pointed out does not apply to us. We think that *dharma*s are empty from the ultimate point of view. We also avoid the second extreme, which is non-existence. How can our [position] be compared to a doctrine of nihilism? For this reason, your angry words are like vomit.

Absolute Identity

If you think that the Dharma nature (*dharmatattva*) is as non-conceptual as space, this is unreasonable.[106] Why? D222a

> 5.85 It is not reasonable for [the Dharma nature] to be a non-conceptual entity like space, because [space] permits a variety of concepts.

Space may have no concepts, but a variety of concepts, such as "blue," "broad," "pure," and "impure," can still be applied to it. If the Dharma nature were like this, it would be the object of a variety of concepts, such as "pure" and "impure," and it would no longer be non-conceptual.

Furthermore, if you think that absolute identity is inexpressible, [we] respond:

> 5.86 If [absolute identity] arises, it cannot be inexpressible, because of the refutation previously stated. If it were an inexpressible [entity], it would

106 In verse 5.85, Bhāviveka begins his discussion of absolute identity (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). Verses 5.85-92 discuss absolute identity as an object of cognition; verses 5.93ff. then discuss it as cognition itself. This distinction reflects the structure of the Yogācāra objection (where verses 5.2-3 discuss the ultimate as object and 5.4 discusses it as cognition); it also reflects Bhāviveka's response in 5.10-16 and 5.17-54. Bhāviveka uses the same distinction in his critique of absolute identity in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 70-75) and elsewhere in his work. For other examples, see the note on verse 5.2.

The objector's position, "the nature of things (*dharmatattva*) is non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*), like space (*ākāśa*)," reflects a common Yogācāra comparison. See, for example, MAV 1.17: "The purity [of emptiness] is thought to be similar to the purity of water, gold, and space."

In the commentary on verse 5.6, the Yogācāra objector speaks obliquely of absolute identity as the "object" of non-conceptual knowledge: "[Dependent identity] is the object of supermundane, non-conceptual knowledge and is perceived when absolute identity is perceived. This is because dependent [identity] is realized by pure, ordinary, subsequent knowledge."

be relative, and you should not confuse it with reality.[107]

If absolute identity arises, it cannot be inexpressible. This has already been refuted by [the verses] that begin with the following:

> A word refers to a thing that possesses a universal, because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [thing] exists, it is reasonable for a word to refer to it.[108]

If it were completely inexpressible, it would be relative (*saṃvṛti*), and something that is relative should not be confused with reality.

Furthermore,

> 5.87 If [you] think that the vision of reality is [vision] of this [absolute identity], because there is no other reality, why not think that the vision of reality is [vision] of a pot, because there is not a second pot?[109]

If [you] think that the vision of reality (*tattvadarśana*) or of ultimate emptiness (*paramārthaśūnyatā*) is [vision] of this ultimate, because there is no other or second ultimate reality, why not think that the vision of ultimate reality is [vision] of a pot, because there is no other or second pot?

Objection: Although the Dharma essence (*dharmadhātu*) is non-conceptual and
D222b inexpressible, [we] think that it is purified in the same way that water, gold, and space are purified. If this is pure, the mind also is [pure].

[Reply:] To refute this we say:

> 5.88 Do not [say] that [the Dharma essence] is defiled and purified just to hide a weakness in [your] approach, because gold and so forth are affected by conditions.[110]

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107 The "inexpressibility" (*anabhilāpyatā*) of Thusness is discussed in chapter 4 of Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Tattvārtha* chapter). Note particularly pp. 32-33, where the text quotes and comments on the verse from the *Bhavasaṃkrānti Sūtra* that Bhāviveka quotes in verse 5.75. The commentary on verse 5.86 refers to the argument that began in verse 5.61, where Bhāviveka gave his own account of the objects of words from a relative point of view. Compare Bhāviveka's position in this verse to MHK 3.282: "Words such as 'Buddha' are used metaphorically in a way that corresponds to [the Buddha's] progress, but ultimately [the Buddha] is considered inexpressible because he cannot be conceptualized in any way."

108 Verse 5.61.

109 Verse 5.5 said: "Those who see reality see absolute identity." Hoornaert locates the source of the language in verse 5.87 in *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra* 4.10.

110 On the defilement and purification of the Dharma essence, see the notes on verse 5.85.

When water is conditioned by dirt, gold by corrosion, and space by clouds, they appear stained. When these conditions are not present, they appear pure. First they are stained, then they are pure. If the Dharma essence is similar, it must be pure at one moment and stained at another. [You] have said [that the Dharma essence is defiled and purified] simply to hide a weakness in your approach. The Dharma essence is neither defiled nor purified, and gold and so forth are affected by conditions, so the examples of gold and so forth do not prove [your] definition of the Dharma essence.

[This argument about the Dharma essence] is reasonable.

> 5.89 The Dharma nature (*dharmatā*) is like space; it is always pure, but it appears stained or unstained according to the impurity or purity of the eyes.[111]

Someone with an eye disease (*taimirika*) sees space completely obscured by a network of unreal hairs, bees, and flies. But when he applies an ointment that removes the disease, his eyes are purified, and he sees space without any hairs, bees, or flies. Whether space is seen as pure or impure depends on the condition of the eyes, not on [the condition of] space. Similarly, the Dharma nature is naturally pure, but fools whose minds' eyes are impure see it as stained. Noble ones, on the other hand, whose minds' eyes have been
purified by applying the ointment of the view of emptiness (*śūnyatādarśana*), understand D223a
that it is unstained. Whether the Dharma nature is seen as pure or impure depends on the condition of the mind, not on [the condition of] the Dharma nature.

Therefore [we] say:

"Dharma nature" (*dharmatattva* and *dharmatā*) and "Dharma essence" (*dharmadhātu*) are synonyms.

111 Hoornaert takes verse 5.89 as a Yogācāra attempt to justify the claim that was made in the introduction to verse 5.88: the Dharma essence is purified in the way that space or gold is purified. He then interprets verse 5.90 as Bhāviveka's response. This interpretation is permitted by the grammatical structure of the Tibetan, but it seems unlikely. Verses 5.89-90 make the same point, namely that purity and impurity are in the eye of the beholder, and the commentary on verse 5.89 uses a common Madhyamaka example to make the same point.

The example of the person with diseased eyes (*taimirika*) is cited often in Madhyamaka literature to show how the correct vision of reality (*tattvadarśana*) is no vision at all. Bhāviveka concludes his critical discussion of the conventional categories of reality in MHK 3.251-52 with the example of diseased eyes: "Someone who removes an eye disease and whose eyes are clear and pure, does not see spots, hairs, flies, or a double image of the moon. Similarly, someone who removes the eye disease of defilements and objects of cognition and has the clear eye of true knowledge does not see anything at all." In MHK 3.280, Bhāviveka attributes this perfected vision to Bodhisattvas in the tenth stage of the Bodhisattva path: "Great beings see [the Buddha] like space, without seeing." For further discussion of this example in Bhāviveka's thought, see Eckel 1992: 129-52. For other examples of *timira* and the *taimirika* in Madhyamaka literature, see La Vallée Poussin 1933c: 30; May 1959: 187; and Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 168. Compare also verse 5.101 below.

5.90ab The cognitive error that consists of impurity and so forth is a property of the subject, not the object.

When space appears pure or impure, the cognitive error is a property of the subject, which is a composite cognition associated with the body and sensory awareness, rather than a property of the object of cognition, which is space and so forth. Similarly, the impurity and purity of the Dharma essence is a property of the subject, which has either false cognition or true cognition. It is not a property of the Dharma essence, which is the object of cognition. So it is unreasonable for you to say that [the Dharma essence] is pure and impure.

Furthermore,

5.90cd [We] think that [a cognition] that has this [Dharma essence] as its object (*ālambana*) is not pure, and reality cannot be treated as an object.[112]

It is unreasonable for a cognition that has the Dharma essence as its object to be pure, because [we] do not accept that a cognition is non-conceptual if it has this as its object. [We] do not think that the Dharma essence, or reality, can be treated as an object, because it cannot ultimately be apprehended as "Dharma essence."

Furthermore,

5.91 If reality is substantially real, there is a flood of faults as before. [We] also do not think that a cognition of that [reality] is supermundane and non-conceptual, because it would cease.[113]

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112 In verse 5.90cd, Bhāviveka rejects the possibility that the ultimate can be an "object" (*ālambana*) of cognition, as he did in verses 5.13-16. The same point is discussed in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25: "Knowledge in which something is apprehended (*sopalambhajñāna*) cannot be called non-conceptual, because it has an image (*ābhāsa*) of an object (*viṣaya*), even when there is no concept of [the object's] identity, as in the case of visual cognition" (Eckel 1985: 72).

113 In verse 5.91ab, the subject of the sentence is the "reality" (*tattva*) that "could not be treated as an object" in the previous verse. Bhāviveka says that, if this "reality" is treated as something "substantially real" (*dravyasat*), problems ensue. To illustrate these problems, he quotes verse 5.47: "[You] may think that the mind is substantially real. . . ," where the subject is not reality as "object" but the mind itself. In other words, reality as "object" can be treated with the same arguments that were earlier applied to claims about the reality of the mind.

In verse 5.91cd, the subject shifts to a syllogism about supermundane cognition:

> The cognition of that [reality] cannot be supermundane and non-conceptual, because it would cease.

Bhāviveka uses a syllogism about the Buddha's awareness to make a point about its object (or lack thereof), as he did in verse 5.16. The terminology of the verse recalls the objection

If [you] think that the Dharma essence is substantially real, then the faults mentioned earlier apply here as well:

> [You] may think that the mind is substantially real because there is defilement and purification, but this is not a refutation, because [we] accept that they come from the arising of mental phenomena in a certain way.

[You] may say that non-conceptual apprehension (*upalabdhi*) of the Dharma nature arises when there is a supermundane cognition (*lokottarajñāna*), but [we] do not think that such [a cognition] can actually arise, because it would cease as soon as it arises. [You] would need to explain why this supermundane cognition does not cease. D223b

Furthermore,

> 5.92ab Cognition is diseased as long as it imitates objects.[114]

What is wrong with this?

> 5.92cd It imitates objects as long as knowledge arises.

This means that even supermundane cognition is diseased if it has absolute identity as its object (*ālambana*), because it imitates the knowledge of an object. Why is this reasonable? A diseased mind that imitates the form (*ākāra*) of an object is subject to saṃsāra. But when one knows that the nature of objects (*jñeya*) is not absolute, there is no object, and one is not subject to saṃsāra, so [we] think that this [no-object] is the Dharma nature (*dharmatattva*).

You think that a Self Existent One's awareness occurs in a single moment, but this is impossible.[115]

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that preceded verse 5.6: "Absolute identity is realized directly and is the object of a Sage's supermundane knowledge."

114 Verse 5.92 echoes Bhāviveka's definition of reality in MHK 3.266: "No object of knowledge (*jñeya*) exists at all, so those who know reality say that ultimate (*atulya*) reality is [the object] about which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises." To take "no-object" (*anālambana*) as the referent of "this" in the last sentence of the commentary is speculative, but it makes sense grammatically and is consistent with Bhāviveka's strategy of equating true awakening (*bodha*) with no-awakening (*abodha*), true seeing (*darśana*) with no-seeing (*adarśana*), and so forth, in MHK chs. 3 and 4.

115 Verse 5.93 marks the transition from discussion of the Dharma essence as the object (*viṣaya* or *ālambana*) of cognition to the discussion of absolute identity as cognition itself. For other examples of this sequence of analysis, see the notes on verses 5.2 and 85.

Svayaṃbhū-jñāna (the Self-Existent One's awareness) is a synonym of *buddha-jñāna* (the Buddha's awareness) in *Aṣṭa* 37 and 191.

The idea that a Buddha's awareness consists of a single moment (*ekakṣana*) of cognition

5.93 Omniscience cannot occur in a single moment, because a cognition cannot act on itself, like a sword-blade,[116] and because there cannot be any self-cognition.

While there are many different objects of knowledge, there is only one Dharma nature, so it is possible for the Omniscient One to know it in a single moment without any distinction But a moment of omniscient cognition cannot know different objects in a single moment. This is because a cognition cannot exist in such a way that it acts on itself, since that would be a contradiction. For example, a sword-blade cannot cut itself. Therefore, if a moment of knowledge ultimately exists, it needs a second moment of knowledge to cognize the first moment of knowledge.

[Objection:] If the Dharma nature does not exist at all, then it is impossible for the nature of things (*bhāvasvabhāva*) to be definitively grasped. If [you] deny even self-cognition, [you] cannot establish that omniscience occurs in a single moment.

D224a [Reply:] It can be established according to our position. How?

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is recognized as an option in the *bhāṣya* on *Kośa* 6.26. In the *Nikāyabheda* section of the 4th chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāviveka associates this idea with the Ekavyāvahārikas: "Some [Mahāsāṃghikas] make the conventional claim (*vyavahāra*), 'The Blessed Ones, the Buddhas comprehend all *dharma*s with a single thought and realize all *dharma*s with a single moment of wisdom,' and thus are called Ekavyāvahārikas." See Bareau 1955: 270. The *locus classicus* for the study of this concept in Mahāyāna literature is chapter 7 of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. For a summary of recent work on this chapter, see Naughton 1991: 1-166.

Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Buddha's awakening as "a single moment of awareness" (*ekakṣaṇajñāna*). For examples, see the commentary on MHK 1.6, 3.268, 3.273, and 4.23. Bhāviveka gives his own interpretation of the "single moment" in verse 5.102 below. For other occurrences of the concept in Madhyamaka literature, along with a discussion of its implications, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 176.

The argument in verse 5.93 deals with the last point in the Yogācāra objection in verse 5.7: "This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is [the means] to attain omniscience, and the one that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not."

> Omniscience cannot occur in a single moment,
> because a cognition cannot act on itself and because there cannot be any self-cognition,
> like a sword-blade.

The word order in the Sanskrit (repeated in the Tibetan translation) suggests that the argument contains two separate reasons: "because a cognition cannot act on itself" and "because there cannot be any self-cognition." But the commentary compresses both into a single reason: "Because a cognition cannot exist in such a way that it acts on itself, since that would be a contradiction." It seems likely that Bhāviveka intended the first reason ("because a cognition cannot act on itself") to serve as justification for the second ("because there cannot be any self-cognition").

116 On the comparison of the sword-blade, see the notes on verse 5.22.

5.94 [The Dharma nature] is grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge, because it does not arise, since its arising can be negated as before, and because it is not substantially real. It also is completely inexpressible.[117]

[The Dharma nature] is grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge. In other words, it is grasped by the discipline of no-grasping. This is because it does not arise, since its arising can be negated as explained before, in the chapter on "The Quest for the Knowledge of Reality," and because it is not substantially real, since it arises in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtyā*) from homogeneous (*sajātīya*) causes and conditions. It also is completely inexpressible, because it is empty. This nature (*svabhāva*) is ultimate (*pāramārthika*).

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117 The structure of verse 5.94 is awkward in English because of the sequence of reasons, but Bhāviveka's meaning is clear. The subject of the verse is the Dharma nature (*dharmatā*), or the nature of things (*bhāvasvabhāva*), carried down from the commentary that states the opponent's objection. The predicate is "grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge." Bhāviveka gives two reasons for his assertion: "because it does not arise" (*ajāta*) and "because it is not substantially real" (*adravyasat*). He supports the first of these reasons ("because it does not arise") with a secondary reason ("since its arising can be negated as before").

The commentary explains that the previous "negation of arising" occurred in the chapter on "The Quest for the Knowledge of Reality," the third chapter of the MHK. Bhāviveka's explicit discussion of non-arising in that chapter begins in verses 3.137-38: "This expanding network of concepts is based on the idea that things arise and forcibly confuse simple people. When scholars see things correctly with the lamp of knowledge, they negate arising, pacify these [concepts], and lay all verbal diversity (*prapañca*) to rest." The argument is summarized in MHK 3.247: "Nothing [arises] from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all; nothing exists or does not exist; and there is no other possibility." The form of the argument follows the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's MMK.

Bhāviveka argues that the Buddha's awakening (*bodha*) ultimately is no-awakening (*abodha*), as, for example, in verses 5.102 and 106 of this chapter and in his discussion of the epithets of the Buddha in 3.267-72. The same can be said of anything when it is viewed from the ultimate perspective, especially concepts and activities that are significantly related to the path toward Buddhahood. In MHK 3.290, Bhāviveka says that advanced Bodhisattvas worship the Buddhas "with the discipline of no-worship" (*anupāsanayogena*). In the commentary on 3.292, a Bodhisattva practices "recollection" (*anusmṛti*) by means of "no-recollection" and "reflection" (*manaskāra*) by means of "no-reflection." He frequently reminds the reader that the "vision of reality" (*tattvadarśana*), which is the goal of the text, in the end is simply "no-vision" (*adarśana*), as in verses 3.280-81: "Heroic beings see him the way they see space, without seeing. They have no concepts and make no effort, and their eyes are clear. They pay homage to the Blessed One without any homage, reflection, or words, and they also are worthy of sincere homage." "No-vision" is discussed in the commentary on verse 5.89. All of these negative modes of practice are based on the practice of "no-apprehension" (*anupalambha*), as discussed in verses 4.20cd-21 and 5.51.

Bhāviveka's claim that the knowledge of the noble ones is only possible if things do not arise and are not substantially real is similar to the idea expressed in verse 5.81 that liberation is possible only if [things] are not substantially real.

Furthermore, according to you,

5.95 If the ultimate identity is the existence of the absence of existence, how can you be free from improper reification and denial?[118]

Someone who seeks to be free from the two extremes of improper reification (*samāropa*) and denial (*apavāda*) has to avoid the extremes of existence (*bhāva*) and absence (*abhāva*). But you think that the absolute (*pariniṣpanna*), or ultimate (*paramārtha*) identity, is both existence and absence. If it exists, [you] are not free from the extreme of improper reification, and if it is absent, [you] are not free from the extreme of improper denial. If [liberation] is to avoid such extremes, how can you be free?

According to us,

5.96 There is no existence, because in reality nothing arises. There is no absence, because there is no existence. [We] think that reality is non-dual, because it avoids both existence and absence.

There is no existence, because ultimately nothing arises. There is no absence, because there is no existence. If there were existence, then, by contrast, there could also be absence. But because there is no existence, there can be no absence. [We] think that reality (*tattva*) avoids both existence and absence, and is non-dual in this way, so this non-duality does not contradict reason.

Your position leads to another great fault.

D224b 5.97 The Teacher is not free from all objects if he objectifies Thusness, and awakening is not [an understanding of] equality if the image of reality is differentiated.[119]

118 In verse 5.95, Bhāviveka returns to his argument against the Yogācāra definition of the ultimate (*paramārtha*) as "the object of a cognition of existence and absence" (*sadādibuddhiviṣaya*). This definition was presented in verse 5.2; Bhāviveka criticized it in verses 5.10-16. Here, in verse 5.96, he goes beyond criticism to give his own understanding of the ultimate.

119 The argument in verse 5.97 repeats verse 5.16 on the "objectification" (*ālambana*) of Thusness. Compare also Eckel 1985: 72-73. The quotation that begins "The Buddha has the characteristics of space" comes from the *Ārya Sarvabuddhaviṣayajñānālokālaṃkāra Sūtra*. See Eckel 1985: 73.

On the concept of "equality" (*samatā*), compare the commentary on verse 5.5, where the Yogācāra objector says: "Those who see reality, or know the ultimate, see absolute identity as the equality of subject and object. This is because supermundane knowledge arises without any concepts." In MHK 3.269-70, Bhāviveka defines a *sambuddha* ("Perfectly Awakened One") as one who understands the equality (*samatā*) of all *dharma*s, along with the equality of self and other, by not understanding equality.

If the Teacher, or the Blessed One, the Buddha, objectifies "absolute identity" or "Thusness," he is not be free from all objects, because he objectifies Thusness. This contradicts traditions (*āgama*) such as:

> The Buddha has the characteristics of space, and space has no characteristics. Homage to you who are free from [the duality of] defining and being defined and who have no object.

The Teacher's awakening is not [an understanding of] equality. Why? Because it distinguishes between "absolute nature" and the knowledge in which it appears. If this duality is present, how can the understanding of this duality be [an understanding of] equality?

Furthermore,

> 5.98 How can there possibly be a cognition that objectifies Thusness without coming from an implanted potentiality? It would be like the cognition of a flower in the sky, which also is impossible without an implanted potentiality.[120]

You are well known for thinking that the store-consciousness has no beginning and that active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), such as visual [cognition], transfer their potentiality to the store-consciousness when they arise and cease. These potentialities develop in various ways into objects, the senses, and consciousness, and they are active in the store consciousness as long as there is saṃsāra. So, for an ordinary person who does not see reality, no cognition of Thusness can ever arise. And if none can arise, none can cease. If none ceases, there is nothing to implant a potentiality that can become a cognition of Thusness through the evolution of a potentiality implanted in the store-consciousness. If no potentiality is implanted and there is no cause for a cognition of Thusness, how can such a cognition ever arise? For example, if there has never been any potentiality for the cognition of a flower in the sky, then no such potentiality can be implanted in the store-consciousness, and there cannot subsequently be any sight of a flower in the sky. D225a

Furthermore,

> 5.99ab You have said that reality is neither identical nor different only to conceal your own approach.[121]

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120 On the transfer of potentiality (*śaktyarpaṇa*) in the store consciousness, see verses 5.22-23, and 41-42. The Tibetan translation of the commentary on this verse indicates that the verbs for "transfer" (Tib. *'jog par byed* / Skt. *arpaṇa*) and "implanted" (Tib. *bzhag pa* / Skt. *āhita*) are used interchangeably.

121 The argument in verse 5.99 refers to a claim made by the Yogācāra objector in the commentary on verse 5.6: "When dependent identity is free from imagined subject and object, it

You think that both absolute identity and dependent identity exist, and you also have said that they are neither identical nor different. But this is only to conceal your own approach. Absolute identity, which [you] call reality, is not free from identity and difference.

According to the Madhyamaka approach,

> 5.99cd [Reality] is not a real thing and is not apprehended, so for us [reality] can be what [you] have said.

It is precisely because [reality] is not a real thing (*dravya*) that it cannot be apprehended in its own right. So for us [reality] can be what [you] have said—that is, neither identical nor different.

According to our position, the example of space and so forth also is reasonable.[122] How?

> 5.100 [Reality] is like space because does not arise, has no particulars, and is unstained. It also is completely inexpressible, because it cannot be grasped by the mind in any way.

Ultimate reality (*paramārthatattva*) is like space in the following way. If something arises, it can be apprehended with respect to its particular aspects. But something that does not arise has no particulars, because it does not arise. It also is not stained, because it is not stained by any conceptual diversity (*prapañcavikalpa*). For these reasons,

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is absolute identity. This [absolute identity] is neither identical to nor different from dependent [identity]. If it were different, the Dharma nature would be diverse. If it were identical, [the Dharma nature] would be defiled and could not be the cause of purification."

The commentary on verse 5.99 turns on an ambiguity in the Sanskrit of the first line. Depending on the division of the words, the first line can mean: "You said that reality is neither identical nor different in order to conceal your own approach" (*naikatvānyatvam uktaṃ vas tattvaṃ svanayaguptitaḥ*). Or it can mean: "Your reality is not free from identity and difference . . . in order to conceal your own approach" (*naikatvānyatvamuktaṃ vas tattvaṃ svanayaguptitaḥ*). The Tibetan translator chooses the second option. The commentary, however, makes use of both interpretations and reads the first as a reason for the second. Bhāviveka clearly intended to put both readings into play, not only in the commentary on 5.99ab but in 5.99cd, where the *uktam* ("said") of 5.99ab is echoed by the *uditam* ("said") at the verse's end.

Hoornaert points out that Bhāviveka's own view of identity and difference is present in MHK 3.11 (*vigataikatvanānātve tattve gagananirmale*) and 4.67 (*nānātvaikatvarahitaṃ śāntaṃ tattvaṃ vidur budhāḥ*).

122 In verse 5.100, Bhāviveka returns to the Yogācāra example that opened the section on absolute identity: "If [you] think that the Dharma nature is as non-conceptual as space, this is unreasonable. Why? [Verse 5.85:] It is not reasonable for [the Dharma nature] to be a non-conceptual entity like space." After criticizing the Yogācāra understanding of this example, Bhāviveka offers his own interpretation.

[ultimate reality] is like space. It also is completely inexpressible. It can be completely inexpressible, because words are applied to things that are grasped by the mind, but this [ultimate reality] is not grasped by the mind.

[Objection:] If [ultimate reality] does not arise in any way, how can it be called [the object] of a supermundane [cognition] and so forth?[123]

Reply:

> 5.101 [We] think that a cognition in which the eye disease of arising is gone is supermundane (*lokottara*), because it is intended to rescue (*uttāraṇa*) from the world (*loka*) or because it goes beyond (*atikrama*) the world (*loka*).

Arising (*utpāda*) is [like] an eye disease (*timira*). A cognition that does not [arise] is one D225b
in which the eye disease of arising is gone. [We] think that this [cognition] is supermundane. Why? Because it is intended to rescue from the world or because it goes beyond the world. As it is said: "[A cognition] is supermundane if it goes beyond the movement and agitation of the world."

Furthermore,

> 5.102 [A supermundane cognition] is non-conceptual, has no object, and has no mark, because it understands the equality of self and other in a single moment with no understanding.[124]

This [supermundane] cognition is non-conceptual, because, if it does not arise, it must be free from all concepts. It has no object, because it does not objectify anything. It has no mark, because it does not grasp the mark of any object. This cognition understands

123 In the introduction to verse 5.6, the Yogācāra objector said: "Absolute identity is realized directly and is the object of a Sage's supermundane knowledge."

124 In verse 5.102, Bhāviveka responds to the problems he pointed out in the Yogācāra position in verses 5.93-97. On the relationship between "no objects" (*nirālamba*) and the Buddha's understanding of "equality," see 5.97. On its occurrence in a single moment (*sakṛt*) see 5.93. Bhāviveka's account of "supermundane cognition" (*lokottaramati*) should be compared to his account of the ultimate Buddha in 3.267-79. In 3.269-70, Bhāviveka defines the *sambuddha* ("the Perfectly Awakened One") as one who understands the equality of *dharma*s and of self and other, through the means of no understanding. In the commentary on 3.273 he identifies the Buddha's awareness as "the understanding of the equality of all *dharma*s in a single moment." To say that this moment of cognition has to do with "self and other" (*svānya-dharmatayā*), and that self and other are subject and object, responds to the Yogācāra claim, in the commentary on 5.6, that absolute identity constitutes the equality of self and object. It also corrects the error attributed to the Yogācāra in 5.93, where Bhāviveka argues that a real cognition cannot simultaneously cognize itself and its object. Here supermundane cognition can cognize both at once because it and they are of the same nature (*dharmatā*): they do not arise at all.

(*budh*) the equality (*samatā*) of self, or cognition (*jñāna*), and other, or object (*jñeya*), in a single moment with the approach of no understanding (*abodhanayena*). According to us, awakening occurs in a single moment of understanding.

To investigate the object of supermundane knowledge [we] say:

> 5.103 The non-arising of *dharma*s is called the selflessness of *dharma*s. There cannot be any sign of conceptual defilements with regard to this [object], as [explained] previously.[125]

The non-arising of *dharma*s is called the selflessness of *dharma*s. There cannot be any conceptual defilements with regard to this [object], as [explained] previously in the chapter on "Seeking the Knowledge of Reality." Concepts are like defilements. A sign is a mark. These [signs] are completely impossible with regard to this [object].

Objection: When it says in a sūtra that "the ultimate cannot be analyzed (*atarkya*) and is not an object of logical reasoning (*tarkagocara*)," it means that [the ultimate] is an object (*viṣaya*) of perception (*pratyakṣa*).[126] You contradict tradition when you say that

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125 Compare MHK 3.245-46: "Like an illusion, it does not exist; so in reality it is not seen. It cannot be analyzed (*apratarkya*), discriminated (*avijñeya*), defined (*anirūpya*), or compared (*anidarśana*). It has no marks (*nirnimitta*), no appearance (*nirābhāsa*), no concepts (*nirvikalpa*), and no syllables (*nirakṣara*). It must be understood by the mind of someone who sees. In other words, it is seen by no-seeing." Here Bhāviveka gives his interpretation of the term "cannot be analyzed" (*apratarkya*) in MHK 3.245c.

126 The introduction to verse 5.104 begins with a scriptural quotation about the use of "logical reasoning" (*tarka*) to gain knowledge about the ultimate. The same quotation appears in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel 1985: 73) with the reading *brtag mi nus pa* ("incapable of being analyzed") rather than *rtag tu med pa* ("eternally nonexistent"). It also appears in the MRP (Lindtner 1981: 169). The reading of the *Prajñāpradīpa* is correct, as it is in a similar quotation from an unidentified sūtra in *Prasannapadā* 498: "Not long after his perfect awakening, the Blessed One thought: 'I have attained the Dharma that is profound and appears to be profound; it cannot be analyzed (Tib. *brtag par bya ba ma yin* / Skt. *atarkya*) and is inaccessible to logical reasoning (Tib. *rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pa* / Skt. *atarkāvacara*); it is subtle and can be known only by a scholar.'" La Vallée Poussin cites parallel passages in *Mahāvastu* 3.314, the beginning of *Lalitavistara* 25, MN 1.167, SN 1.136, *Mahāvagga* 1.5.2. Compare also *Laṅkāvatāra* 2.122 and 10.28: "I teach one nature, which is free from logical ideas (*tarkavijñapti*). It is accessible (*gocara*) to the noble ones, divine (*divya*), and free from a duality of natures."

This traditional teaching about the limits of *tarka* poses a problem for the author who chooses to call his commentary *The Flame of Reason*. As explained in Part 1 of this book, Bhāviveka does not shrink from the challenge. Verses 5.104-10 give his response.

The Yogācāra objector poses the problem by constructing a syllogism and attributing it to Bhāviveka:

> [Reality] is an object of logical reasoning,
> because it is said to be ultimately unknowable,
> like heaven and so forth.

[reality] is an object of logical reasoning, because it is said to be ultimately unknowable, like heaven and so forth.

[The next two verses] refute the opponents' objection. If the opponents think: D226a

5.104 The Dharma nature of *dharma*s cannot be known by logical reasoning,
because reality is not an object of logical reasoning and is not known by
inference.

[We] reply:

5.105 Buddhas use faultless inference in a way that is consistent with tradition
to completely reject many different concepts of imagined things.[127]

Here, the Blessed One uses faultless inferential knowledge in a way that is consistent with tradition to completely reject a multitude of different concepts about things that are imagined in Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems.

5.106 Then, without seeing, they see all objects of knowledge just as they are,
with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space.[128]

They attain the name [Buddha] and so forth. [Their] minds are empty in the sense that they do not grasp the five kinds of objects: past, future, present, unspecifiable, and uncompounded. This [awareness] is a single moment of non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*), perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*). The word "see" is a metaphor (*upacāra*): [they see] by the discipline of no-seeing (*adarśanayogena*).

5.107 It is impossible to understand reality as an object of inference, but infer-

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The objector then claims that the thesis ("reality is an object of logical reasoning") is contradicted by tradition.

127 Later Mādhyamikas made a point of distinguishing two kinds of "incorrect relative truth" (*mithyāsaṃvṛtisatya*): perceptual errors, such as the vision of the moon reflected in water, and the "imagined" (*kalpita*) errors of other philosophical systems, such as the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the three *guṇa*s. See Eckel 1987: 75 and notes 39-40.

128 In the commentary on MHK 3.246cd ("Someone who sees [the Dharma Body] and understands it with wisdom sees it without seeing"), Bhāviveka says that "seeing" is a metaphor (*upacāra*) for "no-seeing" (*mthong ba med pa nyid mthong ba'o zhes nye bar gdags te*, sDe-dge Dza, folio 116b). He uses similar language in the commentary on MHK 3.261 ("For the wise, non-conceptual cognition arises through the discipline of no-arising"): "Since no object of cognition either exists or does not exist, there is no arising even of a cognition that has no apprehension. The no-arising of this cognition is referred to metaphorically as arising (*skye ba med pa gang yin pa de nyid skye ba zhes nye bar gdags te*: sDe-dge Dza, folio 121a).

ence rules out the opposite of the knowledge of reality.

Inferential knowledge can rule out concepts that are opposed to the conceptual knowledge of reality, but reality (*tattva*) cannot be understood as an object of inference.

Objection: How does inference rule out the opposite [of the knowledge of reality]? Reply:

5.108 Differences in other traditions (*āgama*) cause differences of understanding; even when there are no differences in tradition, what other method is capable of investigating [these differences]?[129]

Other traditions are traditions that differ from one another. Their differences, which
D226b consist of 363 doctrines, give rise to differences of understanding. Those who seek agreement have no way to investigate [these differences] other than by inference (*anumāna*), which consists of theses, reasons, and examples. Why? Because

5.109 [We] do not admit that an assertion alone can rule out its opposite. How can there be non-conceptual cognition without negating its opposite?

An assertion by itself is incapable of negating any concepts. There can be no non-conceptual cognition without removing its opposite, which is conceptuality. So anyone who makes an assertion has to state a reason and an example. A point is proved by a complete, valid inference.

5.110 The Sage who saw reality taught two truths, because the understanding of reality depends on conventional usage.[130]

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129 Compare MHK 9.19-20: "If tradition (*āgama*) is defined as an unbroken transmission, then everything is tradition, and it is necessary to determine which is true. If a teaching can withstand logical analysis, it is tradition; then one should investigate its meaning." On the tradition of "363 doctrines" see Part 1 of this book.

130 This verse echoes MMK 24.10: "It is impossible to teach the ultimate without relying on conventional usage, and it is impossible to attain nirvāṇa without understanding the ultimate." The same line is quoted in 5.56 above.

In the commentary on MHK 3.26, Bhāviveka distinguishes between two kinds of ultimate: "The first is effortless, supermundane (*lokottara*), free from impurity, and free from discursive ideas (*niṣprapañca*). The second is accessible to effort, consistent with the prerequisites of merit and knowledge, pure, and accessible to discursive ideas, in the sense that it can be referred to as mundane knowledge (*laukikajñāna*)." In the commentary on verse 5.110, Bhāviveka marks the passage from the "mundane" ultimate to the "supermundane" ultimate. This distinction is discussed in *Jñānagarbha's Commentary* (Eckel 1987: 71).

The inference that negates concepts depends on what is called correct relative truth (*tathyasaṃvṛtisatya*). By relying on conventional truth (*vyavahārasatya*), one gradually (*krameṇa*) understands the non-conceptual and inexpressible (*avācya*) ultimate (*paramārtha*). As it is said, "It is impossible to understand the ultimate without relying on a relative *dharma*."

Having established the Madhyamaka approach to reality, [we] point out the faults in the Yogācāra [approach to] reality.

> 5.111 A cognition that has Thusness as its object (*ālambana*) is false, because it has an object (*sālambanatvāt*), like dream-cognition and so forth. Moreover, its object cannot be reality.[131]

"A cognition that has reality as its object" is the subject. Falsehood is the inferred property. The combination of subject and property is the thesis. "Because it has an object" is the reason: whatever has an object is invariably false. "Like dream-cognition" is the example. Because it is false, its object cannot be called reality. This is because [the object of a false cognition] also is false. D227a

Furthermore,

> 5.112 The greatest of Sages taught a Dharma that is ungraspable, inexpressible, and not subject to cognitive activity. It must also be negated in the same way.[132]

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131 The syllogism in verse 5.111 takes the following form:

> A cognition that has thusness as its object is false,
> because it has an object,
> like a dream cognition.

Similar arguments appear in 5.16 and 90.

132 Compare MHK 1.1-3: "I pay sincere homage to the Teacher who spoke the truth. Out of compassion, he used syllables to teach the reality that is free from syllables, not accessible to logical reasoning, not capable of discrimination, . . . beyond definition, not capable of representation, directly known, without beginning and end, blessed, non-conceptual, without image, without cognitive marks, . . . and not subject to cognitive activity (*dhīpracāra-vivarjita*)." The definition of ultimate truth as "[that] concerning which there is no cognitive activity" (*yatra jñānasyāpy apracāraḥ*), echoes the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* and is quoted widely in Madhyamaka literature. The terminology figures prominently in Bhāviveka's definitions of reality in MHK 3.10-11 and 366. He quotes the sūtra itself in his commentary on MMK 18.7ab. For other examples of this quotation in Madhyamaka sources, see *Prasannapadā* 374; Lindtner 1982a: 149; and Eckel 1987: 74.

It is not clear what Bhāviveka means by "If so, it must be negated." Hoornaert interprets "it" as the Yogācāra doctrine. In this context, it is more likely that Bhāviveka is referring to any verbal expression of ultimate reality.

It cannot be grasped, because it is not an object of cognition, and it cannot be expressed, because that would contradict statements like the following: "The Dharma cannot be grasped and cannot be expressed" and "Ultimate truth is not subject to cognitive activity."

Having completed this chapter, let [me] mention the points that have now been abandoned.

> 5.113 Now, [we] said earlier that reality is consistent with reason and scripture.
> This has now been investigated rationally and remains unharmed.

The Yogācāra conception of reality has been examined and cannot withstand analysis.

> 5.114 Some get caught in the jungle of the aggregates and others sink in the ocean of consciousness, but the sons of the Conqueror amuse themselves without falling into the abyss of even correct extremes.[133]

In the chapter on "Seeking the Knowledge of Reality" reason and scripture were used to explain reality as follows:

> Since no object of cognition is established in any way, reality is that of which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises. Those who know reality, know that it is incomparable.[134]

The text in which this verse is included [shows] that [our explanation of reality] remains unshaken by the arguments of Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians.

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133 The fact that 5.114 does not appear in the Sanskrit text of MHK and has no direct commentary suggests that it is a scribal addition. Hoornaert reports Ejima's opinion that it serves as an apt summary of chapters 4 and 5, in which the Śrāvakas are trapped in the jungle of the aggregates and the Yogācāras drown in the ocean of consciousness. If so, it makes a fitting conclusion to the chapter.

134 A quotation of MHK 3.266.

Part 3:
Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts

A Note on the Edition

Bhāviveka's *Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakahṛdayakarikāḥ*), with the commentary known as *The Flame of Reason* (*Tarkajvālā*), were originally written in Sanskrit. According to the colophon in the Tibetan translation, they were translated by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (also known as Atiśa) and Tshul khrims rgyal ba. This translation is likely to have been made in the twelfth century. Between the twelfth century and the present day, the Sanskrit text of the commentary has been lost. The Sanskrit text of the verses survives in a single palm-leaf manuscript. This manuscript was identified by Rahula Samkrtyayana in Zha-la monastery in Tibet. Samkrtyayana's handritten copy was left in the custody of Prof. V. V. Gokhale, who made a preliminary study of its early chapters (Gokhale 1961-62 and 1993). Prof. Gokhale's students took up the task of editing and translating subsequent chapters. Among these early studies were unpublished editions of chapter 4 by Robert A. F. Thurman and chapter 5 by Shotaro Iida. More recent editions of the Sanskrit text have been based on photographs of the manuscript. These photographs are now held in Beijing and have been published by Dr. Jiang Zhongxin in *Papers in Honour of Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday* (Jiang Xi Ren Ming Press, 1991). The edition presented here is based on a comparison of Christian Lindtner's edition, published in his *Madhyamakahṛdayam of Bhavya*, Adyar Library Series 123 (Chennai: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2001), with Thurman's edition of chapter 4 and the recent edition of chapter 5 by Paul Hoornaert (Hoornaert 1999-2003). (Full information about the fascicles of Hoornaert's edition can be found in the Bibliography under "Bhāviveka.") Lindtner and Hoornaert do not always agree in their readings. When I have chosen to differ, I have given their readings in notes, marked as "L" (for Lindtner) or "H" (for Hoornaert). I have kept my emendations to a minimum and based them largely on the evidence of the commentary or the requirements of the sense of the argument.

This edition of the Sanskrit verses is accompanied by an edition of the Tibetan translation of the verses and commentary. This edition is based on three published versions of the Tibetan bsTan-'gyur: *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition*, edited by Daisetz T. Suzuki (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957), folios Dza 157b-253b; the *sDe-dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan-ḥgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo* (Tokyo: 1977), folios Dza 144b-227a; and *The Golden bsTan-*

'*gyur*, published in digital form by the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, beginning at folio Dza 104b. My procedure has been to follow the wording and text-divisions of the sDe-dge version and adopt the readings of the Peking or Golden bsTan-'gyur only when they offer a clear improvement on the text of the sDe-dge. Anyone who has compared these texts knows that they differ quite frequently in the spelling of common words, but in other respects the texts of these three versions are remarkably uniform. Occasionally one will offer a reading that changes the interpretation of a passage, but their main value is to serve as checks on one another. When one version is difficult to read, because there is a smudge in the ink or the carving of the wood blocks is unclear, other versions can be used to fill the gap. Together they offer a clear and accurate account of what might be called the "canonical" version of the translation. Whether this is an accurate version of the Sanskrit original is another matter. The job of a translator is to look behind the Tibetan translation to the lost Sanskrit in the hope of reconstructing its original form. From the few places where Bhāviveka quotes texts that have survived in Sanskrit, and from the Sanskrit original of his own verses, we can see many places where the Tibetan translation needs correction. These are discussed in the notes to the translation. No doubt there are many more.

In laying out the Tibetan, I have attempted to reproduce the paragraph divisions and section headings of the English translation. These are not found in the original Tibetan and are only intended to facilitate comparison of the translation with the Sanskrit and Tibetan originals.

The edition contains a number of editorial marks that require some explanation. To make it possible to refer easily to the Tibetan originals, I have included the folio numbers of the different versions in backets. The Peking version is identified as P, the sDe-dge as D, and the Golden bsTan-'gyur as G. The mark "[D145a]," for example, indicates the beginning of folio 145a in the sDe-dge version.

Textual variants also are listed in brackets. For example, "gzhag [bzhag PG]" indicates that the Peking and Golden bsTan-'gyur versions read "bzhag" for "gzhag." When one of the versions adds a syllable that is not found in another version, it is listed as "[P add bzhag]." When a version omits a syllable, it is listed as "[P om. bzhag]." When one version substitutes a word or phrase for more than one word in another version, the phrase for which the substitution is made is set off with asterisks. For example, "*bya ba'o* [bya'o P]" indicates that P reads "bya'o" for "bya ba'o."

Finally it should be noted that a portion of the commentary on chapter 4 appears as a separate text in the canon under the title *sDe pa tha dad par byed pa dang rnam par bshad pa* (Skt. *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*), Tōhoku no. 4139, Su, folios 147a-154b. Textual variants from this version are identified as Dn (for sDe-dge *Nikāyabheda*).

Chapter 4: Analysis of Reality According to the Śrāvakas

de nas da ni nyan thos kyi de kho na nyid rnam par gtan la dbab pa'i skabs kyis [kyi D] / theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyi gsung [gsungs P] nyid du sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa'i phyir rab tu byed pa bzhi pa rtsom par byed de / [D145a]

Introduction

de ltar rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i bla na med pa'i chos ye shes zab mos nyams su myong ba'i de kho na nyid ni /

> 4.1 durvigāhām imāṃ nītiṃ boddhuṃ durbalaśaktayaḥ /
> asthānatrāsasaṃrabdhāḥ prāhur hīnādhimuktayaḥ //
>
> rtogs par dka' ba'i lugs 'di la // rtogs pa'i nus pa chung [G105a] gyur pa //
> gnas min skrag pa'i dman mos dag // yang dang yang du rtsod par rtsom //

shes [zhes G] bya'i [bya ba'i PG] sgrib pa spang ba'i thabs yongs su shes pa med pas 'di la 'jug par *gyur pa'i* ['gyur ba'i D] nus pa chung ba nyid kyis ji ltar bstan pa'i de kho na nyid [D add kyang, G add kyi] shes pa tshol ba'i lugs [lug PG] 'di rtogs par dka' ste / 'dis phyin par byed pa'am / thob [theb P] par byed pas theg pa ste / theg pa chen po'i lam ni lugs zhes bya ba la de rtogs pa'i nus pa med pa'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / dad pa dang / brtson 'grus dang / dran pa dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab kyi stobs rnams nyams par gyur pa'i phyir ro // dmigs pa med pa'i lta ba 'jigs ['jig G] par bya [lta P] ba'i gnas ma yin la / chad lta 'di ni 'jigs par bya ba'i gnas yin no zhes nam mkha' 'jigs shing skrag pa bzhin du gyur pa na / 'jigs pa med pa gang la [D om.] yang ma mthong zhing dngos por 'dzin pa'i gdon gyis zin pa'i dbang gis sems 'khrug par gyur pa rnams / me khyer gyi 'od kyis nyi ma rjes su dpog pa dang / ba lang gi rmig [DG add rjes kyi] rjes su zhugs nas rgya mtsho chen po rjes su dpog par [P158a] byed pa [par P] ltar nyan thos kyi theg pa pa [D om.] rnams zab cing rgya che ba la mos pa dang bral bas theg pa chen po 'di ni sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa ma yin no snyam sems shing dpog par byed pas

The Śrāvakas' Objection

'di la rigs [rig PG] pa yod pa ma yin par sgrub [bsgrub D] pa'i phyir smras pa /

4.2 nirvikalpadhiyaḥ śāstuḥ śarīraṃ nāśrayaḥ kila /
śarīratvāc charīraṃ hi yathā gopasya neṣyate //

ston pa'i rnam par mi rtog blo // sku la brten pa ma yin te // [G105b]
lus can yin phyir ba rdzi yi // lus la ji lta ba bzhin zer //

rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin gyis rjes thogs la sems kyi skad cig bcu drug gis rnam par grol ba'i lam thob pa'i ye shes kyi skad cig ni sangs rgyas zhes bya ba'i sgras bstan te / sde pa thams cad kyi 'dod pa kun dang yang mi 'gal lo // yang rnam par mi rtog pa nyid ni sangs rgyas nyid du [ni PG] rigs [rig P] par 'jug pa yin te / [D145b] 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi la dmigs pa'i phyir / rang sangs rgyas la sogs pa'i blo bzhin no // rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo ni rnam par mi rtog pa yin na yang / rten gyi sku mtshan dang dpe byad dang ldan pa yang sangs rgyas nyid yin par brjod pa de ni rigs [rig PG] pa ma yin pa'o zhes zer ba'i phyogs la ci'i phyir lus can yin pa'i phyir te / gang dang gang lus can yin pa de dang de ni rnam par mi rtog [rtogs DPG] pa'i sangs rgyas kyi rten ma yin no // dpe ci yod / ji ltar ba lang rdzi la sogs pa'i lus bzhin no // 'dis ni sangs rgyas ye shes kyi skad cig ma nyid yin par sems shing / theg pa chen po las rab tu grags pa'i sku gsum du rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa ni mi 'grub par bstan [ston PG] te / de ltar gzhan dag 'dod cing sgrogs pa'i gzhan gyi las [la PG] dang [nga D] smra ba'i tshig tsam yang bdag la sdig pa sogs par ma gyur cig ces bsams nas slob dpon bdag nyid kyis 'dod pa ma yin pas zer zhes bya ba'i sgra bstan pa yin no //

gal te theg pa [G106a] chen po pa 'di skad du /

rtag pa'i sku dang de bzhin chos tsam dang //
rkyen rtogs pa dang skye med rtogs pa dang //
thams cad rtogs [rtog PG] pa bde gshegs byang chub ste //
rnam pa lngar [sngar P] ni theg pa mchog las [P158b] bstan //

zhes [ces PG] brjod na / de dag ni lam gzhan dang gzhan gyis rtogs [rtog PG] pa yin pas des [de PG] na de [des PG] dag ni gsung rab kyi lugs la mkhas pa ma yin pa de'i phyir 'di ltar

4.3 samyagdṛṣṭyādimārgeṇa pratītena pratīyate /
saṃbuddhānāṃ mahābodhir bodhitvāc chiṣyabodhivat //

yang dag lta sogs lam gyis ni // rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas byang chub cher //
'dren byed yang dag rab rtogs byed // byang chub yin phyir slob ma'i bzhin //

yang dag pa'i lta ba dang / yang dag pa'i rtog pa dang / yang dag pa'i ngag pa dang / yang dag pa'i las kyi mtha' dang / yang dag pa'i 'tsho ba dang / yang dag pa'i rtsol ba dang / yang dag pa'i dran pa dang / yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi mtshan nyid kyi 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad ni rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas thob par byed pa yin no zhes bya ba ni lung gi rigs [rig G] pa yin te / des na sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi byang chub kyang lam 'dis rab tu rtogs shing nyams su myong ba 'thob po // chos thams cad la rab tu [D146a] 'byed pas rtogs pa ni byang chub yin te / de'i ngo bo ni byang chub nyid yin no // byang chub nyid yin pa de'i phyir gang dang gang byang chub yin pa de dang de ni lam 'di dag nyid kyis [kyi PG] mngon par rtogs par 'gyur gyi gzhan gyis ma yin te / nyan thos kyi byang chub bzhin no // [G106b] ji ltar nyan thos kyi byang chub yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i lam gyis rtogs pa ltar sangs rgyas kyi byang chub kyang de bzhin no //

gal te yang lam thun mong ma yin na nyan thos rnams kyi phyogs gcig pa dang / gzhan gyi rkyen gyis shes par 'gyur la bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi ni gzhan la rag ma las shing rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid yin pa ji ltar srid ce [zhe PG] na /

4.4 indriyātiśayāc chāstuḥ sarvajñajñānasaṃbhavaḥ /
mārgābhede yathābhīṣṭāḥ kasyacit pratisaṃvidaḥ //

ston pa'i dbang po khyad 'phags pas // kun mkhyen ye shes srid pa yin //
lam gcig na yang 'dod pa bzhin // 'ga' yi [yis DPG] so so yang dag rig //

bcom ldan 'das kyi dad pa la sogs pa'i dbang po ni shin tu rno ba yin la / nyan thos rnams kyi ni rtul [brtul PG] ba yin / rang sangs rgyas [P159a] rnams kyi ni 'bring po yin te / des na bcom ldan 'das ni rang byung thams cad mkhyen pa nyid *kyi ye shes* [kyis PG] yin gyi / nyan thos la sogs pa rnams kyi [DG add ni] ma yin no // ji ltar lam gcig pa nyid yin na yang nyan thos rnams nyid [PG om.] la dbang po'i bye brag mthong ste /

shā ri'i bu yi [PG om.] shes rab la // de bzhin gshegs pa'i ma gtogs pa //
sems can kun gyi shes rab kyis // bcu drug char yang mi phod do //

zhes bya ba dang / rdzu 'phul dang ldan pa'i mchog ni *maud gal* [mau dgal P] gyi bu chen po'o // lha'i mig dang ldan pa rnams kyi mchog ni ma 'gags pa'o // thos pas 'dzin pa rnams kyi mchog ni kun dga' bo'o // chos smra ba rnams kyi mchog ni gang po'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang / [G107a]

rang sangs rgyas kyi rnam pa lnga ste / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na smras pa /
rang sangs rgyas kyi sa dag ni // rnam pa lnga ste rigs dang lam //
gzhan yang kun nas 'byung ba dang // gnas dang de bzhin spyod pa'o //
rigs kyi mtshan nyid gsum nyid de // rang bzhin gyis ni 'byung ba nyid //
dang po nyid nas 'dod chags chung // snying rje chung ba'i rigs can pa //

> khyad 'phags nga rgyal la spyod pa // des na [D146b] de ni 'du 'dzi dang //
> sems can don dang bya ba la // yid mi 'jug ste de phyir 'di //
> slob dpon med par 'dod pa yin // gnyis pa gzhan med kho na yis //
> byang chub pa yin lam dag kyang // de yis gsum du rig par bya //
> 'ga' zhig bskal pa brgyar sangs rgyas // 'byung ba rnams la legs mchod cing //
> rang rgyal byang chub phyir brtsams nas // smin par byed do gzhan dag ni //
> sangs rgyas mnyes byas de 'byed kyi // cha mthun bskyed pa rdzogs byed do //
> gzhan ni sangs rgyas 'byung la 'bras // 'thob byed dgra bcom mngon mi byed //
> kun nas 'byung ba rgyu dag ni // gsum po de dag nyid dag gis //
> sangs rgyas med par dgra bcom nyid // slob dpon med par thob dang ldan //
> [P159b] dang po kun 'byung rang sangs rgyas // bse ru lta bur 'dod pa yin //
> lhag ma dag ni kun 'byung ba // rkyen gyi rang rgyal nyid yin no //
> dang po gcig pur gnas pa ste // zab mo la ni rtog pa yi //
> mos pa dang ldan lhag ma gnyis // tshogs dang lhan cig gnas pa yin //
> lus la [G107b] sogs pa legs bsdams nas // de ni [na PG] bsod snyoms dag la 'jug //
> dman pa rjes su gzung [bzung PG] ba'i phyir // de ni gcig tu rab zhi ldan //

de ltar shes pa la khyad par yod kyang lam la tha dad pa med pa de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyi yang blta bar bya'o //

'on te yang theg pa chen po pa dag na re sgrib pa ni gnyis te / 'dod chags la sogs pa nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa dang / gzugs la sogs pa shes bya'i sgrib pa dag go // de la lam 'dis ni nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa tsam spong gi shes bya'i sgrib pa spong ba ni ma yin te / ji skad du /

> 'jig rten sna tshogs gang de 'dod min gyi //
> skyes bu'i kun rtog 'dod chags 'dod pa yin //
> 'jig rten sna tshogs de bzhin gnas kyang ni //
> 'on kyang brtan [bstan DPG] rnams 'di la 'dun pa 'dul //

zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du /

> kun rtog las ni 'dod [G add pa] skye bas // 'dod pa'i rtsa bar shes kyis te //
> khyod ni kun rtog ma byed dang // des na nga [khyod DPG] la 'byung mi 'gyur //

zhes bya bas brtags pa tsam dang bral ba ni nyon mongs [D147a] pa dang bral ba yin no // nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa thog ma med pa'i dus nas goms par byas pa'i nyon mongs pa'i bag chags ni nyan thos la sogs pa la ni 'jug cing yod pa nyid yin la / stong nyid kyi lta ba yun ring du goms par byas pas nyon mongs pa'i dra ba'i dri ma ma lus pa bag chags dang bcas pa rtsa ba nas spangs pa ni bcom ldan 'das [G108a] yin te / des na [ni G] 'di ni shes bya'i sgrib pa spong ba'i thabs kyi [kyis PG] khyad par du bstan pa yin no zhes zer na

de ni ma yin te / gang gi phyir /

4.5 etenaiva ca mārgeṇa jñeyāvaraṇasaṃkṣayaḥ /
caitasatve sati vṛteḥ kleśāvṛtivad iṣyate //

shes bya'i sgrib pa zad byed pa // de yang lam 'di nyid kyis yin //
sems las byung ba'i sgrib [P160a] yin phyir // nyon mongs sgrib pa ji bzhin 'dod //

shes bya'i sgrib pa zad byed pa / zhes bya ba ni chos can no // de yang lam 'di nyid kyis [kyi PG] yin zhes bya ba ni de'i chos rab tu sgrub pa'o // chos dang chos can bsdoms pa ni phyogs so // sgrib pa ni bkag pa dang g.yogs pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste / phyi rol gyi sgrib pa dang chos mtshungs pas ma nges pa nyid spang ba'i phyir gtan tshigs khyad par can dgod pa ni / sems las byung ba'i sgrib yin phyir // zhes bya ba'i *nyon mongs pa'i* [PG om.] sgrib pa bzhin zhes bya ba ni dpe'o // sgrib pa nyid du mtshungs pa'i phyir lam gyis [gyi PG] nyon mongs pa [PG om.] spong bar nus pa bzhin du shes bya'i sgrib pa yang spong bar nus so snyam du bsams pa yin no //

gal te nyan thos kyi theg pa'i gzhung gis lam 'di nyid kyis thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob par 'dod kyi / theg pa chen po'i [po P] gzhung gis ni ma yin no zhe na / de ni rigs [rig PG] pa ma yin te / 'di ltar /

4.6 mahāyāne 'py ayaṃ mārgaḥ sarvavittvāptaye muneḥ /
yānāntaratvāt pratyekabuddhayāne yatheṣyate //

theg chen du yang lam 'di yis // kun rig thub pa 'thob byed de //
theg pa gzhan nyid yin pa'i phyir // rang rgyal theg pa bzhin du 'dod //

theg pa gsum po thams cad du yang lam 'di nyid kho na byang chub gsum 'thob pa'i rgyu yin [G108b] gyi gzhan 'ga' zhig 'di pas lhag pa'i byang chub kyi lam ni yod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ni tshig gi lhag ma'o //

yang na mang du smras pas ci dgos te / theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyi gsung nyid dang mi 'gal bar gyur na lta ba [PG om.] de la dmigs pa'i phyogs dang lhan cig tu lam ma [D147b] yin zhes dpyad par rigs [rig PG] par gyur na de ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung nyid du rigs [rig P] pa ma yin te / rigs [rig PG] pa dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro // ji lta [ltar G] zhe na /

4.7 na buddhoktir mahāyānaṃ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt /
mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanam //

mdo sde sogs su ma bsdus dang // lam gzhan nye bar ston phyir yang //
theg chen sangs rgyas gsung [gsungs PG] ma yin // rig byed mtha' yi lta ba bzhin //

theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa ma yin te / ci'i phyir zhe na / mdo sde dang / *mngon pa dang / 'dul ba* ['dul ba dang / mngon pa D] rnams su ma bsdus [P160b] pa nyid kyi phyir ro // gang cung zhig sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa de thams cad ni mdo sde dang / mngon pa dang / 'dul ba rnams la snang na / theg pa chen po ni ming tsam yang mdo sde dang / mngon pa dang / 'dul ba rnams la mi dmigs te / de'i phyir na sangs rgyas kyi bka' ma yin te / rig byed kyi mtha'i lta ba bzhin no // rig byed kyi mtha' la [P add la] nges pa ni rig byed kyi [DG om.] mtha' pa ste / de yang 'di ltar gang gā la sogs pa'i 'bab stegs su bkrus pa dang / smyung bar gnas pa dang / khams gsum pa'i gsang sngags la sogs pa bzlas pas sdig pa dag cing grol ba thob par smra ba'o / [G109a] theg pa chen po pa yang gang gā dang / sin dhu dang / pa kṣu dang / sī ta [śī ta D] zhes bya ba'i chu klung bzhi'i chu la bkrus pa dang 'thungs pa dang der gnas pa'i rim gyis gzungs sngags dang / gsang sngags klags pa dang / bzlas brjod la sogs pa byas pas sdig pa zad cing bsod nams nye bar 'phel ba la sogs pa'i lam gzhan nye bar bstan pa'i phyir rig byed kyi mtha' pa'i ['i P] lta ba dang 'dra ba nyid de / de'i phyir na theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyi bka' ma yin no zhes bya'o //

4.8ab phalahetvapavādād vā yathā nāstikadarśanam /

chad par lta ba de bzhin du // rgyu dang 'bras bu skur 'debs pas //

de'i phyir yang ste / bdag nyid thams cad thams cad du stong pa nyid du khas len pa'i phyir las dang / 'bras bu dang / bden pa dang / dkon mchog rnams kyang med pas / las kyang med / bya ba yang med [PG om.] / 'bras bu yang med do zhes 'bras bu dang bcas pa'i rgyu la skur pa btab [D148a] par gyur pas 'jig rten 'di tsam pa'i lta ba dang / theg pa chen po pa'i grub pa'i mtha' mtshungs par 'gyur te / chad par lta ba po yang med / 'di ltar 'jig rten 'di yang med / 'jig rten pha rol yang med / legs par spyad pa dang nyes par spyad pa'i las rnams kyi 'bras bu rnam par smin pa yang med do zhes bya ba [P161a] la sogs par mngon par zhen to //

gal te 'di kun [G109b] stong pa na // skye ba med cing 'gag med pas //
'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi po rnams // dngos po med par thal bar 'gyur //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa dbu ma'i rab tu byed pa'i don yang 'dir sbyar bar bya'o //

gzhan yang /

4.8cd aṣṭādaśanikāyāntarbhāvābhāvān na niścitam //

sde pa bco brgyad khongs su yang // gtogs pa med pas ma yin nges //

theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa ma yin te / sde pa bco brgyad kyi khongs su

ma gtogs pa'i phyir rig byed mtha' pa'i lta ba bzhin no zhes bya ba ni tshad ma nye bar dgod pa yin no //

yang sde bco brgyad po de dag ni gang yin pa de dag gi bye brag ni ji ltar byung zhe na / bdag gi bla ma gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa las 'di ltar rjes su thos te //

A Sarvāstivāda Account

sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das yongs su mya ngan las 'das nas lo brgya [D add bcu] drug cu [D om.] lon pa na grong khyer me tog gis rgyas pa zhes bya bar / rgyal po dha rma a sho ka zhes bya ba rgyal srid byed pa'i tshe / rtsod pa'i chos 'ga' zhig byung ba'i dbang gis / dge 'dun gyi dbyen chen por gyur to // des re zhig dang por sde pa gnyis su chad nas gnas te / dge 'dun phal chen pa dang gnas brtan pa'o //

de la dge 'dun phal chen pa'i sde [Dn add pa] yang rim gyis dbye [bye DnG] bar gyur pa na / rnam pa brgyad du gnas te / *'di lta ste* [Dn om.] / dge 'dun phal chen sde pa dang / tha snyad gcig pa dang / 'jig rten las 'das par smra ba dang / mang du thos pa pa [Dn om.] dang / btags par smra ba dang / mchod rten pa dang / shar gyi ri bo pa [Dn om.] dang / nub kyi [G110a] ri bo pa'o //

gnas brtan pa yang rim gyis dbye [bye GDn] bar gyur pa na / rnam pa bcur gyur te / 'di lta ste / gnas brtan pa nyid la / gangs ri ba zhes kyang brjod pa dang / thams cad yod par smra ba [Dn add pa] nyid la rnam par phye ste smra ba dang / rgyur [D148b] smra ba dang / kha cig mu run ta ka [GDn add pa] zhes kyang zer ba dang / gnas ma'i bu dang / chos mchog pa dang / bzang po'i lam pa dang [Dn om.] / kun gyis [gyi PG] bkur ba la kha cig [Dn add ni] a pan ta ka pa [P161b] yang [zhes kyang Dn] zer / kha cig ni ku ru ku la pa zhes [Dn147b] kyang zer ba dang / mang ston pa dang / chos sbas pa dang / char [chos Dn] *bzangs 'bebs pa* [bzang 'beb ba PG, bzang 'bebs pa Dn] zhes bya ba la kha cig ni [na P] 'od srungs pa zhes zer ba dang / bla ma pa [Dn om.] la kha cig ni 'pho bar smra ba zhes zer ba ste / sde pa bco brgyad kyi dbye ba [Dn add ni] de dag go //

de la dge 'dun yang yin la phal *che ba* [chen po yang Dn] yin pas dge 'dun phal chen te / de nye bar ston par byed pa ni dge 'dun phal chen pa'o // kha cig ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis chos thams cad thugs gcig gis [Dn om.] rnam par mkhyen cing skad cig gcig dang ldan pa'i shes rab kyi [kyis P] yongs su mkhyen to zhes tha snyad 'dogs te / des na tha [P om.] snyad gcig pa zhes bya'o // 'jig rten thams cad kyi [kyis PGDn] [Dn add chos thams cad] 'jig rten pa las sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams 'das par gyur pas [par PG] de bzhin gshegs pa la 'jig rten pa'i chos [ches PG] mi mnga'o zhes *smras pas* [smra ba Dn] ni 'jig rten las 'das par smra ba'o [ba pa'o Dn] // mang du thos pa'i slob dpon gyi [gyis Dn] [G110b] rjes su ston par byed pas na mang du thos par smra ba'o // 'dus byas rnams phan tshun btags [brtags Dn] pa nyid kyis [kyi PG] sdug bsngal ba yin no zhes smra ba'i phyir btags par smra ba'o // mchod rten can gyi ri la gnas bcas pa nyid ni [G add shar gyi ri la gnas pa nyid ni] mchod rten pa'o // shar gyi ri dang nub kyi ri la gnas pa nyid ni shar gyi ri bo pa [PG om.] dang / nub kyi ri bo pa'o //

gnas brtan 'phags pa'i rigs yin par ston pa ni gnas brtan pa'o // de nyid la gangs [PG add kyi] ri ba zhes kyang zer te / gangs kyi ri la brten nas gnas pa'i phyir ro // gang cung zhig 'das pa dang / ma 'ongs pa dang / da ltar byung ba thams cad yod do zhes smra ba'i phyir thams cad yod par smra ba'o // de dag nyid las 'ga' zhig ni yod de [do PG] / 'das pa'i las 'bras bu ma byung [phyung GDn] ba gang yin pa'o // la la ni med de / gang 'bras bu myong zin pa dang / ma 'ongs pa dag go zhes rnam par phye nas smra bar byed pa'i phyir de nyid la rnam par phye ste smra ba zhes bya'o // de dag [D149a] nyid las gang cung zhig byung ba dang 'byung ba dang 'byung bar 'gyur ba de thams cad ni rgyu dang [P162a] bcas pa'o zhes smra bas rgyur smra ba'o // de rnams nyid las [la Dn] kha cig mu run ta'i ri la gnas pa'i phyir mu run ta ka pa [P om.] zhes bya'o // gnas pa'i [Dn148a] rigs nyid kyi bud med ni gnas ma yin la de las [la PG] skyes pa'i bu ni gnas ma'i bu ste / de'i rigs yin par ston pa ni gnas ma'i bu'o // slob [G111a] dpon chos mchog gi [gis D] rjes su ston par byed pa ni chos mchog pa'o // bzang po'i *lam pa'i* [la ba'i P] slob ma ni bzang po'i lam pa'o // kun gyis [gyi PG] bkur ba'i slob dpon gyi lugs ston par byed pa ni kun gyis bkur ba'o [ba pa'o Dn] // de nyid las a pan ta'i grong khyer du yang dag par bsdu ba byas [bya bas Dn] pa'i phyir a pan ta ka pa'o // kha cig [Dn add ni] ku ru ku la'i ri la gnas pa'i phyir ku ru ku la pa'o // sa su'i skad kyi dbyings las rjes su ston du bsgyur te / skye bo'i tshogs chen po la yang srid [stid PG] par mi 'byung bar rjes su *ston par byed pa ni mang* [PG om.] ston pa'o // slob dpon chos sbas kyi [kyis Dn] yin par smra ba ni chos sbas pa'o // rab tu bsngags pa'i dam [dmigs Dn] pa'i chos kyi char 'bebs par byed pas na char bzangs 'bebs pa'o // de nyid slob dpon 'od srungs [srung PG] kyi [gi PG] yin par smra ba [bas Dn] ni 'od srungs pa'o // de bzhin du bla ma pa'i yin par smra ba ni bla ma pa'o // de nyid las kha cig na re 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten pha rol tu [du D] gang zag 'pho bar 'gyur ro zhes smra ba ni 'pho bar smra ba'o //

de rnams las sngar bstan pa'i dge 'dun phal chen la sogs pa brgyad pa [DDn om.] dang / phyis bstan pa'i [Dn add phyir] gnas brtan pa dang / thams cad yod par smra ba dang / *mang ston* [thams cad D] pa dang / chos mchog pa dang / 'od srungs pa rnams ni bdag med par smra ba yin te / mu stegs pa'i 'dod pas btags [brtags Dn] pa'i bdag dang bdag gi dag ni stong pa yin pa dang / chos thams cad ni bdag med pa yin [G111b] par smra ba'o [ba yin no PDn] // lhag ma gnas ma'i bu la sogs pa sde pa lnga ni [lnga'i D] gang zag tu smra ba yin te / gang zag ni phung po dag las de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa dang rnam par shes pa drug gis shes par bya ba 'khor bar [D149b] gyur pa [P162b] yongs su gsal bar gyur pa yin no zhes zer ro // de dag ni sde pa bco brgyad kyi dbye ba yin no //

A Mahāsāṃghika Account

gzhan nyid kyis smra ba ni gzhi ni snga ma bzhin du brjod par bya'o // rtsa ba'i dbye ba ni gsum ste / 'di ltar gnas brtan pa dang / dge 'dun phal [Dn148b] chen pa dang / rnam par phye ste smra ba'o // de la gnas brtan pa yang rnam pa gnyis te / thams cad yod par

smra ba dang / gnas ma [ma'i Dn] bu'i sde pa zhes bya'o // yang thams cad yod par smra ba yang rnam pa gnyis te / thams cad yod par smra ba dang / mdo sde smra ba zhes bya'o // gnas ma [ma'i Dn] bu yang rnam pa bzhi ste / mang pos bkur ba [pa P] dang / chos mchog pa dang / bzang po'i lam pa dang / grong khyer drug pa zhes bya ste / de ltar na gnas brtan pa ni rnam pa drug tu gnas so // yang dge 'dun phal chen sde ni rnam pa brgyad de / dge 'dun phal chen pa dang / shar gyi ri bo pa dang / nub kyi ri bo pa dang / rgyal po'i [po Dn] ri pa dang / gangs ri pa dang / mchod rten pa dang / don [brten Dn] grub pa dang / ba lang gnas pa zhes bya ba ste / de ltar [Dn add na] de dag ni dge 'dun phal chen gyi [pa'i Dn] dbye ba yin no // rnam par phye ste smra ba yang rnam pa bzhi ste / sa ston pa dang / 'od srungs [G112a] pa dang / chos sbas pa dang / gos dmar po [pa PDn] zhes *bya ba'o* [bya'o Dn] // de ltar 'di dag ni 'phags pa'i sde rnams rnam par dbye [Dn add ba] nas rnam pa bco brgyad du gyur pa'o //

A Sāṃmatīya Account

yang gzhan dag ni 'di skad smra ste / bcom ldan 'das yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa nas bzung nas lo brgya sum cu rtsa bdun log [lon Dn] pa na / rgyal po dga' bo dang pad ma chen po zhes bya bas [DP om.] grong khyer *pā ṭa la* [pa ta li Dn] *pu tra'i* [ba'i P] nang du sdud [Dn add par byed] pa la sogs pa'i 'phags pa la ni yang len pa med *pa na* [par PG Dn] bsil ba'i dngos po thob par gyur pa na / 'phags pa 'od srungs chen po dang / 'phags pa spu chen po dang / gtong ba chen po dang / bla ma dang / re ba [pa D] ta la sogs pa so so yang dag par rig pa thob pa'i dgra bcom pa'i dge 'dun de ltar bzhugs pa na [ni PG] bdud sdig [Dn add to] can bzang po thams cad kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur pa dge slong [P163a] gi cha byad 'dzin pas rdzu 'phrul sna tshogs bstan nas / gzhi lngas [ltas PG] dge 'dun gyi dbyen chen po bskyed de gnas brtan klu zhes [D150a] bya ba dang / yid brtan pa zhes bya ba mang du thos pa dag gis gzhi lnga bsngags [sngags PG] par byed / rjes su ston par byed cing de gzhan la lan gdab [gdag Dn] pa dang / mi shes pa dang / yid gnyis dang / yongs su brtag [brtags Dn] pa dang / bdag nyid gso bar byed pa ni lam yin te / 'di ni sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa yin [Dn add no] zhes zer ro // *des na* [de na PG, de nas Dn] sde pa gnyis su chad nas gnas te / gnas brtan pa dang / [G112b] dge 'dun phal chen sde zhes bya'o // de ltar lo drug cu rtsa gsum gyi bar du dge 'dun bye nas 'khrug long gis [gi PG] gnas so // de nas lo brgya phrag gnyis pa 'das pa'i rjes la gnas brtan gnas ma'i bus bstan pa yang dag par bsdus so // des yang dag par bsdus pa na dge 'dun phal chen yang rnam pa gnyis su byung bar gyur to [te PGDn] // tha snyad gcig [DPG om.] pa dang ba lang gnas pa zhes *bya ba'o* [bya'o Dn] //

de la tha snyad gcig [DPG om.] pa rnams kyi dam tshig gi rtsa ba ni / sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams ni 'jig rten las 'das pa ste / de bzhin gshegs pa la 'jig rten gyi chos ni mi mnga'o // de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyis [kyi PG] chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba'i rjes su gsung ni mi 'jug go // de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi gsung ni snying po la mngon par mos pa'o // de bzhin gshegs pa la gnas der gzugs nye bar len pa ni mi mnga'o

// byang chub sems dpa'i dus na nur nur po dang mer mer po dang ltar ltar pos 'jug pa ma yin te / glang po cher gyur nas yum gyi sku [dku Dn] nas zhugs nas rang nyid nges par 'byun ba yin gyi byang chub sems dpa' rnams la 'dod pa'i 'du shes ni mi 'byung ngo // ngan 'gro rnams su bdag nyid kyi 'dod pas skye ba blangs te / sems can yongs su smin par byed do // ye shes gcig gis bden pa bzhi rnams yongs su shes so // rnam par shes pa drug po rnams [dag Dn] ni 'dod chags dang bcas pa dang / 'dod [G113a] chags dang bral ba yang yin no // [P163b] mig gis ni gzugs rnams mthong ngo // dgra bcom pa rnams kyang gzhan dag gis bstan pa sgrub par byed do // mi shes pa dang yid gnyis dang yongs su brtag [rtag PG, brtags Dn] pa dang sdug bsngal spong ba'i [D150b] lam yang yod do // mnyam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i tshe ngag 'jug *par byed* [Dn om.] pa yang yod do // mi gtsang ba *spang ba* [spangs pa Dn] yang yod do // yang dag par sdom pa mngon [sngon PG] du byas pa nyid kyis kun tu sbyor ba thams cad rab tu spangs par brjod [Dn149b] par bya'o // de bzhin gshegs pa rnams la 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i [par Dn] lta ba ni mi mnga'o // sems ni rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba yin pas bag la nyal ba rnams sems dang mtshungs par ldan zhe'am / mi ldan zhes brjod par mi bya'o // bag la nyal yang gzhan la kun nas ldang ba yang gzhan yin no // 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa ni med do // rgyun tu zhugs pa ni bsam gtan thob pa yin no [na PG] zhes bya ba [Dn add ste] de lta bu rnams ni tha snyad gcig pa rnams kyi dam tshig yin no //

yang ba lang gnas pa rnams kyi dbye ba ni mang du thos pa dang btags par smra ba pa zhes *bya ba'o* [bya'o Dn] // de la mang du thos pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni nges par 'byun ba'i lam la ni rnam par dpyod pa med do // sdug bsngal gyi bden pa dang / kun rdzob kyi bden pa dang / 'phags pa'i bden pa ni bden pa'o // 'du byed kyi sdug bsngal rnams [G113b] mthong bas yang dag par skyon med pa la 'jug gi / sdug bsngal gyi sdug bsngal dang / 'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal mthong bas [pas D] ni ma yin no // dge 'dun ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'o // dgra bcom pa rnams la yang gzhan gyis [gyi Dn] nye bar bstan pa sgrub pa yod do // yang dag par bsgrags pa'i lam yang yod do // mnyam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa la yang dag [Dn add par] 'jug pa yang yod do zhes bya ba rnams ni mang du thos pa rnams kyi dam tshig go //

yang btags par smra ba rnams ni [kyi Dn] phung po med pa'i sdug bsngal yang yod do // yongs su ma rdzogs pa'i skye mched kyang yod do // 'du byed rnams ni phan tshun btags [brtags Dn] pa yin no // yang [P164a] sdug bsngal ni don dam par ro // sems las byung ba ni lam ma yin no // dus ma yin par 'chi ba ni med do // skyes bu byed pa yang med do // sdug bsngal thams cad ni las las byung ba yin no zhes bya ba de lta bu ni btags par smra ba rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig yin no //

yang ba lang gnas pa rnams kyi bye brag las gnas brtan mchod rten pa [D151a] zhes bya [Dn add ba] ste / de ni lha chen po zhes bya ba'i kun tu rgyu zhig rab tu byung nas mchod rten can gyi ri la gnas pa yin te / yang de ni dge 'dun phal chen pa'i gzhi 'dod ['don Dn] par gyur pa ni [na Dn] mchod rten pa zhes bya ba'i sde par rnam par gzhag [bzhag PGDn] ste /

de dag ni dge 'dun phal chen pa rnams kyi sde pa drug tu bzhag pa yin no //

yang gnas brtan pa yang rnam pa [Dn150b] gnyis te / sngar gyi gnas brtan pa dang gangs [G 114a] ri *la gnas* [DnG om.] pa zhes bya'o [bya ba'o Dn] // sngar gyi gnas brtan pa'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni dgra bcom pa rnams la gzhan gyis ston cing sgrub [bsgrub Dn] pa ni med do // de bzhin du gzhi lnga po yang med do // gang zag ni yod do // srid pa bar ma ni yod do // dgra bcom pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa ni yod do // 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa yang yod do // mya ngan las 'das pa'i don ni yod do zhes bya ba dag [Dn om.] ni gnas brtan pa'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig go //

de la gangs ri ba'i [pa'i PG] rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni byang chub sems dpa' rnams ni so so'i skye bo ma yin zhes bya'o // phyi rol pa la yang mngon par shes pa lnga ni yod do // phung po las gang zag ni gzhan yin par brjod par bya ste / mya ngan las 'das par 'gyur ba na / gang du phung po 'gags pa na gang zag ni gnas pa'i phyir ro // mnyam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa la ngag 'jug pa ni yod do // lam gyi sdug bsngal ni [Dn om.] spong ngo zhes bya ba de dag ni gangs ri ba'i [pa'i PG] dam tshig *yin no* [Dn go] //

yang dang po'i gnas brtan pa yang rnam pa gnyis su 'gyur te / thams cad yod par smra ba dang / gnas ma'i bu [bu'i Dn] zhes *bya ba'o* [bya'o Dn] // de la thams cad yod par smra ba'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni gnyis [P164b] kyis thams cad bsdus te / 'dus byas dang / 'dus ma byas so // de skad smras pas cir 'gyur / gang zag ni med ces bya ba ste / ji skad du /

> bdag med *pa yi* [pa'i G] lus 'di 'byung ba na /
> byed pa med cing rig pa po yang med /
> ji ltar 'khor [G114b] ba'i chu klung 'jug *gyur pa* ['gyur ba Dn] //
> nyan pa'i mchog khyod de ni bstan gyis nyon

zhes [ces G] gsungs pa lta bu'o // de dag ni thams cad yod par smra ba'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig go //

yang de dag gi rtsa ba'i dam [D151b] tshig ni ming [mi PG] dang gzugs kyi [kyis Dn] thams cad bsdus so // 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa ni yod do // rgyun tu zhugs pa ni mi nyams pa'i chos can yin par brjod par bya'o // 'dus byas rnams kyi *'dus byas kyi* [Dn om.] mtshan nyid ni gsum yin no // 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi ni rim gyis rtog [rtogs Dn] par 'gyur ro // stong pa nyid dang / smon pa med pa dang / mtshan ma med pa dag gis skyon med pa la 'jug par 'gyur ro // skad cig ma bco lngas ni rgyun tu zhugs pa'i 'bras bu la zhugs pa yin no // rgyun tu zhugs pa'i [pa ni Dn] bsam gtan thob pa yin no // dgra bcom [Dn150b] pa yang nyams pa srid do // so so [so'i Dn] skye bo la yang 'dod pa'i 'dod chags sam gnod sems spong ba yod do // phyi rol pa la yang mngon par shes pa lnga yod do // lha rnams la yang tshangs par spyod pa la gnas pa yod do // mdo sde thams cad ni drang ba'i don yin no // skyon med pa la 'jug par 'gyur ba ni 'dod pa'i khams nas so // [Dn add 'dod pa'i] 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba ni yod do // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga ni 'dod chags dang bcas pa yang ma yin / 'dod chags dang bral ba yang ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di dag ni thams cad yod par smra ba'i dam tshig go //

yang thams cad yod par smra ba'i bye brag ni rnam par phye ste smra ba yin no // yang rnam par phye ste [G115a] smra ba'i bye brag pa ni mang ston pa dang / chos sbas pa dang / gos dmar pa dang / 'od srungs pa zhes bya ba'o //

de la mang ston pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa ni med do // da ltar byung ba'i [P165a] 'dus byas nyid ni yod do // sdug bsngal mthong bas bden pa bzhi char mthong bar 'gyur ro // bag la nyal yang gzhan yin la mngon du rgyu yang gzhan yin no // srid pa bar ma ni med do // lha'i gnas na yang tshangs par spyod pa ni yod do // dgra bcom pa yang bsod nams gsog [bsog Dn] go // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga la yang 'dod chags dang bcas pa dang 'dod chags dang bral ba yod do // gang zag ni mgo la sogs pa lus dang mnyam po yin no // rgyun du zhugs pa ni bsam gtan thob pa'o // so so [so'i Dn] skye bos [D152a] kyang *'dod pa'i* [Dn om.] 'dod chags sam / gnod sems spong ngo // sangs rgyas ni dge 'dun gyi khongs su gtogs pa'o // dge 'dun ni bras bu chen po 'byung bar byed kyi sangs rgyas ni de lta ma yin no // sangs rgyas dang nyan thos kyi rnam par grol ba ni gcig go // gang zag ni mi mthong ngo // sems dang sems las byung ba 'ba zhig ni skye ba'i chos cung zad tsam yang 'jig rten 'di nas [na PG] 'jig rten pha rol tu 'pho ba ni med pa nyid do // 'dus byas thams cad ni skad cig ma'o // 'du byed rgyas par gyur pa las ni skye ba yin no // 'du byed rnams gnas [G115b] pa ni med do // sems ji lta ba de ltar las yin gyi / lus dang ngag gi las ni med do // nyams par mi 'gyur ba'i chos med do // mchod rten mchod pa la ni 'bras bu med do // da ltar byung ba rtag tu pa ni bag la nyal ba yin [Dn151a] no // 'dus byas mthong bas skyon med pa la 'jug par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'di dag ni mang ston pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig yin no //

yang chos sbas pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni sangs rgyas ni dge 'dun gyi khams [khongs Dn] su gtogs pa ma yin no // sangs rgyas las [la D] 'bras bu chen po 'byung ba de ltar [dag Dn] dge 'dun las ni ma yin no // lha'i gnas na yang tshangs par spyod pa ni yod do // 'jig rten pa'i chos ni yod do zhes bya ba de dag ni chos sbas pa rnams kyi [Dn add rtsa ba'i] dam tshig yin no //

de la 'od srungs pa rnams kyi dam tshig ni rnam [P165b] par smin pa rnam par smin pa'i chos rnams yang [kyang Dn] 'byung bar 'gyur ba'i chos ni yod do // spangs la yongs su ma shes pa yang [Dn om.] yod do zhes bya ba dang / chos sbas pa'i thams cad kyang 'dod de de dag ni 'od srungs pa'i dam tshig yin no //

gos dmar po [pa Dn] rnams kyi dam tshig ni gang zag [Dn add ni] med do zhes bya ba'o //

yang thams cad yod par smra ba rnams kyi bye brag slob dpon bla ma'i gzhung ston par byed pa'i 'pho ba *bar smra ba* [D P om.] rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni phung po lnga ni 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten pha rol tu 'pho ba'o // lam ma gtogs [rtogs Dn] par phung po 'gag pa med do // rtsa [G116a] ba'i ltung ba dang bcas pa'i phung po ni yod do // gang zag ni don dam par mi dmigs so // kun kyang [D152b] mi rtag [rtog D] go zhes bya ba de dag ni 'pho ba'i [ba pa'i DG] dam tshig yin te / rnam pa bdun po de lta bu dag tu thams cad yod par smra ba'i [bar Dn] dam tshig dag gnas so //

yang gnas ma'i bu'i dam tshig ni nye bar blang ba [ba'i DPG] nye bar len pa dang

ldan pa ni btags pa'o // chos gang yang 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten pha rol tu 'pho ba med do // gang zag ni phung po lnga nye bar blangs nas 'pho bar 'gyur ro // 'dus byas ni skad cig ma dang skad cig ma ma yin pa yang yod do // gang zag ni nye bar blangs pa'i phung po nyid dang gcig pa 'am / gcig pa ma yin par brjod par mi bya'o // mya ngan las 'das pa ni chos thams cad dang gcig pa nyid dam tha dad pa nyid du mi brjod do // mya ngan las 'das pa ni yod pa nyid dam / med pa nyid du mi brjod do // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga ni 'dod chags dang bcas pa yang ma yin / 'dod chags dang bral ba yang ma yin no zhes bya ba ni gnas ma [ma'i Dn] bu pa rnams kyi dam tshig go //

yang gnas ma [ma'i Dn] bu yang rnam pa gnyis te / [Dn151b] ri chen po pa [Dn om.] dang / mang pos bkur ba pa'o // de yang mang pos bkur ba pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni 'byung bar 'gyur ba dang / 'byung ba dang / 'gag par 'gyur ba dang / 'gag pa dang / skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skye ba dang / 'chi bar 'gyur ba dang / 'chi ba dang / byed bar 'gyur ba dang / byed pa dang / chad par 'gyur [P166a] ba dang / *chad pa dang /* [G om.] 'gro bar 'gyur ba dang / 'gro [G116b] ba dang / *rnam par shes par 'gyur ba dang /* [G om.] rnam par shes pa ni yod do zhes bya ba de lta bu ni mang pos bkur ba pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig *yin no* [go Dn] //

yang ri chen po pa yang rnam pa gnyis te / chos mchog pa dang / lam bzangs pa zhes bya'o [bya ba'o Dn] // chos mchog pa rnams kyi rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni skye la ma rig pa dang / skye ba dang 'gag pa la ma rig pa dang 'gag pa'o // lam bzangs pa'i yang de bzhin no //

grong khyer drug pa la kha cig na re [G add ni] ri chen po pa'i bye brag yin zer / gzhan dag gis smra ba ni mang pos bkur ba *pa dag gis* [pa'i Dn] bye brag yin par 'dod de /

de ltar de rnams ni gnas ma'i bu'i sde pa rnam pa [D153a] bzhir gnas pa yin no //

gang de dag ni slob dpon dag gi rjes su *'brangs pa'i* ['brang ba'i D] rim gyis rnam pa bco brgyad du gyur pa yin te / de dag ni rtsa ba'i rtog pa dag yin no // gzhan nang gses kyi dbye ba ni mang du yod pas brjod par bya'o // ji [ci Dn] lta [ltar PG] zhe na /

thams cad yod par smra ba rnams kyi 'dod gzhung gi bye brag kyang dbye ba rnam pa bzhi ste / dngos po dang / mtshan nyid dang / gnas skabs dang / gzhan gzhan du *gyur pa* ['gyur ba Dn] nyid kyi bye brag gis so //

de la dang po dngos po gzhan nyid du gyur pa ni btsun pa chos skyob kyi ste / de ni chos rnams dus kyi [kyis Dn] 'jug ['jig DPG] par gyur pa na dngos po gzhan du gyur pa [Dn om.] nyid ni yin gyi rdzas gzhan du gyur pa nyid ni ma yin te / gser gyi snod bcom nas gzhan du byas pa ni [na Dn] dbyibs gzhan du gyur pa [Dn add nyid] yin gyi / rdzas gzhan du gyur pa ni ma yin [G117a] *pa bzhin* [Dn om.] no // ji ltar 'o ma las [la Dn] zhor gyur ba na ro dang nus pa dang / smin pa gzhan du gyur pa las kha dog ni ma yin pa de bzhin du chos rnams kyang 'das pa'i dus nas da ltar gyi dus su byung ba na 'das pa'i dus kyi dngos po nyams pa yin gyis [gyi Dn] rdzas ni ma yin no // de bzhin du da ltar gyi dus nas ma 'ongs par 'byung ['gyur Dn] ba na yang da ltar gyi dngos po nyams pa yin gyi rdzas kyi dngos po ni ma yin [Dn add no] zhes zer ro //

mtshan nyid gzhan du gyur [P166b] pa ni btsun pa dbyangs sgrog gi [gis PG] te [ste

Dn] / de na re chos rnams dus kyi [kyis DDn] ’jug par gyur pa na [ni Dn] ’das pa’i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa ni ma ’ongs pa dang da ltar gyi mtshan nyid dag [Dn om.] dang mi ldan pa yang ma [DPDn om.] yin la ma ’ongs pa yang ma yin [’ongs Dn] pa’i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa na [ni Dn] ’das pa dang da ltar [Dn add gyi] dag gi [Dn om.] dang mi ldan pa ni ma yin te [no Dn] / dper na skyes bu bud med gcig [cig G] la chags par gyur pa na lhag ma rnams la yang [Dn om.] chags pa dang bral ba ni ma yin *pa bzhin* [Dn om.] no zher zer ro //

gnas skabs [Dn add su] gzhan du gyur pa ni btsun pa dbyig bshes kyi [kyis P] te / de ni chos rnams dus kyi [kyis DPDn] ’jug par gyur pa na gzhan dang gzhan du rjod par byed pa ni gnas skabs gzhan du gyur pa yin gyi [gyis P] rdzas gzhan du gyur pa ni ma yin te / dper na sdong po [bu Dn] [D153b] gcig bu bgrang ba’i tshe na [ni Dn]gcig ces brjod par bya [gyur pa Dn] la / grangs brgyar gtogs pa’i tshe na [ni Dn] brgya zhes bya / grangs stong du bgrang ba’i tshe ni stong zhes bya ba dang ’dra’o zhes zer ro //

gzhan gzhan [G117b] du gyur pa ni btsun pa sangs rgyas lha’i ste / de ni chos rnams dus kyi [kyis DPGDn] ’jug par gyur [GDn add pa] na sngon dang phyi ma la ltos nas gzhan dang gzhan du brjod par bya ste / dper na bud med gcig la ma zhes kyang brjod bu mo zhes kyang brjod pa bzhin [yin Dn] no //

bzhi po de dag ji lta ba bzhin du thams cad yod do [Dn om.] zhes [ces Dn] bya [smra Dn] ba’i phyir [G add thams cad yod do zhes bya ba’i phyir] thams cad yod par smra ba’o //

de bzhin du kha cig ni [Dn om.] rkyen bdun te / rgyu dang dmigs pa dang de ma thag dang / bdag po dang las dang zas dang rten zhes *bya ba’o* [bya’o GDn] // de bzhin du la la ni rtogs pa’i sems bzhi ste / bden pa so so ba’o // gzhan rnams ni chos shes pa dang rjes su shes pa brgyad yin te / so sor rtogs [rtog Dn] pa’i ye shes ni ma yin no zhes zer gzhan rnams ni bcu gnyis su ’dod do // de las kyang gzhan pa rnams ni bcu drug tu ’dod do // de bzhin du sems med pa’i gnyid la ni [na PG] sems ma yin no // mtshungs par ldan pa lhag ma rnams la ni yod do //

’du shes dang tshor ba ’gog pa la ’du [P167a] shes dang tshor ba bkag [’gog Dn] pa ni yod do // lhag ma rnams la ni mtshungs par ldan pa yod do // ji ltar yid gnyis [Dn om.] kyis [kyi P] [Dn152b] skyo bar gyur pa ni spyod pa med pa’i bsam gtan la snyoms par ’jug la / dga’ bas skyo bar gyur pa ni / dga’ ba med pa’i bsam gtan la snyoms par ’jug // de [Dn om.] bzhin du ’du shes [Dn add pa] dang tshor bas skyo bar gyur pa ni ’du shes dang [G118a] tshor ba ’gog pa la snyoms par ’jug la /

de bzhin du kha cig na re sems kyis yul gyi khyad par thob pa ni mya ngan las ’das pa [Dn add thob pa] yin no zhes zer ro // la la na re phung po med par gyur pa [par Dn] mya ngan las ’das pa yin gyi dngos po’i don ni ma yin no [Dn om.] zhes zer / kha cig na re rang bzhin gyis lung du bstan du med pa ni mya ngan las ’das pa yin no zhes brjod do //

de bzhin du la la na re tshad med pa rnams ni byang chub kyi yan lag yin no yang zer [Dn add ro] / kha cig na re ’bras bu che [D154a] ba ni gsum ste / gzhan gyi sems ni [kyi Dn] ’bras bu dang ’bras bu che ba dang / tshad med pa’i [D add che ba’i] ’bras bu zhes bya’o [bya ba’o Dn] // de bzhin du nyon mongs pa’i dbang gis ’gro bar ’gro ba na [ni PG]

grogs su gyur pa ni las yin no // de bzhin du de spangs par gyur pa ni 'gro ba de dag tu 'gro bar mi 'gyur ro // yang la la na re sngar byas pa'i las rnams kyi dbang gis dang po [por PGDN] 'gro bar 'dod do // kha cig ni re [P om.] ji ltar goms pa'i las rnams kyi [kyis DN] yin par 'dod do // la la na re ni [DN om.] rnam pa lnga [lngas DN] goms pas [PG pa] te snga ma bzhi dang rkyen gyi [gyis PG] khyad par goms pas so // kha cig na re 'das pa'i nye bar len pa las me 'bar ro zhes zer [PG om.] [DN add ro] // kha cig na re da ltar gyi las so zhes zer ro [PG om.] //

kha cig na re sgrib pa lnga po rnams las gang yang rung ba la mi mthun par sems pa las so zhes zer // kha cig ni gzugs kyi khams ni *kha dog* [khams DN] bzhi par 'dod do // gzhan dag [DN om.] ni kha dog gcig par 'dod do //

de bzhin du gzhan [G118b] dag ni gang zag [DN add ni] yod de [do DN] de yang phung po las gzhan yin no zhes zer / phung po tsam yang ma yin te / phung po *nye bar len pa'i* [DN om.] nye bar [P167b] blangs pa dang ldan par btags [brtags DN] pa'o // nye bar len pa med pa ni mya ngan las 'das pa yin pas so // 'di ltar 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi la [las DN] rim gyis brtags [btags PG] nas mngon par rtogs par 'gyur te / bar ma dor mi mthun pa'i sems 'byung ba ni [DN om.] med do // sdug [DN153a] bsngal la dmigs pa'i byang chub kyi yan lag gis skyon med par 'jug go // 'dod par gtogs pa'i 'du byed mi rtag par yid la byed pa la brten pa'i sems bcu gsum gyis rgyun tu zhugs pa'i 'bras bu thob par 'gyur te / chos de la gnas pa las nyams pa ni [DN om.] med do // de bzhin du zhugs pa yang ngo // dgra bcom pa la yang nyams pa'i chos yod do // srid pa bar ma do yang yod do // 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa yang yod do // gcig tu dge ba'i chos kyi don mya ngan las 'das pa ni yod do // phung po 'gags [dgag DN] pa ni dus las rnam par grol ba yin no // lha la yang tshangs par spyod pa la gnas pa yod do // 'dod pa'i khams nas [D154b] skyon med *pa la 'jug* [D om.] par 'gyur ro // so so'i skye bos kyang 'dod pa'i 'dod chags dang gnod sems spong ngo // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga ni 'dod chags dang bcas pa 'am bral ba [DN add yang] ma yin te / rnam par rtog pa med pa'i phyir ro // drug pa ni 'dod chags dang bcas pa dang [G119a] / 'dod chags dang bral ba yang yin no // dgra bcom pa ni zag pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs dang / sems kyis [kyi DPG] zag pa dang bcas pa dang / zag pa med pa la [las DN] dmigs pa yin no // sems kyis [kyi DPG] yul gzhan du phyin pa ni ma yin gyi / 'di na gnas bzhin du thag ring po na gnas pa la dmigs par byed do // gzugs med pa'i *khams la ni* [khams la P, khams na DN] gzugs med do // dgra bcom pa la yang nyams pa'i chos yod do // dus ma yin par 'chi ba yod do // skyed bu'i [bus PG] byed pa yod do // 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba yod do // phyi rol pa la yang mngon par shes pa lnga yod do // dgra bcom pa la gzhan gyis bstan cing sgrub [bsgrub DN] pa med do // mi [P168a] shes pa med do // yid gnyis med do // gzhan gyi la *yongs su brtag* [brtags PG] pa med do // ngag 'jug pa'i smra ba med de / dbang po dang / stobs dang / byang chub kyi yan lag bskyed pa'i phyir ro //

bcom ldan 'das kyi nyan thos rnams byang gi sgra mi snyan dang / bdud ris dang 'du shes med pa'i sems can du skye ba ni med do // rgyun tu zhugs pas bsam gtan rnams thob pa ma yin no // mdo sde thams cad ni nges pa'i don yin no // mtshungs par

[Dn153b] mi ldan pa'i bag la nyal dang sems las byung ba'i bag la nyal yang yod do // 'dus byas ni skad cig ma dang skad cig ma ma yin pa yang yod do // 'gag par 'gyur ba'i nye bar len pa las me 'bar bar 'gyur ro //

sems gcig gcig [G119b] 'chi zhing skye bo [ba PG] mi shes pa'i gzhi las 'chi ba'i mthar thug pa'i [gi Dn] bar du'o // 'chi ba'i rkyen byed pa'i sems gcig po de nyid yang dag par zhi bar bya'o // tshad med pa rnams ni byang chub kyi yan lag ma yin no // snyoms par 'jug pa drug cu rtsa bdun grub par byas nas snyoms par 'jug pa bcu dgu dang / dbang po dang / stobs dang / byang chub kyi yan lag [D155a] rnams byang chub sems dpas yang dag par spyod par byed do // kun tu sbyor ba rnams ma gtogs pa nyid ni bar chad med pa'i lam gyis [gyi PG] spong [spang PGDn] bar bya ba rnams so // 'gro ba dang bcas pa'i lam ni nges par gnyis yin no // dge sbyong gi 'bras bu ni rim gyis thob pa ma yin no // 'jig rten pa'i lam gyis kyang lan cig phyir 'ong ba'i 'bras bu dang / phyir mi 'ong ba'i 'bras bu mngon du byed do // 'khor ba gzhan du 'gyur ba yang yod do // chos cung zhig kyan 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten pha rol tu 'gro ba med do // phung po nye bar blangs nas sems can ni 'pho bar 'gyur ro // gzugs kyi khams ni kha dog bzhi [Dn add pa] yin no // de bzhin du srid pa bar ma ni kha dog bcu 'am nya lcibs [phyis Dn] kyi mdog 'dra ba'o // de bzhin du srid pa bar [P168b] ma ni zhag lnga 'am bdun du gnas pa'o ['am DDn] / yun ring por yang ngo // de bzhin du las ni nam yang med par mi 'gyur ro // nyams par mi 'gyur ro // phrog ['phrogs Dn] par mi 'gyur ro // las kyi rnam par smin pa nyams par [su myong bar Dn] 'gyur ba ni med do // srid pa ji srid kyi bar du rigs [G120a] kyi ngo bo dang / lhan cig tu gnas so // sngar nye bar bsags pa dang phyis nye bar bsags pa'i las kyi rkyen [Dn add nye bar] rnyed par gyur nas 'gro ba rnams su 'gro bar byed do // nges pa'i las ni [nas Dn] bzlog par mi nus so //

byang chub sems dpa' ni skyes bu'i gzugs kyis lhums su zhugs pa yin no [D om.] // yum gyi sku [dku D] nas glang po [Dn154a] cher gyur nas zhugs pa ni ma yin te / de ni de'i rmi lam gyi rnam rtog yin no // nur nur po dang / mer mer po dang / ltar ltar po [po'i Dn] ngo bor yang 'gyur ro // skye gnas nas skyes [Dn om.] na yang sgrib pa med pa'i rnam par grol ba'i nus pa can du 'gyur ro // sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi ye shes ni longs spyod la 'jug par 'gyur ro // so so'i skye bo nyid kyang sems rtse [PGDn om.] gcig gis 'gog go // sems rtse [PGDn om.] gcig gis sgrib pa thams cad spong ngo [Dn om.] // sems gcig gis thams cad mkhyen pa'i sgrib pa med pa'i rnam par thar pa yang rab tu 'thob po // sems gcig gis zhugs pa'i chos rnams 'gag [D155b] par byed cing [cig PG] 'bras bu la gnas pa rnams skyed par byed do //

rkyen bzhi [gzhi PG] nyid kyis rkyen thams cad bsdus so // sdug bsngal gyis [gyi PG] spang bar bya ba'i kun nas ldang ba la gnas pa ni mtshams med pa dag byed pa yin gyi / gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // mthong bas [bar PG] spang [spong D] bar bya ba'i bag la nyal bzhis bsdus [sdus PG] pas thams cad bsdus pa [Dn add ste] des dge ba'i rtsa ba thams cad gcod par byed kyi / bsgoms [bsgom Dn] pas spang bar bya ba [bas Dn] ni ma yin no // bsgom pa'i rang bzhin [G120b] thams cad la ['jig rten Dn] ji srid gnas kyi bar du gzhan gyis gnod par byed pa'i 'bad pas gnod par mi 'gyur gyi / bdag nyid kyi tshe zad pas dus byed par 'gyur ro // dgra bcom pa [P169a] thams cad ni bral bas 'chi bar 'gyur gyi / 'pho

bas ni 'chi ba med de ji skad du lus dang bral bas dus byed par 'gyur te / dgra bcom pa ni lus tha ma dang bral bas 'bral ba'i phyir ro zhes [Dn add bya bar] gsungs pa lta bu ste / lus ni 'dir dbang po'i lus la bya bar bzhed do // 'byung bar 'gyur ba dang / 'byung ba dang / 'gag par 'gyur ba dang / 'gag pa dang / skye bar 'gyur ba dang / skyes [skye Dn] pa dang / 'chi bar 'gyur ba dang / 'chi ba dang / byed par 'gyur ba dang / byed pa dang / chad par gyur ba dang / chad pa dang / 'gro bar 'gyur ba dang / 'gro ba dang / rnam par shes par 'gyur ba dang / rnam par shes pa'o // phung po gsum gyi [gyis Dn] sems can [Dn om.] thams cad bsdus kyis [kyi PDn] chos thams cad ni ma yin no // tshor ba thams cad ni las [Dn154b] las byung ba yin no // sngar byas pa'i bsgom pas spang bar bya ba'i las thams cad ni las kyi rnam par smin par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i bar te [rnams so Dn] /

de lta bu'i sde pa'i dbye ba dag la sde pa gcig gi [gis G] khongs su theg pa chen po 'di gtogs par gyur na yang sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin par rtog [rtogs D] par bya na theg pa chen po ni sde pa gcig gcig gi gsung rab kyi nang du yang ma bstan pas theg pa chen po 'di sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa ma yin no // [G121a] 'di'i phyir yang 'di ni sde pa bco brgyad kyi khongs su gtogs pa ma yin te / bcom ldan 'das yongs [D156a] su mya ngan las 'das pa'i dus nyid ni rtsa ba'i yang dag par sdud par byed pas ma bsdus pa'i phyir dang / phyis bye bar gyur pa na yang sdud par *byed pa* [P om.] rnams kyis ma bsdus pa'i phyir ro //

Miscellaneous Objections

de bzhin gshegs pa rtag pa nyid du ston par byed pas 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa zhes bya ba dang 'gal ba'i yang phyir ro // de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying pos khyab pa nyid dang / len pa'i rnam par shes pa ston par byed pas bdag tu 'dzin pa ma spangs pa'i yang phyir ro // [P169b] sangs rgyas mya ngan yongs mi 'da' / zhes ston par byed pas de la zhi ba nyid med par bstan pas chos kyi phyag rgya gsum dang 'gal ba'i phyir dang / nyan thos chen po rnams lung bstan pa dang / dgra bcom pa rnams la shin tu smod [mod PG] pa dang / khyim pa la phyag bya ba ston pa dang / de bzhin gshegs pa las khyad par du byang chub sems dpa' la bsngags par byed pa'i phyir dang / nam mkha' mdzod la sogs pa'i byang chub sems dpa'i smon lam rnams kyang tshig tsam yin pa'i phyir dang / shā kya thub pa sprul pa yin par smra bas bstan pa thams cad kyang log pa yin pa'i phyir dang / rtag tu mnyam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa yin zhes bya bar yang mi rigs pa'i phyir dang / mdo sde mang po las 'bras bu med pa'i bsngags pa ston pa'i phyir te / shin tu sdig pa chen po yang rtsa [G121b] ba nas 'byin par *smra bas* [smras ba P] las la [P om.] 'bras bu med par ston pa'i phyir dang / shin tu rgyas pa yang gzhan nyid ston pa dang / kri ki'i rmi lam gyi dbye ba yang ma bstan pas de'i phyir theg pa chen po 'di sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa ma yin te / 'di ni nges par bdud kyis [kyi PG] skye bo blo gros ngan pa dang / rmongs pa rnams bslu bar bya ba'i phyir sna tshogs pa mang po brtsams pa ma yin no //

theg pa chen po'i lta ba 'di mngon sum la sogs pa dang shin tu 'gal bar ston pa /

4.9 rūpādyālambanā buddhiḥ svasaṃvedyāpi vidyate //
yataḥ pratyakṣabādhāpi jāyate 'jātivādinaḥ //

gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa'i blo // rang rig nyid du yod pas kyang //
mngon sum gnod pa gang yin des // skye med smra ba de la [D156b] yod [gnod DPG] //

gzugs la sogs pa'i yul rnams la dmigs pa 'di la yod pas de ni gzugs la sogs pa la dmigs pa'i blo'o // yul la rnam par shes pa rnams te / de ni dngos po'i ngo bo ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu rnam par shes pa'i mtshan nyid can yin pa'i phyir ro // rang gi rgyud kyis nyams su myong bar bya ba yin pas rang rig go // kyang zhes bya ba'i sgra ni 'gro ba ma lus pa yang yang dag par rig pas so // blo de ni yul dang bcas [P170a] pa yin pa'i phyir la ma skyes pa nyid du btags pa la ni rigs pa med pa'i phyir mngon sum gyis kyang gnod la / 'jig rten gyi yang dag par rig pa bkag pas na / grags pas gnod pa yang skye ba med par smra ba la yod do //

4.10 tattvato hi na bhāvānāṃ janmety evaṃ viśeṣaṇāt /
na pratyakṣapratītibhyāṃ bādhā saṃbhavatīti cet //

srid pa rnams ni de nyid du [G122a] // skye med ces bya'i khyad par gyis //
mngon sum dang ni grags pa dang // gnod pa 'di la med ce na //

gal te dbu ma pa dag smra ba //

mig med gzugs la yod ma yin // bar dang gnyi ga la mi gnas //
gang du de ni gnas gyur pa // yod pa ma yin med pa min //

zhes bya ba [pa PG] la sogs pas shes pa dmigs su med pa 'i phyir mngon sum yang 'byung ba yod pa ma yin la / 'jig rten ni mi shes pa'i rab rib kyis bsgribs pa'i phyir 'jig rten gyi grags pa dang / mngon sum gyi gnod pa yang bdag gis [gi PG] don dam pa nyid [PG add la] mi 'byung ngo zhe na /

de nyid bzhad gad yin par lan gdab par bya ba'i phyir /

4.11 agamyā paramārthena gamyā strītvād yathetarā //
ity evam api vaktuḥ syān nirdoṣaṃ doṣavad vacaḥ //

bgrod min la yang yang dag tu // bgrod par bya ste bud med phyir //
bud med gzhan bzhin zer ba yi // skyon bcas tshig kyang skyon med 'gyur //

bud med gang bgrod par bya ba ma yin par 'dod pa de yang don dam par bgrod par bya

ba yin te zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par *bya ba'o* [bya'o P] // gtan tshigs ci yod / bud med yin pa'i phyir ro // gang dang gang bud med yin pa de ni bgrod par bya ba yin te / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / bud med gzhan bzhin te / rang gi chung ma bzhin zhes bya ba' i tha tshig go // 'jig rten pa'i dang lung dag dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro zhe na / don dam par [D157a] zhes khyad par du byas pa'i phyir skyon med do // 'di ni rigs [rig PG] pa dang 'gal ba yang yin te / ji ltar gdung ba'i dbang gis bud med la 'jug par gyur pa na bgrod par bya ba dang / bgrod par bya ba ma yin pa dag gis [G122b] gdung ba zhi bar byed par mnyam pa nyid do zhes de skad du smra ba de dag ni blo gros ngan pas smra ba ste / de la yang skyon med par 'gyur la de bzhin du dngos po thams cad la skur ba [P170b] 'debs pa khyod kyi tshig kyang de dang 'dra'o //

skyon chen po gzhan yang yod de /

4.12 satyadṛṣṭir na cet tattvaṃ tattvābhāvaḥ prasajyate /
yonākadevadeśyaṃ vā tattvaṃ tac ca na hīṣyate //

bden pa mthong ba de nyid min // de nyid med par thal bar 'gyur //
nam mkha'i lha yis [yi PG] bstan pa ltar // de nyid yin par mi 'dod do //

theg pa chen po la yang sdug bsngal dang / kun 'byung ba dang / 'gog pa dang / lam ma yin la / sdug bsngal la sogs pa shes pas kyang yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da'o zhes ston pa'i tshig yod par grags te / bden pa mthong ba de kho na nyid ma yin na de ma yin pa'i de kho na nyid gzhan gang yin zhes brjod do // theg pa chen po las bstan pa'i de kho na nyid yod do zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / bden pa mthong ba las gzhan yin pa'i phyir nam mkha'i lhas bstan pa bzhin no // de dag ni 'di lta bu'i de kho na nyid ston te / gser gyi snod du gser gyi khab kyis [kyi PG] grog ma phug nas bsad [gsad D] na 'khor ba las grol bar 'gyur la / de gsod pa po yang thar pa'i sa bon bsags par 'dod pa dang / ba lang la sogs pa bsad pa dang skyed [bskyed PG] par byed pa la nyal po byas pas mtho ris la sogs pa'i rgyu yin no zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o //

gzhan yang khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam mo zhes bya ba'i mdo'i don [G123a] yang gzhan du btags nas phyi rol gyi skye mched la sogs pa dgag pa'i phyir ston par byed pa yang rigs pa 'dis na mi rigs te /

4.13 bāhyāyatanasadbhāvas tannirbhāsodayād dhiyaḥ /
pratīyate pratītaṃ vaś cittāstitvaṃ yathāpriyam //

phyi rol skye mched yod pa las // der snang ba yi blo 'byung bas //
yod par rigs te sems nyid ni // yod la dga' bas ji bzhin gyis //

phyi'i skye mched ni chos can no // de rnams kyi chos yod par gyur pa ni de'i chos su gtogs pa'o // phyi'i skye [D157b] mched de rnams kyi snang ba ni dmigs pa'i rnam pa'i

rang gi ngo bo'i khyad par ro // de snang ba 'byung ba ni der snang bas 'byung ba'o // snang ba 'byung ba de gang la zhe na / blo la ste / dbang po drug gi rnam par shes pa'o // yul med par rnam par shes pa 'byung ba mi 'grub pas / khyod rang gi gzhung la rab tu grags pa'i sems yod par 'dod pa la dga' [P171a] ba ji ltar skye ba de dper byas nas de bzhin du phyi'i skye mched yod par 'dod pa la yang dga' ba nyid du gyis shig ces bya ba'i don to //

4.14 atha cetostitā neṣṭā cittamātraṃ na vo jagat /
jagatpakṣīkriyāyāṃ ca hetūdāharaṇe na vaḥ //

gal te sems yod mi 'dod na // khod kyi 'gro ba sems tsam min //
'gro ba phyogs su bya ba dang // gtan tshigs sgrub pa khyod la med //

yang sems tsam du nye bar dmigs na ni phyi'i skye mched la sogs pa nye bar dmigs par [pas PG] mi 'gyur la / phyi'i skye mched la sogs pa ma dmigs na yang sems tsam du yang dmigs par mi 'gyur bar 'dod na ni khams gsum pa 'di dag ni sems [G123b] tsam mo zhes bya ba'i lung yang nyams par 'gyur ro // gzhan yang 'gro ba sems tsam mo zhes ba 'di la gtan tshigs ni gang yin / 'di la dpe ni gang yod / gtan tshigs dang dpe skyon med pa 'di la yod pa ma yin pas 'di dam bca' ba tsam du zad de / dam bca' ba tsam gyis ni 'dod pa'i don gang yang grub ba [pha D] yod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ni nyan thos kyi theg pa pas nye bar sbyar ba'i phyogs snga ma yin no //

Bhāviveka's Response

4.15 tatra prāguktanītyā tu svanītivipadaṃ paraḥ /
yad amṛṣyann upādikṣat tan na yuktam itīṣyate //

de la sngar smras rigs pa ni // rang gi phyogs nyams dogs pas gzhan //
mi 'dod gyur pa gang smra ba // de ni rigs [rig P] pa ma yin no //

de la zhes bya ba ni phyogs phyi ma nye bar dgod pa'i tha tshig go // sa la sogs pa ni 'byung ba rang gi ngo bor mi 'gyur te zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i sngar gyi rigs [rig PG] pa dang / rang gi sde snod gsum gyi lugs nyams par dogs pas gzhan te nyan thos kyi theg pa pa'o // mi 'dod gyur pa ni mi bzod par gyur pa'o // gang smra ba ste / skyon nye bar ston par gyur pa'o // de ni rigs pa ma yin zhes bya ba ni 'chad par 'gyur ba'i lan dag gis skyon dang bcas par ston pa yin no zhes bya ba'i [D158a] bsam pas so //

phyogs snga mas don gyis tshad mas 'di smras so // ston pa ni rnam par mi rtog [rtogs PG] pa'i blo mnga' ba ste / 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi la dmigs pa'i phyir / rang sangs rgyas la sogs pa'i blo bzhin no [P171b] zhes bya ba [G124a] 'di'i lan /

4.16 nirvikalpā matiḥ śāstur nairātmyālambanā matā /
yathā pudgalanairātmyaviṣayā buddhir ity ataḥ //

ston pa rnam par mi rtog blo // bdag med pa la dmigs par ’dod //
yul can gyi ni blo yin [min D] phyir // gang zag bdag med pa bzhin no //

zhes smras so // bcom ldan ’das kyis gang zag la bdag med pa yongs su mkhyen pas gang zag gi rnam par rtog pa mi ’jug pa de bzhin du chos la bdag med pa yongs su mkhyen pas kyang chos la yang rnam par rtog pa ’jug par ni mi ’gyur ro // chos dang *gang zag* [zag gang P] las ma gtogs pa gzhan ni cung zhig kyang med na gang la rnam par rtog par byed pas rnam par mi rtog pa nyams par ’gyur /

4.17ab sādhanaṃ bādhyate tasya viruddhāvyabhicāriṇā /

[*Tibetan missing*]

de lta na sgrub par byed pa’i tshig ’dis ni sngar smras pa’i sgrub par byed pa la gnod pa yin te / de dang ’gal ba na [ni PG] yang zhugs pa’i phyir ro //

4.17cd prāyogikādibuddhīnām utpādo yan niṣidhyate /

sbyor las byung sogs blo dag ni // ’byung ba gal te ’gog byed na //

’jig rten las ’das pa’i rnam par mi rtog pa’i rjes las thob par sbyor ba las byung ba’i blo rnams la / dag pa’i ’jig rten pa’i ye shes brjod pa ni dbu ma pas kyang ’byung bar ’dod pa nyid yin te / gang bcom ldan ’das kyis [kyi PG] lo bzhi bcur chos bstan pa la sogs pa’i bya ba la sogs pa sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa gang yin pa de / bdag cag gi lta ba las med par rnam par brtags nas / sbyor ba las byung ba la sogs pa’i blo de rnams ’byung ba la gzhan dag gis ’gog par byed pa ni mi rigs te [G124b] / skyon ma yin pa la sgro ’dogs pa’i phyir ro //

’on te ’jig rten las ’das pa’i blo’i dbang du byas nas / rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa nyid du bsgrub pa de ni mi rigs par rigs pa nyid kyis bdag gis bsgrub par bya ba nyid de ’dir rigs pa ni ’di yin no //

4.18 jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher yas tatrānudayo dhiyaḥ /
so ‘yaṃ bodhyo ’bhisaṃbodhau jñeyatattvāviparyayāt //

shes bya kun tu ma grub pas // blo gang gang gi rjes ’byung ba //
de ni rtog med mngon [sngon DPG] byang chub // shes bya de nyid ma log phyir //

phung po dang / khams dang / skye mched kyi mtshan nyid [D158b] can gyi shes bya rnams ngo bo med pa nyid du bdag gis [gi PG] sngar bsgrubs so // thams cad du rang rang gi ngo bo grub pa med pas [par PG] *shes bya med pa'i* [G om.] [P172a] shes pa yang ji ltar 'byung bar 'gyur / gang nyid la de'i rjes su blo 'byung bar 'gyur ba [pa P] de yang rtog pa med pa nyid ni *mngon par byang chub pa'o zhes byas nas* [D om.] mngon par byang chub pa nyid du 'dod de / yongs su ma sgrub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi shes bya'i de kho na nyid phyin ci ma log par rtogs pa'i phyir ro // de'i yongs su grub pa ni skad cig ma dang / sgyu ma dang / rmi lam dang 'dra ba'i phyir phyin ci ma log pa ga la yod /

4.19 sā svabhāvavikalpādirahitābhimatā matiḥ /
tadāśrayaniṣedhaś cet sādhyam eva prasādhyate //

de yi ngo bo rnam rtog sogs // bral ba'i blos ni mngon 'dod pas //
de yi rten ni 'gog byed na // grub pa nyid ni rab sgrub byed //

gang yang rtog pa med par mngon par byang chub pa gang yin pa de [PG add nyid] ni rang gi dngos po dang gzhan gyi dngos po nges par rtogs par byed pa na de'i rjes su dran pa'i rnam par rtog [rtogs PG] pa dang bral ba mngon [G125a] sum gyi mtshan nyid can ni ston pa nyid yin par 'dod do // gal te de la shā kya thub pa zhes bya ba'i mtshan nyid can gyi sprul pa'i sku [sku'i D] rten *nyid ni* [nyi PG] ma yin no zhes rab tu sgrub par byed na grub [sgrub PG] pa *la sgrub pa* [G om.] yin te / 'og min na bzhugs pa'i longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku la rten [brten D] pa yin pa'i phyir ro //

gal te de lta bu yin na zhi ba dang / stong pa dang / gnyis su med pa la sogs par ston par byed pa ji ltar yin zhe na / brjod par bya ste /

4.20ab kalpanāṃ ca samāropya tacchāntatvādideśanā /

de ni zhi nyid sogs bstan pa // rtog pa rnam kyi [kyis D] sgro btags pa'o //

dag pa dang rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba dang / dbul ba dang / nad nye bar *zhi bar* [P om.] byed pa la sogs par bstan pa ni yid bzhin nor bu bzhin du rang gi rnam par rtog pas sbyar ba yin no //

yang gal te gsung rab las rab tu grags pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i lam [las PG] rnams kyis [kyi PG] / yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub thob par bstan to zhe na //

bden te lam 'di nyid mi dmigs pa'i tshul gyis goms par byas pas yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub 'thob kyi / dngos po la mngon par zhen pas ni ma yin no // mi dmigs [P172b] par bsgom [D159a] pa de gang yin zhe na //

4.20cd samyagdṛṣṭyādimārgaṃ ca bhavaty abhyasyato yadā //

[*Tibetan missing*]

4.21 adarśanam asaṃkalpo vāgavyāhṛtir[1] akriyā /
anājīvo ‘samārambho ‘saṃpramoṣo ‘sthitis tathā //

mthong ba med pa rtog med pa // brjod pa med pa byed med pa //
’tsho ba med pa rtsom med pa // de bzhin dga’ med gnas med pa //

chos thams cad rang gi ngo bo yongs su grub pa med pas mthong ba med pa nyid ni yang dag pa’i lta ba’o // ’das pa dang / ma ’ongs [G125b] pa dag gi sems dag ni nyams shing ma skyes pa’i phyir dang / da ltar byung ba la yang gnas pa med pas rtog pa med ni yang dag pa’i rtog pa’o // gnas dang / byed pa dang / rtsol ba rnams re re la’am / ’dus par gyur pa la ’am / yi ge so so yang dag nye bar mi dmigs pas ngag brjod pa med pa ni yang dag pa’i ngag go // lus dang / dbang po dang / blo’i tshogs dag bdag med pa yin pa’i phyir dang / de’i dge ba’i las byed par sems dpa’ [pa D] ni byung ma thag tu ’jig pa’i phyir las nye bar len ba ni don dam par ’byung bar mi ’gyur bas bya ba med pa ni yang dag pa’i las kyi mtha’o // thog ma med pa’i dus nas goms par byas pa’i zang zing la mngon par zhen pa ’phel bar byas pa’i lus kyi bza’ ba dang / bgo ba la sogs pa lus ’phel bar byed pa la dbu ba’i gong bu dang / chu bur dang / smig rgyu dang / chu shing gi sdong po dang / sgyu ma dang ’dra bar gang gis gang zhig la phan ’dogs par byed ces phung po dag la yongs su btags pa nyid na ’tsho ba med pa nyid ni yang dag pa’i ’tsho ba’o // lus ni rtsva dang / shing dang ’dra bar bem [bems D] po sems pa med pa byed pa med pa yin la / sems kyang sgyu ma dang ’dra bas de dag gis yang dag par brtsams pa yang skad cig ma yin no zhes de kho na nyid du na yang dag pa’i rtsom pa med na yang tha snyad du dge ba’i chos la mngon par sbyor ba ni yang dag [G126a] pa’i rtsol ba’o zhes tha snyad du byed do // don dam par na dbang po rnams kyi rnam par shes pa rnams kyis [kyi PG] nyams su myong ba ci yang med pas de’i rjes las skyes pa’i yid kyi rnam par shes pas kyang ci zhig la rjes su brtag par bya ste / brtag par [P173a] bya ba’i nyams su myong ba ni med pas ci zhig dran nas dran [D159b] pa [D om.] zhes bya / ’on kyang mi brjed [brjod P] pa nyid la kun rdzob tu yang dag pa’i dran pa zhes gdags so // sems ’das pa ni nyams par gyur pa yin / ma ’ongs pa ni ma skyes pa yin / da ltar byung ba yang ’gag pa nyid la mngon du phyogs pa’i phyir sems skad cig tsam yang mnyam par gnas pa ni yod pa ma yin no // dmigs pa yang rim pa ’di nyid kyis dmigs par mi ’gyur bas sems gnas pa med pa nyid la tha snyad du yang dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin zhes ’dogs so //

gang gi tshe byang chub sems dpa’ [dpas PG] ’di nyid shin tu goms par byas na /

4.22 tadānenaiva mārgeṇa buddhabodhir matā hi naḥ /
siddhasādhanadoṣo ‘to bhāvanā vā parīkṣyatām //

1 L vāgavyākṛtir.

de tshe lam ni de nyid kyis // sangs rgyas byang chub 'dod phyir bdag //
grub pa sgrub pa'i skyon yang yin // bsgom nyid la yang brtag par bya //

yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i lam gyis byang chub 'thob po zhes bya ba ni grub pa sgrub pa yin te / gzhan dag khas mi len pa nyid la yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa lam 'di dag nges par bzung nas bdag gis brjod par bya ba yin [D add gyi] / gang la ma goms par byed pa de dag la ni *'dir rigs* ['di rig PG] pas brtag par bya ba ni [DPG add ma] yin no // [G126b]

ci lam de dang ldan na rigs [rig PG] pa dang ldan pa'i bsgom pa yin nam / 'on te ma yin / ji ltar na 'di rigs pa dang ldan par 'gyur zhe na /

gang gi tshe rjes su dpag pa'i rjes su 'brang ['brangs PG] nas lung dang mi 'gal bar gyur pas de kho na nyid gang [G om.] la dmigs pa [par PG] na'o //

gal te khyod kyi [kyis PG] rjes su dpag pa'i rjes su 'brangs na ni lung dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro zhe na /

smras pa /

4.23 yad āgamenāvidhuram anumānānusāriṇām /
tat tattvaṃ bhāvanā cāsya tathaivābhimatā satām //

ji ltar lung dang mi 'gal bar // rjes su dpag pa'i rjes *'brang ba* ['brangs pa PG] //
'di ltar de nyid bsgom pa ste // de ni de bzhin mkhas pas 'dod //

de nyid shes pa 'tshol ba la 'jug pa zhi ba dang / stong pa dang / gnyis su med pa dang gzhan la rag ma las pa dang / mi dmigs pa la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid can lung dang / rigs [rig PG] pa dang mi 'gal bar bstan pa ni de kho na nyid do [P173b] zhes bdag gis bsgrubs pa zin pa ni de nyid do // bsgom pa'i rigs pa yang brjod ma thag pa nyid do // 'di'i lung ni

'jam dpal gang yang chos thams cad mi mnyam pa med pa dang / [D160a] gnyis su med pa dang / gnyis su byar med par mthong ba 'di ni yang dag pa'i lta ba'o // 'jam dpal gang gis chos thams cad rtog [rtogs PG] pa med pa dang rnam par rtog pa *med pa* [PG om.] dang / kun tu rtog pa med par mthong ba med pa'i sbyor bas mthong ba de ni yang dag pa'i rtog pa'o // gang gis [G127a] chos thams cad brjod pa med par mthong bas brjod pa med pa mnyam pa nyid du shin tu rig [rigs PG] pa nyid ni yang dag pa'i ngag go // gang gis [gi PG] chos thams cad bya ba dang byed pa med par mthong ba 'di ni byed pa po mi dmigs pa'i phyir yang dag pa'i las kyi mtha'o // gang gis [gi PG] chos thams cad 'phel ba yang ma yin // 'grib pa yang ma yin pa de ni 'tsho ba med pa mnyam pa nyid la rab tu gnas pa'i phyir yang dag pa'i 'tsho ba'o // gang gis [gi PG] chos thams cad slong bar mi byed / rtsom par [pa PG] mi byed / pha rol gnon pa'i sbyor ba yang mi byed pa 'di ni yang dag pa'i rtsol ba'o // gang gis chos thams cad la dran par bya ba'i lam gyis dben pa'i phyir dran pa byung ba med pa ni yang dag pa'i dran pa'o // 'jam dpal gang gis chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis mnyam par gzhag [bzhag PG] par [pa PG] mthong ba de

ni rtsom pa'i rnam par g.yeng ba mi dmigs pa'i phyir yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin ste / 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad ni de lta bur blta bar bya'o // de ltar lam yang dag par rjes su mthong ba de ni rgal ba dang / pha rol tu phyin pa dang / thang la phyin pa dang / zhi ba thob pa dang / 'jigs pa med pa thob pa dang / nyon mongs pa med pa dang / dgra bcom pa dang / dge sbyong dang / tshangs pa yin no zhes smra'o zhes bya ba la sogs [G add pa chos thams cad la 'jug par bstan pa'i mdo] las 'byung ngo //

[P174a] de bzhin du *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa* [G127b] las kyang dben pa dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba dang / 'gog pa la brten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba mi dmigs pa'i tshul gyis sgom par byed do [de G] zhes 'byung ngo //

de ltar na mthong ba med pa'i rnam par sgom [bsgom PG] pa 'di [D160b] ni lam gzhan yin par brjod [P om.] *par bya'o zhe na brjod par* [PG om.] mi bya'o // lam 'di nyid kyis 'grub par brjod par bya ste / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / smras pa / thar pa'i mi mthun par gyur pa mi dge ba'i chos lta ba log pa la sogs pa spong bar byed pa'i gnyen por yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa dngos po ji lta ba bzhin du sgom par byed de / *'phags pa blo gros mi zad pa 'i mdo* las ji skad du / yang dag pa'i lta ba gang zhe na / 'phags pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i 'phags pa'i bdag dang / sems can dang / srog dang / g.yo [gso DG] ba dang / skyes bu dang / gang zag dang / chad pa dang / rtag pa dang / srid pa dang / srid pa ma yin pa'i dang / dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du [PG add ma] bstan pa dang / 'khor ba dang / mya ngan las 'das par lta [blta PG] bas kun nas ma *bslangs pa* [bslang ba PG] gang yin pa de ni yang dag pa'i lta ba'o // de la yang dag pa'i rtog pa gang zhe na / gang 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug gi kun tu rtog pa mngon du 'byung ba dag gis kun tu rtog par mi byed cing / gang tshul khrims dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba'i phung pos kun nas bslang ba'i kun tu rtog pa dag gis kun tu rtog pa ni yang [G128a] dag pa'i rtog pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te / de'i phyir na dngos por 'dzin pa la mngon par zhen pa rab tu spang ba'i phyir mthong ba med pa la sogs pa'i bsgom pa goms par bya'o // de ltar byas na chos thams cad kyi de kho na nyid mngon par rtogs pa'i rang byung gi phyin ci ma log pa skad cig gcig gis bag chags dang bcas pa'i rgyun rab tu spong ngo // shes [P174b] bya'i dngos po dang rab tu 'brel pa ni bag chags yin no [na PG] // shes bya mi dmigs par 'gyur [gyur PG] na gang la brten nas bag chags 'byung bar 'gyur zhes bya ba 'di ni theg pa chen po la go rim yin no //

ji ltar bstan pa'i lam 'di nyid mthong [mthar DPG] gyis bsgom [bsgoms PG] pa las de kho na nyid thob par 'gyur par bstan pa /

> 4.24ab sa buddho yena tad buddham anyathā mātṛmodakam /
>
> gang gis de rtogs de sangs rgyas // gzhan ni ma yi la du mtshungs //

ji skad bstan pa nyid [D161a] kyi [kyis D] lung rigs [rig PG] pa dang ldan pa'i bsgom pa gang gis de kho na nyid rtogs par gyur pa de ni sangs rgyas zhes brjod par rigs te / ye

shes phyin ci ma log pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro // rigs [rig PG] pa dang 'gal ba'i lung tsam gyi [gyis PG] rjes su *'brang ba'i* ['brangs pa'i P] de kho na nyid du bsgrub pa ni brtag mi bzod pa'i phyir bem [bems D] po'i blo dang ldan pa rnams la mas byin pa'i la du bzhin du [te PG] / bud med 'ga' zhig gis bu byis pa chung ngu la sman zhu ba'i dus 'das kyi bar du brid pa'i phyir bu ram gyis bskus pa'i rde'u dag 'di la du yin gyis [gyi PG] zo zhig ces byas nas byin la / de yang ma 'di ni [G128b] [G add 'di ni] bdag la nam yang log par byed pa ma yin no snyam nas drag tu so btab cing bca' bar brtsams pa dang so dag kyang chag par 'gyur ro // de bzhin du la la dag sman pa'i rgyal pos nye bar bstan pa'i sman phyin ci ma log pa nye bar spyod pa ltar / bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa brda dang bcas pa dang / dgongs pa dang bcas pa dag ji lta bzhin du ma rtogs [rtog PG] nas / thub pas ni 'di ltar bstan pa yin no zhes sgra ji lta ba bzhin du bzung nas / mngon par zhen pa brtan [bstan PG] par byed pa de dag ni mas byin pa'i la du za ba'i khye'u bzhin du mkhas pa rnams kyis [kyi PG] bzhag gang du bya ba yin no // des na lung gi rjes su 'brang ba tsam du mi bya'i / rigs [rig PG] pas rjes su dpag par bya'o //

de la rigs pa ni 'di yin te / 'phags pa nyan thos rnams ni chos tsam mthong ba'i mngon par rtog [rtogs D] pa can yin la / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yongs su shes pa ni rang sangs rgyas rnams so // [P175a] de dag ni ji ltar bstan pa'i lam gyi dngos po dag bsgom pas yin la / bcom ldan 'das kyis ni mi dmigs pa la snyoms par zhugs pas byang chub rtogs pa yin no // de yang dngos por 'dzin pa rtsa ba nas ma spangs kyi bar du ma yin pas de lta bas na [ni PG] mi dmigs par bsgoms [bsgom PG] pas ni yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rgyur gyur pa / khyad par du 'phags pa'i lam yin gyi / nyi tshe ba ni ma yin no //

4.24cd na buddhoktir mahāyānam ity atrāpy eṣa nirṇayaḥ //

theg chen sangs rgyas gsung min zhes // [D161b] zer ba 'di [G129a] yang gtan la dbab //

nges par skyed [bskyed PG] pas khrid nas don rtogs par byed pa ni gtan la dbab pa'o // de gang yin zhe na / rigs pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i lung dang mi 'gal ba'i phyir theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa yin no // rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal ba de ni sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa ma yin te / dper na chad par lta ba bzhin no // theg pa chen po ni rigs pas gnod pa ma yin te / rigs pa ni 'og nas bstan par bya'o // de lta bas na theg pa chen po ni [PG om.] sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa kho na yin te rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa bzhin no //

gzhan yang /

4.25 buddhabodhyāptaye cāyaṃ nālaṃ mārgaḥ puroditaḥ /
duḥkhādyākārato bodhāt pratyekajinamārgavat //

sngar bstan pa yi lam 'di yis // sangs rgyas byang chub thob mi nus //
sdug bsngal rnam pa rtogs byed phyir // rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa bzhin //

mthong ba med par sgom [bsgom PG] par byed pa la sogs pa ma gtogs pa zhes bya ba ni tshig gi lhag ma'o // sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i rnam pa ni sdug bsngal gyi rnam pa ste / mi rtag pa sdug bsngal ba stong pa bdag med pa zhes bya ba sdug bsngal gyi rnam pa bzhi'o // de bzhin du kun 'byung ba dang / 'gog pa dang / lam rnams kyi rnam pa rnams kyang mdo las bstan pa bzhin du so sor rtogs par bya'o // yang na sdug bsngal ba [PG om.] dang / kun 'byung ba dang / 'gog pa dang / lam rnams dang / yongs su shes par bya ba dang / rab tu spang ba dang / mngon du bya ba dang / bsgom par bya ba rnams dang [G129b] / yongs su shes pa dang / rab tu spangs pa dang / mngon du byas pa dang / bsgom [bsgoms D] zhes bya ba rnam pa bcu gnyis rtogs pa yin te / rang sangs rgyas kyi lam bzhin te / [P175b] bcom ldan 'das kyis ni sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i rnam pa rnams mi dmigs par mnyam pa nyid du rtogs so zhes bsams pa'o //

> 4.26 anumānena bādhaivaṃ parapakṣasya jāyate /
> dṛṣṭāntāsaṃbhavo vāpi tadvadvṛtter nirākṛtiḥ //

> rjes su dpag pas gnod pa yang // gzhan gyi phyogs la 'byung bar 'gyur //
> dpe ni ma grub pa nyid kyang // de la zhugs pa bzlog par dka' //

gang dag gis de dag tu lam [lan G] 'di dag nyid kyis shes bya'i sgrib pa zad par byed do zhes zer ba 'di yang bsgom pa khyad par can [D162a] med par shes bya'i sgrib pa spong ba mi srid do // bcom ldan 'das kyang lam 'dis shes bya'i sgrib pa zad par mdzad pa ma yin te / bsgom pa'i khyad par gzhan gyis spangs pa'i phyir ro // gal te yang lam 'di la shes bya'i sgrib pa spong ba'i nus pa yod par gyur na ni nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyis kyang sgrib pa gnyis zad par byas nas bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba dang bcas par spong bar 'gyur ba [PG om.] zhig na de lta bu ni mi srid do // de lta bas na theg pa chen po las bstan pa'i lam bsgom pa'i khyad par kho nas shes bya'i sgrib pa rab tu spong ba yin no //

gzhan yang /

> 4.27 nānutpādakṣayajñāne yathārthe paramārthataḥ /
> bhrāntivat savikalpatvāt tadbodhaḥ kasya tattvataḥ //

> mi skye zad par shes pa ni // ji bzhin don gyi don dam min //
> 'khrul bzhin rnam rtog bcas pa'i phyir // de rtogs [rtog PG] ji ltar de nyid yin //

sdug bsngal la chos [G130a] shes pa'i bzod pa dang / sdug bsngal la chos shes pa dang / sdug bsngal la rjes su shes pa'i bzod pa dang sdug bsngal rjes su shes pa dang / de bzhin du kun 'byung ba dang / 'gog pa dang / lam rnams la chos dang / rjes su shes pa'i bzod pa dang / shes pa zhes bya ba sems kyi skad cig ma bcu drug gi mthar phyin pas phung po mi skye bar shes pa dang / nyon mongs pa zad par shes pa 'byung bar bcom ldan 'das

kyis bstan pa ni zad pa dang mi skye ba shes pa'i byang chub po zhes gzhan gyis [gyi PG] 'dod pa de rjes su mthun pa ma yin pas dgag par bya ba'i phyir smras pa / de dag ni don dam par ji lta ba bzhin du ma yin no // [P176a] gtan tshigs ci yod ce na / rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i phyir 'khrul pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa bzhin no // 'dis ni zad pa dang mi skye ba shes pa de dag 'khrul pa'i shes pa dang 'dra ba'i phyir dang / phyin ci log la dmigs pa'i phyir yongs su shes pa gang zhig rigs [rig PG] pa dang ldan pa yin zhes bstan to //

4.28ab hetuyānāntaratvākhya etenaiva gatottaraḥ /

theg pa gzhan nyid rgyu yin zhes // zer ba de'i lan yang btab //

nyan thos kyi theg par bstan pa'i lam ni yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rgyu ma yin te / bsgom pa dang bral bas des ni shes bya'i sgrib pa spong bar mi nus pa'i phyir rang sangs rgyas kyi theg par bstan pa'i [D162b] lam bzhin no zhes bya bar 'brel to //

4.28cd kathaṃ cāvṛtisadbhāvād arhann arhati nirvṛtim //

ji ltar sgrib pa yod bzhin [G130b] du // dgra bcom mya ngan 'da' bar rigs //

sgrib pa yang gnyis te / nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa zhes bya'o // nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa yang rnam pa gnyis te / 'ching bar byed pa dang / bag chags kyi ngo bo'o // yang shes bya ba'i sgrib pa ni 'ching bar byed pa'i bdag nyid kho na'o // de la nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dag gis ni nyon mongs pa'i 'ching ba tsam spangs kyi nyon mongs pa'i bag chags kyang ma yin la / shes bya'i sgrib pa gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid kyang ma yin pas de'i phyir dgra bcom pa ni mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya ba ma yin te / sgrib pa yod pa'i phyir rgyun du zhugs pa la sogs pa bzhin no // des na nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dag kyang bag chags kyi dri ma dag par byas te / byang chub kyi tshogs yongs su rdzogs par byas nas sangs rgyas su 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'di grub pa yin no //

de lta na yang mi shes pa yang rnam pa gnyis te / nyon mongs pa can *dang / nyon mongs pa can* [PG om.] ma yin pa'o // de la nyon mongs pa can ni bdag tu nga rgyal ba dang / bdag [rtag D] tu rmongs pa dang / bdag la chags pa la sogs pa'o // nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa de ni bag chags kyi ngo bo ste / ji skad du mchog 'dod kyis *sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa bstan pa* las / [P176b]

ma rig [rigs P] 'di ni rnam gnyis te // 'jig rten pa yi 'phags par shes //
jig rten pas ni 'du byed skyed [bskyed PG] // ring du gyur pa 'phags pa yi //
slob ma 'gog la gnas [G131a] pa la // gang tshe yid ni bzhag gyur pa //
de tshe 'di yi ['di'i PG] nyer len med // srid par 'jug pa yang mi 'gyur //
de ni 'gog bral la gnas pa // ma rig pa yis [yi PG] 'phags de rmongs //

rnam shes nyer len dang bral ba // grol ba yin zhes rjod [brjod G] par byed //
rmongs 'di grol ba ga la yin // yang dag tu na kun la rmongs //
chos kyi skye mched phug dag tu // 'di yi rnam shes rab tu sbas //
yang srid 'jug pa'ang ma yin la // mthar thug sangs pa'ang 'di ma yin //
sangs rgyas chos kyi [D163a] sku nyid du // gyur na 'di bzod mya ngan 'das //
sangs rgyas chos kyi sku 'di ni // mya ngan 'das yin de nyid ni //
sangs rgyas kho nas [na P] mngon par mkhyen // de phyir byin gyis brlabs nas bzhugs //

zhes bstan pa lta bu'o //

de la nyon mongs pa can gyi mi shes pa ni 'phags pa nyan thos rnams kyis [kyi PG] lhag ma ma lus par rab tu spangs te / gang zag la bdag med pa rtogs pa'i phyir ro // nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa ni grol ba la sgrib par byed pa ma yin par [pas PG] yod bzhin du yang 'dir zad pa dang / mi skye ba shes pa thob par 'gyur zhes bya'o //

4.29 kliṣṭāvidyāprahāṇāc cet tanmuktir buddhavan matā /
tad asat tadasadbhāvān mukhyanirmāṇabuddhayoḥ //

ma rig nyon mongs can spangs pas // de ni grol 'gyur sangs rgyas bzhin //
de ni mi bden med pa'i phyir // dngos dang sprul pa'i sangs rgyas la //

byang chub sems dpar gyur pa nyid nas sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das des sgra'i rjes su 'jug pa'i [G131b] lugs su 'byung ba skye ba med pa'i chos la bzod pa rtogs pas nyon mongs pa can gyi mi shes pa spangs par gyur pa yin gyi / gtso bo chos kyi sku dang / sprul pa'i sku dag gis ni yang nyon mongs pa can gyi mi shes pa spong bar mi srid pas sangs rgyas kyi dang / de'i thar pa ni 'dra bar rigs pa ma yin no //

gzhan yang theg pa chen po'i lugs 'di la ni kun rdzob tu bcom ldan 'das kyis lam bsgom pa dang mngon par [P177a] rtogs pa bstan pa yin gyi don dam par ni ma yin no zhes bstan par /

4.30 na tattvato mahāyāne mārgaḥ saṃbuddhabodhaye /
savikalpanimittatvāt sākṣāllaukikamārgavat //

yang dag tu na theg chen gyi // lam gyis sangs rgyas byang chub dag //
sgrub min rtog bcas mtshan bcas min // 'jig rten pa yi lam bzhin no //

'jig rten 'di dang 'jig rten pha rol ni yod do zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang / mtshan ma dang ldan pa'i phyir lam ni byang chub kyi rgyu ma [P om.] yin te / lha dang mi'i 'gro bar 'jug par byed pa'i dge ba'i las byed pa'i lam bzhin no //

4.31 atha syād yady abhūto 'yaṃ mārgaḥ kleśakṣayo 'py asan /
abhūtatvād yathā sthāṇau narajñānān na tatkṣayaḥ //

[*Tibetan missing*]

gal te yang lam goms par byed pa ni nyon mongs pa zad par bya ba'i don du yin na gang gi tshe de nyid mi bden par gyur nas gang gis nyon mongs pa zad par byed / sdong dum la mi yin par nyams su myong bar gyur pas the tshom med par byed pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba [D163b] ni gzhan gyi bsam pa smras pa yin no // de ltar na ji lta ba bzhin ma yin pa'i lam gyis nyon mongs pa zad par byed pa yang med de [do PG] / yang dag pa ma yin pa'i phyir sdong dum la mir shes pas [par PG] de dang mi 'bral [G132a] bas rang gi bsam pa smras pa /

4.32 rajjvāṃ sarpa iti bhrānter yathā trastasya kasyacit /
latākularajjujñānaṃ pratipakṣo 'pi jāyate //

ji srid 'ga' zhig skrag pa yis // thag pa la ni sbrul zhes 'khrul //
'khri shing bsdogs par shes pa ni // gnyen po'i phyogs kyi shes par 'byung //

'khrul par gyur pas dang por ni thag pa la sbrul [sprul D] yin gyi / thag pa yin par mi [ma PG] shes par 'gyur la / yang de nyid la 'di'i 'khri shing bsgril ba yin gyi / thag pa yang ma yin pa la yang ma yin no zhes yang dag pa ma yin pa'i 'khri shing bsdogs par shes pas kyang sbrul du 'khrul pa'i gnyen por gyur pa de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa la dang po ni 'khrul pas lta ba ngan pa rtog [rtogs D] pa ngan pas zhen pa 'byung la / yang [PG add dag] de dag la 'khrul pa nyid shes pas yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i gnyen po'i lta ba skyes pa na de dag gnyi ga yang dngos por 'dzin pas yang dag pa ma yin par shes kyis [kyi PG] / mthong ba med pa ni yang dag pa [P177b] nyid yin te / dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid las gzhan med pa'i phyir ro //

de yang ji skad du *de bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzod kyi mdo* las / 'od srungs 'di lta ste / skyes bu 'ga' zhig mi [ma PG] bden pa'i the tshom gyi dug gis gdungs par gyur cing bdag gis dug zos so bdag gis dug zos so zhes zer zhing du bar byed brang rdung bar byed pa de la sman pa thabs la mkhas pas yang dag pa ma yin pa'i dug 'byin pa ltar byas pas des de'i the tshom gyi dug gi [gis PG] 'du shes de ldog [G132b] par 'gyur te / des de yongs su gdung ba las grol bar 'gyur ro // 'od srungs de ji snyam du sems / de la sman pa gang gis yang dag pa ma yin pa'i dug gzhan 'byin pa ltar ma byas na skyes bu de 'tsho bar 'gyur ram gsol pa / bcom ldan 'das ma lags so // ji ltar yang dag pa ma lags pa'i dug gis som nyis gdungs par gyur pa la de bzhin du yang dag pa ma lags pa'i dug gzhan gsal bar bgyi'o // bcom ldan 'das [D164a] kyis bka' stsal pa / 'od srungs de bzhin du byis pa so so'i [so PG] skye bo rnams nyon mongs pas nyon mongs par gyur pa rnams la yang dag pa ma yin pa'i tshul gyis chos ston par mdzad do // gsol pa bcom ldan 'das ni bden pa gsung ba

ma lags sam / de bzhin gshegs pa ji ltar na bden pa ma lags pa gsung ba mdzad / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / 'od srungs de ji snyam du sems / khyod bden pas rnam par grol lam / bden pa ma yin pas yin / gsol pa bdag ni bden pa ma lags pas grol gyi / bden pas ni ma lags so // de ci'i slad du zhe na / bcom ldan 'das mi bden pa zhes bya ba ni 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug dag go // bcom ldan 'das gal te 'dod chags bden pa zhig tu 'gyur na ni *mi sdug* [mu stegs P] pas kyang 'dod chags dang bral [G133a] bar mi 'gyur ro // bcom ldan 'das gal te zhe sdang yang dag pa zhig tu gyur na ni byams pas kyang [P178a] zhe sdang dang 'bral bar mi 'gyur ro // bcom ldan 'das gal te gti mug yang dag pa zhig tu gyur na ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung bas kyang gti mug dang 'bral [bral PG] bar mi 'gyur ro // bcom ldan 'das gang gi slad du / 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug yang dag pa ma lags pa de'i slad du mi sdug pa dang / byams pa dang / rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba bsgoms pas 'bral bar 'gyur ba lags so // bcom ldan 'das nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang yang dag pa ma lags pas na yang dag pa ma lags pa'i yongs su shes pas yongs su spong bar 'gyur ro // bcom ldan 'das de la nyon mongs pa gang gang gis yang dag par spong bar 'gyur ba de gnyi ga yang yang dag pa ma lags pa bden pa ma lags pa'i slad du yang dag pa ma lags pa'i nyon mongs pa yang dag pa ma lags pa'i yongs su shes pas 'bral bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no //

4.33ab hetuḥ savyabhicāro 'to vādatyāgaś ca vādinaḥ /

des na gtan tshigs ma nges bcas // [D164b] rgol ba'i smra ba spangs pa yin //

gang dag yang dag pa ma yin pa'i phyir sdong dum la mir shes pa bzhin no zhes zer ba'i yang dag pa ma yin pas yang dag pa ma yin pa'i 'khrul pa spong par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba la / yang dag pa ma yin pa nyid kyis ci thag pa la 'khri shing bsdogs par shes pa sbrul du 'khrul pa spong bar 'gyur ba nyid yin nam / 'on te yang dag pa ma yin pa nyid [G133b] kyis sdong dum la mir 'khrul pa bral bar mi 'gyur ba zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs ma nges pa yin no // gang yang gzhan gyis [gyi PG] khas blangs pa'i yang dag pa'i lam gyis yang dag pa'i nyon mongs pa bsags pa zad par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba de yang dpe 'dis yang dag pa ma yin pas [pa'i DPG] 'di gnyis bral ba byed pas nyan thos kyi theg par *smra ba* [smras pa PG] de spong ba yin no //

gzhan yang /

4.33cd saṃkleśapratipakṣatvam etena vihitottaram //

kun nas nyon mongs gnyen po'i phyir // 'dis ni lan yang btab par byas //

yang [P178b] gal te gzhan dag na re lam ni yang dag pa yin te / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnyen po yin pa'i phyir mun pa'i gnyen po'i snang ba bzhin no zer na / de [PG add la] yang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa yang dag pa ma yin pa'i gnyen pos

[po'i PG] spong bar byed do zhes bya ba thag pa dang sbrul dang 'khri shing bsdogs pa'i dpe 'di dag nyid kyis lan btab pa yin par rig par bya'o // gtan tshigs ma [PG om.] nges pa nyid du rgol ba yang spangs pa yin no //

'dir theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyi [kyis PG] gsung ma yin no zhes sngar bdag cag gis bsgrubs [bsgrub PG] zin pas de'i phyir na lung med pa'i theg pa chen por bstan pa ni rigs pa ma yin te / tshad ma'i rtog ge skom po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes zer ba'i lan gtab par bya ba'i phyir phyogs snga ma dang gnyen po'i phyogs kyi dbye ba brjod pa /

> 4.34 mahāyānaṃ ca no bauddhaṃ nairātmyādiprakāśanāt /
> ratnatritayamāhātmyaprathanāc chiṣyayānavat //

> theg chen sangs rgyas gsung yin te // bdag med la sogs ston pa dang // [G134a]
> dkon mchog gsum gyi bdag nyid che // ston phyir slob ma'i theg pa bzhin //

'bras bu dang bcas pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa drug ces bya ba'i lam dang / de ston par byed pa'i gtsug lag kyang theg [D165a] pa chen po zhes bya ste / 'di ni chos can no // de sangs rgyas kyi gsungs pa'i gsung yin pas sangs rgyas kyi zhes bya ba ni chos yin par bsgrub par bya'o // chos can dang chos bsdoms pa ni phyogs so // mu stegs byed gzhan dag gis bdag la sogs par btags pa dag las 'das pas bdag med pa ste / bdag med pa'i ngo bo ni bdag med pa nyid do // gang dag la bdag med pa la sogs pa ste / stong pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa yod pa de ni bdag med pa la sogs so // de rnams ston par byed pa ni bdag med pa la sogs pa ston pa'o // rnyed par dka' ba'i don dang dga' bar byed pa'i don gyis na dkon mchog ste / sangs rgyas dang [PG om.] / chos dang / dge 'dun no // dkon mchog rnams ni gsum yin pas dkon mchog gsum [P179a] mo // de che ba'i bdag nyid kyi [kyis PG] ngo bo nyid ni che ba'i bdag nyid de dkon mchog gsum gyi bdag nyid che'o // de ston par byed pa ni dkon mchog gsum gyi che ba'i bdag nyid sgrogs pa'o // gang dang gang bdag med pa la sogs pa rnams ston pa dang / dkon mchog gsum gyi che ba'i bdag nyid sgrogs pa de ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin te / dper na slob ma'i theg pa bzhin no // slob [G134b] ma'i theg pa dang 'dra bas slob ma'i theg pa bzhin te / des na theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa yin no //

ma yin te / sde snod gsum po nyid [D add theg pa gsum] thob pa'i rgyu yin gyi theg pa chen po yang bdag cag la ma grags la / de sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin par yang ma grub pas phyogs gnyis ka la ma grub pa'i skyon yod pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i mi shes pa rang byung phyin ci ma log par skad cig ma gcig gis chos thams cad mngon par rtogs pa'i ye shes kyis rab tu spangs shing mi dmigs pa la goms par byas [byams PG] pas shin tu bral bar gyur pa ni theg pa gzhan nyid du 'di ['dis PG] sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa yin pas gnyi ga la ma grub pa ma yin no //

> 4.35ab pratitarkeṇa bādhato hetoś ca syād asiddhatā /

> phyir rgol tshad mas [la P, ma G] [D165b] gnod pa'i phyir // de'i gtan tshigs ma grub nyid //

gang dag gis [gi PG] phyogs snga mar / theg chen sangs rgyas gsungs ma yin // mdo sde sogs su ma bsdus phyir // rig [rigs PG] byed mtha' pa'i lta ba bzhin // zhes gang smras pa'i tshad ma de la yang lan btab pa'i phyir gang gis 'di la gnod par 'gyur ba bsgrub cing brjod par bya'o // gang gis mdo sde la sogs par ma bsdus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs de ni ma grub pa nyid de / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na /

> 4.35cd mahāyānoktasatyādisaṃgrahād vinayādiṣu //

> theg pa chen por bstan pa'i bden pa la sogs pa ni 'dul ba la sogs pa'i nang du bsdus pa'i phyir te /

gang 'di ltar sdug bsngal dang / kun 'byung ba [G135a] dang / 'gog pa dang / lam gyi bden pa dang / dbang po dang / stobs dang / byang chub kyi [P179b] yan lag dang / lam dang / stobs bcu dang mi 'jigs pa dang / so so yang dag par rig pa dang / sangs rgyas kyi chos ma 'dres pa la sogs pa theg pa chen por bstan pa de dag nyid 'dul ba dang / mdo sde dang / chos mngon pa rnams su yi ge de dang / tshig de dag dang gsal byed de dag nyid kyis bstan te / de rnams bsgoms [bsgom PG] pas nyon mongs pa spong bar kun kyang mtshungs so // khyad par ni theg pa chen po mi dmigs pa'i tshul gyis shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs pa ni bcom ldan 'das 'ba' zhig yin no // 'dis ni 'dul ba la sogs par bstan pa'i bden pa la sogs par ni theg pa chen po thams cad du bstan pa yin pas mdo sde la sogs pa dang theg pa chen po phan tshun bsdus pa yin te / don gyis na mdo sde la sogs pa'i nang du theg pa chen po bsdus pa yin pas gzhan gyi [gyis PG] gtan tshigs ma grub par ston to //

yang 'dir 'phags pa'i bden pa la sogs pa kha cig dang theg pa chen po ldan du zin kyang sde pa tha dad kyi gtsug lag mang pos phyogs snga mar bdag cag gis [gi PG] bkod pa gang yin pa de dag dang 'gal lo zhe na /

brjod par bya ste / phyin ci log la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags kyi blo bsgos [sgos PG] pa khyod kyis theg pa chen po'i gtsug lag gi don nges par ma bzung bar smra bar byed pa [G135b] de la bdag gis [D166a] brjod par bya'o //

theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa [gsung ba PG] nyid yin te / chos kyi phyag rgya dang mi 'gal ba'i phyir dang / gang 'phags pa'i bden pa'i mdo sde la yang 'jug / nyon mongs pa 'dul ba yang yang dag par mthong / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i chos nyid dang yang mi 'gal ba nyid ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin no zhes bya ba de thams cad theg pa chen po la grub ['grub PG] pa'i phyir ro //

yang na sde pa bco brgyad po rnams kun gyi yang rang rang gi mdo sde la sogs pa la 'jug pa yin gyi / phan tshun ni 'gal ba cher yod pa yin no // theg pa chen po yang gzhan la phan pa'i dbang du byas pa'i zab pa [P180a] dang rgya che ba'i tshul gyis nyan thos kyi

mdo sde la sogs pa'i sde snod la 'ga' zhig mi 'jug tu zin kyang / theg pa chen po'i mdo sde la yang 'jug / byang chub sems dpa'i bslab pa'i gnas bdun brgya [bcu D] la yang snang / stong pa nyid du bstan pa'i chos nyid dang yang mi 'gal ba'i phyir ro // de ltar na chos kyi phyag rgya dang 'gal ba med do //

'di'i phyir yang theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] gsungs pa yin te / rtsa ba'i sdud par byed pa po kun tu bzang po dang / 'jam dpal dang / gsang ba'i bdag po dang / byams pa la sogs pa rnams kyis bsdus pa'i phyir ro // bdag cag gi rtsa ba'i sdud [bsdus PG] par byed pa nyan thos ni ma yin te / theg pa chen po'i gsung rab ni de dag gi yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro // [G136a]

ji skad du / *shing sha pa'i tshal gyi mdo* las / kun dga' bo shing sha pa'i tshal 'di la 'dab ma ji snyed yod pa bas lhag par mang po'i chos ngas rtogs par gyur na yang khyed la ni ngas ma bstan te / de snyed nyid kyis don bya ba byas pa'i phyir de dag nyid kyis ni khyed skyo bar yang mi 'gyur / 'dod chags dang bral bar yang mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba dang /

de bzhin du /

> *bla ma kun dga' pa ta li // sdug bsngal phung po sa pa* dang //
> *'char byed stong pa 'char ba* dang // *gang po sbas* [spangs DPG] *pa ram pa* dang //
> *mya ngan 'das* dang *yul 'khor skyong* // zhes bya gzhan yang *'gro ba'i* [D166b] *mdo* //
> rtsa ba'i sdud par ma tshang bas // rgyas pa min par rtogs par bya //

'di ltar *bla ma'i mdo sder* lha'i dbang po brgya byin gyis smras pa / btsun pa bla ma bcom ldan 'das kyi nyan thos ji snyed cig 'dzam bu'i gling na rab tu gnas pa thams cad kyi sems la bltas na chos kyi rnam grangs 'di 'dzin par byed pa ni btsun pa bla ma khyod ma gtogs pa dge slong gcig kyang med kyi [kyis PG] / btsun pa bla ma chos [khyod D] kyi rnam grangs 'di ni bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs yin gyi [gyis PG] / khyod kyis *zung [P180b] shig* [gzung zhig P] ces bya ba ste / 'di'i rjes su dpags nas gzhan dag kyang de'i dus na med par shes par bya'o // gang yang bcom ldan 'das mya ngan las 'das nas ring po ma lon pa dang / 'phags pa kun dga' bo [G136b] yang yod bzhin du sangs rgyas kyi gsung rab rab tu shes pa dang shes par gyur pa med na da ltar lta ga la yod /

gzhan yang [PG om.] *kun dga' bo'i mdo* las / bcom ldan 'das bgres [bsgres P] par gyur pa'i gnas skabs na / 'phags pa kun dga' bo la bsnyen bkur bar bka' stsal te / ngas bstan pa'i chos rnams kyang 'dzin par nus so zhes bya ba nas des gsol pa / bdag lo nyi shu lhag tsam zhig bcom ldan 'das kyi thad du gnas par bgyi lags so zhes bya ba dang / de nyid las chos kyi phung po stong phrag brgyad bcu [cu P] zhig // bcom ldan 'das kyi thad nas bdag gis bzung [gzung PG] ngo [bas so D] // gnyis ni dge slong dag las so zhes bya ba ste / 'dis ni 'di ltar rtogs par bya ste / gang bcom ldan 'das kyis sngar bstan pa de dag des [de P] ma bzung [gzung PG] ba nyid yin la / de nyid de la yang bstan to zhes bya ba yang mi rigs te / gang dge slong dag la bzung [gzung PG] bas so // lo bzhi bcu'i bar gyi dus de srid cig chos nyung zad cig bstan par yang mi rigs so //

gal te ’phags pa kun dga’ bos thams cad rtogs par ’gyur ro zhe na / de lta na ni *bla ma’i mdo* las / lha’i dbang po brgya byin gyis chos kyi rnam grangs ’di ’dzin par byed pa’i dge slong ni gcig kyang med do zhes smra bar mi ’gyur ro // de lta bas na [D167a] kun dga’ bos thams cad bzung [gzung PG] ba ma yin no // de’i phyir des bstan cing yang dag par sdud [bsdus D] pas yang dag par bsdus pa [G137a] der ni sangs rgyas kyi bka’ rgyas par mthong ba ma yin no //

pa ta li’i mdo las / bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa / pa ta li gang gi [gis PG] tshe ’khor nyung zad dang lhags par gyur pa de’i tshe / gang nas dge slong gi dge ’dun la rta cang shes bzang po’i rte’u zhes bya ba’i chos kyi rnam grangs bstan te zhes bya ba la sogs pa ’byung [P181a] ste / mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

gzhan yang *sdug bsngal gyi phung po* [*po’i* PG] *mdo* las / bcom ldan ’das kyis shā kya ming chen las brtsams nas / nga dus gcig gi tshe na rgyal po’i khab na gnas pa las / ri’i lam nas nga ri ngos bzangs [bzang P] la gshegs pa na / der ngas gcer bu pa mgo thur [’thur PG] du pa stan pa ngas mthong ste / de la ngas ’di skad ces smras so zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgyas par ’byung ba’i mdo sde de lta bu yang ma mthong ngo //

*sa *ston gyi** [DPG *pa’i*] *mdo* las / bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa / dus gcig na nga rgyal po’i khab na bzhugs pa’i tshe ri la ’gro ba’i lam du gzhan mu stegs byed kun tu rgyu mang po zhig nga’i thad du lhags so // lhags nas nga la don ’di dag ’dri bar sems so zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgyas par ’byung ba’i mdo sde de yang ma mthong ngo //

yang *’char byed kyi mdo* las / rnam grangs kyang yod de / gang ngas tshor ba bzhi bstan pa’o zhes bya ba’i mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

stong pa nyid kyi mdo las kyang / ’phags pa kun dga’ bo la bka’ [G137b] stsal pa / bcom ldan ’das shā kya rnams kyi tshong dus na bzhugs so // der bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa’i don kun shes te zhes bya ba nas / kun dga’ bo nga ni stong pa nyid la mang du gnas so zhes bya ba la sogs pa ’byung ste / mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

’char ba’i mdo las / bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa / rgyal po chen po / ngas dran te dus gcig tu thams cad shes pa dang thams cad mthong ba’i dge sbyong ngam bram ze ’ga’ yang ma byung ’byung bar mi ’gyur [D167b] / de ltar mi ’byung ste / de ni gnas ma yin no zhes bya ba ste / mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

gang po’i mdo las / gnas brtan kun dga’ bos smras pa / tshe dang ldan pa gang po zhes bya ba dge slong gnas brtan byams ma zhes bya ba’i bu sngon gsar bur gyur pa na ’di lta bur zab pa zab pa’i ngo bo’i chos kyi gtam brjod pa dang ldan pa na [ni PG] zhes bya ba rgyas par ’byung ba’i mdo sde de yang [P181b] ma mthong ngo //

sbas pa’i mdo [PG om.] las / lo byed kyis smras pa / dge slong gau ta ma ni ta ka na bzhugs pa’i dus gcig na gu ’dzi ka’i bsti gnas su zhes bya ba rgyas par ’byung ba na der ji skad du / bcom ldan ’das gau ta mas thams cad la bsam gtan bsngags par mdzad do zhes bya ba la sogs pa’i mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

ram pa ka’i mdo las der bcom ldan ’das kyis dge slong lnga sde las brtsams te bka’ [G138a] stsal pa / nga sngon rab tu ma byung zhing khyim par gyur pa na ’di ltar bsams shing bslabs te / khyim na gnas pa ni gnod pa dang bcas par gyur pa’o zhes rgyas par

’byung ba’i mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po’i mdo las / gnas brtan kun dga’ bos tshe dang ldan pa ma ’gags pa la smras pa / ngas bcom ldan ’das kyi thad nas mngon sum du thos shing mngon sum du gzung ba yin te / sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das rnams ni bsam gtan bzhi pa la snyoms par zhugs shing g.yo ba med pa’i zhi ba rtogs nas mig dang ldan pa yongs su mya ngan las ’da’o zhes ’byung ba’i [ba PG] mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

phags pa yul ’khor skyong gis smras pa / rgyal po chen po bcom ldan ’das kyis yang dag par mkhyen cing gzigs nas de bzin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas kyis skyo bar ’gyur ba’i lam bzhi po ’di gsungs te / ji srid smra bar gyur pa ste / rgyal po chen po ’jig rten ’di ni ngoms pa med pa sred [srid P] pa’i khol po’o zhes bya ba’i bar du ste mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

‘gro ba’i mdo las kyang / mgon med zas sbyin gyis smras pa / bdag gis bcom ldan ’das kyi thad nas mngon sum du thos [D168a] shing mngon sum du bzung ste / kun dga’ ra ba byas nas sngo bar byed pa’i sems can yang yod de / lus zhi gnas shi ba’i ’og tu bde ’gro mtho [G138b] ris kyi ’jig rten du lha rnams kyi nang du skye bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba rgyas par [P182a] ’byung ba [PG om.] nas sa phan yon ston cing sbyin rabs brjod pa’i rgyus [rgyu DG] skye ba yang yod do zhes bya ba’i bar du byung ba’i mdo de yang ma mthong ngo //

de bzhin du mdo gzhan dag kyang shes par bya ste / *mi smra ba’i dngos po’i mdo* las / mau dgal gyi bu la sangs rgyas kyi gsung gis sngar bka’ stsal pa bzhin du mau dgal gyi bu khyod kyis ’phags pa’i mi smra ba sgoms shig // bag med par ma byed cig ces bya ba dang / *gnas par bya ba’i mdo* las / ’phags pa’i gnas pa ’di la bag med par ma byed cig // ces bya ba ’byung ba’i mdo de dag kyang ma mthong ngo //

yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po la sogs pa’i mdo da ltar yod pa’i mdo mang po rnams kyang mdo tha dad kyi nang nas tshig so sor ’byung ngo // de lta bas na de dag dang gzhan yang mdo mang po dag nyan thos kyi theg pa la da ltar sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa rgyas par mi snang ba yin pas shes par bya’o //

gang yang rtsa ba’i sdud par byed pa po ’od srungs chen po la sogs pa dgra bcom pas byas pa de ni da [’di D] ltar nyams te / sde pa tha dad kyi lung las tshig gi mdo rnams rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa tha dad pa’i phyir ro // lung gi tshig de dag gi khyad par bsdus pa’i mdo de dag gi tshig gi don bsdus pa rnams kyang / yang tha dad du ’don pa’i phyir dang / mdo gzhan yang ma gtogs shing mi ’gal ba *mngal du ’jug pa* dang / *dga’* [G139a] *ba can* dang / *tshe’i mthar thug pa* zhes bya ba’i ming can rnams nye bar mthong ste / de ltar na sdud par byed pa yang ’chol bar gyur pas de lta bu dag la sangs rgyas kyi bka’ rgyas par gzhugs [bzhugs PG] par ji ltar yid ches par nus / gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa las thos pa gcig las ’phros pa yang brgya’i bar du yang yod do zhes thos so //

gzhan yang theg pa chen po la yang / gsung rab gzhan nyid yin na tha dad kyi sdud par byed pas ga la sdud par ’gyur te / phan tshun [D168b] ’gal bas [ba PG] na sdud par byed pa tha dad pa yin pa’i phyir ro // [P182b] gang gi phyir ’di ltar *don dam par stong pa nyid* la sogs pa bdag med pa dang ldan pa’i mdo ni ’phags pa mang pos bkur ba rnams

[rnam P] khas mi len te / bar ma do'i srid pa *srid pa bdun pa* dang ldan pa la sogs pa ni sa ston sde pa la sogs pa khas mi len to // de bzhin du 'dul ba las kyang / gnas ma bu pa [D om.] rnams kyi las ni dus ma yin par bu ram bza' ba la sogs pa bkag go // thams cad yod par smra ba rnams kyi las ni bza' zhing longs spyod par snang ngo // de dag gi mdo las ni bdag yod pa nyid du rjes su bsngags so // thams cad yod par smra ba rnams kyis ni spong ngo //

de bzhin du kha cig ni bdag med par smra ba'o // kha cig ni gang zag tu smra ba'o // kha cig ni 'dus byas thams cad skad cig mar 'dod do // la la ni skad cig ma gnyis su 'dod do // la la ni sa 'di bskal pa'i mthar gnas [G139b] par 'dod do // la la ni mya ngan las 'das pa rdzas su yod par 'dod do // kha cig ni ming tsam du'o // kha cig ni srid pa bar ma 'dod do // gzhan dag ni mi 'dod do // kha cig ni bcom ldan 'das kyis mngon par rtogs pa skad cig ma gcig tu 'dod do // gzhan dag ni skad cig ma bcu drug nyid du 'dod de / de ltar na snga ma bzhin du 'gal bar gyur pas sde pa tha dad kyi gsung rab rnams sna tshogs su gyur pas na gtsug lag nyid kyang re zhig bsgrub par dka' [bka' PG] bas sdud par byed pa tha dad kyis [PG add ma] bsdus pas theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyis bka' ma yin no //

The Eternal Tathāgata

gzhan yang gang dag de bzhin gshegs pa ni mngon par rtogs pa ji lta ba bzhin yin gyi de las gzhan du ma yin pas mngon par rtogs pa rtag pa yin pa'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pa rtag pa zhes bstan gyi mi 'gyur ba ni ma yin no // khyad par du shes par 'dod na *lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo* las blta bar bya'o // rgyun gyi rjes su 'jug pa skad cig gis 'jig pa'i ngo bo la yang rtag pa zhes [P183a] bya ba'i sgra yod de / ji ltar chu klung ni rtag tu 'bab po // me ni rtag tu 'bar ro zhes bya ba ste / de ltar [D169a] na 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag go zhes bya ba dang mi 'gal lo //

Pervasion by the Tathāgatagarbha

de bzhin gshegs pa ni khyab pa'o zhes bya ba ni ye shes kyi shes bya ma lus pa la khyab pas yin gyi / khyab 'jug dang 'dra bar thams cad du gnas pa nyid ni ma yin no // de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po can zhes bya ba yang stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang [G140a] / smon pa med pa la sogs pa rnams sems can thams cad kyi rgyud la yod pa'i phyir yin gyi / nang gi byed pa'i skyes bu rtag pa thams cad du khyab pa lta bu ni ma yin te / ji skad du / chos thams cad ni stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang / smon pa med pa'i ngo bo / gang stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang / smon pa med pa de ni de bzhin gshegs pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung bas so // len pa'i rnam par shes pa yang 'khor bar 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i rgyur gyur pa / chu bo chen po'i rgyun bzhin du 'bab pas 'jug tu zin kyang / skad cig ma nyid kyi rgyun gyis [gyi PG] 'jug pa yin gyi / bdag dang 'dra bar ni ma yin pa'i phyir bdag med pa'i chos kyi phyag rgya dang mi 'gal lo //

The Buddha Does Not Attain Complete Nirvāṇa

sangs rgyas mya ngan yongs mi 'da' / zhes bya ba dang / nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs su zin kyang gdul ba'i skye bo la ltos [bltos PG] nas chos nyid kyis thob pa'i skye bas [ba PG] kha cig tu ni 'bar ba [bar PG] mdzad pa [la PG] / yang gang dag tu gdul ba'i skye bo'i zhing med par gyur pa de dag tu ni mya ngan las 'das par yang ston te / 'gro ba gzhan dag tu shing med pa'i me bzhin no // yang gzhan dag tu ji ltar bzhed pas sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa dang / mya ngan las 'das pa yang ston pa yin gyi / gtan du yongs su mya ngan las 'da' ba ni ma yin te / sems can gyi khams ma lus pa mthar thug par bsgrub [P183b] par bya'o [G140b] zhes smon lam btab pa yod pa'i phyir ro // mya ngan las 'das pa yang mya ngan las 'da' ba bstan pas 'dul ba rnams skyo ba skyed [bskyed PG] pa'i phyir ro // rnam grangs kyi mya ngan las 'das pa yang yod pa'i phyir ram / 'khor ba dang zhi ba la mi gnas pa'i mya [D169b] ngan las 'das pa yang yod pa'i phyir te /

> dngos pos mya ngan nga mi 'da' // mdzad pa nyid dang mtshan gyis min //
> shes dang shes bya'i rnam rtog las // 'das pas nga ni mya ngan 'da' //

zhes bya bas rnam par rtog pa spangs pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa khas blangs pa'i phyir mya ngan las 'das pa zhi ba dang 'gal ba yang ma yin no //

The Mahāyāna Predicts the Awakening of Śrāvakas and Insults Arhants

nyan thos chen po rnams lung bstan pa yang sangs rgyas kyi bka' ma yin pa ma yin te / nyan thos gang dag gi rigs [rig PG] la dgongs nas lung bstan pa yin te / sems can gyi rigs gang dbang po rno ba gang yin pa de lta bus gzhan gyi [gyis PG] don rab tu sgrub pa'i thabs la mkhas pa bla na med pa'i 'bras bu khyad par can thob par 'dod pas 'bras bu'i mchog 'dod pa nyid kyis mchog nyid du gyur pa yang yod de / byang chub sems dpa' bzhin no // sems can gyi rigs gang dbang po rtul [brtul PG] ba bdag gi don sgrub pa byed pas gang zag la bdag med pa tsam goms par byas pas 'bras bu dman pa nyid kyis dman pa'i khyad par nyid thob par gyur pa yang yod de / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas bzhin no [G141a] // sems can gyi rigs gang dag khyad par can la 'dod pa bskyed pa na yang 'bras bu dman pa thob pa yang yod de / ji ltar rang sangs rgyas bse ru ltar spyod pa dag gis byang chub kyi tshogs bskal pa brgya'i bar du bsags nas rkyen 'ga' zhig gis byang chub chen po las phyir log par 'gyur ba lta bu'o // sems can gyi rigs gang dag dbang po rnon po dang ldan du zin na yang dman pa'i khyad par 'dod cing thabs la mi mkhas par gyur pas dang por nyon mongs pa spong bar byed [P184a] pa la gang gi [gis PG] tshe byang chub chen po'i bskal pa yod par mthong ba na de bzhin gshegs pas lung nod par mdzad de [do PG] / de de'i rjes la las dang nyon mongs pa spangs na yang chos nyid kyis thob pa'i skye bas byang chub chen po'i tshogs khyad par can nyid bsags nas

khyad par can gyi rtogs pa thob par ’gyur te / nyan thos chen po shā ri’i bu la sogs pa bzhin te / de dag ni *chos bcu pa’i mdo* las bstan to // yang na sngar nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa spang bar byas nas phyis shes bya’i [D170a] sgrib pa spong bas yongs su sbyang ba byas nas / thams cad mkhyen pa nyid du ’gro bar ’gyur ro //

gang yang sa bon mes tshig pa la myu gu ’byung bar mi ’gyur ba bzhin no zhes zer ba yang mi rigs te / bdag cag kyang yang de nyon mongs pa’i skye ba’i myu gus yang ’byung bar mi ’dod do // de lta na yang nyon [G141b] mongs pa med pa’i shes bya’i sgrib pa spang ba’i phyir sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das rnams kyis bskul ba na rab tu sbyor bar byed de / des dang por ni lhag pa’i bsam pa dag pa’i sa nas nye bar bzung nas byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa nyon mongs pa can ltar spyod na yang kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa’i byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa yin par blta bar bya’o //

gang ’di skad du sa bdun pa ni nyon mongs pa dang bcas pa yang ma yin / nyon mongs pa *med pa* [G om.] yang ma yin zhes zer ba ni nyon mongs pa’i kun tu rgyu ba med pas nyon mongs pa dang bcas pa yang ma yin la / de bzhin gshegs pa’i ye shes ’dod pa’i bsam pa rdzogs par ma gyur pas nyon mongs pa med pa yang ma yin zhes brjod par bya’o // bskal pa grangs med pa gnyis pas yongs su rdzogs pa’i sa brgyad pa la ni sbyor ba las byung ba’i spyod pa thams cad nas thams cad du yongs su rdzogs par ’gyur ro // nyon mongs pa dang bcas pa’i spyod pa yongs su rdzogs ma thag nyid du byang chub sems dpa’ des byang [P184b] chub sems dpa’i gnas pa zab mo dben pa la gnas pa thob par ’gyur ro // de ni ’gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa’i dgra bcom pa bzhin du gang gi tshe skye ba med pa’i chos la bzod pa la gnas pa de’i tshe de la sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das rnams kyis [kyi P] bslang bar ma mdzad na de nyid du mya ngan las ’da’ bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba ni mdo’i tshig yin no // skye ba med pa’i [G142a] chos la bzod pa de’i nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa spangs pa ni dgra bcom pa dang ’dra bas bsil bar gyur cing / ’khor bar ’jug pa dang bral ba’i tshe la dbang ba la [D om.] sogs pa dbang bcu rab tu thob pa de la dbang bar gyur cing / rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi shin tu goms pas bdud bzhi las [D170b] rnam par rgyal zhing sems can gyi don la ro gcig par gyur pa sgrib pa med pa’i byams pa la gnas pa yid bzhin gyi nor bu dang / sman gyi sdong bu dang / dpag bsam gyi shing [PG om.] ljon pa dang ’dra ba’i lus kyis [G add gang dang gang ’dra ba’i lus kyis] gang dang gang sems can la mngon par bsgrub pa de dang de sems can gyi rgyud [rgyu PG] la bsams pa bzhin du ’bras bu rtsol [stsol PG] bar ’gyur te mig dug can bzhin no //

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las kyang / don ’di nyid bstan te / lha’i bu gzhan [gang PG] dag bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sems ma bskyed pa / dbang po rnon po la sogs pa de dag ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sems bskyed par bya’o // gang dag yang dag pa’i skyon med pa la zhugs par gyur pa de dag ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sems bskyed pa’i nus pa yod pa ma yin no // de ci’i phyir zhe na / des ’khor bar ’jug pa’i mtshams bcad pa’i phyir ro // gang yang bse ru dang dman pa’i rigs kyi ’bras bu can dag kyang bla na med pa yang [G142b] dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sems skyed par byed na / de dag la yang rjes su yi rang ngo // gang yang khyad par can gyi rigs dag thabs la mi mkhas pa nyid kyis

nyon mongs pa spangs [P185a] par gyur na yang dman pa las khyad par can gyis rtogs par 'gyur te / de ci'i phyir zhe na / nyan thos la sogs pa'i chos las khyad par du 'phags shing 'jig rten las shin tu 'das shing khyad par 'phags pa'i mchog // rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa'i chos la dmigs par byed pas so // de ltar na nyan thos la sogs pa lung bstan pa mi rigs pa ma yin no //

yang na /

> gzugs ni gang dang gang rnams kyis // lus can rnams ni 'dul gyur pa //
> snying rje'i dbang gis de dang der // de bzhin gshegs pa ston par mdzad //

gang gi phyir sa brgyad pa'i byang chub sems dpa' kho na nyon mongs pa dang bral ba dgra bcom pa dang 'dra na yang thabs kyis 'dod pa'i yon tan lnga mngon par sprul nas byang chub sems dpa' rnams dang gros su mdzad de / rgya che zhing rnam par mang ba'i nyon mongs pa [D171a] can lta bu'i spyod pa yang ston par mdzad de / sems can rnams skyo ba skyed [bskyed PG] pa'i phyir gling bzhi pa dag kyang *yongs su* [PG om.] gtong ste / ji [ci PG] skad du 'bar ra ru ces sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa las /

> bdag nyid gcig las mang po nyid // mchog tu legs par mdzad pas sprul //
> tha dad ma gyur bden dngos las // [G143a] bdag dang lhan cig *dga' bo* [dga'o D] zhes //
> myos pa rnams dang lhan cig de // rgyags shing myos pas myos ma dang //
> 'dod pa'i rgyags pa las brgal [rgal D] kyang // 'dod pas myos pa [ma DG] rnams dang brtse [rtse D] //
> rnal 'byor ye shes me yis ni // 'dod pa'i 'dod chags bsregs gyur kyang //
> de yi [yis D] sems la 'dod pa ni // 'byung ba lta bu nyid du ston /
> de ltar de ni spyod pa dang bcas rmi lam sgyu ma ltar //
> myos pa'i dbang gyur de dag 'dun phyir rtse [brtse PG] ba nyid du byed //
> mi g.yo brtan pa'i sems can sems can kun gyi sems can gcig //
> legs par spyad [spyod P] pas gnyid spangs gnyid ces bya ba'i [P185b] gnyid kyis log //

ces 'byung bas / de lta bas na 'dod chags dang bral bar gyur na yang snying rje'i dbang gis nyon mongs pa'i spyod pa sprul pa'i gar stabs ston par mdzad do //

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gang dag byang chub sems dpa' srid pa tha ma pa la gnas pa ni 'dod pa la dga' ba bstan par gyur nas [na P] sras kyang bltam [bltams D] par gyur to zhes zer ba de dag gis ltar na ni sangs rgyas nyid kyang med de / tshul khrims 'chal par gyur pas so // tshul khrims kyi pha rol tu phyin pa med par gyur na ni tshul khrims kyi pha rol tu phyin pa med pas

pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyang med de / gang gi phyir tshul khrims 'chal pa la [PG om.] ni sbyin pa med do // bzod pa yang med do // brtson 'grus kyang med do // bsam gtan kyang med do // shes rab kyang med do zhes gsungs pa ste / de ltar na pha [G143b] rol tu phyin pa med pas sangs rgyas kyang med par thal bar 'gyur ro //

gzhan yang mi rigs pa mang du yod de / thams cad mkhyen pa nyid dang nye bar gyur cing mthu phun sum tshogs par gyur pa gang gis yum gyi lhums su 'jug cing 'byung ba de dag gi tshe 'jig rten thams cad du snang ba rgya chen pos gsal [D171b] bar gyur na yang thos pa dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / snyoms par 'jug pa la dbang thob pa ma yin zhing nyon mongs pa'i kun tu rgyu thams cad ma spangs pa yang mi rigs so // de ltar gyur na yang nyon mongs pa'i dbang gis 'dod pa'i khams su skye ba bzhes shing lhums su 'jug pa dang / de na [nas PG] gnas pa yang rigs pa ma yin no // bltams nas ring po ma lon pa na byang chub sems dpa' sus kyang ma brten par gom [goms G] pa bdun du gshegs pa dang / phyogs bzhir gzigs nas bdag gi skye ba tha ma 'di yin no zhes gsungs pa yang brjod par mdzad pa [D om.] de phyis sku rgyas par gyur cing dbang po yang yongs su smin pa na 'dod pa'i dga' ba la longs [long P] spyod cing bag med par gyur to zhes bya ba yang mi rigs so //

rang bzhin gyis [P186a] skye ba du ma rjes su dran pas / bcom ldan 'das 'od srungs las tshangs par spyod [sbyad PG] par byas [byos D] shing / byang chub kyi lam goms par byas nas dga' ldan du lha'i rigs drug la bos nas 'dir byon pa dang / bdag dang / gzhan gyi rga [dga' D] ba dang / na ba dang / 'chi ba'i chos kyi de nyid mi mkhyen pa dang / [G144a] mu stegs byed gzhan las byang chub kyi lam btsal ba byas pa dang / bdag nyid gdung ba la rjes su sbyor bas gnas pa la lam gyi 'du shes byas nas dka' thub kyi sdug bsngal gyis gdung bar byed pa yang mi rigs so //

yang skye ba dran pa yang ma yin te / bskal pa [P om.] mi nyung bar bsod nams kyi tshogs bsags pa dang ldan zhing / dran pa dang blo dang stobs chen po yang thob nas / lhums su zhugs pa dran pa bsnyel zhing [cing PG] 'khrungs pa tsam gyis de lta bu'i gsung brjod pa yang mi rigs so // byang chub sems dpa' srid pa tha ma pa ni bsam gtan dang gzugs med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa bskyed nas nyams par gyur pa'o zhes bya ba yang mi rigs pa 'am nyams par ma gyur na yang dka' thub spyad pas dag par 'gyur bar 'dod cing / 'dod pa na spyod cing tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog tu [D172a] 'dzin pa'i lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa yang mi rigs so //

gal te yang byang chub sems dpa' ni blo sngon du btang nas sems can gdul ba'i thabs [thams P] kyi bye brag bzung ba'i don gyis ji skad smras pa de dag thams cad bstan pa yin no zhe na / de lta bu thams cad ni sprul pa nyid kyis kyang mdzad par spyod do // de lta bas na glo bur du skye ba yongs su 'dzin pa [PG om.] yang mi rigs la 'dod pa'i [G144b] bsod nams kyi mtha' la sbyor ba dang / bdag nyid dub pa'i mtha' la sbyor ba yang mi rigs pas brjod par mi bya'o //

gal te 'di dag thams cad sprul pa yin na [P186b] dka' ba'i spyod [spyad PG] pa spyod pa'i dus na las kyi 'bras bu yin te / nga sngon bram ze bla ma zhes bya bar gyur pa'i dus su yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas 'od srungs la dge sbyong mgo reg la byang chub

ga [P om.] la yod / byang chub ni shin tu dka' bas bsgrub [sgrub PG] par bya ba yin no zhes ngag tu brjod pa'i las de'i rnam par smin pas ngas lo drug tu dka' ba spyad pa yin no zhes ci'i phyir gsungs par [gsung bar PG] gyur ce na /

da ni de ltar shin tu mun par gyur pa'i rigs dag bsal bar bya'o // ji ltar na de lta bu'i dgongs pa can dag la drang thad du dad par gyur nas spro bar byed / gang khyim bdag mgon med zas sbyin gyis sangs rgyas zhes bya ba'i sgra snga na ma thos pa thos [thob P] pa na ba spu thams cad langs par gyur cing mchog tu dga' ba dang bde ba skyes te / shin tu mthong bar 'dod par 'gyur to zhes bya ba dang / yang bram ze bla mas [ma PG] sangs rgyas la skur pa btab pa yang gzhan du ma yin la skye ba gsum pa la sangs rgyas su gyur to zhes bya ba dang /

mya ngan las 'da' ba'i sgra yang kun tu sgrogs shing bdud kyi dgra'i [sgra'i PG] rgyal po de bzhin gshegs pas dril chen gyi sgras bdud bzhi las rgyal bar gyur cing / 'chi bdag kyang shin tu pham par byas na / ci zhig byed na mthar [G145a] byed pa'i dgra' [sgra PG] bo'i gnod pa dang 'brel par gyur / yang bcom ldan 'das de sku che chung [thung DPG] ngu ni [na DPG] du 'jug pa'i phrin las ci zhig mdzad nas mi rnams kyi che [tshe PG] tshad tsam du yang 'di [DP add ma] gyur cing 'chi bdag gi dbang du gyur pa dang / so so'i [so PG] skye bo bzhin du gsung bar yang mdzad de / kun dga' bo 'jam bu'i gling 'di ni dga' bar bya'o // [D172b] ri'i lam gyi ri 'di ni dga' bar bya ba'o // 'dod pa thams cad dang / yid du 'ong ba dang / mdzes pa dang / yid dang 'thad pa'i dngos po sna tshogs kyang byung bar gyur pa de dag thams cad kyang thad du 'gyur ba'o zhes gsung bsgrags pa dang / dge slon dag nga'i mdun [P187a] du ma 'dug cig ces snyung ba na *tshor bar* [tshe rabs PG] nyen pa'i thugs skyo ba'i tshig gsung ba dang / kun dga' bo la chu blangs pa na [la PG] ni ring du 'gor ro zhes ma dgyes par gyur bas [par PG] gsung ba dang / mya ngan dang / smre sngags 'don pa dag gis nyams par gyur cing non nas / kha rlangs kyi ngu bas mun par gyur cing / gdong g.yogs par gyur pa'i dgra bcom pa stong snyed kyi bu dag smre sngags sna tshogs 'don cing ngu ba dang / so so skye bo'i dge slong gi tshogs brgya stong snyed du ngu ba dang bcas pa dang / kun nas mtha' yas pa'i dge slong gi dge 'dun las lung [lus D] 'bor ba dang / dge bsnyen dang dge bsnyen ma'i tshogs stong phrag snyed kyis [kyi PG] stod g.yogs dang rgyan rnams 'bor bar byed cing / mgo dang lus rngul gyis [gyi PG] g.yogs [g.yog P] par gyur cing mchi mas gdong gi pad ma [G145b] bangs par gyur pa dang / skra 'bal ba dang spyi gtsug tu rdebs [brdebs PG] shing snying rje rje ltar ngu bar byed cing bzhin mi sdug pas smre ba dang / lha'i bu brgya stong rgyan dang / phreng ba dang / lus kyi rgyan dang / cod pan dang / gdub 'khor dang / gos dang / mgo rgyan dag skyur bar byed cing / lag pa dbyug pa ltar sgreng [bsgreng PG] ba kun tu g.yob par byed pas / bdag nyid la mgon skyabs med par sems shing mya ngan byed pa dang / shin tu g.yo ba'i mar me'i rtse mo la rlung gi shugs kyis brgyab [rgyab PG] pa ltar mi rtag pa 'i rlung gi shugs kyis brgyab [rgyab P] pa'i tshe'i mtha' mi rtag pa nyid kyi chu srin gyi ltor zhugs pa ni gang 'di skad bstan pa dang 'gal ba yin te /

skyes bu gang zag 'ga' zhig srog bcod [gcod G] pa rab tu spangs nas / gang gi tshe sbyin pa sbyin par byed pa de'i tshe phun sum tshogs pa gnyis 'dzin pa yin te / longs

[long PG] spyod chen po phun sum tshogs pa sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa dang / tshe ring ba phun sum tshogs pa sgrub [bsgrub P] pa'o // 'dir bcom ldan 'das ni thams cad du srog gcod pa las shin tu log cing spangs [D173a] par [P187b] gyur pas dag par byas nas phyi dang nang gi bdag nyid kyi dngos po grangs med pa yongs su btang bas mchod sbyin chen po rtsom pa mdzad pa'i sku tshe ring po'i las bsags pa'i rnam par smin par cung zhig kyang mthong bar ma gyur pa de gang du zad par gyur / grangs med pa gsum du bsags pa las lo bzhi bcu rtsa lngas 'bras bu 'byung [byung PG] bar ma gyur pa yang mi rigs so //

bcom ldan 'das kyi [kyis PG] [G146a] phrin las kyi dbang gis yin no zhe na / bcom ldan 'das ni 'jigs ['jig PG] pa thams cad las grol bar gyur pa yin na phrin ['phrin PG] las kyi dbang gis 'jigs pa mnga' ba'o zhes bya ba 'di mi rigs so // rgyun mi 'chad par yangs shing rgya che ba tshad med pa'i sku tshe ring bar 'jug pa'i las rnams mi dge ba'i las 'ga' zhig gis zil gyis mnan nas sku tshe thung ba'i las kyi rjes su rnam par smin par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba ni gzhan dag zil gyis [PG om.] mnan nas de dag [PG om.] gcig pu smin par 'gyur zhes bya ba 'di lta bu ni shin tu rmongs par gyur pa rnams kyis gzung bar bya ba yin no // rdo rje ltar mi phyed par gyur pa'i bcom ldan 'das kyi sku / mi dge ba'i chos thams cad spangs par gyur pa la snyun mnga' bar gyur nas maud 'gal gyi bu 'tsho byed la rmed du btang ba na / des gnas brtan zhun mar ro zhes bya ba'i bar gyis thams cad mkhyen pas 'tsho byed la rmed par byed pa yang rigs pa ma yin no // 'di ltar yang grags te / gnas brtan ba [PG om.] ku las tshangs pa mtshungs par [pa PG] spyod pa rnams la smras pa / tshe dang ldan pa dag bdag gis bsnyen par rdzogs nas lo brgyad cu lhag gcig lon na mgo na ba tsam yang nam yang byung bar ma dran te zhes smras pa dang / de ni sman 'a ru ra gcig nad pa la sbyin pa byas pas rnam pa de lta bur gyur to zhes seng ge'i sgra bsgrags par gyur to // nad pa la 'a ru ra gcig tsam byin pa'i rnam par smin pa yang de dang 'dra na / bcom ldan 'das sbyin pa'i [G146b] pha [P188a] rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs par gyur lta smos kyang ci dgos te 'gal lo //

de lta bas na 'di dag thams cad ni sems can gyi don gyi ched du bcom ldan 'das kyi sprul pa yin [D173b] te / de ltar na bdag nyid nyan thos su sprul pa lung bstan pa yin pa 'am / nyan thos kyi cha byad 'dzin pa śā ri'i bu la sogs pa'i ming gis brjod pa'i byang chub sems dpa' rnams lung bstan pa yin te / ji skad du /

> gcig ni nges par bzhugs pa dang // gzhan dag nges par gzung ba'i phyir //
> rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas rnams kyis ni // ma nges rnams la theg gcig bstan //

ces 'byung ba bzhin no // yang gzhan dag ni bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba dang bcas par spangs pas grol ba ni de bzhin gshegs pa gcig pu yin gyi / nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams ni ma yin te / de dag la nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i mi shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro // de la nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyis kyang shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs pas bag chags dang bral bar gyur nas / de bzhin gshegs pa'i mi rtog pa'i ye shes thob par 'gyur te / de dag gi [gis PG] ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa des 'bad pa med na

yang sngon mngon par bsgrubs pa'i smon lam gyi [gyis P] mthus 'khor ba'i mtha'i bar du sems can la phan pa bsgrub cing gnas so zhes zer ro [to PG] // rtag pa nyid dang de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po can [D add yin pa] nyid dang / yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i phyir nyan thos [G147a] la sogs pa lung bstan pa nyid ni yang 'tsham zhing rigs pa yin no zhes rjod par byed do //

theg pa ni [PG om.] gcig ste gnyis dang gsum du med do zhes bya ba la sogs pa ma lus pa'i lung du *dam pa'i chos padma dkar po'i mdo* ston par byed do // 'di lta ste / yi ge zhes bya ba ni gang ji ltar theg pa rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa ston par byed pa yin no // don zhes bya ba ni gang chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pa la 'jug pa'i ye shes kyi tshul [P188b] gcig pu'o zhes *blo gros mi zad* [*bzad* PG] *pas bstan pa'i mdo* las byung ['byung PG] ngo // de bzhin du theg pa thams cad theg pa gcig tu 'du bar 'gyur ro zhes *blo gros rgya mtsho'i mdo* la sogs pa rnams las kyang 'don par byed do // yang theg pa chen po 'ga' las kyang dgra bcom pa rnams la dmod pa'i byed pa ni med de / gang yang *bu mo blo gros bzang mo'i mdo* las [D174a] / yungs kar dang / ri rab dang / me khyer dang / nyi ma dang / wa dang / seng ge dang / e raṇḍa [ran da PG] dang / tsandan [tsan dan PG] bzhin du nyan thos dang / byang chub sems dpa'i khyad par bstan pa de yang rang gi ngo bo ji lta ba bzhin du gnas pa tsam smras pa byas pa yin gyi / gang la yang smad [dmad PG] pa 'am bstod par byas pa med de / gang yang nor bu mching bu'i 'od bas ni yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che 'od shin tu chen por 'byung ba yin no zhes zer na / ci des nor bu mching bu la smad [dmad PG] pa 'am / yid bzhin gyi nor bu la bstod pa yin nam / yang rmongs pa gang dag rgya mtsho chen [G147b] po dang ba lang gi rmig rjes kyi chu snyoms par byed cing / ba lang gi rmig rjes kyi chu la 'di ni rgya mtsho chen po yin no zhes smra bar byed na ci de bzhad gang du bya ba ma yin nam / de la nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa pa dag ni don nyung ba dang / bya ba nyung ba dang / gzhan la phan pa la rgyab kyis phyogs pa bdag nyid dul ba dang / zhi ba la mngon par sbyor ba dang thar pa'i sa bon cung zhig la brten nas yungs kar gyi nang srin bus zos pa'i nam mkha'i tshad tsam gyi [gyis PG] zag pa med pa'i ye shes thob pa de rnams su zhig gis smad [dmad PG] pa yin / byang chub sems dpa' rnams ni bskal pa bye ba brgya stong dpag tu med pa rnams su dge ba'i rtsa ba nye bar bsags pa / gzhan sdug bsngal bas sdug bsngal bar gyur pa sems can ma lus pa grol bar bya ba'i phyir dad pa dang ldan pa'i blo can nam mkha'i khams ma lus pa dang mnyam pa'i zag pa med pa'i ye shes [P189a] kun nas sgrub pa'i phyir brtson pa dang ldan pa rnams ni bdag nyid mthu chen po mtha' med pa dang ldan par gyur pa de rnams ni su zhig gis bstod pa yin te / ji skad du /

> kun kyang sa bon chung ngu las // 'bras bu shin tu yangs pa 'byung //
> sangs rgyas rgyu ni dpag med las // 'bras bu dpag med bsam ci dgos //

zhes kyang 'byung ngo //

khyim pa la phyag byed pa 'byung bas theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa ma yin no [na PG] zhes bya ba yang 'jig rten dbang phyug la sogs pa'i byang chub sems

[G148a] dpa' rnams ni khyim pa ma yin te / [D174b] chags pa thams cad yongs su spangs pa dang / so sor [so PG] thar pa'i sdom [sdoms PG] pa yang dag par blangs pa dang / byang chub sems dpa'i sdom pas byang chub kyi snying po la gnas kyi bar du bsdams pa'i phyir ro // gang yang de dag khyim pa la sogs pa'i gzugs su gnas pa ni sprul pa ston pa yin te / de dag ni [gis PG] sems can yongs su smin par bya ba'i phyir yin pas de dag ni khyim pa yang ma yin la phyag mi bya bar gyur pa yang ma yin te / ji ltar rgyal po ka pi na gdul bar bya ba'i phyir thub pas 'khor los sgyur bar sprul na yang khyim pa yang ma yin zhing phyag mi bya ba yang ma yin par yang 'dod pa bzhin te / gang gi phyir der 'khor los sgyur ba'i gzugs su bcom ldan 'das rgyan rnams kyang bzung zhing / de na re khyod kyis [kyi PG] mda' 'phongs dang zhes zer ba na mda' dang bcas pa'i gzhu blangs nas bkang ba dang / 'khor de'i [der PG] nyan thos chen po thams cad kyang blon po'i gzugs 'dzin par gyur cing rgyan rnam pa sna tshogs rab tu byung ba la ma gnang ba thogs par gyur pa nyid dang / mnyan yod de nyid du bram ze rgyu can zhes bya ba 'dul ba'i dus su bcom ldan 'das tshangs pa'i gzugs zhal bzhi pa ral pa'i cod pan 'chang ba zhig tu gyur te zhes kyang 'byung ba dang / 'ba' [ba PG] shi ta'i rigs [P189b] kyi bram ze mo gdul ba'i phyir mnyan yod de nyid du bcom ldan 'das kyis bram ze'i gzugs su mdzad nas bud med shi ba'i ro gcig bzung ste / 'di ni bdag gi [G148b] chung ma'o zhes gsungs pa dang / ko sa lar gar mkhan gdul ba'i don du bcom ldan 'das gar mkhan gyi gzugs su mdzad nas rdza rnga brdungs so zhes 'byung ba dang / rtse lnga'i dri za gdul ba'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis dri za'i gzugs tha ma la pa bzung nas pi wang blangs shing *brdung ba* [brdungs pa P] dang / de bzhin du rab tu byung ba dang 'gal ba 'dul ba las bkag pa / gzhan dang gzhan rdza mkhan gyi gzugs dang / lcags mgar gyi gzugs dang / stobs 'gyed pa'i gzugs dang / rngon pa gzugs mi sdug pa la sogs pa khyim pa tha ma la pa'i gzugs dang / spyod pa dang / smra ba ltar mdzad na yang bcom ldan 'das dang nyan thos de dag ni phyag mi bya bar 'os [D175a] pa ma yin te / ji skad du /

> rgyan gyis brgyan par gyur kyang chos spyod de //
> zhi dang dul dang yang dag sdom tshangs spyod //
> sems can kun la chad pa spangs pa ni //
> de de bram ze dge sbyong de dge slong //

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //

gal te khyim pa'i gzugs la ni khyim pa kho nas phyag bya ba yin gyi [gyis PG] / rab tu byung ba ni ma yin no zhe na / yon tan gtso bor gyur pa'i phyir phyag bya bar 'os pa yin pas rab tu byung ba rnams kyis kyang phyag bya ba kho na ste / yon tan gtso bor gyur pa la phyag bya'i rtags la ni ma yin te / yon tan dang bral bar gyur pa'i rtags ni shin tu smad [dmad PG] pa yin te / ji skad du /

> gang dag rab tu byung yang dngos po kun las nges ma byung //
> gang dag ngur smrig bgos kyang sems kyi [G149a] skyon ma spangs //

> gang dag lhung bzed thogs kyang yon tan snod ma gyur //
> rtogs 'dzin byed kyang khyim pa ma yin dge slong min //
> char pa [P add med pa] med pa'i sprin bzhin chu med khron pa bzhin du dang //
> [P190a] lo rtog nyams pa bzhin du [dang PG] myu gu mi 'byung sa bon bzhin //
> dge slong nyams pa'i dge slong de 'dra bde gshegs gsungs [gsung PG] //
> ri mo'i mar me bzhin du de ni yod min med ma yin //

zhes bya bas gang dag rtags blangs pa tsam gyis dregs par ci'i phyir bya ste / rab tu byung ba'i rtags blangs pa'i don tshul khrims kyi phung po yongs su rdzogs par gyur pa'i nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyang byang chub sems dpa' rnams dang / shin tu dbul por gyur pa dang / nor chen po dang ldan pa bzhin du khyad par shin tu che ste / de dag ni byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa nas bzung nas pha rol tu phyin pa drug gi dge ba'i rtse ba bsags pas legs par bsdams [gdams PG] pa dang / theg pa chen po'i gzhir gyur pa'i bzhon pa chen po can gyi ded dpon chen po bzhin du skye bo'i tshogs mang po dang thun mong [mongs P] du gyur pa'i nor can ni skyes bu dbul po le lo can lta bu'i nyan thos rnams dang yang mtshungs pa ma yin na rtags tsam dang ldan pa'i rmongs pa gzhan dag dang lta smos kyang ci dgos / de lta bas na yon tan dang ldan pa'i khyim pa rnams ni yon tan gyis dbul bar gyur pa'i rab tu byung ba dag gis [gi PG] phyag bya ba kho na yin te /

sde pa bco brgyad [G149b] phal chen gyi gzhung las kyang / byang chub sems [D175b] dpa' la phyag bya bar rab tu grags te /

ci ltar dge 'dun [slong P] phal chen sde'i nang tshan don grub pa rnams *rig pa 'dzin pa'i sde snod 'don pa* na

> dge slong dag nga'i bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub ni byams pa 'di la dad pas gang byams pa la mngon par phyag byed pa de [des PG] ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas nga la phyag byas pa dang mchod pa byas par 'gyur ro // nga gang dag gi ston pa yin pa dang / gang dag gi mchod gnas bla na med pa yin pa de dag gis ni byang chub sems dpa' byams pa 'di la yang phyag bya ba dang mchod pa bya ba yang [P190b] yin no // dge slong dang / dge slong ma dang / dge bsnyen dang / dge bsnyen ma dang / 'khor bzhi po thams cad kyis kyang rgyal tshab byams pa 'di la yang phyag bya'o zhes bya ba'i bcom ldan 'das kyi [kyis PG] bka' thos nas dgra bcom pa stong nyis brgya lnga bcus dus gcig dang dbyangs gcig gis 'di skad ces / rgyal tshab du dbang bskur ba'i byang chub sems dpa' thams cad la bdag cag so so nas phyag bgyi'o // lha sbas dang lam sbas na gnas pa de dag la yang phyag bgyi'o

zhes bya ba dang /

> de nas 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pas gnas brtan rab 'byor la 'di skad ces smras so // gnas brtan rab 'byor gang de bzhin gshegs pas sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong zhig mkhyen pa de khyod kyis shes [G150a] sam [PG add ma] / rtogs sam / mthong ngam / de dag dang mthun par gtam rjod [brjod PG] par byed nus sam / smras pa / 'jam dpal de ni ma yin no // *smras pa* [PG om.] / gnas brtan ting nge 'dzin gang la snyoms par zhugs shing gnas na sems can thams cad lta ba dang / sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong lta bar byed pa dang / shes par gyur nas ji ltar 'os pa bzhin du chos ston par 'gyur ba'i ting nge 'dzin de la khyod mnyam par 'jog nus sam / smras pa / 'jam dpal de ni ma yin no // de nas yang gnas brtan rab 'byor gyis 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la 'di skad ces smras so // 'jam dpal yang byang chub sems dpa' 'ga' zhig sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong shes pa dang / sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong dang [D176a] rjes su mthun par chos ston par byed pa 'ga' zhig yod dam / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / gnas brtan rab 'byor bcom ldan 'das la [pa P] zhus shig // bcom ldan 'das kyis ston par 'gyur ro // de nas gnas brtan rab 'byor gyis bcom ldan [P191a] 'das la 'di skad ces gsol to // bcom ldan 'das sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong yang dag par 'tshal zhing / sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong dang mthun par chos ston par bgyid pa 'ga' zhig mchis lags sam / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / rab 'byor chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis mnyam par rgyas pa zhes bya ba'i ting nge 'dzin yod de / byang chub sems dpa' gang dag gis [G150b] ting nge 'dzin de thob par gyur pa'i byang chub sems dpa' de thams cad ni sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong yang dag par shes shing sems can gyi spyod pa brgyad khri bzhi stong dang mthun par chos ston par yang byed / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas kyis ma yin pa thams cad kyang shes par gyur pa yang yod do // de nas gnas brtan rab 'byor gyis bcom ldan 'das la 'di skad ces gsol to // bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpa' rnams ni ngo mtshar du bgyi ba lags so // bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpa' rnams ni rmad du byung ba'o // nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi yul ma lags pa gang lags pa de ni byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi yul lags so // nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnams la ma mchis pa'i rdzu 'phrul byang chub sems dpa' rnams la mchis te / bcom ldan 'das de'i slad du / byang chub sems dpa' rnams la phyag bgyi'o zhes

'phags pa dge 'dun phal chen sde'i shar gyi ri bo la gnas pa gang dag la las kyi yul 'khor na gnas pa zhes kyang bya ba rnams kyi *byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod* las byung ['byung PG] ngo //

> de nas bcom ldan 'das la gnas brtan 'od srungs chen pos 'di skad ces gsol to // bcom ldan 'das 'di lta bu ci'i snga ltas lags / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa /

> [P191b] ’od srungs chen po ’di ni byang chub sems dpa’ dra [D176b] ba can gyi ’od kha dog gcig pa ste / de’i ’khor yang ’di ltar [G151a] gser gyi kha dog tu ’gyur ro // de’i ’khor rnams kyi mos pa yang gcig tu ’gyur te / ’di ltar thams cad mkhyen pa nyid la mos par ’gyur ro // der nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas ni ming yang med par ’gyur gyi / byang chub sems dpa’i [dpa’ PG] dge ’dun chen po dang ldan pa’i sangs rgyas su ’gyur ro // de nas bcom ldan ’das la gnas brtan ’od srungs chen pos ’di skad ces gsol to // bcom ldan ’das byang chub sems dpa’ rnams ni ngo mtshar du bgyi’o // bcom ldan ’das byang chub sems dpa’ rnams ni rmad du byung ba’o // bcom ldan ’das nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi yul ma lags pa gang lags pa de ni byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi yul lags so // nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas la ma mchis pa’i rdzu ’phrul gang lags pa de ni byang chub sems dpa’ rnams la mchis te / bcom ldan ’das de’i slad du byang chub sems dpa’ rnams la phyag bgyi’o

zhes bya ba / ’phags pa dge ’dun phal chen sde’i nub kyi ri bo la gnas pa rnams kyi *byang chub sems dpa’i sde snod* las ’don to //

> stobs dang mngon shes dbang thob pa // thub pa nyi ma rnal ’byor pa // kun tu bzang la sogs pa ni // sa bcu po la gnas bcas nas // khams gsum smra ba’i rtag gyur pa // smra ba thams cad pham mdzad pa // gang dag nyan thos rang sangs rgyas // rnams kyi spyod yul ma yin pa // chos de sems can rnams la ni // chos [G151b] gsung ldan pa ston par mdzad // ces bcom ldan ’das la gsol pa dang / tshe dang ldan pa maudgal gyi bu chen pos / bcom ldan ’das la ’di skad ces gsol to // sangs rgyas skyob pa gang rnams kyi // chos lta bcom ldan shin tu ring // byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi yang // [P192a] bdag gir gyur la ma lags so // bcom ldan de slad bdag cag ni // byang chub sems dpa’ rdzu ’phrul che // kun la thal sbyor dngos kun gyis // legs par btud nas phyag bgyi’o //

zhes dge ’dun phal chen sde pa’i pa bzang po’i lam pa pho brang dpal yon can na gnas pa rnams [D177a] kyi [kyis PG] *shin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod* las ’don to //

> byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi sku’i gsang ba gang dag yin pa dang / gsung gi gsang ba gang dag yin pa dang / thugs kyi gsang ba gang dag yin pa de dag la nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi ye shes ’jug pa ma yin no // kun dga’ bo byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi skye ba lnga brgya tsam yang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyis [kyi PG] yongs su shes par mi nus so // gang yang spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug gi spyod pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa dag kyang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams la med de / kun dga’ bo gang [dang PG] ming ’dzin pa tsam zhig byed pa’i sems can de thams cad kyang ’jigs pa [PG add de] thams cad dang bral bar ’gyur ro // de skad ces bka’

stsal pa dang / tshe dang ldan pa kun dga' bos bcom ldan 'das la 'di skad ces gsol to // bcom ldan 'das 'di dpa' [G152a] bo ni // mi 'jigs snying rje'i bdag nyid can // spyan ras gzigs kyi dbang phyug ni // thub pa che la rab tu 'dud //

ces dge 'dun phal chen sde'i gangs kyi ri la gnas pa rnams kyi [kyis PG] *skyes pa rab kyi sde snod* las 'don to //

'od srungs chen pos gsol pa // 'gro ba'i mgon khyod gang gi tshe // sems can kun la sman bzhed nas // spyan ni phyung nas sbyin mdzad pa // de tshe'i phyag 'os de phyag bgyid // gang gi 'phrin las rtogs brjod pa // sku tshe snga ma'i thos gyur gang // mgon po thub pa chen po yi // skyes pa'i rabs la phyag bgyi'o // gang tshe dga' [P192b] ldan gtsor gyur dang // śā kya'i rigs su 'khrungs pa dang // gang tshe khyod ni rdzogs sangs rgyas // thub pa khyod kyi de dag 'dud //

ces 'phags pa dge 'dun phal chen gyi *mdo sde'i sde snod* las 'don te /

'jig rten 'das pa zhi ba dang // don grub pa dang ri gnyis gnas //
bzang po'i lam pa gangs ri pa // dge 'dun phal chen rtsa ba'i drug //

de rnams kyi yin no //

sangs rgyas sras po byang chub sems // 'jig rten kun gyis phyag bgyi'o //
shes rab dpag tu med pa dang // tshul khrims shes rab rnam grol dag [bdag PG] //
go cha chen po'i go bgos nas // bsam gyis mi khyab dbang thob cing //
pha rol [D177b] phyin bcu rdzogs gyur nas // sangs rgyas chos rnams mngon gyur pa // 'jig rten kun gyi mchod rten la // 'jig rten kun gyis [gyi PG] phyag bgyi'o // shes rab tshul khrims ting 'dzin gyi [gyis PG] // de [G152b] dang mnyam pa'i dge 'dun med // 'jig rten kun gyis phyag bgyis pa // sangs rgyas kun mkhyen ma gtogs [rtogs PG] pa'i // lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten ni // 'gas kyang phyag mi bya ba min //

zhes 'phags pa gnas brtan pa 'jigs med ri la gnas pa rnams kyi *sangs rgyas kyi rigs khri nyis stong* las 'don to //

de nas tshe dang ldan pa shā ri'i bus mnyan yod du cho 'phrul chen po bstan pa mthong bas / bcom ldan 'das la sems shin tu dang bar gyur nas / bcom ldan 'das de ga la ba de logs su thal mo sbyar bas phyag 'tshal te tshigs su bcad pas mngon par bstod pa / bag chags bcas pa'i skyon las rgyal // mu stegs ma lus kun las rgyal // cho 'phrul bstan pas lha rnams kyi // 'jig rten 'og min mthar

> thugs [thug DG] mdzes // 'jig rten phra rab rdul snyed kyis // dpa' bo che la phyag 'tshal lo // byang chub sems bskyed las brtsams nas // drang srong che la bdag phyag 'tshal // [P193a] byang chub kyi sems bskyed par mdzad pa de la yang phyag 'tshal lo // mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas de la yang phyag 'tshal lo // chos kyi 'khor lo bskor bar mdzad pa de la yang phyag bgyid do // bsil bar gyur pa la [P om.] yang phyag 'tshal lo //

zhes btags [rtag PG] par smra ba'i mang du thos pa pa rnams kyi *cho 'phrul chen po'i mdo* las 'don to //

> de nas tshe dang ldan pa gang pos mnyan yod du cho 'phrul chen po bstan pa de mthong bas / bcom ldan 'das la sems shin tu dad [G153a] par gyur nas 'di skad ces gsol to // mgon po khyod ni byang chub sems dpar gyur pas cho 'phrul brgya stong mdzad pa de la yang phyag 'tshal lo // byang chub sems dpar gyur pa'i skye ba rnams cho 'phrul brgya stong gi 'byung gnas su gyur pa la yang phyag 'tshal lo // mgon po khyod gshegs pa na yang phyag 'tshal lo // mgon po khyod bzhugs pa na yang phyag 'tshal lo // mgon po 'khyod sku g.yo ba na yang phyag 'tshal lo // spyod lam dag ni thams cad du // sangs [D178a] rgyas mdzad pa thams cad kyis // sems can kun la sman mdzad pa // phyag 'os phyag bgyi khyod phyag 'tshal //

zhes 'phags pa mchod rten pa'i *cho 'phrul chen po'i mdo* las 'don to //

> de nas tshe dang ldan pa 'od srungs gzhon nus mnyan yod du cho 'phrul chen po bstan pa de [PG om.] mthong nas sems shin tu dang bar gyur pas / bcom ldan 'das la thal mo sbyar bas phyag 'tshal nas / tshigs su bcad pas bcom ldan 'das la bstod pa / dga' ldan gnas nas 'pho ba dang // lhums su 'jug par mdzad pa dang // bltams dang bltams par gyur pa na // cho 'phrul dag ni ston mdzad pa // phyag 'os kun gyis phyag bgyis pa // dpa' chen khyod la phyag 'tshal lo // zag med drang srong gyur pa yi // lam mkhan ded dpon mchog gyur dang // skye ba [P193b] spangs pa yang srid med // rgal nas dgon pa las sgrol ba // cho 'phrul bcas pa [pa'i PG] ston mdzad pa // byang chub sems [G153b] dpa' la phyag 'tshal //
>
> 'od srungs chen pos gsol pa // dpa' bo zhabs ni brkyang mdzad cing // da ltar 'jigs ['jig DPG] med phyag 'tshal lo // mgon khyod bltams pa la phyag 'tshal // bla med rdzogs par byang chub dang // chos kyi 'khor lo la phyag 'tshal // thub pa mya ngan 'das pa dang // skyes pa'i rabs ni thams cad dang // sku gdung bzhugs pa thams cad de // mgon po kun la phyag 'tshal lo //

zhes 'phags pa ba lang gnas chen po mchod rten pa rnams kyi *cho 'phrul chen po'i mdo* las 'don to //

> phags pa shā ri'i bus gsol pa / gang nas bzung ste thub pa khyod // byang chub tu ni sems bskyed pa // de nas bzung ste spyi bos bdag // mi mchog khyod la phyag 'tshal lo // sems can bde don kun 'dren pa // byang chub brnyes pa'i kun mkhyen la // lag gnyis spyi bor thal sbyar nas // brgya phrag mang por bdag phyag 'tshal // gang tshe don 'dod pa la don // nyid kyi sha yang stsol mdzad pa // de tshe nyid du phyag 'os ni // kun gtso mchod gnas mnga' bdag gyur // mngon shes drug po mngon shes che // rkyen rgyal gtso bo rnams kyis kyang // de tshe gtso bor gyur pa khyod // [D178b] phyag dang mchod pa byas pa yin //

zhes 'phags pa 'od srungs pa'i *pha rol tu phyin pa'i lam* las 'don par byed do //

> tshe dang ldan pa *re ba tas* [re ba tis PG] gsol pa / dpa' chen khyod kyi spyod pa ni // thams cad la yang bdag phyag 'tshal // khams gsum phyag 'os phyag bygis pa'i // skyes pa'i rabs la bdag [G154a] phyag 'tshal //

zhes 'phags pa gos dmar po'i *sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa* las 'don par byed do //

> tshe dang ldan pa kun dga' bos gsol pa / 'od zer mdzes pa'i kha dog gis // dga' ldan gnas ni [P194a] snang mdzad nas // byang chub sems dpa' 'dir gshegs pa // shā kya thub la bdag phyag 'tshal // shāk rigs gzhon nur 'khrungs pa la // gang 'di rgyan gyis brgyan pa'i gtso // dran dang shes bzhin gyis bltams [bsdams DPG] pa'i // shā kya thub la phyag 'tshal lo // gang zhig 'dzam [dzam P] bu'i grib ma la // bzhugs tshe nyi ma yol gyur kyang // mnyam med grib mas ma btang ba // shā kya thub la phyag 'tshal lo //

zhes 'phags pa mang pos bkur ba ku ru ku la'i gnas pa rnams kyis 'don par byed do //

> tshe dang ldan pa rab 'byor gyis gsol pa / tshogs ni yongs su rdzogs pa las // shā kya'i rgyal rigs 'khrungs pa la // lha mi'i tshogs kyis [kyi PG] mchod gyur pa // phyag 'os de la'ang phyag bgyi'o // byang chub shing gi rtsar bzhugs nas // sder bcas bdud las rgyal bcas te // gang tshe kun mkhyen nyid gyur pa // de'i tshe phyag 'os de [des P] phyag bgyi // *bā rā ṇa sī'i* [bā ra na si'i PG] drang srong tshal // bdud rtsi'i go 'phang mkhyen gyur nas // bdud rtsi'i 'khor lo bskor mdzad pa / de'i tshe phyag 'os de phyag bgyi //

zhes 'phags pa sa ston pa rnams kyis [kyi PG] *tshoms brgyad pa* las 'don par byed do [de P] //

> tshe dang ldan pa nag po 'char kas gsol ba [pa PG] / sems can kun la sman slad du // spyi gtsug nor [G154b] ldan pa yi dbu // gang tshe khyod kyis [kyi PG] sngon btang ba // de tshe'i gtso bo de phyag bgyi //

zhes 'phags pa rnam par phye ste smra ba rnams kyis [kyi PG] *sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa* las 'don par byed do //

> gang tshe mar me mdzad kyis ni // nga ni lung bstan gyur de tshe // sa brgyad pa ni ngas thob cing // dbang bcu dag kyang thob gyur la // 'jig rten mgon gyis [D179a] mngon sum du // nga lung bstan par gyur thos nas // lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis // gus bcas nga la phyag kyang bgyis // nga yi ral pa'i phung po la [las PG] // sangs rgyas [P194b] zhabs kyis [kyi PG] mnan mdzad de // lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis // phyag 'os 'di la phyag gyis shig // spun zla sa gnyis gnas pa dang // sangs rgyas kun mkhyen ma gtogs pa // 'di la phyag byed rigs min pa // 'jig rten 'di na 'ga' med gsungs [gsung PG] //

zhes 'phags pa chos sbas pa rnams kyis [kyi PG] *chos kyi rkang pa* las 'don par byed do //

> tshe dang ldan pa kun dga' bos gsol pa / gang bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpar gyur pas dga' ldan gyi gnas nas 'phos nas dran pa dang shes bzhin dang ldan bzhin du yum gyi lhums su zhugs pa de yang bcom ldan 'das bdag gis ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba'i chos su 'dzin lags so // de la 'di skad ces bya ste / gang zhig dga' ldan gnas 'phos nas // dran ldan shes bzhin ldan par ni // yum gyi lhums su gshegs pa dang // lhums gnas de la bdag phyag [G155a] 'tshal // gang gi tshe bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpa' bltams par gyur pa na stong gsum gyi stong chen po'i 'jig rten 'od kyis gsal bar mdzad pa dang ldan pa de yang bcom ldan 'das bdag gis byang chub sems dpa'i ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba'i chos su 'dzin lags so // de la 'di skad ces bya ste / gang yang bltams tshe stong gsum 'di // 'od kyis gsal bar mdzad dang ldan // nyi ma bye ba mtshungs pa yi // bcom ldan 'das la phyag 'tshal lo // gang yang bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpa' bltams ma thag tu gom pa bdun du gshegs pa 'di yang bdag gis byang chub sems dpa'i ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba'i chos su 'dzin to // de la 'di skad ces bya ste / bltams ma thag tu gom pa bdun // pad ma la ni gnas pa dang // *ban glang* [ba lang PG] rol pa ltar gshegs pa // gau ta ma la phyag 'tshal //

zhes 'phags pa thams cad yod par smra ba'i *chos* [P195a] *rmad du byung ba* las 'don to //

de ltar na sde pa bco brgyad kyi gzhung las dang [D179b] po sems bskyed pa la sogs pa'i byang chub sems dpa' rnams la phyag bya bar grub pas theg pa chen po sde pa bco brgyad kyi khongs su gtogs pa yin par rig [rigs PG] par bya'o //

ci yang byang chub tu sems bskyed pa tsam gyi khyim pa kun la yang [PG om.] rab tu byung bas phyag bya ba yin nam zhe na / ma [PG om.] yin par brjod par bya ste / gang dag sa la zhugs pa dang / lung bstan pa [G155b] thob pa yin par thos pa de dag ni gang dag ri bong dang ngang pa'i rgyal po la sogs pa dud 'gror gyur pa la yang phyag bya ba yin na mi la sogs par gyur pa la lta smos kyang ci dgos // gang yang dge slong gis phyag bya ba ni gnyis te / sangs rgyas dang dge slong rgan pa'o zhes bya ba de la yang sangs rgyas kyi ni gnyis la phyag bya ba yin te / bsod nams kyi tshogs kyi bdag nyid kyi yon tan dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi [kyis PG] bdag nyid kyis rtogs pa'o // gang de dag gnyi ga'i rtsa ba ni byang chub kyi sems yin te / *'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo* las / de bzhin gshegs pa'i tshul khrims dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba la sogs pa dang / sbyin pa la sogs pa de rnams ni byang chub kyi sems kyi rtsa ba las byung ba yin te / de'i phyir de dag ni mi zad pa yin no zhes gsungs so // de bzhin du /

> byang chub kyi sems [P add kyi sems] bsod nams gang // gal te de ni gzugs can gyur // nam mkha'i khams ni kun bkang [gang PG] ste // de ni de bas lhag par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa yang 'byung ngo //

de kho na nyid rtogs [rtog PG] pa med du zin kyang de'i rten byang chub gyi sems brtan par yod na phyag bya ba kho na yin no // mngon par rtogs pa yang sa dang po la ni sgra'i rjes su 'gro ba'i [P195b] bzod pa'o // drug pa la ni rjes su mthun pa'o // brgyad pa la ni skye ba med pa'i chos la bzod pa zhes bya ba'o // [G156a] mngon par rtogs [rtog PG] pa'i mthu ni 'jig rten gyi khams brgya snyed rdzu 'phrul gyis g.yo ba dang / snang ba dang [dag P] / gshegs pa dang / bskal ba brgyar gnas pa dang / sngon gyi mtha' dang / phyi ma'i mtha' la 'jug pa la sogs pa bsam gyis mi khyab [D180a] pa thams cad du nyan thos la sogs pa dang thun mong ma yin pa yin pas dang po sems bskyed pa la sogs pa'i byang chub sems dpa' gang la [PG om.] yang phyag mi bya ba ma yin no zhes bya ba dang 'gal ba ci yod / sangs rgyas la phyag byed pa de bzhin du byang chub sems dpa' la yang phyag bya ste / rgyud tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir nya gro'i myu gu dang / chen por gyur pa lta bu 'am / 'khor los sgyur ba'i bu la phyag byed pa bzhin no //

> byang chub sems dpa' las sangs rgyas // rdzogs sangs rgyas las chos yin te // chos las 'phags pa'i tshogs 'byung ngo // de las dkon mchog gsum 'byung ['gyur P] phyir //
> byang chub sems dpa' la gang sdang // de ni dkon mchog gsum la sdang // dkon mchog gsum po gang spang [spong PG] ba // dge slong med cing sdom pa med //

ma khol [gol DPG] la sogs pa bstod pa byed pa phal cher gyis kyang / bcom ldan 'das

kyi sku che snga ma rnams kyi mdzad spyod la mngon par bstod pa /

> yang dag rdzogs pa'i byang chub rgyu // sems ni rin chen de nyid kyang //
> dpa' bo khyod kyis snying por mkhyen // de las gzhan [G156b] pas ring bar gyur //
> dang por khyod la phyag bgyi 'am // 'on te gang gis [gi PG] 'khor bar khyod //
> skyon mkhyen yun ring de lta bur // bzhugs mdzad thugs rje che la bgyi //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung ba dang / *sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa bsgom pa* las kyang de bzhin gshegs pa'i sngon gyi sbyor ba'i yon tan rjes su dran pa las gsungs te / sngon gyi sbyor ba yang sems dang po [P196a] bskyed pa nas bzung ste / byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa'o // gal te yang sngon gyi sbyor ba rjes su dran pas de bzhin gshegs pa rjes su dran par 'gyur ba yin na / sangs rgyas la phyag bya ba yin zhing byang chub sems dpa' la phyag bya ba ma yin par ji ltar 'gyur / gang yang theg pa chen mdo [P om.] sde kha cig las / byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyis [kyi PG] nyan thos rnams la btsun pa zhes bya ba gus pa'i tshig gis spyod par byed cing phyag byas pa dang / nyan thos rnams kyis kyang de dag la rigs kyi bu zhes bya ba'i tshig gis gtam rjod par byed pa ni 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob nye bar bzung [D180b] ba yin no //

'di ltar bzod pa rtogs par gyur cing / dpa' bar 'gro ba'i ting nge 'dzin la sogs pa thob pa sangs rgyas kyi sprul pa ston par mdzad pa de dag ni dgra bcom pa la sogs pa rnams kyis kyang phyag bya ba yin no // gal te de dag nyan thos la sogs pa'i phyag bya ba'i gnas ma yin na ni / de dag gis sangs rgyas kyi sprul pa yang ston par mi 'gyur la / de dag gi [gis D] [G157a] phyag bya ba yang bdag gir byed par mi 'gyur te / 'phags pa nyer [nye PG] sbas kyis bdud la smras nas sangs rgyas kyi sprul pa byas pa lta bu'o // khyad par rtogs par 'dod pas ni theg pa chen po'i gsung rab zab mo rnams blta bar bya ba'i phyir rab tu sdang ba rtsom dang 'brel ba'i ngan 'gro 'gro ba'i rgyu tshig ngan pa mang po smra bar bya ba ma yin no //

gang yang gang ga'i [gā P] klung bdun cu rtsa gnyis kyi bye ma snyed kyi de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi mtshan bzung ba'i bsod nams dang / 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug gi mtshan bzung ba'i bsod nams mnyam par gsungs pa dang / gang yang *dkon mchog brtsegs pa'i mdo* las / zla ba ches pa dang nya ba'i dpes byang chub sems dpa' la khyad par du bsngags par 'byung ba yang de las 'phags pa 'byung zhing ster ba yin [P196b] pa'i phyir dang / phar gyur pa'i phyir dang / byang chub tu sems bskyed pa la sogs pas dang po'i dge ba'i bshes gnyen du gyur pa'i phyir dang / byang chub kyi sa bon rab tu 'byung ba yin pa'i dbang du byas nas bstan pa yin no //

The Vows of Bodhisattvas Like Gaganagañja Are Just Words

nam mkha' mdzod kyi smon lam la sogs pa yang tshig [tshigs P] tsam ma yin te 'bras bu mthong ba'i phyir ro // da ltar ci'i phyir mthong bar ma gyur ce na / dge ba'i rtsa bas [ba PG] dbul bar gyur pa'i rgyud la 'bras bu yod bzhin du yang bar du nyams par 'gyur ba

’am / phyin ci log tu mthong ba yin te / gang gā’i chu klung skams pa ’am [G157b] / rnag gam / me mar mur du mthong ba bzhin te / ji ltar chu bo gang gā’i ’gram na yi dvags brgya stong mang po gnas pa rnams bdag nyid la skal pa med par gyur pa’i dbang gis gang gā’i chu klung yongs su skams pa ’am / rnag gam me mar mur du ’bar ba mthong ba bzhin no // de bzhin du byang chub sems dpa’i smon lam las yongs su byung ba’i [D181a] nor gyi char phab par gyur kyang dge ba’i rtsa ba ma bsags pa’i sems can gyi khams rnams la ’bab par mi ’gyur te / nam mkha’ nyid du med par ’gyur ba ’am thog [thogs PG] la sogs pa’i ngo bor gyur nas ’bab par ’gyur te / ji ltar chu ’dzin dang bral bar gyur pa’i nam mkha’i dkyil du ’od zer stong ’gyed pa’i nyi ma shar par gyur kyang dmus long gis sngon gyi [gyis PG] las kyi dbang gis ’od zer gcig tsam yang mthong bar mi ’gyur ba bzhin no // de bzhin du nam mkha’i dkyil nas rin po che’i phung po ’bab par gyur kyang skye bo bsod nams chung ba dag gi sngon gyi las kyi [P om.] nyes pas cung zad cig kyang de’i nye bar longs spyod par ’gyur ba ma yin no //

gal te rang gi *las kyi* [D om.] mthu nyid kyis ’byor pa dang rgud pa dag tu ’gyur ba yin na ni de lta na ni byang chub sems dpa’i [P197a] smon lam dag la nus pa med par gyur pa yin no zhe na / gzhan la phan pa ’byung ba ni tshogs pa las byung [’byung PG] ba yin pa’i phyir nus pa med pa ma yin te / ji ltar sa dang / chu dang / me dang / rlung dang / nam mkha’ rnams tshogs pa las myu gu ’byung gi / *rkyen gcig* [rten cig PG] ma tshang na yang ’byung bar [G158a] mi ’gyur ro // de bzhin du gtong ba dang / ser sna spangs pa dang / ’dod pa med pa mang du goms pa dang / mnyam pa’i sems dang / ’dod pa la sbyin pa rdzogs par byed pa dang / lan du phan ’dogs pa la re ba med pa dang / ’bras bu la ’dod pa mi skyed [bskyed PG] pa dang / sems can thams cad dang thun mong du byas pa’i sbyin pa [PG om.] pas ni nor gyi char pa ’bab pa la sogs pa thob par ’gyur ba’i ’bras bu rnam par smin par yongs su ’dzin cing gsal bar byed pa yin gyi [gyis PG] / de las rkyen gang yang rung ba zhig ma tshang na ’byung bar mi ’gyur ro // de lta bas na nam mkha’ mzod la sogs pa’i smon lam ni ’bras bu dang bcas pa kho na yin no //

Śākyamuni Is a Manifestation

śā kya thub pa yang sprul pa kho na yin par rigs te / ’og min gyi spyod yul can chos kyi sku la brten pa’i longs spyod rdzogs pa’i sku las rab tu byung ba yin pa’i phyir ro // gal te chos dang longs spyod rdzogs pa’i sku dag ni rnam par rtog pa mi mnga’ ba yin la de dag la rnam par rtog pa mi mnga’ na yang sprul pa’i sku ga las ’byung bar ’gyur [D181b] te / ma yin no zhe na / brjod par bya ste / ’di na bcom ldan ’das byang chub sems dpar gyur pa na smon lam btab pa yin te / bdag gis rnam par mi rtog pa’i chos nyid thob nas spyod pa gang dag dang skad kyi rnam pa gang dag [P om.] gis sems can rnams ’dul bar ’gyur ba’i spyod pa de dag dang / cha byad [byas PG] de lta bu dang / skad kyi rnam pa de dag gis rnam par rtog pa’i rtsol ba [G158b] med bzhin du yang ’jug par [P197b] gyur cig ces bya ba’i sngon gyi smon lam gyi shugs kyis / rtsa ba’i de bzhin gshegs pa’i sku las dga’ ldan gyi gnas na bzhugs pa la sogs pa nas mya ngan las ’das pa’i bar gyi sems can la

phan pa'i thabs su gyur pa *rnams 'jug* [rnam 'jig PG] par 'gyur ba yin te / sprul pa'i sku med par ni dzam bu'i gling bye ba phrag brgya rnams su 'pho ba dang / 'jug pa dang / bltams pa dang / bzo'i gnas bslab pa bstan pa dang / btsun mo'i 'khor na gnas pa dang / mngon par 'byung ba dang / bdud 'dul ba dang / mngon par byang chub pa dang / chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba dang / yongs su mya ngan las 'das par ston pas 'dul ba'i sems can rnams 'dul par nus pa ma yin no //

sde pa tha dad kyi gzhung las kyang / sangs rgyas kyi sprul pa ston pa yod de / ji ltar phyin ci log tu mngon par zhen pa'i rngon pa gdul ba'i phyir rngon pa'i gzugs su sprul pa dang / mi dbang padma skyes bu [bus D] gdul ba'i phyir rgan po'i gzugs su sprul pa dang / lha'i mig gis ci zhig mthong zhes dris pa na 'phags pa ma 'gags pas smras pa / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sprul pa dang / srid pa bar ma'i sems can grangs med pa dag mthong ngo zhes bya ba ni ji ltar sprul pa de dag gis sems can rnams 'dul bar 'gyur ba de ltar sprul nas 'jug pa yin no // de bzhin du / śā kya thub pa'i sprul pa yang 'jug pa yin la / yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin ma yin pa'i sgyu ma dang [G159a] 'dra ba yang ma yin zhing / gnas gtsang ma na gnas pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa rnam par snang mdzad kyi [kyis PG] byin *gyi rlabs* [gyis brlabs PG] kyis bstan pa yang [PG add ma] yin la / sprul pa'i sangs rgyas de rnams tha dad pa'i sangs rgyas kyang ma yin te / rten gcig [D182a] pa'i phyir nyi ma'i dkyil 'khor las rab tu bkye ba'i 'od zer lta bu 'am / mi'i bdag po la brten pa'i [P198a] bya ba byed pa'i skyes bu mang po bzhin du sprul pa rnams mang po nyid yin na yang mdzad pa gcig pa'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pa ni mang po nyid ma yin par 'dod de / des na 'jig rten gyi khams gcig tu sangs rgyas mang po 'byung ba ni gnas med cing skabs med do zhes bya ba dang yang mi 'gal te / stong gsum gyi stong chen po'i 'jig rten gyi khams gyi dbang du byas nas bstan pa yin gyi / 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad du ni ma yin pas so // ji ltar chos sbas pa rnams kyang //

> sangs rgyas rnams la phyag 'tshal lo // sangs rgyas rnams kyi nyan thos dang //
> rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas grags ldan pa'i // sku kun la yang de bzhin te //
> rdzogs sangs gang du bltams pa dang // gang du byang chub la reg dang //
> chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba dang // gang du zag med mya ngan 'das //
> gang du gnas dang 'chag pa dang // de bzhin gshegs pa bzhugs pa dang //
> seng ge lta bur gzims [gzim P] bshams pa'i // gnas de la ni bdag phyag 'tshal //
> rkang gnyis dam pa shar dang ni [G159b] // byang gyi phyogs na bzhugs pa yi //
> rgyal ba brten dka' zhes bya ba // des ni tshigs bcad 'di gsungs te //
> gang gis tshigs bcad 'di bzhi yis // de bzhin gshegs pa la stod [bstod PG] byed pa //
> bskal pa bye ba stong rnams su // ngan 'gror 'gro bar mi 'gyur ro //

zhes 'don par byed do //

yang gnas brtan shā ri'i bus bzhag pa'i skye [ska PG] rags gnas brtan maudgal gyi bus rdzu 'phrul gyis bteg par ma nus pa na bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / maudgal gyi bu khyod ni rdzu 'phrul las nyams pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyang dge slong shā ri'i bus rang gi shes

rab kyi stobs bskyed pas / de bzhin gshegs pa [P om.] bsten [brten PG] par dka' ba'i seng ge'i khri la skye [ska PG] rags kyi sna btags shing bsten [brten PG] pa yin no zhes [P198b] gsungs pa dang / gser mgar dang shing mkhan gyi gtam rgyud kyis sangs rgyas dang bcas pa dang / sangs rgyas med pa'i 'jig rten gyi khams [D182b] rnams nye bar bstan par shes par bya'o //

yang gsungs pa /

> gang dag 'das pa'i rdzogs sangs rgyas // gang dag ma byon sangs rgyas dang //
> gang yang da ltar rdzogs sangs rgyas // mya ngan sel mdzad mang po rnams //
> kun kyang chos la rim gro yis // gnas par gyur cing gnas mdzad la //
> da dung du yang gnas mdzad de // 'di ni rdzogs sangs chos nyid do //

zhes kyang 'byung bas / gang dag 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad na de bzhin gshegs pa ni [PG om.] gcig cig bzhugs so snyam sems pa de dag gis ni gsung rab kyi don mi shes pa yin te / [G160a] ji skad du mar me mdzad dang / rin chen gtsug tor can la sogs pa sangs rgyas mang po zhig ni 'das par gyur / seng ge dang / rgyal la sogs pa mang po zhig ni 'byung bar 'gyur zhes kyang 'don pa dang lung gi mdo las kyang 'don par byed de / ji ltar zhe na / 'das pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa ji snyed cig ce na / gang gā'i klung gi bye ma snyed do // ma byon pa ji snyed cig ce na / gang gā'i klung gi bye ma snyed do zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung bas 'jig rten gyi khams mang po dag tu mang po 'byung bar rigs pa nyid yin gyi [gyis PG] gcig ni ma yin no //

The Buddha Is Always in Concentration

de bzhin gshegs pa ni rtag tu mnyam par bzhag pa nyid yin na yang / dus gsum du gzigs pas gzigs par mdzad pa nyid do // zhes gsungs pa ni 'jig rten gyi rjes su mthun par zhugs pa yin te / mnyam par bzhag pa nyid na sngon gyi smon lam gyi shugs kyis mdzad pa 'di dag thams cad 'jug par 'gyur ba yin gyi [gyis PG] / rnam par rtog pa mdzad pa ni ma yin te / chu'i yur ba rka sna tshogs su dang po bkye zhing / 'dod pa'i phyogs su btang [P199a] ba byas nas phyis bya ba med par sdod par byed pa'i chun pa'i skyes bu bzhin no zhes bya bas [ba PG] sangs rgyas kyi bka' ma yin pa ma yin no //

Mahāyāna Sūtras Teach Useless Mantras

gang yang theg pa chen po'i mdo sde las phan yon mang du 'byung bar bsngags par yang phal cher ni phyi ma'i 'bras bu yin la / gang dag mthong ba'i chos kyi phan yon kha cig 'byung ba de yang dad pa [G160b] dang lhag pa'i bsam pa nyams pas dge ba spangs shing mi dge ba spyod par gyur pa dang / mthong ba'i chos nyid la sdig pa kun tu *spyod pa* [spong ba D] shin tu stobs [D183a] dang ldan par gyur pas gnod par gyur cing zil gyis mnan pas gang dag gi dad pa yang chung bar gyur la / lhag pa'i bsam pa yang spangs par gyur pas de dag gi phan yon yang nyi ma 'od zer brgya stong 'gyed pa shar bar gyur

pa na skar ma rnams mthong bar yang [PG om.] mi 'gyur ba bzhin no //

yang kha cig dam pa'i chos spangs pa dang / 'phags pa la skur ba btab pa dang / dkon mchog gsum la gnod par [pa PG] byas pa rnams kyis dge ba'i rtsa ba bzang po yang mang du bsags na yang thal bas bkab pa ltar gyur pas de rnams ni ngan song gsum gyi lam la gnas par gyur pa la phan yon yang ji ltar ga la 'byung bar 'gyur / gang dag sdig pa shin tu chung ba la yang 'jigs par lta [blta PG] zhing gcig tu dge ba'i phyogs la spyod par gyur pas theg pa chen po'i yi ge bri ba dang / 'dzin pa dang / klog pa dang / kha ton byed pa dang / sems pa dang / sgom pa dang / nyan pa dang / sbyin pa dang / rab tu ston pa dang / mchod pa zhes bya ba rnam pa bcu rab tu sgrub pas nan tan byed pa de ni gnyen po'i phyogs zil gyis non par mi 'gyur bas ji skad bstan pa'i phan yon rnams ci'i phyir 'byung bar mi 'gyur te / ji ltar gtsug lag rnam pa gsum la brten nas goms par byas pas / skye ba dang / rga ba dang / na ba dang / [G161a] 'chi ba'i gnod pa dang bral ba'i bdud [P199b] rtsi'i go 'phang 'thob [thob PG] pa nges pa bzhin no //

gal te de ni bden na 'dra ba nyid ma yin te / gang gi phyir sde snod gsum du byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos sum cu rtsa bdun bstan pa rten [brten PG] du gyur pa de goms par byas pa las ni byang chub kyang rtogs par 'gyur zhing / nyon mongs pa zad pa yang rnyed dka' ba ma yin no //

theg pa chen po las yi ge dang don shes par mi rung ba'i gzungs sngags dang / gsang sngags dang / rig sngags la sogs pa phan yon mang po can byis [byas PG] pa'i skye bo slu bar byed pa bstan pa de rnams ni gzhan gyi rigs byed dang 'dra'o // bsgom pa med pa ni skyon phra rab tsam yang zad par byed nus pa ma yin te / nyon mongs pa bsags pa dang de'i rtsa ba yod na sdig pa zad pa ga la 'byung bar 'gyur / gzungs sngags kyis kyang sdig pa zhi bar byed pa ma yin [D183b] te / de'i rgyu [rgyud PG] dang mi 'gal ba nyid kyi phyir 'tshe ba la sogs pa bzhin no // de bzhin du gsang sngags kyis kyang sdig pa zad par byed pa ma yin te / skad gzhan gyis brjod pa'i phyir kla klo la sogs pa'i skad bzhin no zhes kyang smar bar nus so zhe na /

gang yang theg pa chen po'i gzungs sngags la sogs pa yi ge sbyar ba tsam du 'dod pa 'di la brjod par bya'o // re zhig gzungs sngags ni bsgom pa'i rnam pa nyid yin te / ji skad du *sgo mtha' yas* [G161b] *pa sgrub pa'i gzungs* las / gzungs 'di sgom par byed pa'i byang chub sems dpa' ni 'dus byas dang 'dus ma byas kyi chos rtog [rtogs DPG] par yang mi byed / len par yang mi byed / gnas par yang [PG om.] mi byed / mngon par zhen par mi byed / tha snyad 'dogs par yang mi byed / sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa 'ba' zhig sgom par byed do zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du *klu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo* las kyang / klu'i rgyal po [P200a] gang yang bstan pa thams cad ni mi zad pa ste / 'di ni mi zad pa'i za ma tog ces bya ba'i gzungs yin no // so so yang dag par rig [rigs PG] pa dang / ye shes dang / shes rab dang / spobs pa bzhi yang mi zad par rjes su 'byung ba dang / de bzhin du shin tu rtogs [rtog PG] par dka' ba dang / ngoms pa med pa'i brtson 'grus 'bar ba dang / mthar thug pa med pa dang / mthong ba med pa dang / rton pa med pa dang / dmod pa med pa dang / 'jigs pa med pa bzhi po rnams dang / snying po dang / nges par 'byed pa dang / snang ba dang / stobs kyi gter bzhi 'byung ba dang / de bzhin du gang yi ge'i lugs dang / ming dang / brda dang / chos

kyi brda'i rjes su 'jug pa de dag thams cad kyang mi zad pa'i za ma tog gi gzungs 'di'i rjes su zhugs pa'i byang chub sems dpas shes te / 'di lta ste / chos thams cad ni gdod [G162a] ma nas dag pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang / de bzhin du gzungs sngags 'di la gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa' ni yi ge kho [D184a] na las byang chub tshol bar byed / rjes su 'jug par byed de / yi ge ni stobs so // dgod pa ni lus so // chos kyi sgo la 'dzud pa'i mgo bo blta ba ni dpral ba'o // shes rab ni mig go zhes bya ba la sogs pas [PG om.] bsgom [sgom PG] pa'i rtsa ba ni shes rab yin la / shes rab yod pa'i phyir gti mug med par 'gyur ro // rtsa ba med na 'dod chags dang zhe sdang 'byung bar mi 'gyur te / rtsa ba dang 'gal ba yod pa'i phyir ro // des na rtsa ba dang 'gal ba med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i don ma grub pa yin no //

phyir rgol ba'i rtog ges kyang bsgrub [sgrub PG] par bya ba la gnod pa nyid de / gzungs sngags kyis ni sdig pa zhi bar 'gyur ba nyid yin te / bsgom pa'i rnam pa yod pa nyid kyi phyir de'i rtsa ba dang 'gal bar gyur pa nyid kyi mi sdug pa la sogs pa [P200b] bsgom pa bzhin no //

de bzhin du gsang sngags kyang de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes kyi gsang ba ston par byed pa'i sbas pa'i yi ge sbyar ba ngo bos bsgom pa la rab tu 'jug pa rgyud la gnas pas ji ltar 'dod pa'i bsam pa yang dag par sgrub par nus pa yin te / mthu chen po'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir dpag bsam gyi shing bzhin no //

rig [rigs PG] sngags kyang phal cher pha rol tu phyin pa drug dang / 'phags pa'i bden pa dang / byang [G162b] chub kyi phyogs kyi chos ston par byed pa'i yi ge dang don gyis nyon mongs pa zad par byed pa ston par byed pa nyid yin te / ji ltar śa ma ya śa ma ya / *da nte śā nte dha rma rā ja* [dha na te śan te dar ma rā ja PG] / *bha ṣi te ma he ma hā bī dya* [bha ṣi te ma he ma dha bid dye PG] / *sa rbā rtha sā dha na ni* [sa rba rtha sā da ni na PG] / zhes bya ba lta bu dang / de bzhin du chos kyi mchog las byung ba ni tā re / dang po'i chos las byung ba ni tu ttā re / brjod du med pa'i chos las byung ba ni tu re zhes bya ba lta bu ni mngon par rtogs pa gsal bar byed pa ste / bdag ma rig pa dang bral bar gyur pas gzhan dag gi rig pa yang bskyed par nus pa yin na de bsten [sten PG] par gyur na ci'i phyir sdig pa gzhi [bzhi D] dang bcas pa zhi bar mi 'gyur te / de'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i phyir byams pa la sogs pa bzhin no // rig pa'i tshig gang dag gi don rtogs par ma gyur pa ni de dag 'jig rten las 'das pa'i skad kyis bstan pa'i phyir dang / lha dang / klu dang / gnod sbyin la sogs pa'i skad kyis [D184b] bstan pa'i phyir ro // chos nyid ston par mi byed pa yang ma yin pas dam tshig rig pa dang / gzungs thob par gyur pa rnams kyi spyod yul yang yin te / ji skad du *gsang ba blo gros kyi mdo* las / gang 'di na sdug bsngal dang / kun 'byung ba dang / 'gog pa dang / lam zhes bya ba rnams la rgyal chen bzhi'i ris kyi lha rnams kyi [G om.] ni e ne dang / me ne dang / dam po dang [P201a] / da dam po zhes bya ba la sogs par brjod do zhes 'byung bas [ba P] 'jig rten pa'i don ston par byed pa bzod par dka' ba'i [G163a] nyon mongs pa bdo bas 'khrigs pa tsa *mu ṇḍa* [mun da PG] la sogs pa'i rig pa dag dang / sgrol ma la sogs pa'i don dam pa'i rig pa rnams 'dra ba lta ga la yin / des na dpe ma grub pa yin te / bsgrub [sgrub PG] par bya ba'i chos dang mi ldan pa'i phyir ro //

'di skad brjod par yang nus te / gzungs sngags dang / gsang sngags dang / rig sngags

rnams de bzhin gshegs pa'i man ngag bzhin du ngag tu brjod pa dang / bsams pa dang / bsgoms pas sdig pa rgyu dang bcas pa zhi bar byed pa yin te / lam dang rjes su mthun pa yin pa'i phyir mdo sde la sogs pa'i gsung rab bzhin no //

EVEN GREAT EVIL CAN BE UPROOTED

sdig pa shin tu chen po yang rtsa ba nas 'byin pa zhes bya ba yang mi rigs pa ma yin te / 'di ltar / las rnams bskal pa brgyar yang ni / chud mi za ba'ang zhes bya ba'i [ba yi PG] bskal pa brgyar yang zhes bya ba dang / 'ang [gang D] gi sgra gnyis pas ni nyams par 'gyur ba yang ston pa yin te / gang gis she [zhe PG] na / sdom par byed pa dang / gnyen po'i phyogs rnyed pa dang / sdig pa bshags pa dang / rten gyi stobs kyis rab tu 'thob pa yin te / ji skad du / byams pa chos bzhi dang ldan pa'i byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen pos ni sdig pa byas shing bsags pa yang zil gyis gnon par 'gyur te / bzhi gang zhe na / 'di lta ste / rnam par sun 'byin pa kun tu spyod pa ni / mi dge ba'i las gang byas pa de la 'gyod pa rab tu mang ba yin no // gnyen po kun tu spyod pa [G163b] ni mi dge ba'i las gang byas pa de dag ches shin tu mang ba'i dge ba'i las la sbyor ba'o // phyir mi ldog pa'i stobs ni sdom pa blangs pas mi byed pa'i sdom pa thob pa'o // [P201b] rten gyi [gyis PG] [D185a] stobs kyis [P om.] ni sangs rgyas dang / chos dang / dge 'dun la skyabs su 'gro zhing byang chub kyi sems mi 'dor ba ste / chos bzhi po 'di rnams dang ldan pa'i byang chub sems dpas ni sdig pa lhag [lhags P] ma ma lus par bral bar 'gyur zhing 'bras bu 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro zhes gsungs so //

las kyi sgrib pa rnam [*rnams* P] *par dag pa'i mdo* las / tshogs dang dus ni rnyed gyur nas / zhes bya ba ni ji ltar sa bon mthu ma nyams pa dang ldan pa la sa dang / chu dang / me dang / rlung dang / nam mkha'i rkyen rnams tshogs na dus ji lta ba bzhin du myu gu mngon par sgrub par byed do // rkyen nye bar gnas su zin kyang sa bon tshig [tshigs P] gam rul lam snad [gnad PG] pa las kyang ma yin la / rkyen gang yang rung ba zhig ma tshang ba na [PG add yang] myu gu mngon par 'byung bar 'gyur ba ma yin no // de bzhin du dge ba dang / mi dge ba'i las mthu ma nyams pa dang / phan pa byed pa dang / gnod pa byed pa'i sems can gyi 'gro ba dang / yul dang / lus kyi rkyen rnyed nas mthong ba'i chos dang / rnam grangs gzhan dang / skyes nas mngon bar nges pa'i dus thob par gyur na gang yang rung ba [P om.] zhig gi [gis PG] 'bras bu mngon par sgrub par byed kyi / gang gi tshe dge ba yang lta ba log pa dang / gnod sems kyis [kyi PG] nyams par gyur pa 'am mi dge ba yang dmod pa dang / sdom pa dang / 'chags [G164a] pa la sogs pa'i gnyen pos stobs nyams par gyur pa de dag ni rkyen tshogs pa yod du zin kyang dge ba dang / mi dge ba'i sa bon gyi nus pa nyams gang las 'bras bu gang zhig 'byung bar 'gyur /

rkyen tshogs pa med pas dus gang gzhan du gyur na / ji ltar na rtsa ba nas shin tu 'byin pa yang ma yin te / ji skad du dam pa'i chos 'dzin par byed pa de'i myong bar nges pa'i sdig pa yang mthong ba'i chos la myong bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba dang / gzhan yang gang yang ngan [P202a] 'gror 'gro ba'i las rnams de / 'dir ni mgo bo tsha ba tsam du 'gyur

/ zhes kyang ’byung ngo //

gal te mgo bo tsha ba tsam du ’gyur ba’i ’bras bu yod na rtsa ba nas phyung ba ji ltar yin zhe na /

sdig pa’i las rnams kyi ’bras bu ma lus par rdzogs pa dmyal ba’i sdug [D185b] bsngal nyams su myong bar ’gyur ba las gang dag gis dmyal ba’i sdug bsngal phra mo tsam yang nyams su myong bar ma gyur pa de nyid shin tu rtsa ba nas phyung ba ji ltar ma yin / mgo bo tsha ba la sogs pa ’di la ’byung bas ’bras bu ye med par ’byung ba yang ji ltar yin /

gal te sdig pa shin tu zad par ’gyur ba yin na / ci’i phyir sngon gyi las kyi rnam par smin pa [par PG] ni ma gtogs so zhes bstan ce na /

dmus long dang / mig gcig pa dang / zha bo dang / theng po dang / lkugs [lkug PG] pa dang / ’on pa la sogs pa’i ngo bo nyid du gyur pa’i rgyud ’bras bu nye bar longs spyod pa las dgongs nas bstan [G164b] pa yin te / gang gi phyir rnam par smin pa’i gnas skabs kyi ngo bor gyur pa’i las rnams kyi ’bras bu ni yongs su zad par nus pa yod pa ma yin no // rgyur gyur pa’i sems pas mngon par ’dus byas pa ni sems pa’i khyad par gzhan thob pa na [ni PG] yongs su zad par ’gyur ba yin te / ji ltar sor mo’i phreng ba dang / ma skyes dgra dang / sva ka dang / pha [phag DPG] gsod pa dang / mya ngan med pa la sogs pa dag la brten pa bzhin no //

gal te ma skyes dgra dang / ma gsod pa dag la dge ba’i sems pa gzhan skyes pa yod bzhin du ci’i phyir las zad par ma gyur nas mnar med pa dag tu skyes she na /

de’i las dang ’bras bu yid ches pa bskyed pa’i phyir mnar med pa la sogs par skye ba bstan pa yin gyi / las rnams lhag [lhags G] ma ma lus par ma zad pa ni ma yin te / dar gyi pho long brdabs pa las ’phar ba bzhin du der skyes shing thar pa yin [P202b] la / dmyal ba’i me’i phreng ba la sogs pas kyang reg pa ma yin te / de ltar sdig pa shin tu rtsa ba nas ’byin par yang grub la / las la ’bras bu med pa yang ma yin no //

theg pa chen po rig pa rnams ’di snyam du sems te / gnyen po thob par gyur na ni las rnams shin tu rtsa ba nas ’byin gyi [te PG] / gnyen pos zil gyis ma mnan pa ni nyams par mi ’gyur ro snyam ste / ji ltar thabs la mkhas pa dang mi ldan pa la ni sdig pa chung ngu yang rnam par smin par [G165a] ’gyur bar mthong ste / maud gal gyi bu chen po la sogs pa bzhin no // dge ba’i rtsa ba chen po bsags su zin na [D186a] yang yid kyi nyes pas thal ba bzhin du byed de / ji ltar de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad zil gyis gnon pa’i bstan pa la zhal lta [ta D] byed pa’i dge slong bzhin no // des ni sngon dgra bcom pa chen po rnams kyi bsnyen bkur dang por [po PG] byas pa las phyis ’dod pa mi bzad pas zil gyis mnan te / tshogs [chos PG] gyi dkor [dgor P] brkus shing sdang bar gyur pa’i yid kyis khros pa’i tshig dag gis kyang gshes [shes P] te / de las des mi gtsang ba za ba’i srin bu shin tu gdon par dka’ ba’i gnas su skyes shing dge ba’i rtsa ba yang cung zad tsam yang ma lus par gyur te [to PG] / rtogs pa brjod pa las kyang byang chub sems dpa’ la sogs pa thabs la mkhas pa’i stobs dang ldan pa rnams kyis ni mi dge ba’i phung po chen po yang shin tu zad par byed cing / dge ba’i rtsa ba chung ngu thob pa yang nyams par mi ’gyur ro zhes gsungs pa dang / mdo sde las kyang ji skad du / dge slong dag ’di lta ste / skyes bu

zhig gis chu nyung ngu zhig tu lan tshva srang gcig blugs na de ni btung du mi rung bar 'gyur ro // de nas skyes bu gzhan zhig gis chu shin tu chen po'i nang du lan tshva srang gcig blugs na de ni shes par yang mi 'gyur na yang de btung du mi rung bar ga la 'gyur / de ci'i [P203a] phyir zhe na / dge slong dag chu [G165b] shin tu mang po'i phyir ro // dge slong dag de bzhin du gang 'di ltar skyes bu gang zag 'ga' zhig sdig pa'i las byed pa *de dag* [P om.] de nyid phyogs gnyis po 'di la gnas pa yod pa yin no // de bzhin du /

rdzing chen nang du tshva ni srang gcig blugs //
ji ltar chu de btung du mi 'dod min //
khyor gang chu la tshva ni srang gcig blugs //
khyor gang chu de btung du 'dod mi 'gyur //
de bzhin gang gis bsod nams rgya chen bsags //
mi de sdig pa'i dug ni chung gyur pas //
gang phyir ngan 'gro dag tu 'khrid mi nus //
sgo de nas ni 'bras bu 'ga' zhig yin //
gang dag bsod nams chung ngu ma bsags shing //
mi dge mang du yang yang bsags pa'i mi //
the tshom med par shin tu chung bas kyang //
nyon mongs de ni 'og tu 'khrid par byed //

ces gsungs te / mi 'phrod pa'i zas cung [nyung PG] zad cig zos pa bzhin du'o [du PG] zhes bya'o [bya ba'o PG] //

gal te de ltar sems dang po bskyed [D186b] pa nyid kyis kyang las thams cad zad par 'gyur ba yin na / mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i bcom ldan 'das la seng ldeng gi tshal pas zug pa dang / mdzes ma bsad pa dang / dregs mas skur pa [ba PG] btab pa dang / lhung bzed ji ltar bkrus pa bzhin du phyir gshegs pa dang / zla ba gsum du nas kyis [kyi PG] chos ston mdzad pa dang / ba ra dva dza khros pas ngan du smra ba dang / bsnyung [snyung PG] bar gyur pa dang / *lha sbyin* [lhas byin PG] gyis rdo'i sgyogs 'phangs pa la sogs pa'i las kyi rnam par smin pa'i cha mnga' bar gyur pa ji lta bu zhe na /

'di dag [G166a] thams cad ni thabs la mkhas pas sems can gdul bar mdzad pa'i phyir bstan pa yin gyi / bcom ldan 'das la ni 'phrin [phrin D] las kyi cha shin tu phra ba yang mi mnga' ste / ji ltar *thabs la mkhas pa'i mdo* dang / *'jig rten las 'das pa'i le'u* las / [P203b] rigs kyi bu de bzhin gshegs pas las kyi rnam par smin pa bcu bstan pa 'di dag ni thabs la mkhas pa dang ldem dgongs kyi bka' yin par rtogs par bya'o // 'di ni gnas ma yin zhing skabs med de / ji srid skra'i rtse mos gzugs pa'i tshad kyis bstan pa tsam gyis [gyi PG] mi dge ba'i rtsa ba dang ldan par gyur pa'i byang chub sems dpa' yang byang chub kyi shing drung du 'jug pa ni gnas ma yin par shes te / dge ba'i chos thams cad dang ldan par gyur pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa mi dge ba thams cad spangs par gyur pa / bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba dang bcas pa yang spangs pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa la las kyi sgrib pa'i skyon lta 'byung bar ga la 'gyur / 'on kyang sems can phal cher las kyi rnam par smin pa chud

gson [son PG] pa dang / las kyi rnam par smin pa la yid mi ches pa de rnams la las kyi rnam par smin pa bstan par bya ba'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pas phrin las kyi rnam par smin pa bstan te / chos kyi rgyal po nga la yang re zhig las kyi rnam par smin pa 'byung na / khyed rnams la lta las kyi rnam par smin [G166b] pa ci'i phyir mi 'byung zhes bstan pa yin gyi [gyis PG] / de bzhin gshegs pa la las kyi sgrib pa ni cung zhig kyang mi mnga' ste / 'di ltar legs par bslabs pa'i sman pa bdag nyid la nad med bzhin du [D187a] yang na ba ltar bstan nas sman kha ba dang tsha ba dag bstan par byas pas de'i rjes su slob pa'i nad pa dag yongs su sos par byed pa de bzhin du de bzhin gshegs pa sman pa'i rgyal po gnod pa thams cad zhi bar mdzad pas kyang sgrib pa mi mnga' na yang nga'i las 'di'i rnam [rnams P] par smin pa ni 'di'o zhes phrin las ston par mdzad de / ji ltar na sems can rnams las kyis 'jigs shing skrag par gyur na / lus dang ngag dang yid rnams yongs su dag par 'gyur // zhes kyang gsungs so // *thabs la mkhas pa'i mdo* la [P204a] sogs pa 'khor ba grol bar byed pa dang 'dra ba yang ma yin te / sems gti mug med pa la sogs pas kun nas bslang ba'i phyir ro //

gang gzhan dag mtshams med pa byed pa la mngon par phyogs pa mthong nas de ni las des yun ring du sdug bsngal bar 'gyur ro snyam nas snying rje'i dbang gis de gsod par byed pa ni bdag nyid dmyal bar skye bar nges par shes kyang de bskyab [skyab PG] pa'i phyir dge ba 'am / lung du ma bstan pa'i sems la gnas par byas nas gsod par byed de / bdag nyid dmyal bar skye ba ni 'dod kyi / 'di sdug bsnyal chen po dang yun ring du ldan par ma gyur cig ces bya ba de [G167a] lta bu dge ba'i sems kyis [kyi PG] kun nas bslang ba nyid ni dge ba yin te / gang gi phyir ma chags pa la sogs pa'i sems dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i phyir ro //

gal te ma chags pa la sogs pas kun nas bslang ba'i srog gcod pa yang smad pa zhig yin na ni gshe ba dang mdza' ba dbye ba la sogs pa yang bkag par 'gyur ba zhig na /

'di lta ste / bcom ldan 'das kyis *'char ka* dang *kim pa* la sogs pa'i mdo las gshe ba ma bkag ste / ji skad du rmongs pa *lha sbyin* [lhas byin PG] zhes bya ba dang / bdud sdig can de zhes gsungs pas so // yang snying rje'i dbang gis byang chub sems dpa' [dpas PG] srog gcod pa ni smad [dmad PG] par bya ba ma yin te / zhe sdang gi bsam pas bskyed pa ma yin pa'i phyir / de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs pa'i tshig bzhin no zhes kyang smra bar nus so //

rin chen tog dang *zla ba'i sgron ma* la sogs pa'i [pa PG] [D187b] theg pa chen po'i mdo sde mang po las kyang sdig pa shin tu chen po yang rtsa ba nas 'byin par bstan la / [PG add mdo las] sde pa gzhan dag gi [gis PG] mdo las kyang *phyi ma'i* [kya sa'i P] dus na dge slong rnams bsam pa ji lta bus 'dir ni de bzhin gshegs pa bltams par [P204b] *'gyur ro* [gyur pa'o PG] // 'dir ['di PG] ni de bzhin gshegs pa mngon par byang chub pa'o // 'dir ni de bzhin gshegs pas chos kyi 'khor lo bskor bar gyur pa'o // 'dir ni de bzhin gshegs pas yongs su mya ngan las 'das par gyur to zhes [G167b] mchod rten rnams la phyag byed cing rgyu bar 'gyur ba de dag ni bar ma dor dus byas par gyur na yang khur lci ba bor ba bzhin du bde 'gro mtho ris kyi 'jig rten lha rnams kyi nang du skye bar 'gyur te / srid pa tha ma pa ma gtogs [rtogs PG] pa gzhan mtshams med pa byas pa yang bsal zhing [cing PG] bor ba med do //

gzhan yang khyod nyid kyi lta ba'i 'dul ba las ltung ba las ldang bar bstan pa dag dang yang 'gal te / de las ni gang zag rnam pa gnyis ni ltung ba med par dus byas par 'gyur te / gang ltung ba ye mi 'byin pa dang ltung ba byung ba rnams chos ji lta ba [bu PG] bzhin du 'chags par byed pa'o zhes gsungs pas so // rigs [rig PG] pa yang yod de / gang dang gang cung zad zad par 'gyur ba de dang de ni rim gyis shin tu zad par 'gyur ba mthong ste / stobs dang ldan pa'i thabs rnyed par gyur pa'i phyir / dper na chu'i nang du bzhag pa'i lan tshva bzhin du 'am / me'i nang du bzhag pa'i mar sar bzhin no // gzhan yang de lta bas na gang thabs shes par gyur pa des ni bskal pa dpag tu med pa stong du bsags par gyur pa'i sdig pa yang lhag ma ma lus par zad par byed de / gnyen po'i phyogs stobs dang ldan pa'i phyir / legs par rab tu 'bar ba'i mar me byung ma thag tu shin tu mun nag du gyur pa'i gnas kyi mun pa'i sgrib pa med par 'gyur ba bzhin no // thabs dang bral bar gyur pa'i dge ba yang shin tu zad par 'gyur te / mtshan mo nyi ma'i [G168a] snang ba med pa bzhin no // yang gang dang gang nyin re zhing sogs pa yod pa de dang de ni 'phel bar 'gyur ba nyid yin gyi [gyis PG] nyams par mi 'gyur te / ji ltar sbrang rtsi byed pa'i sbrang ma'i [P205a] sbrang rtsi bzhin du 'am ['ang P] / yar gyi [D188a] ngo'i zla ba'i gzugs bzhin te / las kyis [kyi PG] nyams par 'gyur ba dang / nyams par mi 'gyur ba yang rgyu la ltos pa yin gyi / ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] grub pa ni ma yin no // de lta bas na sdig pa shin tu mi bzad pa byas pa yang bdag nyid kyis 'gyod cing dmad pa dang / bshags shing bsgrags pa dang / phyin cad bsdams [bsdam PG] pa byas pas bsrabs par 'gyur zhing rtsa ba nas ' byin par 'gyur ba 'di ni grub pa yin no //

The Vaipulya Has a Different Teaching

gang yang shin tu rgyas pa yang gzhan nyid ston pa'i phyir zhes zer ba yang don gyi rjes su zhugs pa'i ming gis shin tu rgyas pa'i ngo bo nyid ni shin tu rgyas pa zhes bya ba yin pas theg pa chen po lhag par shin tu rgyas pa [P add zhes bya ba yin pas theg pa chen po lhag par shin tu rgyas pa] yin pa de bzhin du nyan thos kyi [kyis PG] theg pa la ni yod pa ma yin no // gal te khyod shin tu rgyas pa gzhan zhig 'dod na ni ming tsam du 'dod la rag go // bdag cag ni theg pa chen po'i gsung rab ma lus pa rnams ni gzhung dang don shin tu rgyas pa'i phyir shin tu rgyas pa zhes bya ba 'dod de / bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang 'di ni shin tu rgyas pa'o // 'di ni ma yin no zhes nges par dbye ba mdzad pa ni mi mnga' bas theg pa chen [G168b] po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa yin no zhes brjod pa la [PG om.] yid rab tu sdang bar gyur pa khyod kyis [kyi PG] gang smra ba de ni kho bo cag la tshad mar gyur pa ma yin pas des na theg pa chen po 'di ni shin tu rgyas pa nyid yin par grub po //

The Mahāyāna Is Not Mentioned in the Dream of King Kṛkin

gal te bcom ldan 'das 'od srungs la rgyal po *kṛ kīs* [kri kis G] rmi lam gsol pa na / bka' stsal pa / skye dgu'i tshe lo brgya thub pa na de bzhin gshegs pa shā kya thub pa zhes

bya ba 'byung ba de'i bstan pa la sde pa bco brgyad du gyes par 'gyur ro zhes bstan pa'i dbye bar theg pa chen po ma bstan to zhe na /

theg pa chen po ni nges par zab cing rgya che [P205b] ba la mos pa'i sems can gyi bsam pa dang lhag pa'i bsam pa'i dbang du byas nas sde pa bco brgyad la thun mong du bstan pa yin te / gtsug lag gi gsung rab rnams las skye ba dang / na tshod dang / mdog dang / yul dang / dus tha dad pa med par bstan pa bzhin no //

yang na sangs rgyas thams cad kyi bstan pa la nyan thos kyi theg pa dang / rang sangs rgyas kyi [D188b] theg pa dang / theg pa chen po'i dbye ba ni yod pa kho na yin la / bstan pa tha dad kyi dbye ba ni shā kya thub pa kho na la yod kyi gzhan la ni ma yin zhing / log pa [par DPG] dang sel la sogs pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyis kyang theg pa tha dad du dbye ba mdzad pa ni yod pa yin pas [PG add yang] 'od srungs kyis ma bstan pa yin no // de'i phyir na theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung ma [G169a] yin pa ma yin no //

bcom ldan 'das yongs su mya ngan las 'das nas ring po ma lon par nyan thos la sogs pa rang [PG add rang] la gsungs pa la yongs su zhen cing / de ched du byed pa'i sdud pa po yis ji ltar dbang ba bzhin du yang dag par bsdus pa na theg pa chen po'i gsung rab ni snod [gnod PG] du gyur pa su yang med pas gang gis kyang ma bsdus te / bde bar gshegs pa la mngon par dga' ba'i klu la sogs pa rnams kyis yongs su bsdus nas klu'i 'jig rten *dang lha* [PG om.] la sogs par bzhugs su gsol ba las de'i snod du gyur pas sangs rgyas kyis [kyi PG] lung bstan pa 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis de dag nas bsdus nas mi'i 'jig rten du rab tu rgyas par mdzad pa yin no //

rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob par 'gyur ba dang / rjes su mthun pa'i theg pa chen po'i bstan pa ni bdud kyi spyod yul ma yin pas de'i phyir theg pa chen po ring du spong bar byed cing sun 'byin pa ni rigs pa ma yin no // blos dpyod par nus pa yod na rigs pa dang rigs pas de brtag par [P206a] gyis shig /

shin tu spros pas chog go // skabs su bab pa nyid kyi dbang du byas te /

> 4.36 sarvajñāptaye mārgaḥ samyagdṛṣṭipuraḥsaraḥ /
> yasmād ukto mahāyāne tasmād dhetor asiddhatā //

> thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob pa'i lam // yang dag lta ba sngon 'gro ba //
> gang phyir theg chen las gsungs pa // de phyir gtan tshigs ma grub nyid //

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa dang / *byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod* dang / *blo gros mi zad* [*bzad* P] *pa* dang / *blo gros rgya mtsho* dang / [G169b] *nam mkha' mdzod* dang / *gzungs kyi dbang phyug rgyal po* dang / *gtsug na rin chen* dang / *rgya mtshos zhus pa* la sogs pa theg pa chen po'i mdo sde phal che ba las yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa lam 'di dag nyid yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rgyur bstan gyi / lam gzhan nyid bstan pa ni med pas de'i phyir lam [D189a] gzhan nyid nye bar ston pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid yin no //

'dir gang gā la sogs pa'i 'bab stegs su khrus byas pa dang / smyung [snyung PG] bar gnas pa la sogs pa'am / gzhan bstan pa ma yin nam zhe na /

bden te gang gā dang / sin dhu dang / pa kṣu dang / sī ta [shī ta D] zhes bya ba chu bo bzhi rnams kyi chu la bkrus pa dang / 'thungs pa dang / de'i nang du bzhugs [zhugs P] pa dang / de'i nang du gnas pa la sogs pa ni [D om.] byang chub sems dpa'i smon lam gi dbang gis gsungs pa yin gyi / chu la sdig pa la sogs pa zad par byed pa'i nus pa yod pa ma yin te / 'di ltar *ma dros pa'i mdo* las / klu'i rgyal po ma dros pas las dang [PG om.] skye ba la dbang thob pa yongs su bzung nas / pa na sa zhes bya ba'i mtshe'u chen po'i nang du skye ba blangs par gyur te / de'i smon lam ni gang srog chags gang dang [PG om.] gang dag gis bdag gi [gis PG] mtshe'u 'di las 'bab ['ba' P] par gyur pa'i chu klung rnams la *khrus byas* [bkrus PG] pa dang / 'thungs pa dang / zhugs nas gnas par byed pa de rnams la / de dag nyid [P206b] de rnams kyi byang chub kyi rgyur gyur la / de dag thams cad kyang rim gyis bdag gis sangs rgyas nyid [G170a] la 'god par gyur cig ces gsungs pa yin pas / de dag nyid dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyis yongs su bzung nas sangs rgyas su 'gyur ba la 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no // smyung [snyung PG] ba la sogs pa yang rig sngags spyod pa'i lus la sogs pa yongs su sbyangs nas / rig sngags bsgrub par bya ba'i phyir gsungs pa yin gyi [gyis PG] grol bar 'dod pa'i phyir ni ma yin no // ci ltar de lam gzhan yin / des na gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyi skyon bzlog par dka' ba yin no //

de ltar ni bden na yang theg pa chen por lam de dag nyid bstan kyang 'bras bu med pa yin te / sdug bsngal shes pas mya ngan las mi 'da' bas / sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i bden pa mthong ba dang 'gal ba la sogs pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

de lta na ni dang por khyod kyis ston pa'i bka' 'di blta bar bya ba yin te / de yang gang 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi'i mnyam pa nyid gang yin pa de rnam par byang ba yin no zhes gsungs [D189b] pa'o // yang mnyam pa nyid gang zhe na / chos thams cad stong pa nyid yin te / dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir ro // sdug bsngal la sogs pa rnams kyi stong pa nyid dpyad pa ni 'di yin te /

4.37 duḥkhotpattinirodhokter nājātaṃ duḥkham iṣyate /
jātaṃ duḥkhasvabhāvena śūnyaṃ tat kiṃ na gṛhyate //

sdug bsngal skye ba bkag bstan pas // ma skyes sdug bsngal yin mi 'dod //
skyes pa sdug bsngal ngo bo na // de stong ci'i [ci yi D] phyir khas [D om.] mi len //

bdag dang gzhan dang gnyi ga dang / rgyu med pa las skye ba [G170b] bkag pas ma skyes pa la sdug bsngal gyi bden pa ji ltar gzung [bzung PG] bar bya / rgyu dang rkyen las kun tu byung zhing [zhin PG] skyes par mthong ba'i phung po lnga po'i rnam [rnams PG] pa 'di dag ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa yin no zhes ci'i phyir nges par gzung [P207a] bar mi bya zhes bya ba 'di lta bu ni phyogs yin no //

yang gtan tshigs dang dpe ni /

4.38ab saṃskṛtatvād yathā māyā skandhā vānāsravā yathā /

'dus byas yin phyir sgyu ma 'am // zag med phung po ji bzhin no //

skye ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsngal ni ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa'o zhes bya ba ni tshig lhag ma'o // de lta bas na 'di dag ni ngo bo nyid kyis /

4.38cd duḥkhasatyamatiḥ kiṃ te samyagdarśamatir matā //

khyod kyi sdug bsngal bden 'dod [G om.] pa // yang dag lta ba'i blos 'dod pa //

bslu ba med pa ni bden pa yin par rigs kyi sdug bsngal gyi ngo bo cung zhig yod pa ni ma yin no // 'di ni ngo bo *nyid stong pa* [PG om.] nyid kyis bslu ba med pa yin pas / 'di ni sdug bsngal gyi bden pa nyid do zhes yang dag par blta bar bya'o zhes bya ba'i [ba ni PG] blo gang la yod pa de ni yang dag lta ba'i blo yin na [PG om.] / de gang gi phyir bslu ba med pa yin par 'dod /

gzhan yang /

4.39ab duḥkhā ca vedanā duḥkhaṃ jātyāder duḥkhatā katham /

tshor ba sdug bsngal sdug bsngal yin // skye sogs sdug bsngal nyid ci ltar //

gang skyes pa na bral bar 'dun pa 'byung ba'i nyams su myong ba'i sdug bsngal 'di ma yin pa nyams su myong ba gzhan skye ba dang / rga ba dang / na ba dang / 'chi ba dang / mya ngan la sogs pa rnams ci'i phyir sdug bsngal yin /

4.39cd vināśas tasya duḥkhaṃ ca duḥkhatvaṃ hetumārgayoḥ //

mi rtag phyir na sdug bsngal na // rgyu dang lam yang sdug bsngal nyid //

gang dang gang mi rtag pa de dang de sdug [G171a] bsngal yin na kun 'byung ba dang lam yang sdug bsngal nyid yin par thal bar 'gyur ro // de ltar na ni sdug bsngal dang 'gog pa zhes bya ba bden pa gnyis su 'gyur ro //

4.40ab hetutvataś ced syād duḥkhaṃ duḥkhaṃ samudayo bhavet //

sdug bsngal rgyu yin phyir zhe na // kun 'byung sdug bsngal nyid du 'gyur //

gang gi phyir skye ba la sogs pa rnams [D190a] sdug bsngal nyams su myong ba'i rgyur gyur pa *rnams kyang sdug bsngal nyid yin par* [yin pas D] rgyu la 'bras bu nye bar

btags nas skye ba la sogs pa yang sdug bsngal nyid du ’dod do zhe na / gang dang gang [P207b] sdug bsngal nyams su myong ba’i rgyur gyur pa de dang de sdug bsngal zhes bya ba ni / ma rig pa dang / sred pa dang las rnams la kun ’byung zhes bya ba’i sdug bsngal nyams su myong ba’i rgyur gyur pa rnams kyang sdug bsngal nyid du thal bar ’gyur ro // de ltar gyur na ni sdug bsngal nyid dang / ’gag [’gog PG] pa dang / lam zhes bya ba bden pa gsum du ’gyur ro //

gzhan yang /

4.40cd vākyatvāc cāpi duḥkhasya tajjñānaṃ duḥkhadhīḥ katham //

sdug bsngal nyid ni tshig tsam phyir // de shes ci [ji P] ltar sdug bsngal shes //

btags pa dang tshig tsam dang kun rdzob dang nye bar btags pa zhes bya ste / tshig tsam du nye bar btags pa nyid ni tshig tsam zhes bya ba’i tshig go // skye ba la sogs pa rnams ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] sdug bsngal ma yin yang / tshig tsam du tha snyad kyis nye bar btags nas sdug bsngal zhes rjod [brjod PG] par byed na ni gang dang gang skye ba la sogs pa sdug bsngal shes pa [PG om.] de dang de yang nye bar btags pa ma [pa PG] yin gyi / yang dag pa [PG add pa] ma yin pas de bden pa nyid du ji [G171b] ltar ’gyur /

de lta bu’i sdug bsngal la sogs pa shes pa ni don ji lta ba bzhin ma yin par tshad mas kyang bsgrub par bya ste /

4.41 na duḥkhaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tattvataḥ satyam iṣyate /
duḥkhatas tatparijñānād yathā vedhādiduḥkhadhīḥ //

sdug bsngal yul can shes pa de // de nyid du na bden pa min //
sdug bsngal nyid du de shes phyir // phug sogs sdug bsngal blo bzhin no //

’di ni sdug bsngal lo zhes gang shes pa skye bar ’gyur ba de ni yang dag pa nyid du bden pa ma yin te / des sdug bsngal gyi rnam par yongs su shes pa’i phyir dper na dmyal ba pa [PG om.] ’am / gang g.yul du zhugs pa rnams mda’ dang / mdung dang / ral gyi rnon pos phug cing bcad pa dang / *bsnun pa* [sgyogs PG] la sogs pas gsnad par byas pa la sogs pa’i bde ba’i mi mthun par gyur pa’i sdug bsngal de lta bu dang ldan pa’i blo bzhin no //

de ltar sdug bsngal gyi bden pa bkag nas ’byung gyi bden pa dgag par brtsam par bya ste / [P208a]

4.42 hetur na duḥkhahetutvād yuktaḥ samudayātmakaḥ /
yathā khaḍgābhighātādi caittatvād vāpi mārgavat //

rgyu ni sdug bsngal rgyu nyid du // mi rigs kun ’byung bdag nyid phyir //

ral gris gshags [bshags PG] sogs bzhin [D190b] du 'am // sems 'byung yin phyir lam bzhin no //

ma rig pa dang / sred pa dang / las [lus PG] zhes bya ba gang rnams sdug bsngal gyi rgyur 'dod pa de rnams ni 'di dag kun tu 'byung ba'i phyir kun 'byung yin na [no PG] zhes bya bar mi rigs te / sdug bsngal gyi rgyur gyur pa yin pa'i phyir / ral gris gshags [bshags G] pa la sogs pa sdug bsngal gyi rgyur gyur pa bzhin no // yang na kun 'byung yang sems las byung ba yin pa'i phyir / 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa sdug bsngal 'byung ba'i rgyu ma [G172a] yin pa bzhin no //

de bzhin du /

4.43 na duḥkhahetuviṣayā duḥkhādyākārabodhataḥ /
matis tathyā matā yadvat tadanyā duḥkhahetudhīḥ //

sdug bsngal rgyu yi yul can gyi // blo de brdzun [rdzun PG] pa nyid du 'dod // rgyu sogs rnam par rtog [rtogs PG] pa'i phyir // sdug bsngal rgyu yi blo can bzhin //

gang dang gang sdug bsngal gyi rgyu'i yul can gyi blo yin pa de dang de ni yang dag par bden pa ma yin te / sdug bsngal gyi rgyus sdug bsngal rab tu 'byung ba yin no zhes des rtogs pa'i phyir dper na ral gris gshags pa la sogs pa la 'di ni sdug bsngal gyi rgyu yin no zhes rtog pa'i blo bzhin no //

kun 'byung ba rab tu bkag nas 'gog pa'i bden pa dgag par bya ba'i phyir /

4.44ab ajāte na nirodho 'sti prāguktapratiṣedhataḥ /

skye med 'gag pa yod min te // sngar smras pa yi dgag pa nyid //

ces bya ba smras te / sngar bstan bcos 'di nyid du skye ba thams cad re zhig bkag pas de'i phyir ma skyes pa la 'gag pa yang med par rab tu bsgrubs [bsgrub PG] pa yin te / de med na yang dag par ni 'gog pa nyid kyang yod pa ma yin na de bden pa'i don yin par lta ga la 'gyur / de lta bas na /

4.44cd jāter niṣedhān nājāteḥ khapuṣpasyeva yujyate //

skyes pa 'gags ['gag PG] na ma skyes la // nam mkha'i me tog bzhin mi rigs //

skyes pa nyid ni kun rdzob tu 'gag pa'i rgyur gyur pa yin te / kong bu dang snum dang [P208b] sdong bu la sogs pa tshogs pa las mar me 'byung la / rkyen dang bral bar gyur pa las 'gog par mthong ba bzhin no // yang na nam mkha'i me tog la sogs pa rnams ni

skye ba med pas ’gag pa yang med pa nyid du bstan pa yin te / de’i phyir na ma skyes pa la ’gag pa yod par ga la ’gyur /

gzhan yang /

4.45 niruddhaś ca nirodhaḥ syāt so ‘jāto janmanā yadā /
neṣyate kiṃ tadā vidvān tvam anyaṃ satyato vada //

gang tshe skye [G172b] bas de ma skyes // ’gog pa nyid kyis ’gog yin par /
mi ’dod de tshe mkhas pa khyod // ci zhig bden par yod pa smros //

skyes par [D191a] gyur pa’i dngos po’i ’gag par ’gyur ba la ’gag pa zhes bya ba yin pas dngos po nyams par ’gyur ba la [PG om.] ’gag pa zhes bya ba’i tshig tu brjod par gyur [’gyur PG] na / gang de skye ba nyid du ma skyes par bdag gis bsgrubs zin pa ste [de PG] / kye mkhas par nga rgyal byed pa khyod de la ci zhig yang dag par bden pa nyid du yod pa de smra dgos so //

yang na skye ba med kyang de kho na nyid du ’gog pa khyod ’dod na de lta bu de ’gegs par byed pa’i rjes su dpag par byed pa bya ba nyid de /

4.46 naivājātanirodho ‘pi nirodhaḥ paramārthataḥ /
anutpannanirodhatvād aprasaṃkhyānirodhavat //

ma skyes pa yi ’gog pa yang // yang dag tu na ’gog pa min //
ma skyes pa yi ’gog yin phyir // so sor brtags [rtags PG] min ’gog pa bzhin //

gang ’gog la mi ’bral ba de ni so sor brtags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa yin la / de ni bden pa ma yin te / shes rab kyis [kyi PG] mngon [sngon PG] du ma byas na yang ngo bo nyid kyis skad cig ma’i ’jig [’jigs D] pas ’jig pa’i ’dus byas thams cad kyi ’gog pa yod pas so // gang shes rab kyis [kyi PG] so sor brtags nas ’gog pa thob pa de dag [PG om.] ni so sor brtags pa’i ’gog pa ste / des ni ’bral bar byed pa yin pas yang dag pa yin te / shes rab sngon du song ba’i phyir ro // de dag gnyi ga yang skye ba med pa’i ngo bo nyid la ’gog pa yin par brtags [G173a] pa yin [D om.] de la ni so sor brtags [P209a] pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa bzhin du so sor brtags pa’i ’gog pa yang don dam pa pa ma yin no zhes rig par bya ba yin no //

de ltar ’gog pa’i bden pa bkag nas lam gyi bden pa yang dgag par bya ba’i phyir /

4.47 nirodhāsambhavād eva kiṃ mārgo mārgate tava /
ajātaś ca kathaṃ mārgas tasya kiṃ prāpayiṣyati //

’gog pa ngo bo nyid med na // khyod kyi lam gyis ci zhig len //
ma skyes lam yang ji ltar yin // gang gis ci zhig thob par byed //

’gog pa thob par byed pa’i rgyu ni lam yin par ’dod na gang gi tshe de ltar brtags [brtag D] par byas pa na ’gog pa’i ngo bo nyid kyang yod pa ma yin pa de’i tshe ci zhig tshol zhing thob par byed na lam zhes bya ba’i sgra rjod par byed / lam ’di yang rang gi ngo bor ma skyes pas ma skyes pa’i rnal ’byor gang gis ma skyes pa’i ’gog pa’i bden pa gang zhig ’thob par ’gyur /

tshad mas kyang ’di ltar bsgrub [bsgrubs PG] ste [te PG] /

4.48 nāpavargāptaye mārgaḥ saṃskṛtatvāt tadanyavat /
nirodhālambanatvād vā yathetaranirodhadhīḥ //

lam gyi ngan grol thob min te // ’dus byas yin phyir gzhan bzhin nam //
’gog pa la ni dmigs pa’i phyir // de las gzhan pa’i ’gog pa bzhin //

ngan pa zhes bya ba ni smad [dmad PG] pa ste / ’dod pa dang / [D191b] gzugs dang / gzugs med pa’i khams la brten pa’i sems so // spangs pa’i phyir ngan grol te thar ba’o [pa’o PG] // de thob par ’gyur ba’i rgyu ni lam ma yin te / ’dus byas yin pa’i phyir dge ba bcu zhes bya ba mtho ris kyi lam bzhin nam / ’gog pa mngon du bya ba’i phyir goms par byed pa’i lam ’di ni ’gog pa la dmigs par byed pa nyid yin pas ’gog pa la dmigs pa yin pa’i [G173b] phyir so sor brtags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa’i [G add ’gog pa’i] blo bzhin no //

yang dag pa’i lta ba la sogs pa’i lam rnams so sor dgag par bya ba’i phyir /

4.49 sāmānyālambanatvād vā saṃskṛtatvād athāpi vā /
duḥkhādidarśanaṃ mithyā mithyājñānavad iṣyatām //

spyi la dmigs pa yin phyir ram // ’dus byas yin phyir de bzhin du //
sdug bsngal la sogs mthong ba brdzun // brdzun pa’i shes pa bzhin du ’dod //

ces bya ba [P209b] smras te / gang sdug bsngal yang sdug bsngal nyid du / kun ’byung yang kun ’byung nyid du / ’gog pa yang ’gog pa nyid du shes pa ni yang dag pa’i lta ba yin no // de la sdug bsngal la sogs pa mthong ba zhes bya ba ni chos can no // de’i chos brdzun pa nyid ni bsgrub par bya ba’o // mi rtag pa dang / bdag med pa dang / stong pa la sogs pa spyi la dmigs pa’i phyir ram / rgyu dang rkyen gyis mngon par ’dus byas pa’i phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs so // brdzun pa’i shes pa bzhin no zhes bya ba ni dpe yin no //

4.50 etena samyaksaṃkalpavyāyāmādimṛṣātvataḥ /
mārgasatyaṃ na satyaṃ te yujyate paramārthataḥ //

’dis ni yang dag rtog pa dang // rtsol ba sogs kyang brdzun nyid phyir //
lam gyi bden pa don dam du // mi bden par ni grub pa yin //

yang dag pa'i [pa yi PG] rtog pa dang / yang dag pa'i [pa yi PG] rtsol ba dang / yang dag pa'i 'tsho [tsho PG] ba dang / yang dag pa'i las kyi mtha' dang / yang dag pa'i dran pa dang / yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin la sogs pa ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam par ni brdzun pa yin te / spyi la dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir ram / 'dus byas yin pa'i phyir phyin ci log gi rtog pa bzhin no // de ltar byas na lam gyi bden pa ni [G174a] don dam par bden pa ma yin no zhes bya bar grub pa'o [po PG] //

de ltar ji ltar byas na lam bden pa nyid du rigs [rig PG] pa yin /

4.51 bhāvanātas tathāyuktā yuktā duḥkhādyadarśanāt /
dṛśyasyādṛśyarūpeṇa sarvadā hi tathāsthiteḥ //

des na bsgom de mi rigs la // sdug bsngal la sogs ma mthong rigs //
mthong ba rnams kyi ma mthong gzugs // thams cad du yang de bzhin gnas //

dngos po la mngon par zhen pa khyed kyi nyan thos kyi theg par lam bsgom pa ji ltar [lta ba D] bstan pa de bdag gis brtag pa'i rim [D192a] pa 'dis de dag yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i rnam pa des theg pa chen por rigs pa ma yin no // sdug bsngal la sogs pa rnams mthong ba med pa'i bsgom pa ni rigs [rig PG] pa yin pa'i phyir ro // ci ltar zhe na / mthong ba ste / sdug [P210a] bsngal la sogs pa'i rang gi ngo bo yongs su ma rdzogs pa rnams kyi'o // ma mthong gzugs zhes bya *ba ni* [ba'i P] dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid do // de ni thams cad du ste / dus kun tu de'i rnam [rnams P] pa de bzhin du rab tu gnas pa yin no [te PG] //

gzhan gyi bsam pa blangs nas phyogs snga ma nye bar 'god par byed pa ni /

4.52 athāpi drugdhabuddheḥ syāt kasyacin na tu bālavat /
na satyādarśanād iṣṭo mokṣo 'pi bhavatām iti //

gal te blo ngan 'ga' zhig ni // bden pa mthong ba mi 'dod phyir //
khyod ni thar par rigs min te [ste D] // byis pa'i skye bo bzhin zhe na /

zhes bya ba smras te / sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i bden pa mthong ba la sdang ba'i theg pa chen po pa rnams ni thar par rigs pa ma yin te / bden pa mthong ba med pa'i phyir byis pa so so'i skye bo bzhin no // nyan thos kyi theg pa [G174b] pa gang dag rma btod [gtod PG] pa'i bsam [bsams P] pas de skad du [D om.] smra bar byed pa de dag la lan brjod par bya ba'i phyir /

4.53 duḥkhataddhuḥkhyanutpāde kasya ko mokṣam icchati /
muktir māyākṛtavat[2] sā bhrāntyāvedhān nigadyate //

2 L māyākṛtatvāt.

sdug bsngal des sdug ma skyes phyir // su zhig thar pa ga [gang PG] la 'dod //
grol ba'ang sgyu ma byas pa bzhin // 'khrul pa'i dbang gis bstan pa yin //

sngar bstan pa'i rigs pas sdug bsngal skye ba med pa yin pa'i phyir / sdug bsngal des sdug bsngal bar gyur pa yang [yin PG] skye ba med pa yin la su zhig skye ba med pa'i 'khor ba na bsdams pa yod nas / skye ba med pa'i nges par 'byung ba gang zhig yod pa la 'dod pa skyed par byed / 'on kyang rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gyi dbang la brdzun pa'i bdag nyid mi bden pa'i kun tu rtog pa'i 'ching bas bcings pa dag sgyu ma byas pa bzhin du 'khrul pa'i dbang gis grol bar brjod par bya'i / don dam par ni su yang bcings pa 'am thar pa yod pa ma yin no //

de bzhin du yang /

4.54 sarvathādarśanān muktir duḥkhādīnāṃ yato matā /
dṛṣṭāntāsambhavas tasmāt tathā hetor asiddhatā //

sdug bsngal la sogs gang dag rnams // gtan du ma mthong grol bar 'dod //
de phyir dpe yang yod min la // de bzhin gtan tshigs ma grub nyid // [P210b]

sdug bsngal la sogs pa rnams rnam pa gang gis kyang gtan du ma mthong ba ni grol ba yin no zhes bya ba ni [PG om.] theg pa chen po'i phyogs 'di la bstan pa yin te / de'i mthong ba med pa de ni chos tsam mthong ba'i nyan thos la sogs pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir gang phyogs snga mar slob ma'i byang chub [D192b] bzhin zhes bya ba'i dpe nye [G175a] bar bstan pa'i dpe yang yod pa ma yin la / de bzhin du lam bsgom pa phul du byung bas bstan [ston PG] pa'i rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kyi ye shes 'byung ba yin gyi / dbang po khyad par du 'phags pas ni ma yin te / des na dbang po khyad par du 'phags pa zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs bdag cag la smras pa 'di ma grub pa yin no //

lam gyi khyad par gzhan bstan pa yin no zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyang 'di ltar ma grub pa yin te / ji lta zhe na /

4.55 ayam eva yato mārgaḥ samyagdṛṣṭipuraḥsaraḥ /
mahāyāne 'pi nirdiṣṭas tasmād dhetor asiddhatā //

yang dag lta ba sngon 'gro ba'i // ji ltar 'byung ba'i lam 'di nyid //
theg chen du yang nyer bstan pas // de phyir gtan tshigs ma grub nyid //

yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'i rnam pa'i mtshan nyid ji lta ba nyid kyis [kyi PG] kun rdzob tu bsgom par bya ba yin la / de kho na nyid rtogs pa'i dus su ni mthong ba med pa la sogs pa'i rnam par bsgom par bya ba yin pas des na theg pa chen po 'dir bsgom pa bye brag tu bstan pa yin gyi / yang lam gzhan ni ma yin pas de'i phyir lam gzhan nye bar bstan pas zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin no // de lta bas na /

> bden pa gnyis la nyer brten nas // sangs rgyas rnams kyi chos bstan te //
> 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa dang // don dam nyid kyi bden pa'o //

bcom ldan 'das kyi [kyis D] rtsom pa ni 'jig rten la phan *pa yin* [PG om.] pa'i phyir yin pas de kho na nyid mchog tu 'dzin par mi mdzad kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs [G175b] nyon mongs pa dang bral ba dang rjes su [P211a] mthun ['thun PG] pa nyid dang / sems can g.yeng ba'i bsam pa can la bltos nas don kha cig yang dag pa [par PG] ma yin du zin kyang don dam pa nyid du rnam par byang ba dang rjes su mthun par rjes su ston par mdzad de / ji [de PG] lta bu zhe na / gsungs pa / dge slong rnams khyed rnams kyis [kyi PG] 'di ltar bud med ma dang 'dra bar mthong na ni ma'i 'du shes bskyed par bya'o // de bzhin du sring mo dang 'dra ba'i bud med dam bu mo dang 'dra ba'i bud med mthong ba na bu mo'i 'du shes nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] par bya'o zhes bya ba dang de bzhin du sems can rdzus [brdzus PG] te skye ba yod do zhes bya ba dang / gang zag gcig 'jig rten du byung bar gyur cing byung na zhes bya ba dang / sems can thams cad ni zas kyi gnas so zhes bya ba dang / nga ni rgas shing 'khogs so zhes bya ba lta bu dag go //

ji ltar dri ma kha [D193a] cig ni sa dang thal ba dang lci ba la sogs pa'i dri mas dag par byed par nus la / du ba dang snum dang 'dam la sogs pa'i dri ma kha cig ni nye bar sogs par byed pa yin pa de bzhin du rnam par rtog pa yang phan pa dang mi phan pa'i rgyu nyid du 'gyur ba yin te / 'di ltar bla ma'i chung ma la ma dang sring mo ltar rnam par rtog pa ni phan pa'i rgyu yin la / de nyid la chung mar mi bden par btags pa ni mi 'dod pa dang rjes su 'brel pa yin no // 'dir gsungs pa /

> mkhas pas dri ma dang bral na // gos ni shin tu dag par 'gyur //
> de bzhin dngos po kun rdzob tu // [G176a] kun rdzob mchog tu dbral ba yin //

zhes kyang gsungs so //

gzhan yang de bzhin gshegs pa nyid rnam pa sna tshogs sprul pa'i sbyor bas legs par gsungs pa 'jig rten du grags par mdzad pa yin no zhes bya bar /

> 4.56 vedānte ca hi yat sūktaṃ tat sarvaṃ buddhabhāṣitam /
> dṛṣṭāntanyūnatā tasmāt saṃdigdhaṃ vā parīkṣyatām //

> rigs byed mtha' yang legs bstan gang // de kun sangs rgyas gsungs pa yin //
> de phyir dpe ni ma [P211b] grub ste // the tshom za na brtag par gyis //

zhes bya ba smras te / theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa ma yin te / rig byed mtha' pa'i lta ba bzhin no zhes sngar gang smras pa de la rig byed kyi mtha' dper brjod pa ni bsgrub bya'i nang du 'dus pas bsgrub bya dpe ma grub pa'i skyon yod do //

ma yin te / srog gcod pa dang / ma byin par len pa sogs pa ngan par smras pa mang po smra bar byed pa'i rig byed kyi yan lag de dag dper 'gyur ro zhe na /

theg pa chen por de lta bu ma bstan pas skyon yod pa ma yin no // theg pa chen po ni gtsug lag gsum gyi gsung rab dang yang ’gal ba yang ma yin la / chos nyid dang yang [P om.] ’gal bar bstan pa yang med de / ji ltar sngar bsgrubs [bsgrub PG] pa bzhin no // gang sangs rgyas kyi bka’ dang mi ’gal ba’i legs par smras pa’i rig byed ni gzung bar bya ba yin la nyes par smras pa ni gzung bar bya ba ma yin te / the tshom za na yongs su dpyod cing de lta bas na rigs pa ni gzung bar bya ba la / mi rigs pa ni gzung bar bya ba ma yin no //

gang yang rgyu dang ’bras bu la skur pa [G176b] ’debs pas theg pa chen po pa ni med par lta ba dang ’dra’o zhes zer ba de la lan gdab par bya /

4.57 sadasatkalpanāpoḍhaprajñācāravihāriṇām /
dṛṣṭiḥ kasya kutaś ceṣṭā phalahetvapavādikā //

yod dang med pa’i rtog bral zhing // shes rab spyod pas gnas pa la // [D193b]
rgyu dang ’bras bu skur ’debs pa’i // lta ba gang yod ’dod pa gang //

zhes bya ba gsungs te / gal te bdag cag yod pa’i phyogs spangs te med pa’i phyogs len par byed na ni med pa pa nyid yin na ’di ltar bdag cag yod pa dang med pa’i mtha’ *gnyis ka* [gnyi ga PG] btang nas dbu mar sgrub [bsgrub PG] par bzung ba la dngos po yod pa ma yin te / de ni so so rang gis rig par bya ba yin na de la ji ltar na bdag cag med par lta ba pa yin no zhes sgro ’dogs par byed / gang gi phyir shes rab la spyod [P212a] pas yod pa dang med pa’i rtog pa dang bral bar byed pa de ni yod pa [PG om.] dang med pa’i rtog pa dang bral zhing shes rab spyod pa ste / gang dag la ngang tshul ’di rnams yod pa de ni yod pa’i rtog pa dang bral zhing shes rab spyod pas gnas pa la’o // de dag ni yod pa dang med pa dang gnyi ga’i mtha’ spangs pas lta ba la mngon par zhen cing dngos po ci zhig mngon par ’dzin pa skye bar ’gyur te / sgro ’dogs pa dang skur pa ’debs pa’i mtha’ mngon par spangs pa la don dam pa nyid du rgyu dang ’bras bu la skur pa ’debs pa’i lta ba ’di lta bu yod pa ma yin no //

kun rdzob tu ni /

4.58 hetoḥ phalena sambandho yathā loke pratīyate /
tathā niṣidhyate nāsāv ato hetor asiddhatā //

rgyu dang ’bras bu ’brel pa dag // ’jig rten grags pa ji lta bar //
de bzhin de ni ’gog pa min // de phyir gtan tshigs ma grub nyid //

’jig [G177a] rten ’di yang med / ’jig rten pha rol yang med / legs par byas pa dang nyes par byas pa’i las rnams kyi ’bras bu rnam par smin pa yang med ces bya ba’i log par lta ba spangs nas ’jig rten ’di yang yod / legs par byas pa dang nyes par byas pa’i las rnams kyi ’bras bu rnam par smin pa yang yod do zhes bya bar [ba PG] rang gis nye bar bsags pa’i las

rnams yongs su smin par gyur pa thob nas dus gzhan ’bras bu nyams su myong ngo zhes ’jig rten la ji ltar grags pa de ni bdag cag gis kyang mi ’gog pas de’i phyir na bdag cag la rgyu dang ’bras bu la skur pa ’debs pa’i gtan tshigs smras pa de ma grub pa nyid do //

> med par lta ba mdor bsdu [bsdus PG] na // ’bras bu med de de bzhin las //
> bsod nams med pa ngan ’gro ba // log par lta ba zhes brjod do //
> yod par lta ba mdor bsdu na // ’bras bu yod do las rnams kyi //
> bsod nams bde ’gro’i rgyu mthun pa // yang dag lta bas ’di dran [D194a] bya //
> med pa la [pa PG] ni ngan ’gror ’gro // med las gzhan la bzang ’gro ste //
> gnyi ga yongs [P212b] su spangs pa yi // gnyis med brten pa thar bar ’gyur //

zhes kyang gsungs pas / des na gnyis su med par smra ba bdag cag ni med pa pa ma yin no // ’di dag nyid sgrub par byed pa dbu ma’i rtsa ba las kyang bstan te /

dbu mar smra ba rnams med pa pa dang ’dra’o zhes bya ba de tha snyad kyi dus sam de kho na nyid mthong ba’i dus [PG om.] gang la brtag par bya / de la re zhig med pa pa ni tha snyad kyi dus [G177b] kyi rgyu dang ’bras bu la skur pa ’debs pa la mngon par zhen cing [zhing PG] dkar po’i phyogs ma lus pa drungs nas phyung zhing mi dge ba’i lam [las D] thams cad la zhugs nas yang dag pa’i tha snyad kyi bden pa la gnod pa yin na bdag cag ni sgyu ma dang smig sgyu tsam du btags pa’i rgyu dang ’bras bu ’brel pa la skur pa yang mi ’debs pas mi dge ba’i lam la zhugs pa yang ma yin zhing [cing PG] / zag pa dang bcas pa’i phung po ’di las yang srid pa’i phung po ’byung bar mi ’dod pa yang ma yin pas phung po rnams ni phung po gzhan ’gag pa sngon du song ba las da ltar gyi dang ma ’ongs pa’i ’byung bar mi sgrub pa yang ma yin te / de lta bas na sgyu ma dang rmi lam bzhin du ’dod pas tha snyad kyi dus na med pa dang bdag cag ’dra ba ma yin no //

de kho na nyid mthong ba’i dus na yang ma yin te / ’di ltar yang med pa pa rnams kyi med pa ni med pa’i yul can gyi rnam par shes pa skyed par byed cing dngos po’i don thams cad la skur pa ’debs par byed pa’i phyir phyin ci log gi shes pas de tshul khrims ’chal ba’i dri mas bsgos [bgos PG] par gyur pas sdug bsngal zhi bar mi ’gyur ro // bdag cag gi de kho nyid mthong ba’i dus na ni gang gi phyir gzugs la sogs pa’i dngos po’i yul la sngar bden pa’i blo skyes par gyur pa de gzugs la sogs pa’i dngos po de dag stong pa nyid du rtogs pa’i phyir ’di ni gzugs la sogs pa’i dngos po bden pa’o [P213a] snyam pa de ldog [G178a] par ’gyur ro // don gyi shugs kyis byung ba’i blo med pa’i blo yang ’jug par mi ’gyur te / gzugs la sogs pa’i yul ’di ni med pa yin no zhes bya ba’i blo de yang don dam pa ji lta ba bzhin gyi don dam pa ma yin te / blo yin [D194b] pa’i phyir yod pa’i blo bzhin no zhes bya ba ni sun dbyung ba yin no //

yang na srid par snang ba gang la blo skye bar ’gyur ba dgag par bya / de la med pa’i blo ’byung ba’i skabs yod par ’gyur ba ’di ltar dgag par bya ba’i ngo bo med pa’i phyir mi bden par rtog [rtogs PG] pa’i sgo nas med pa’i blo yang ldog par ’gyur ro // ’phrog pa med pa’i shes rab kyi spyod pa la gnas pa dang / rab tu dben par gyur pa la med do zhes bya ba blo yang skye bar mi ’gyur bas med pa zhes bya ba’i sgra tsam yang mthun

pa yang med pa pa dang / dbu mar smra ba la yod pa ma yin no // ston pa'i dus na yang yod pa nyid dgag pa tsam byed kyi med pa nyid sgrub pa ni ma yin pas yungs kar dang ri rab bzhin du khyad par shin tu che bar yod pa yin te / ji skad du /

> 'di ni yod nyid 'gog pa ste // med nyid yongs su 'dzin pa min //
> sngon po min zhes brjod pa yis // dkar po yin zhes brjod dam ci //

zhes gsungs pas / de'i phyir na lta ba rnam pa gnyi ga yang spros pa ma lus pa spangs pas zhi ba'i bde ba 'dod pa'i mkhas pa rnams la sdug bsngal du 'gyur ba yin no // ci ltar zhe na / gzugs dang gzugs med pa na spyod pa dang / 'jig [G178b] rten las 'das pa'i dge ba dang mi dge ba dang lung du ma bstan par [pa PG] rab tu thob pa'i bdag nyid kyi dngos po gang dag gis tha snyad du bya bar 'os pa de dag gal te 'dir rang rang gi ngo bor [bo PG] don dam par yod par gyur na ni dge ba dang mi dge ba'i chos bskyed pa dang mi bskyed pa'i phyir 'bad pa [P213b] don med par 'gyur te / bden par yod pa'i phyir yod par gyur pa'i bum pa dang / ras yug bzhin te bde ba can yang bde ba'i khyad par las nyams par mi 'gyur la / sdug bsngal can yang sdug bsngal las nyams par mi 'gyur te / rtsig ngos la bris pa'i ri mo bzhin du skye ba dang na tshod dang tshad dang spyod lam gyi khyad par ji lta ba bzhin du srog chags rnams la rjes su 'brel bar 'gyur ro // 'on te med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin na yang khams gsum pa dang / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i dge ba dang mi dge ba'i chos rnams bskyed pa dang mi bskyed pa'i phyir 'bad pa don med pa yang de bzhin te / sems can med pa'i phyir ji ltar ri bong gi rva rno bar sgrub pa de [PG om.] bzhin te des [D195a] ni tha snyad chad par thal bar 'gyur ro //

gang gi phyir lta ba ngan pa'i rab rib kyis [kyi PG] blo gros kyi mig nyams par gyur pa la 'di skad ces /

> gang gis srid rnams yod nyid dang // med pa nyid mthong blo dman pa //
> des ni mthong ba'i nyer zhi dang // zhi ba mthong ba ma yin no //

zhes brjod pa dang / mdo sde las kyang 'di skad du gsungs te /

> gang gis yod nyid sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa yi // [G179a] rkyen nyid gang phyir med pa la //
> lta ngan yod par smra ba yi [yis PG] // med dang yod par rab tu bstan //
> de bzhin yod med yod med min // gang tshe 'jig rten 'di mthong ba //
> de tshe sems ni ldog gyur nas // bdag med par ni rtogs [rtog PG] par 'gyur //

zhes gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du

> 'od srungs yod ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gcig ste med ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gnyis pa'o // gang mtha' 'di gnyis kyi dbus de ni gzugs med pa / bltar med pa

> / phrad pa med pa / snang ba med pa / dam [P214a] pas shes par bya ba ma yin pa / gnas pa med pa / rten [brten PG] med pa 'di ni dbu mar sgrub pa chos rnams kyi yang dag pa la so sor rtog pa zhes bya'o

zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du

> ka ta ya na gang 'jig rten ''di ni khyad par las kyang khyad par can du 'gyur bar 'dod pa nye bar bzung [gzungs P, gzung G] bas [pas P] 'di lta ste / yod pa dang med pa la rten par byed pa chos 'di ni yod pa yang ma yin / med pa yang ma yin

zhes gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du

> kun dga' bo yod ces zer ba ni rtag pa nyid du ltung bar 'gyur ro // med pa ni chad par ro // gang mtha' 'di gnyis spangs nas dbu ma'i bsgrub pas de bzhin gshegs pa chos ston par mdzad de / 'di lta ste 'di yod na 'di 'byung

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pas / dbu mar sgrub pa la brten pa'i theg pa chen po pa dbu mar smra ba rnams ni med pa pa ma yin no // de ltar na dpe ma grub pas bsgrub par bya ba rjes su 'jug pa ma yin no //

gang yang theg pa chen po ni sangs rgyas kyi bka' [G179b] ma yin te / mngon sum la sogs pa dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro zhes zer ba de yang rigs pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir /

> 4.59 sāṃvṛtaṃ bāladhīgrāhyaṃ vastu pratyakṣagocaram /
> pragvad atra samādhānāt tadbādhāpi na bādhikā //

> dngos po mngon sum spyod yul gyi // kun rdzob byis pas bzung ba 'di //
> [D195b] 'dir lan yang snga ma bzhin // de yi gnod pas mi gnod ['god P] do //

mngon sum gyi gnod pa bskyed par 'dod pa gang gis kyang mngon sum mngon sum zhes bya ba nyid nye bar btags nas gdod brtsad par rigs pa yin no // don dam pa nyid du na dbang po ni sems pa med pa yin pa dang / 'du byed rnams kyang bems [bem PG] po yin pa'i phyir dang / skad cig ma yin pa'i phyir dbang po rnams kyi rnam par shes pa rnams kyi [la PG] yul la nye bar dmigs pa'i nus pa yod pa ma yin no // 'on kyang kun rdzob tu mig dang gzugs la brten nas mig gi [P214b] rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba 'byung ba dang / yul yang kun rdzob kho na ste / byis pa'i blos bzung ba la mngon sum zhes nye bar gdags so // don dam par ni mthong ba med pa nyid de kho na nyid mthong ba yin te / ji ltar sngar /

> mig gi dbang po'i gzung ba ni // don dam nyid du gzugs min te //
> bsags pa'i phyir na sgra bzhin nam // yang na 'byung las gyur pa bzhin //

zhes bya ba la sogs pas bsgrubs pa yin no //
ji ltar 'jig rten dang 'gal ba yang med pa de ltar brjod par bya ste /

4.60 vidvannītivicāre hi na pratītiḥ prabādhate /
yathā nirātmakā dharmāḥ kṣaṇikāś ceti jalpataḥ //

mkhas pa'i lugs kyis [kyi PG] brtags pa la // grags pas gnod pa ma yin te //
ji ltar chos bdag med pa dang // skad cig ma zhes brjod pa bzhin //

gal te [G180a] bdag cag gis chos thams cad don dam par skye ba med pa la sogs par smras pa la grags pas gnod par gyur na ni / de lta na sde pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i chos thams cad bdag med pa dang / skad cig ma'o zhes bya ba la yang grags pas gnod par 'gyur ro // gal te de la grags pa dang 'gal bas gnod par mi 'gyur ro zhe na ni bdag cag gis chos rnams skye ba med pa'o zhes smra ba la yang 'jig rten gyi grags pa dang 'gal ba ci zhig yod //
rjes su dpag pas kyang 'jig rten gyi grags pa dang 'gal ba yod pa [par PG] ma yin par bstan te / gang gi phyir /

4.61 na rūpatattvaṃ bālānāṃ viṣayatvam upārcchati /
adhyātmavidyāsaṃskārāt tadyathātmādiśūnyatā //

gzugs kyi de nyid byis rnams kyi [kyis PG] // yul nyid 'gyur ba ma yin te //
nang la rig pa ma sbyangs phyir // bdag sogs stong pa ji bzhin no //

gang gzugs la sogs pa'i don dam pa de ni byis pa rnams kyi yul du 'gyur ba ma yin te / lus kyi dbang po dang *blo ni* [blo'i na D] bdag go // bdag [D196a] gi [gis PG] dbang du byas pas nang ste / nang gi bdag nyid la rig pa gang yin pa'o // de goms par ma byas pas na ma sbyangs pa ste / nang la rig pa ma sbyangs pa de'i phyir [P215a] na nang la rig pa ma sbyangs pa zhes bya ste / gang dang gang nang la rig pa sbyangs pa med pa'i byis pa de dang de dag gi yul du 'gyur ba ma yin te / dper na bdag la sogs pa'i stong pa bzhin no // byis pa rnams bdag tu nga rgyal ba dang / bdag tu rmongs pa dang / bdag la chags pa'i dbang du gyur pa rnams 'jig tshogs kyi lta ba la mngon par [G180b] zhen pas bdag tu 'dzin pa dam du 'jug par *'gyur ba* [gyur pa PG] de dag la / bdag la sogs pa'i stong pa nyid yul du byas pa'i blo lta ga la 'byung bar 'gyur /
de bzhin du /

4.62 na rūpatattve bālānāṃ dhīr yuktā pāramārthikī /
avidyāpaṭalāndhatvād yathā nirvāṇagocarā //

byis rnams blo la yang dag tu // gzugs kyi de nyid ldan pa min //
ma rig rab rib kyis bsgribs phyir // mya ngan 'das pa'i spyod yul bzhin //

gzugs kyi de kho na nyid don dam par byis pa rnams kyi blo'i yul du ldan pa ma yin te zhes bya ba ni phyogs yin no // las dang / 'bras bu dang / bden pa dang / dkon mchog rnams mi shes pa ni ma rig pa'o // de nyid ni rab rib ste / mi mthong bar byed pa'i phyir ro // des bsgribs [bsgrubs P] pa ni ma rig [rigs P] rab rab kyis bsgribs pa ste / de'i ngo bo ni ma rig pa'i rab rib kyis bsgribs pa nyid do // de'i phyir / ma rig rab rib kyis bsgribs phyir // zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs yin no // mya ngan las 'das pa'i spyod yul bzhin zhes bya ba ni dpe yin te / ji ltar mya ngan las 'das pa'i spyod yul can gyi blo byis pa rnams la mi ldan pa de bzhin du gzugs kyi de kho na nyid kyi spyod yul can gyi blo dang yang de rnams ldan pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir ma rig pa'i rab rib kyis bsgribs pa'i phyir zhes bya bas 'jig rten gyi grags pa dang 'gal ba yang med do // des na 'di ltar /

4.63 tattvato hi na bhāvānāṃ janmety evaṃ viśeṣaṇāt /
na pratyakṣapratītibhyāṃ bādhā kutrāpi bādhikā //

srid pa rnams ni yang dag tu // skye med ces bya'i khyad par gyis //
mngon sum dang ni grags pa dag // gnod [P215b] par bstan pas gnod pa med //

'di dag ni sngar yang lan btab pa nyid yin te / yang [G181a] dag par zhes bya ba'i dam bca' ba khyad par can la mngon sum du grags pas gnod pa 'byung ba med bzhin du mi bden pa'i skyon gyis sgro 'dogs pa la mngon par zhen pa dag yang dang yang du [D196b] brtags nas gnod par smar ba des ni bdag cag la gnod pa ma yin te / sngar sun 'byin pa bstan pa'i shugs kyis so zhes bya ba'i *bsam [bsams PG] pas so //

gang yang bgrod min la yang yang dag tu // bgrod par bya ste zhes bya ba la sogs pa smra ba'i lan /

4.64 śānteṣv ākāśakalpeṣu dharmeṣu paramārthataḥ /
strītvādyasiddher dṛṣṭānte bādhā kasya kuto matā //

yang dag par na chos rnams ni // zhi zhing mkha' dang mnyam pa la //
bud med nyid kyang ma grub na // dpe yis gnod pa ji ltar 'dod //

'di'i mngal du 'dzin par byed pas bud med de / de ni don dam par byed pa po dang las dang dban du bya bar ma grub pas bya ba thams cad ldog par gyur pa'i nam mkha' dang mñam par gyur pa'i chos rnams la mi 'grub po // de ma grub na don dam par dpe gang gis gang zhig ji ltar rjes su dpag par 'dod /

de lta na yang /

4.65 gamyā tadgamanaṃ gantā yathaitad vidyate trayam /
agamyāgamanaṃ sādhyaṃ tathā ced doṣaditsayā //

bgrod bya bgrod pa bgrod po dang // gsum po ji ltar yod bzhin du //
bgrod min bgrod par sgrub byed pa // de bzhin skyon zhig ’dogs par ’dod //

bgrod bya ni yang dag par mthun par bya ba’i bud med do // de la ’jug pa ni de la bgrod pa ste / gnyis kyis [PG om.] gnyis sprod pa’o // bgrod po ni ’dod pa ste / de ltar gsum po ’di dag yod pa nyid du ’jig rten du grags so // de lta na yang bgrod par bya ba ma yin pa skyed byed la sogs pa la yang bgrod [G181b] par bya bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba’i tshig gis khyod kyis bdag la skyon sbyin par ’dod cing grub pa ji lta bu yin /

4.66 satyaṃ pratītibādhaivam asiddhaṃ tu viśeṣaṇam /
nāto ‘smadvidhibādhārthaṃ samarthaṃ pratirūpakam //

grags pas gnod pa nyid ni bden // khyad par can la ma grub phyir //
des na mi mthun phyogs ’di la // bdag gi [gis PG] phyogs gnod nus pa med //

gang bgrod par [P216a] bya ba ma yin pa’i bud med la yang bgrod par bya ste / bud med yin pa’i phyir bud med gzhan bzhin [D add zhig] no zhes smras pa ni bden te / ’di lta bu ni grags pas gnod pa yin no // gang dag don dam par zhes khyad par can du byas pa la ni de ma grub ste / don dam par bud med nyid kyang ma grub pa’i phyir ro // de lta bas na gang khyod kyis rjes su dpag pa ltar snang ba bstan pa de la / bdag la gtang nas grags pa dang ’gal ba sgrub par ’dod pa’i nus pa med cing mthu med do // gang yang ’di skad du /

bden pa mthong ba de nyid min // de nyid med par thal bar ’gyur // zhes [D197a] bya ba la sogs pa de la yang /

4.67 niṣprapañcaṃ svasaṃvedyaṃ vikalpamalavarjitam /
nānātvaikatvarahitaṃ śāntaṃ tattvaṃ vidur budhāḥ //

spros pa med cing rang rig pa // rnam rtog dri ma dang bral ba //
du ma nyid dang gcig nyid bral // zhi ba de nyid mkhas rig pa //

ngag gi brjod pa thams cad kyis [kyi PG] // spro bar mi nus pas spros pa med pa’o // mngon sum gyi shes pas rtogs [rtog PG] par bya ba’i phyir rang rig pa’o // de nyid kyi phyir nges par rtog par byed pa dang / rjes su dran pa’i rnam par rtog pa’i dri ma dang bral ba’o // chos thams cad dngos po med pa’i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa’i phyir du ma nyid dang bral ba’o // dngos po med pa’i ngo bo [G182a] nyid kyang ci yang ma yin pa’i phyir gcig nyid dang bral ba’o // skye ba dang / ’gag pa dang / ’gro ba dang / ’ong ba la sogs pa’i bya ba dang mngon par bral bas zhi ba’o // de lta bu’i rnam pa ni de kho na nyid de don dam pa’o // mkhas pa [pas PG] ni [G om.] khyad par du shes pa dang ldan pa’o // rig [rigs G] pa ni de bzhin gshegs pa ’am / de’i man ngag bstan pa las skyes pa yang yin no // mtshan nyid ji lta ba bzhin du rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa mdzad pa’i

’phags pa’i bden pa las ma gtogs pa’i bden pa gzhan zhig ni bdag cag la med do // ’on kyang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dag gis ni sdug bsngal la sogs [P216b] pa’i bden pa’i rang gi ngo bo tsam yongs su shes pa yin la / de bzhin gshegs pas ni sdug bsngal la sogs pa’i mnyam pa nyid rtogs so zhes bya ba ni khyad par yin te / *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa* las sdug bsngal dang / kun ’byung ba dang / ’gog pa dang / lam gyis [gyi PG] mya ngan las ’das [’da’ PG] pa [ba PG] ma yin gyi / ’on kyang ’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi po ’di dag nyid kyi mnyam pa nyid gang yin pa de ni ngas mya ngan las ’das pa’o zhes bstan to zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu’o //

4.68 yonākadevadeśyatvaṃ nātas tattvasya yujyate /
brahmādidevaprabhavaṃ devam āhur yataś ca te //

nam mkha’i *lha yis* [lha’i PG] bstan pa nyid // de nyid yin par mi rigs kyang //
tshangs pa dang po’i lha las byung // lha de la gus de skad smra //

nam mkha’i lha la gus pas de dag ’di skad smra ste / tshangs pa zhes bya ba’i lha ni dang po’i lha yin la tshangs pa de’i [G182b] mthus bskyed pa ni nam mkha’i lha yin te / des ni ba lang gsod pa la sogs pa de kho na nyid du bstan to // tshangs pa yang mchog tu ’dzin pa’i lta ba la mngon par zhen [D197b] pas ’gro ba rnams bdag gis bskyed do snyam du sems kyang rang nyid kyis kyang de kho na nyid rtogs pa med na de’i lta ba’i rjes su ’brang ba nam mkha’i lha de kho na nyid ji ltar rig par ’gyur / de lta bas na ji skad bstan pa’i mtshan nyid can gyi de kho na nyid theg pa chen po las bstan pa dang / nam mkha’i *lha yis* [lha’i P] bstan pa ’dra ba ma yin no //

kun rdzob tu ni /

4.69 rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṃ buddhiviṣaya iṣyate /
sāmānyena tadastitvaṃ sādhyaṃ ced[3] iṣṭam eva naḥ //

gzugs sogs skye mched snang ba nyid // blo yi yul du ’dod pa yin //
de yi yod pa thun mong nyid // bsgrub bya zhe na nga yang ’dod //

gzugs la sogs pa rnams kyi skye mched rnams kyi snang ba ni gzugs la sogs pa’i skye mched kyi snang ba’o // de’i ngo bo ni gzugs la sogs skye mched snang ba nyid do //

de ni mig la sogs pa’i rnam par shes pa’i yul yin par bdag cag kyang ’dod de / de ltar na rdzas su bden par ’dod pa la sogs pa’i khyad par dang bral ba’i gzugs la sogs [P217a] pa’i skye mched thun mong ba nyid ni bsgrub par bya ba yin no zhes khyod ’dod na bdag cag kyang ’dod pa kho na yin te / grub pa sgrub pa yin no zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go //

gal te yang khyad par can du ’dod na ni /

3 L tad.

4.70 bhautikādisvabhāvā hi rūpādyāyatanāstitā /
sādhyate cen na dṛṣṭāntaḥ pratitarkaś ca bādhakaḥ //

’byung las gyur sogs ngo bo yis // gzugs sogs skye mched yod nyid ni //
bsgrub bya’o zhe na dpe yang med // phyir rgol rtog ges [G183a] gnod pa’ang yod //

‘byung ba las *gyur pa* [’gyur ba P] la sogs pa’i ngo bo gzugs la sogs pa’i skye mched ni yod de / rdzas yin pa’i phyir dang / shes bya yin pa’i phyir dang / brjod bya yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni gtan tshigs so // dpe ni med de thams cad bsgrub par bya ba’i khongs su ’dus pa’i phyir ro //

gal te gzhan dag na re gzhan du bstan pa [pa’i PG] las kyang dpe rnyed pa srid pas chos mi mthun pa nyid can gyis bsgrub par ’gyur ba nyid yin te / gang dang gang ’byung ba las gyur pa’i ngo bo ma yin pa de dang de ni yod pa ma yin te / dper na ri bong gi rva ’am nam mkha’i me tog la sogs pa bzhin no zhes bya bas bsgrub bya grub pa yin no zhes smra na /

de lta na yang bdag cag gis lan gyi rtog ge bstan pas gnod par ’gyur ba ni /

4.71 rūpādyāyatanaṃ neṣṭaṃ bhūtabhāutikalakṣaṇam /
svātmanirbhāsadhījanmakāraṇatvād yathā manaḥ //

gzugs sogs skye mched ’byung ba dang // ’byung ba las gyur mtshan nyid min //
rang bdag [D198a] rnam par snang ba’i blo // skyed [bskyed PG] pa’i rgyu phyir yid bzhin no //

gzugs kyi skye mched ces bya ba ni chos can no // de ’byung ba dang ’byung ba las gyur pa’i mtshan nyid ma yin zhes bya ba ni chos te bsgrub par bya ba’o // rang gi bdag nyid ni rang gi bdag nyid de kha dog dang dbyibs la sogs pa gzugs kyi rang gi ngo bo’o // zin pa dang ma zin pa la sogs pa ni sgra’i’o // [PG add rang gi bdag nyid kyi] dri zhim pa dang dri mi zhim pa la sogs pa ni dri’i ste / de lta bu la sogs pa rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam pa’i khyad par mngon par ’jug [P217b] pa’i blo ni rang bdag rnam par [G183b] snang ba’i blo’o // rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam par snang ba’i blo gang skyed [bskyed PG] pa de ni rang bdag rnam par snang ba’i blo bskyed pa’o // rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam par snang ba’i blo bskyed pa’i rgyu gzugs kyi skye mched rnams ni rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam par snang ba’i blo bskyed pa’i rgyu’o // de’i ngo bo ni rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam par snang ba’i blo skyed [bskyed PG] pa’i rgyu nyid de / de’i phyir na / rang bdag rnam par snang ba’i blo // skyed [bskyed PG] pa’i rgyu phyir zhes bya ste / gang dang gang rang gi bdag nyid kyi rnam par snang ba’i blo skyed [bskyed PG] pa’i rgyu yin pa de ni ’byung ba dang ’byung ba las gyur pa’i mtshan nyid ma yin te / dper na yid kyi skye mched bzhin te / don dam pa nyid du skyon dang bral ba’i phyogs dang / gtan tshigs dang dpe yod par gyur pa’i rtog ges gnod pa yin no //

gang yang khams gsum pa ’di dag ni sems tsam mo zhes bya ba ’gro ba phyogs su bya ba ’di la gtan tshigs dang dpe yod pa ma yin pas zhes gang smra ba de la yang [PG om.] re zhig kun rdzob tu yin par /

4.72ab cittacaittasvabhāvaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ caittacetasām /

sems dang sems byung ngo bo nyid // sems dang sems byung rab tu grags //

yang don dam par ni /

4.72cd hetūdāharaṇe nāto naṣṭaḥ pakṣo ‘pi yoginām //

gtan tshigs dang ni dpe yang med // phyogs kyang rnal ’byor pa la med //

bdag cag gi don dam par ni ngag thams cad kyi spyod yul las ’das par gyur pa yin pas yod pa dang / med pa dang / gnyi ga’i phyogs la dmigs pa med pa’i phyir de kho na nyid du phyogs kyang med pa yin no // phyogs med na don dam pa rig pa’i rnal ’byor pa la [G184a] gtan tshigs dang dpe lta yod par ga la ’gyur /

gal te de ni ma yin te / kun rdzob ni ’jig rten pa dang thun mong ba’i [D198b] shes pas rtogs par bya ba yin pa’i phyir tshad ma ma yin la / rnal ’byor pas rtogs par bya ba’i don dam pa ni ngag gis brjod par bya ba las ’das pa yin pas des na gang khyod [P218a] kyis gzhan gyis kun tu brtags [btags P] pa’i dngos po’i don dgag pa’i phyir rjes su dpag pa bstan pa de la / bsgrub bya sgrub pa’i nus pa yod par ji ltar ’gyur zhe na /

brjod par bya ste / bdag gi don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis yod de / de la gcig ni mngon par ’du byed pa med par ’jug pa / ’jig rten las ’das pa zag pa med pa spros pa dang bral ba’o // gnyis pa ni mngon par ’du byed pa dang bcas par ’jug pa / dag pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes zhes bya ba zag pa dang bcas pa spros pa dang bcas pa’o // de nyid ni thams cad du dam bca’ ba khyad par can nyid du nye bar bzung bas bsgrub bya grub pa yin no //

gzhan yang

4.73 vijñaptimātram ity atra bāhyārthasya nirākriyā /
vākyārtha iti tattyāgāt pakṣahāniḥ kutaḥ satī //

rnam shes tsam zhes bya ba ’dir // pha rol don ni bzlog pa’i phyir //
tshig [tshigs P] don ’di ni de spong zer // bdag gi phyogs nyams ji ltar ’dod //

kye rgyal ba’i sras khams gsum pa ’di dag thams cad ni sems tsam yin no zhes gang [PG om.] gsungs pa de la / kha cig na re ’dir tshig gi don ni [PG om.] phyi rol gyi don bzlog pa’i phyir ro zhes sgrub par byed do // bdag cag ni byed pa po dang rtog pa po la sogs pa ’gegs par byed [G184b] pa ni tshig gi don yin par ’dod do // de la phyi’i don spong ba ni tshig gi

don yin no zhes zer ba ni bdag gis kyang spangs pas phyogs ma grub par ga la ’gyur te / bdag gis kyang phyi rol gyi skye mched yod par khas len pa nyid kyi phyir ro //

des na phyogs snga ma dang po dag gis [gi PG] nye bar bkod pa ni ji lta ba bzhin ma yin pas de bzhin du /

> 4.74ab vāgnirvacanataḥ kaścit kriyate na praśāntadhīḥ /

> ’ga’ yi tshig gis [gi PG] smrar med par // bya bar mi nus zhi ba’i blo //

zhes bya ba smras te / lung dang bcas pa’i rigs pa’i rjes su *’brangs pas* [’brang bas PG] mchog tu rtsod pa med pa yin na yang / yang dag pa’i [pa ji PG] lta ba bzhin gyi rigs pa smra ba yin no // gang bdag gis lan de skad du smras pa na yang khyod kyi sems dga’ bar [P218b] ma gyur na gang dag phyogs su ma ltung ba’i sems dang ldan pas /

> 4.74cd vidvāṃsas tatra bhotsyante vacasaḥ sāraphalgutām //

> snying po yod dam snying po med // mkhas pas de la dpyad par gyis //

dus ring por goms [D199a] par byas pas / rang gi phyogs su zhen cing ltung bar sdang ba’i bsam pa can bden pa dang phan pa brjod du zin kyang gzhan dag la yid mi ches pa de dag ni yid gtod kyang rung mi gtod kyang rung la gzu bor gnas pa rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba’i phyogs kyi don rig [rigs PG] pa’i mkhas pa rnams kyi [kyis P] blos gal te rtog na ni tshig ’di ni snying po dang bcas pa’o // ’di ni snying po med pa’o zhes dpyod par byed pas de’i don du tshig tu brjod par *bya ba* [byas pa PG] yin no // da [de PG] ni mi smra bar ’os pa yin pas bdag cag gi ngag srung bar byed pa ’di gzhag [bzhag PG] par bya’o // rigs [rig PG] pa ’dis mkhas pa [G185a] rnams kyis ni rtsed mo’i phyir yang khyod kyi tshig dang kho bo’i tshig la ’di ni snying po dang bcas pa’o // ’di ni snying po med pa’o zhes dpyod par ’gyur ro //

> snying rje’i bsam pa dang ldan [PG add pa’i] theg chen pa ni tshul khrims nyams kyang mchog yin gyi // [PG add sngar ma] nyan thos theg pa pa ni tshul khrims ldan yang bsam pa dman pas de lta min //phyi sa’i nang du [na PG] ’dug kyang mdangs chen ’bar ba’i yid bzhin nor bu mchog ’gyur gyi [PG om.] // gser gyi snod [gnod PG] na ’dug pa’i nor bu mching [’ching PG] bu dman pa’i ’od can de lta min // las dang nyon mongs dri mar bcas kyang theg pa bzang po bzhon pa’i yon tan can // theg pa gzhan la brten pa’i dri ma spangs pas kyang ni de las rgyal mi nus // nyi ma’i ’od zer bla na med pa chu ’dzin bkod pas bkab gyur gang yin ltar // chu ’dzin de nyams pa yi mkha’ la me khyer rgyu bas nus par ga la ’gyur //

dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba las / nyan thos kyi de kho na nyid la 'jug pa'i le'u ste bzhi pa'o //

Chapter 5: Analysis of Reality According to the Yogācāras

de nas da ni rnal ’byor spyod [P219a] pa’i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la ’jug pas le’u lnga pa brtsam par bya ste /

Introduction

5.1 anye pracakṣate dhīrāḥ svanītāv abhimāninaḥ /
tattvāmṛtāvatāro hi yogācāraiḥ sudeśitaḥ //

rang gi lugs kyi nga rgyal gyis // mkhas par rlom gzhan ’di skad smra //
de nyid bdud rtsir ’jug pa yang // rnal ’byor spyod par legs bstan zer //

theg pa chen po pa [D om.] nyid kyi slob dpon thogs [thog PG] med dang / dbyig [dbyigs PG] gnyen la sogs pa gzhan dag ni [G185b] de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan cing / sa rab tu brnyes pa’i ’phags pa klu sgrub kyis yang dag par rtogs pa’i theg pa chen po’i don gyi lugs gzhan du ’dren par byed cing ngo tsha dang khrel med pa [D199b] don rnam par mi shes pa de bzhin du rnam par [pa DPG] shes shing mkhas par nga rgyal byed pa dag ’di skad smra ste / de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsir ’jug pa ste / rab tu ’jug pa de ni bdag cag kho nas legs par bstan pa yin gyi / dbu mar smra ba pa rnams kyis ni ma yin zhes zer ro //

Yogācāra Objection

de’i mtshan nyid ni ’di yin te /

5.2 dvayābhāvasya sadbhāvād abhāvād vā dvayasya ca /
sadādibuddhiviṣayaḥ paramārtho mataḥ kila //

dngos po gnyis po med pa’i phyir // gnyis dngos med pa’i yod pa ni //
yod la sogs pa’i [pa PG] blo yi yul // dam pa’i don du ’dod do lo //

gnyis ni gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba dang / mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa ’dzin pa’o // de gnyis kyi med pa’i ngo bo nyid med pa’o // med pa’i dngos po de’i ngo bo nyid du

rtag tu yod pa nyid kyi phyir dang / gzung ba dang ’dzin pa zhes bya ba gnyis su ni med pa nyid kyi phyir na / ji ltar gnyis kyi dngos por med pa’i ngo bo yin pa de’i phyir ni yod pa’i blo yul yin la / gang gi phyir *gnyis kyi ngo bor* [dngos por PG] med pa yin pa de’i phyir ni [na D] med pa’i blo’i yul yin te / rnam pa de lta bu’i [bu PG] don dam pa ni bdag cag rnal ’byor spyod pa pa rnams ’dod do zhes bya ba ni de’i bsam pa bstan pa yin no // lo zhes bya ba’i sgra ni bstan bcos byed pa / bdag nyid kyis mi ’dod pa bstan pa yin te / [P219b] de lta bu’i don [G186a] dam pa ni phyis ’byung ba’i dpyad pa dag gis bsgrub par dka’ ba yin pa’i phyir ro //

de dag gi don dam pa de’i grangs kyi tshig ni ’di yin te /

5.3 abhāvabhāvo nairātmyaṃ tathatā ca tathāsthitiḥ /
nirvikalpamatigrāhyaṃ tasyaivādhigamaḥ punaḥ //

med pa’i dngos po bdag med pa // de bzhin nyid dang chos gnas dang //
rnam par mi rtog blo’i gzung ste [de DPG] // de shes par ni bya ba yang //

zhes bya ba la med pa’i dngos po zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang ’dzin par btags pa gnyis *med pa nyid* [PG om.] kyi dngos po’o [po’i PG] // bdag med pa [par P] zhes bya ba ni chos dang gang zag bdag med pa nyid do // de bzhin nyid ces bya ba ni phyin ci ma log pa nyid do // *chos gnas zhes bya ba ni rtag par de lta bu’i tshul nyid du gnas pa nyid do //* [PG om.] rnam par mi rtog pa’i blo’i gzung ba ste zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa ni rnam par rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba’i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa’i blo gros kyi gzung ba yin te / de nyid don dam pa’o //

de shes par ni [mi PG] bya ba yang zhes bya ba ni /

5.4 upalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate /
nopalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate //

dmigs pa [D200a] la ni brten byas nas // mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye //
mi dmigs pa la brten byas nas // mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye //

zhes bya ba ste / ’di la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba de ni thog ma med pa’i dus nas zhugs pa / thog ma med pa’i dus kyi spros pa’i bag chags kyi gzhir gyur pa / dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa yongs su ’dzin pa / rgyun ma chad pa dang [D om.] rdzas dpag tu med pa / rigs du ma dang lhan cig skye zhing ’gag pa dang ldan pa / nus pa’i bye brag mthar thug pa med pa thob pa / sngon po la sogs pa’i yul dpag tu med pa snang ba’i cha dang ’brel ba’i rnam par shes pa’i [G186b] tshogs drug bskyed nus pa’i mthu dang ldan pa / nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyis [kyi PG] skye ba dang ’jig pa dang bral ba’i *gnas pa’i* [PG om.] rnam pas bdag tu yongs su btags pa / bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi g.yo ba’i sa bon yod pa’i phyir / khams dang ’gro [P220a]

ba dang / skye gnas thams cad kyi sa bon dang ldan pa / rnam par smin pa dang / ngar sems pa dang / rnam par rig pa gsum yongs su 'gyur ba'i rjes su 'gro ba

de la dngos po skye ba dang ldan pa rnams 'bras bu'i dngos por kun tu sbyor bar byed pa ste / len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin te / reg pa dang / yid la byed pa dang / tshor ba dang / sems pa dang / 'du shes btang snyoms kyi rnam pa dang ldan pa 'di'i zhe 'am / 'di na'o zhes 'jig rten pa'i mkhas pa rnams kyi yul yang ma yin pas rnam pa yang dag par mi rig pa'o // de yang rnam pa gnyis te / 'phen pa dang 'bras bur gyur pa'o // de la 'phen pa ni rnam par shes pa'i dbang gis [gi PG] 'phen pa'o // 'bras bur gyur pa ni rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bur mngon par grub pa ste / dper na chu'i yan lag gzhan dang gzhan gyi rgyun las chu bo'i klung 'bab pa de bzhin du bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi g.yo ba'i bag chags kyis bsgos [bgos PG] pa'i kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i rgyun kyang 'khor ba ji srid pa'i bar du 'jug par 'gyur ro // de la gnas pa'i las kyi bag chags dang / gzung [D200b] ba dang [G187a]'dzin pa'i bag chags dang / lhan [lha dang DPG] gcig tu lha dang mi'i lus la sogs pa'i rnam par *smin pa* [shes pa D] ci rigs pa dag skyed par byed pa'o // len pa'i rnam par shes pa'i [PG add zhes bya ste bdag dang bdag gi zhes bya bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro // rtag tu bdag tu rmongs pa dang / bdag tu lta ba dang / bdag tu nga rgyal ba dang / bdag la chags pa'i] rgyun de yang dgra bcom pa nyid thob pa na nyon mongs pa'i sa bon thams cad spangs pas ldog par 'gyur te / de ltar de ni re zhig rnam par smin pa zhes bya ba dang / de'i yongs [phyogs DPG] su [P220b] 'gyur ba ste gcig go //

gzhan yang sems can rnams de la bdag tu sbyor bar byed pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ste / bdag dang bdag gi zhes bya bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro // rtag tu bdag tu rmongs pa dang / bdag tu lta ba dang / bdag tu nga rgyal ba dang / bdag la chags pa zhes bya ba nyon mongs pa bzhi po dag dang / rang gi sa nas skyes pa'i reg pa dang yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag dang ldan pa yin no // nyon mongs pa can gyi yid de de yang dgra [dag D] bcom pa la med de / nyon mongs pa thams cad spangs pa'i phyir ro // de ltar de ni ngar sems dang zhes bya ba dang / de'i [de DPG] yongs su 'gyur ba ste / gnyis pa'o //

gzhan yang de ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad kyi nus pa 'dun pa dang mos pa la sogs pa sems las byung ba thams cad dang bcas pa kun gzhi yin pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ste / rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa zhes [G187b] bya ba yang de nyid yin no // de las mig dang / gzugs dang snang ba dang / nam mkha' dang / yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen ji ltar nye bar gyur pa na / 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag 'byung ste / dper na rgya mtsho las chu'i rlabs dag rlung dang chu srin gyis bskyod pa la sogs pa'i rkyen gyis 'byung ba bzhin no // kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de yang 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag dang gcig pa nyid kyang ma yin la / tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin te / rgya mtsho dang chu rlabs bzhin no // yul la nye bar dmigs pa de dag kyang 'du shes med pa dang / 'du shes med pa pa dang / 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dang / gnyid log pa dang / myos pa dang / brgyal ba dag gi gnas skabs na ni med do // [D201a] de ltar de ni rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba dang / de'i yongs su [P221a] 'gyur ba ste / gsum pa'o //

sems de nyid rnal 'byor pa de la rab tu snang ba 'dzin pa'i rnam pa dang / yul du

snang ba gzung ba'i rnam par yongs su gyur cing snang ba ste / phyi rol gyi don med pas [pa D] sems tsam du dmigs pa *la brten nas* [pa D] yul mi dmigs pa rab tu skye la / gzung ba med na [D add de] 'dzin pa dag kyang med pas gzung ba mi dmigs pa la brten nas / 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam pa drug po dag mi dmigs pa rab tu skye ste /

ji srid du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rang gi sems kyi chos nyid rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba nyid la mi gnas shing dmigs pa la gnas pa de srid du bzung [gzung PG] ba'i sa bon mi ldog cing / [G188a] mtshan mar lta ba'i sa bon ma spangs pa'i phyir gnyis kyi bag chags mi spong ngo // gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa dag sems las phyi rol tu mi dmigs pa de'i tshe na / rang gi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa yin te / gnas gyur pas sgrib pa thams cad bsal ba'i phyir dang / chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nyid kyis [kyi PG] rnam par mi rtog pa'i chos nyid 'thob po //

rnam par rig pa tsam nyid ces bya ba de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes don thams cad la rnam par mi rtog pa de ni ngo bo nyid gsum yongs su mi shes na mi rtogs [rtog PG] pa [pas D] de'i phyir /

5.5 kalpitānupalabdheś ca paratantrasya cāgrahāt /
svabhāvaṃ pariniṣpannam īkṣante tattvadarśinaḥ //

brtags pa nye bar mi dmigs shing // gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pas //
de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i // ngo bo nyid la lta ba yin //

zhes bya ba smras te / 'di la kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang / gzhan gyi dbang dang / yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gsum po dag ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid kyi khongs su 'dus te /

de la nang dang [PG om.] phyi rol gyi dbye bas tha dad pa'i rnam par rtog pa gang dang gang gis gzugs dang byang chub kyi bar gyi dngos po gang dang gang rnam par brtags [btag PG] par bya ba de ni de bzhin du yod pa ma yin te / yod pa ma yin par [P221b] sgro 'dogs pas brtags [btags PG] pa yin pa'i phyir te / de ni kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid do //

khams gsum nas skyes nas [PG om.] sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa ma yin pa [D201b] kun rtog pa dge ba la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa ni gzhan gyis bskyed cing dbang bya ba yin pa'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang ngo // yang na gzhan skyes pa [G188b] la dbang byed pas gzhan gyi [gyis PG] dbang ste / kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang / yongs su grub pa gnyis de'i gzhi las kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang / yongs su grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir te / de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do //

gzhan gyi dbang de nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid do // de yang gzhan gyi dbang dang [PG om.] gcig pa nyid kyang ma yin la tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin te / gal te tha dad par gyur na ni chos nyid tha dad par 'gyur ro // ci ste gcig pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pas rnam par

byang ba'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro //

gal te ngo bo nyid gsum po dag yod na ji ltar dngos po thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhe na /

kun brtags [btags PG] pa ni rang gi mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas nye bar mi dmigs shing gzhan gyi dbang yang de la rang gi bdag nyid kyis skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas gzung du med do // yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i chos rnams kyi don dam pa yang yin la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin te / 'phags pa'i [pa PG] ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul gyi don yin pas don dam pa ngo bo nyid *med pa nyid* [G om.] kyis ngo bo nyid med pa yin te / de nyid mthong ba don dam par shes pa dag yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de la dmigs par bya ba dang / dmigs pa'i dngos po mnyam pa nyid kyis [kyi PG] lta ba yin te / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi [P222a] rtog pa [G189a] skyes pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar sbyar ro //

gnas gyur pa'i mtshan nyid de yang nyan thos rnams kyi ni rnam par grol ba'i lus yin te / zag pa thams cad dang bral zhing nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir ro // de nyid de bzhin gshegs pa'i ni chos kyi sku yin te / las dang gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags thams cad dang bral zhing shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir ro //

gal te kha cig 'di skad ces kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid ni 'jig rten dang [D202a] thun mong pa'i shes pa'i yul yin la yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni so so rang rig pa ste / thub pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi yul yin na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de shes pa gang gi yul yin zhing [D add de] yod par ji ltar shes zhes zer na

de'i phyir /

> 5.6 prajñapteḥ sanimittatvād anyathā dvayanāśataḥ /
> saṃkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā //
>
> btags pa rgyu mtshan bcas phyir dang // gzhan du gnyis po med phyir dang //
> kun nas nyon mongs dmigs pa'i phyir // gzhan dbang yod pa nyid du 'dod //

ces bya ba smras te / 'di ltar sems dang sems las byung ba dag yod pa nyid du btags pa gang yin pa de ni phyin ci log gi rgyu mtshan dang bcas pa snang ba'i phyir te / mtshan nyid des gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du rjes su dpag go // gzhan du gal te gzhan gyi dbang med par gyur na btags pa dang rgyu mtshan nam kun brtags [btags PG] dang yongs su grub pa gnyis po med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir te / de gnyis ni gzhan gyi dbang la rag lus pa'i phyir ro // gzhan yang gal te gzhan [G189b] gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid med par gyur na kun nas nyon mongs pa dmigs par mi 'gyur ba zhig na de dmigs pa'i phyir te / kun nas nyon mongs pa ni sems dang sems las byung ba dag la brten pa yin la / de dang bral ba nyid ni thar pa yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du 'dod do //

de yang 'jig [P222b] rten las 'das pa'i shes pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i yul yin pas yongs

su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid mngon sum du byas nas mthong ste / gzhan gyi dbang ni de'i rjes la thob pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kyis rtogs [rtog PG] par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro //

5.7 prajñāpāramitānītir iyaṃ sarvajñatāptaye /
na tūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhaparāyaṇā //

shes rab pha rol phyin tshul 'di // thams cad mkhyen nyid thob pa yin //
skye dang 'gag la sogs pa dag // dgag pa lhur len ma yin no //

zhes bya ba ni chos 'di dag nyid kyis chos rnams mngon par rlan par byed / yongs su rdzogs par byed yongs su gsal bar byed / yongs su dpyod par byed kyang [kyis PG] 'di la bdag gam bdag gir bya ba med do zhes gsungs pa de [des PG] ni bdag dang bdag gi rnam par 'dzin pa dang / de la mngon par zhen pa med pa'i sgo nas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i yongs su 'gyur ba bstan to // [D202b] sems de ni sems ma yin no zhes gsungs pa des ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa med par bstan to // sems med pa nyid gang yin pa de ni bsam gyis mi khyab bo zhes gsungs pa des ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid bstan to // de bzhin du gzugs ni mtshan ma'o // byang chub [G190a] kyi bar du yang mtshan ma'o zhes gsungs pa des ni ming dang brdar btags pas kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan to // skur pa gdab pa dang / nye bar blang ba dang / gdags pa'i chos dang / byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos bstan pas ni gzhan gyi dbang bstan to // de bzhin nyid dang / yang dag pa'i mtha' dang / dben pa dang / 'bras bu dang / rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid la sogs pa brjod pas ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan to // de ltar kho bo cag gis [gi PG] bstan pa'i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul 'di ni thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob pa'i thabs yin gyi / dbu ma smra ba rnams kyi skye ba dang 'gag la sogs [P223a] pa dag dgag pa lhur len pa ni med pa nyid du lta ba dang mthun pa nyid du 'gyur bas thams cad mkhyen pa nyid 'thob pa'i thabs ma yin no zhes zer te /

de ni rnal 'byor spyod pa pa dag gis sbyar ba'i phyogs snga ma yin no //

Bhāviveka's Response

5.8 atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvaṃ tāthāgataṃ vacaḥ /
āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate //

'dir bshad de bzhin gshegs bka' kun // kho bo cag gi tshad ma yin //
tshad ma yid ches lung yin phyir // bzang po dag ni sgrub par byed //

ces bya ba ni bde bar gshegs pa'i bka' thams cad ni kho bo cag gi tshad ma yin te / de dag ni de nyid gzigs pa rnams kyis gsungs pa yin pa'i phyir ro // dge legs kyi bsam pa can nyid dag ni de sgrub par byed cing mi mthun par mi byed do //

5.9 nāgamāntarasaṃdigdhaviparyastamatiḥ paraḥ /
tasmāt tatpratipattyarthaṃ tanmṛgyo yuktimannayaḥ //

lung gzhan dag gis [gi PG] the tshom dang // log pa'i blo can gzhan mi byed //
de phyir de dag sgrub gzhug phyir // rigs pa [G190b] ldan pa'i tshul btsal bya //

zhes bya ba la lung las gzhan pa'i lung ni lung gzhan dag go // de dag gis [gi P] the tshom du gyur pa ni de yin nam / 'on te ma yin snyam du the tshom za bar gyur pa'o // log pa zhes *bya ba* [pa PG] ni grub pa'i mtha' 'di las gzhan pa dag la rnam par g.yengs [g.yeng P] shing 'di la mi ltos [bltos PG] pas de ni 'di lta bu nyid ma yin no zhes log par zhugs pa'o // gang dag la de lta bu'i blo yod pa de dag [D203a] ni lung gzhan dag gis the tshom dang log pa'i blo can dag ste / sun 'byin par byed pa byung rgyal du smra ba gzhan dag go // de dag gis tshad ma de sgrub [grub PG] par mi byed pas de'i phyir de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa'i phyir / smra ba po rigs [rig PG] pa dang ldan pa'i tshul phyogs dang / gtan tshigs dang dpe'i skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa'i gnas su ma gyur pa'i mtha'i rigs pa'i lam btsal bar bya'o //

THE ULTIMATE AS AN OBJECT OF COGNITION

khyed kyis brtags [btags PG] pa'i gsung rab dang / skur pa 'debs pa ji skad smras pa dag gis ni rigs pa mi bzod pas de'i phyir /

5.10 dvayābhāvasya bhāvo hi virodhitvān na yujyate /
khapuṣpābhāvasattā vā na vā tadbhāvakalpanā //

gnyis med pa yi dngos po ni // rigs pa ma yin 'gal ba'i phyir //
nam [P223b] mkha'i me tog med dngos sam // de dngos yin par brtag mi bya //

zhes bya ba smras te / gal te re zhig gnyis med pa dngos po yin na ni ji ltar med pa yin / ci ste med pa yin na ni *'o na de lta ni* [PG om.] dngos po ma yin no // de'i phyir gnyis med pa'i dngos po ni rigs pa ma yin te / rang gi tshig dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gal te gnyis med pa'i tshul kho nar rtag tu nges par gnas pa'i phyir med pa nyid dngos po [G191a] yin no zhe na / de lta na nam mkha'i me tog med pa yang dngos po yin par thal bar 'gyur ro // gal te nam mkha'i me tog med pa dngos po yin par mi 'dod na ni gnyis med pa de yang dngos po yin par brtag par mi bya'o //

ci ste 'di snyam du kho bo cag gi tshul ni /

rnam par rtog pa gang gang gis // dngos po gang gang rnam brtags [btags PG] pa // de ni kun brtags [btags PG] kho na ste // ngo bo nyid ni yod ma yin //
gzhan gyi dbang gi dngos nyid ni // rnam rtog rkyen las 'byung [byung PG]

ba yin // de la [lta P] rtag tu snga ma shos // bral ba nyid gang yongs grub yin //

zhes bya ba ste / gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de la rtag tu snga ma shos zhes bya ba kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi gzung ba dang 'dzin par [PG add rnam par] brtags [btags PG] pa'i dngos po dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin te / kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang gzhan gyi dbang la ltos [bltos PG] nas med pa gang yin pa de nyid yongs su grub pa la ltos [bltos PG] nas dngos po yin pas de ltar na med pa dang dngos po zhes bya ba gnyis dbyer med pa'i phyir tha dad pa [D203b] nyid ma yin pas de'i phyir 'gal ba med do snyam du

pha rol po [PG om.] dag sems pa la brtags nas de dgag pa'i lan yang gdab pa'i phyir /

5.11 tattvataḥ kalpitābhāvāt tadabhedo mato yadi /
lakṣyalakṣavyavasthāyāṃ tattulyatvād anuttaram //

gal te yang dag brtag med phyir // de la dbye ba med snyam na //
mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid rnam gzhag [bzhag PG] la // de ni mtshungs phyir lan ma yin //

zhes bya ba smras te / [P224a] kun brtags [btags PG] pa dang gzhan gyi dbang dag med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa la dbyer med du zin kyang gang gi tshe mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid rnam par [G191b] gzhag [bzhag PG] pa byed pa na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi de nyid ces bya ba de'i mtshan nyid ni gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin no zhes bya ba de'i tshe na / gal te re zhig gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin na ni ji ltar med pa yin / ci ste med pa yin na ni 'o na de lta na dngos po ma yin no zhes 'gal bar sngar bstan pa de mtshungs pa'i phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i lan de ni bzang po ma yin no //

gzhan yang /

5.12 svarūpātyāgitā yāsya sā cet tadbhāva iṣyate /
na ca bhāvo[1] 'ta evāsau svarūpaṃ na jahāti cet //

gal te de'i dngos ma btang gang // de ni de dngos yin 'dod na //
de ltar dngos nyid mi gtong ba // de phyir de ni dngos ma yin //

zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag 'di skad ces gnyis med pa'i dngos po nyid yongs su mi gtong ba gang yin pa de nyid dngos po zhes bya'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa ni med do zhes zer na / de la 'di skad ces de ltar ngo bo nyid mi gtong na de'i phyir dngos po de ni med pa kho na yin pas de la dngos por brtag par mi bya'o zhes brjod par bya'o //

de'i phyir /

1 L tac ca bhāvo.

5.13 abhāvālambanaṃ jñānam evaṃ syāt tattvadarśinām /
na cāsau dharmanairātmyam asadbuddher nimittataḥ //

des na de nyid gzigs rnams kyi // mkhyen pa dngos med dmigs par 'gyur //
de yang chos bdag med min te // med pa'i blo yi rgyu phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni theg pa chen po'i grub pa'i mtha'i [PG om.] tshul gyis na sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ni dngos po yod pa dang / med pa'i mtha' gnyis las rnam par grol ba yin par bzhed na / khyed 'dod pa ltar na de dngos po med pa la dmigs pa yin par 'gyur bas lung dang 'gal lo //

gal te mi 'gal te gang gi phyir zhe na / kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i chos rnams kyi bdag med pa'i dngos po ni bdag med pa nyid yin la / de la [yang PG] dmigs pa [G192a] nyid yin par khyed kyang 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

chos bdag med pa ni mtshan ma thams cad [P224b] dang bral ba yin par 'dod na de yang med pa nyid kho nas med pa'i [D204a] blo'i yul yin pa'i phyir chos bdag med pa nyid du mi rung ngo // bdag gi sgra ni ngo bo nyid du smra ba'i phyir dang / bdag med pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dang / dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //

'dir pha rol po dag rnam par rtog [rtogs PG] pa ni 'ching ba yin par gsungs pas de dang bral na grol bar sems shing /

5.14ab abhāvālambanā buddhir avikalpā yadīṣyate /

gal te dngos med dmigs pa'i blo // rnam par mi rtog yin 'dod na //

zhes bya ba ni 'di skad ces chos thams cad ni dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir dngos po med pa la dmigs pa'i blos ci zhig la rtog par byed na rnam par rtog pa dang bcas par 'gyur / rnam par rtog pa med pa'i phyir de ni don ji lta ba bzhin yin no zhes zer na'o //

slob dpon gyis bshad pa /

5.14cd nanv evam avikalpāpi rūpabuddhiḥ satī bhavet //

des na gzugs [gzung PG] blo mi rtog pa'ang // dam pa yin pa nyid du 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni gal te rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyi blo don ji lta ba nyid yin par 'gyur na ni / de lta na 'jig rten pa'i blo gzugs la sogs pa rkyen las byung ba rtog pa dang rjes su dran pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba yang don ji lta ba bzhin nyid 'thob [thob D] par 'gyur ro //

'dir smras pa / gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba'i blo gang yin

pa ni yang dag par na don ji lta ba bzhin [D add ma] yin [G192b] par 'dod kyi / gzugs la sogs pa'i blo ni rnam par mi rtog pa yin du zin kyang yang dag pa ma yin te / gzung bar snang ba'i phyir zla ba gnyis la sogs pa mthong ba'i blo bzhin no zhe na
'dir bshad pa /

5.15 grāhyābhāsatayā ceṣṭā[2] yadi bhūtā na rūpadhīḥ /
hetuḥ syād vyabhicāry evaṃ pratijñā cāvahīyate //

gal te gzung bar snang 'dod pas // gzugs blo yang dag ma yin na //
des na gtan tshig 'khrul 'gyur zhing // dam bcas pa yang nyams par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba la 'khrul zhes bya ba ni 'gal zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste / 'di ltar gzugs kyi blo ni gzung bar snang ba nyid ma gtogs par logs shig ni [na PG] ngo bo [P225a] nyid med pas gzung bar snang ba nyid du rjes su dpag pa yang dag pa ma [P om.] yin pa nyid kyis yang dag pa bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi ngo bo nyid log par bsgrub pas 'gal lo // 'dir dam bcas pa ni gzugs kyi blo yang dag pa ma yin pa'o // 'di la gzugs kyi blo gang yin pa de ji ltar na yang dag pa ma yin par 'gyur te / [D204b] mngon sum dang / lung dang / 'jig rten la grags pas gzugs kyi blo yang dag pa nyid yin *par yang dag pa nyid ma yin* [PG om.] pa bsal [gsal P] ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal lo //

de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i // ngo bo nyid la lta ba yin //

zhes ji skad smras pa de la yang skyon 'di yod do [de PG] //

5.16 savikalpā ca bodhiḥ syāc chāstuḥ sālambanāpi vā /
nirvikalpāpi dhīr na syāt svabhāvālambikā satī //

ngo bo nyid la dmigs yin na // ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dang //
dmigs pa can du 'gyur ba dang // rnam par mi rtog blor mi 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig [rigs P] par bya ba yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i dmigs pa sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa'i [G193a] ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de lta bu cung zhig yod cing / ngo bo nyid de la dmigs pa yin na ston pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub kyi ye shes rtog pa can du 'gyur te / byang chub ni rtog pa mi [P om.] mnga' bar bzhed do // dmigs pa de la dmigs par byed pa yin na dmigs pa can du yang 'gyur bas dmigs pa med pa nyid du yang mi 'grub ste / byang chub ni dmigs pa med pa nyid du bzhed do // de nyid la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par rtog par byed na rnam par mi rtog pa'i blor yang mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i tshig sbyar ro //

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2 L caiṣā.

The ultimate as consciousness

'di lta ste khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam ste / phyi rol gyi don med do zhes dam bcas pa gang yin pa de la yang /

5.17 cittamātropalambhena rūpādyagrahaṇaṃ na ca /
abhyupetapratītibhyāṃ pratijñā bādhyate yataḥ //

sems tsam du ni dmigs pa dang // gzugs la sogs pa mi 'dzin na //
khas blangs pa dang grags pa yis // dam bcas pa la gnod par 'gyur //

[P225b] zhes bya ba la khas blangs pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni mig dang gzugs rnams la brten nas mig gi rnam par ses pa 'byung ngo zhes gsungs pa'i lung dang 'gal ba'o // grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni 'jig rten na gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa mi skye bar grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba'o //

'dir smras pa / gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par yang rnam par shes pa skye bar mthong ste / de lta bur snang ba 'byung ba'i phyir dper na rmi lam na gzugs la sogs pa'i blo skye ba [G193b] bzhin no zhe na /

de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pa /

5.18 nāpi rūpādivijñānaṃ vinārtheneti yujyate /
tathābhāsodayād yadvat svapne rūpādibuddhayaḥ //

de ltar snang ba skye ba'i phyir // rmi lam gzugs sogs blo bzhin du //
gzugs la sogs [D205a] pa don med par // rnam par shes zhes byar mi rung //

zhes bya ba ni de'i phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i rjes su dpag pa de bzang po ma yin no //

ci'i phyir zhe na /

5.19 yasmāt svapnādivijñānaṃ dharmālambanam iṣyate /
dṛṣṭāntanyūnatā hy evaṃ viṣaye[3] cāpavāditā //

gang phyir rmi lam la sogs pa'i // rnam shes chos la dmigs pa'i phyir //
de phyir dpe yang med pa dang // yul la skur pa 'debs par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags kyis bsgos [bgos PG] pa'i shes pa dang ldan pa'i mig gis rmi lam na mthong ba nyid kyi gzugs la

3 L vastuno.

sogs pa dag mthong ba yin gyi ma mthong ba ma yin te / rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa dag ni dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid yin te / sngon mthong ba la sogs pa [pa'i PG] mngon par brjod pa'i phyir dran pa la sogs pa bzhin no // dmus long gi mig gi mthu gtan nyams pa la yang tshe rabs gzhan na mthong ba'i bag chags kyi shugs kyis [kyi PG] rmi lam na kha dog dang dbyibs tha dad pa'i gzugs du ma dag snang bar 'gyur bas de'i shes [P226a] pa de la yang dmigs pa med pa ma yin te / 'di ltar bzang skyong dmus long des rmi lam na shes pa dang ldan pa'i mig gis gzugs de dag mthong ste / sha'i mig gis ni ma yin no zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o // shes pa'i mig gis ni chos la dmigs pa'i phyir rmi lam la [G194a] sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa yang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid yin pas khyed cag gi sgrub pa la dpe med pa'i skyon nyid du 'gyur ro // gzugs la sogs pa'i don gyi dngos po sel bar byed pa'i phyir yul la skur pa 'debs pa nyid kyang yin no //

khyed 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar skye ste / rang du snang ba dang rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba'i phyi rol gyi yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa de rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i yul nyid yin no zhes zer na

de'i phyir bshad pa /

5.20 viṣayābhāsatā cet syāc cittasyālambanaṃ matā /
viṣayābhāsatāṃ projjhya cittātmānyo 'sti kīdṛśaḥ //

gal te yul du snang ba nyid // sems kyi dmigs pa yin 'dod na //
yul du snang ba ma gtogs par // sems kyi bdag nyid gzhan ci yod //

ces bya ba ni 'di ltar kho bo cag gis ni gzugs la sogs pa'i yul du snang bar skyes pa nyid rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par mthong gi yul du snang ba ma gtogs par rang du snang ba gzhan ma mthong [D205b] ngo // gal te yul du snang ba nyid las gzhan pa rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa zhig yod na de gang yin ston cig /

gal te de bstan pa'i phyir 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba dang / yul du snang ba zhes bya ba'i ngo bo nyid gnyis yod de / rang gi ngo bor gnas pa'i phyir dang / gzhan lta bur skyes pa'i phyir shel gyi nor bu bzhin te / dper na shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid las ni rang gsal la / sngon po la sogs pa'i nye bar gzhag [bzhag P] pa'i khyad [G194b] par las ni sngon po [P226b] la sogs par [pa PG] snang bar [ba PG] mtshon du rung ngo // de bzhin du sems rang rang [PG om.] du snang ba'i yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa las yul du snang ba nyid du 'gyur ro zhe na /

de lta na bsgrub par bya ba dang dpe nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa mi mthun ste / gang gi phyir zhe na /

5.21 neṣṭā sphaṭikavat tasya dvyābhatānyanibhodayāt //
upādānāt tatra jāto yato na sphaṭikakṣaṇaḥ //

gzhan ltar skyes phyir de gnyis snang // shel dang 'dra bar mi 'dod de //

nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pas [las PG] der skye ba // shel gyi skad cig min phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni shel gyi nor bu sngon po la sogs pa nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i khyad par gyis [gyi PG] rang gi ngo bor gsal ba nyid yongs su btang bas sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su 'gyur ba ni bden mod kyi / shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma snga ma gang yin pa de ni 'gags par gyur pas sngon po la sogs par gyur pa ma yin no //

5.22ab tadapāye 'nyathotpatter bhrāntatā tanmater matā /

de 'gags gzhan ni skyes pa la // de yi blo ni 'khrul par 'dod //

ces bya ba ni shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma de 'gags pas na nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i khyad par gyis sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la shel yin par dmigs pa'i blo ni 'khrul pa nyid yin no //

ngo bo nyid gnyis ni med de / gang gi phyir zhe na / shel nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa dang bral ba na snga ma'i ngo bo nyid kho nar snang ba ltar shes pa'i rnam par shes bya'i rnam pa dang bral ba shel gyi rnam pa nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa dang bral ba lta bu ni nam yang gzung du med pa'i phyir ro // rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i bdag nyid nyams su myong ba med kyang de yul gyi [G195a] rnam pas *nye bar* [PG om.] kha bsgyur ba'i dmigs par snang ba'i yul du snang ba nyid yin par rigs [rig PG] pa dang ldan pa ma yin no // dper na shel gyi nor bu nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i tshon dang phrad pa na de lta bur snang bar mtshon du rung yang shel gyi nor bu yang nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i [D206a] ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur la nye bar gzhag [bzhag PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang [P227a] shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur te / shel gyi nor bu tshon yin pa 'am / tshon kyang shel gyi nor bu nyid yin par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // de bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang rkyen ji ltar nye bar gyur pa'i yul du snang bar skye yang / rnam par shes pa yang rnam pa thams cad du gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur la / gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur te / sa la sogs pa'i sems dang bcas pa nyid dam / sems kyang [kyi PG] sa la sogs pa bzhin du sems med pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir / rnam par shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa nyid yin no zhes bya bar rang la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir de shel bzhin du gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi rigs so //

'dir smras pa / yul du snang ba des [der D] rang dang rjes su mthun pa'i 'bras bu bskyed par bya ba'i phyir rim gyis rnam par shes pa'i rgyun nus pa dang ldan par byed cing lan 'ga' ni de'i rnam pa'i nus par gnas so // lan 'ga' ni nus pa yongs su smin pa las rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba'i rnam par [G195b] skye'o // rnam par shes pa ni nus pa dang yul du snang ba de gnyis las gcig pa nyid dang tha dad pa nyid du [PG om.] brjod par mi 'dod de / rnam par shes pa nyid nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid gnyis su snang

ba yin no zhe na /

’dir bshad pa /

5.22cd śaktyabhedān na dvyābhatā viṣayābhāsatātmavat //

gnyis su snang med nus pa ni // tha dad min phyir yul snang bzhin //

zhes bya ba la rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang ba ma yin zhes bya ba ni phyogs yin la / nus pa tha dad pa ma yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs yin / yul du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa’i bdag nyid bzhin no zhes bya ba ni dpe yin te / rang du snang ba’i [P227b] rnam par shes pa gzhan yin zhes byar yang de skye ba na yul du snang ba kho na’i rnam par shes pa skye ste / yul gyi rnam pa tha dad par snang ba’i phyir dang / yul du snang ba ’khrul pa med pa’i phyir ro // de ’gag pa na yang rnam par shes pa’i rgyun dang ldan pa’i nus pa yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes pa bskyed pa’i mthu dang ldan pa [D206b] gzhag [bzhag PG] nas ’gag cing de yongs su smin par gyur pa las yang yul du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa nyid skye bar zad kyi / rang du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa’i nus pa gang gis de bskyed par ’gyur ba bzhag pa ni ’ga’ yang med pas yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba nyid brtags [btags PG] pas ci bya /

ci ste yang ’di snyam du rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang ba yin te / lhan cig tu ’dra bar ’byung ba’i phyir gzugs dang gzugs brnyan bzhin te / gang la lhan cig ’byung [G196a] ba’i ngang tshul yod pa de ni lhan cig tu byung ba ste / cig car ’byung ba zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go // gang lhan cig ’byung ba dang ’dra ba’i ngang tshul yod pa de ni ’dra bar ’byung ba ste / lhan cig tu ’dra bar ’byung ba’o // dper na gzugs dang lhan cig tu gzugs brnyan ’dra bar ’byung ba bzhin [PG add no] te / de la gzugs lta bu ni rang du snang ba nyid yin la / gzugs brnyan lta bu ni yul du snang ba nyid yin par sems na /

’dir bshad pa /

5.23 svaparābhāsatā neṣṭā cetasaḥ pratibimbavat //
sahakārānukāritvāt tasmād dvyābhāsatāsatī //

sems ni rang dang gzhan snang ba // lhan cig ’dra bar ’byung ba’i phyir //
gzugs brnyan bzhin du mi ’dod de // de phyir gnyis su snang ma yin //

zhes bya ba ni lhan cig tu ’dra bar ’byung ba nyid yin du zin kyang gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi ’grub pa kho na yin te / gzugs brnyan ni [P228a] dngos po med pa’i phyir dang / de’i blo yang ’khrul pa yin pa’i phyir ro //

’dir smras pa / rnam par shes pa ni gnyis su snang ba kho na yin te / tshad ma dang ’bras bu yin pa’i phyir ro // de la tshad ma ni ’dis rjes su dpog pa’i phyir tshad ma ste / rang du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa’o // ’bras bu ni de’i yul so sor rtog pa ste / yul du snang ba nyid do // yul du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa ’ba’ zhig la ni tshad ma dang ’bras

bu dag ’thad par dka’o zhe na /
’dir bshad pa /

5.24 pramāṇaphalatābhāvād iṣṭā dvyābhāsateti cet //
anyathāpi hi tatsiddhes tatkḷptir api neṣyate //

gal te tshad ma ’bras yod phyir // gnyis su snang bar ’dod ce na //
gzhan du’ang [du PG] de dag ’grub pa’i phyir // brtag pa de yang mi ’dod do //

zhes bya ba ni gnyis su snang ba nyid ma yin par gzhan du yang [G196b] tshad ma dang ’bras bu de dag ’grub pa’i phyir brtag pa de yang mi ’dod do // de ji ltar na [D207a] gzhan du tshad ma dang ’bras bu dag ’grub par ’gyur zhe na / de’i phyir /

5.25 bibhratā jāyamānena jñānena viṣayābhatām /
pramīyate prameyaṃ yat pramāṇaṃ tena tan matam //

yul du snang ba ’dzin pa yi // rnam par shes pa skye bzhin pas //
gzhal bya gang yin ’jal byed pa // des na de ni tshad mar ’dod //

ces bya ba smras te / ’di [yid P] la yul du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba’i rnam par ’dzin par skye bzhin pa nyid kyis yul rnam par rtog [rtogs PG] par byed pa’i phyir / shes pa skye bzhin pa nyid gang yin pa de tshad ma yin par ’dod do //

5.26ab tannirvṛttau ca dṛṣṭatvāt tannirvṛttiḥ phalaṃ matam /

de skyes pa na mthong ba’i phyir // de grub pa ni ’bras bur ’dod //

ces bya ba ni rnam par shes pa de skyes pa na yul mthong ba’i phyir shes pa des mngon par grub pa ni ’bras bu yin pas yul du snang ba’i rnam par shes pa nyid la tshad ma dang ’bras bu gnyis yod par ’dod de / dper na shing la [P228b] sta res gzas pa dang / btab pa’i rkyen gyis [gyi PG] gnyis su gcod par byed pa nyid dang / de dum bu gnyis su chad par gyur pa nyid bzhin no //

5.26cd anirdeśyasvarūpasya tathaivādhigamo yataḥ //

bstan du med pa’i ngo bo nyid // de bzhin rtog pa gang thob pa //

zhes bya ba ni mngon sum gyi shes pa dngos po’i rang gi mtshan nyid tsam la dmigs pa rtog [rtogs PG] pa dang rjes su dran pa’i rnam par rtog pa dang bral bas / gzugs la sogs pa sngon po la sogs pa’i bdag nyid du *bstan du* [P om.] med pa’i ngo bo nyid la / de bzhin

du med pa'i ngo bo nyid kho na bzhin du rang rig pa'i rnam pas rtogs par byed pa gang [G197a] gi phyir de'i phyir yul nyid du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gcig pu kho na la tshad ma dang 'bras bu gnyi ga yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pas rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar rtog [rtogs D] pa ni *dgos pa* [dngos po P] med do //

yang pha rol po dag gi bsam pa gzhan bsal ba'i phyir bshad pa /

5.27 cittasvabhāvo bāhyo 'rtho yadi sādhyo vivakṣitaḥ /
vijñānaviṣayatvena tad yathā samanantaraḥ //

gal tel smra 'dod bsgrub bya ba // phyi don sems kyi dngos nyid de //
rnam par shes pa'i yul yin phyir // dper na de ma thag bzhin no //

zhes bya ba 'di la phyi rol gyi don ni chos can no // de sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin par sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa ni de'i chos so // rnam par shes pa'i yul yin phyir // zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs kyi don du phyir zhes smos so // dper na de ma thag pa'i rkyen bzhin no zhes bya ba ni dpe ste [G om.] / [D207b] sems dang sems las byung ba mtshungs pa de ma thag tu 'gags pa rnams ni de las gzhan pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba rnams skye ba'i rkyen gyi [gyis PG] dngos por 'gyur bas de ma thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'o // gal te de yang rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa de bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang rnam par shes [P229a] pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin no zhe na /

5.28ab pratyekaṃ caitasair hetoḥ syād evaṃ vyabhicāritā /

des na sems byung so so yis [yi PG] // gtan tshigs 'khrul pa nyid du 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni des ci [PG om.] re zhig rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir de ma thag pa'i rkyen bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin par 'gyur ram [G197b] / 'on te rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa sems las byung ba so so dag sems kyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang sems kyi ngo bo nyid ma yin par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid do //

ci ste yang 'di snyam du de ni lung gis 'grub ste / 'di lta ste / khams gsum po ni sems tsam mo zhes gsungs par sems na / 'dir bshad pa / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / lung gi don yongs su ma shes pa'i phyir ro // gang gi phyir zhe na /

5.28cd sūtreṣu cittamātroktikartṛbhoktṛniṣedhitaḥ //

mdo las sems tsam gsungs pa ni // byed po za po dgag phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs can dag gis rnam par shes pa las gzhan gyi byed pa po dang za ba po yod par brtags [btags PG] pa sel bar mdzad pa'i phyir sangs rgyas dang /

byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyis [kyi PG] sems tsam zhes bstan pa mdzad pa yin gyi / phyi rol gyi yul bsal ba'i phyir ni ma yin no // gang gi phyir zhe na / *sa bcu pa'i mdo sde* las / byang chub sems dpa'i sa drug pa la byang chub sems dpa' rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba lugs su 'byung ba dang / lugs su 'byung ba ma [P om.] yin pa la rnam par blta ba 'di snyam du sems te / ma rig pa la sogs pa yan lag bcu gnyis *pa las* [pas PG] sdug bsngal gyi phung po 'ba' zhig pa byed pa po dang / tshor ba po dang bral ba [P229b] 'di 'byung zhing sdug bsngal gyi shing ljon pa mngon par 'grub par 'gyur ro snyam du de ltar nges pas / kye rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste / khams gsum [G198a] pa 'di ni [D208a] sems tsam ste / sems kyis [kyi PG] mngon par 'dus byas pa dang / sems kyis bris pa yin gyi [gyis PG] / sems las gzhan pa'i byed pa po dang / za ba po ni 'ga' yang med do // zhes gsungs pas phyi rol gyi yul med pa nyid du mi 'grub po //

'dir smras pa / de ni *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa* las kyang gsungs te / byams pa byang chub sems dpa' gzugs kyi bye brag gdags pa ni rnam pa gsum gyis [gyi PG] khong du chud par bya ste / 'di lta ste / 'di ni kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i gzugs so // 'di ni rnam par brtags [btags G] pa'i gzugs so // 'di ni chos nyid kyi gzugs so zhes bya bas so // de la kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i gzugs gang zhe na / gzugs zhes bya ba ni ming dang / 'du shes dang / gdags pa dang / tha snyad la brten nas gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid du rtog pa gang yin pa de / de ni rdzas su med do // de la rnam par brtags [btags PG] pa'i gzugs gang zhe na / rnam par rtog pa la brten nas gang la ming dang / 'du shes dang / gdags pa dang / tha snyad kyi gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par mngon par brjod pa nyid de / 'di ni rnam par rtog pa rdzas su yod pa nyid la brten nas rdzas su yod pa yin gyi / rang dbang du 'jug pa las ni ma yin no // de la chos nyid kyi gzugs gang zhe na / kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i gzugs des rnam par brtags [btags PG] pa'i gzugs [G add rnam par btags pa'i gzugs] de la rtag tu ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang [G198b] / chos bdag med pa nyid dang / yang dag pa'i mtha' la sogs pa gang yin pa ste / de la rdzas su yod pa [P230a] yang ma yin la / rdzas su med pa yang ma yin te / rnam par brtags [btags PG] pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid dang / rnam par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhes gsungs so zhe na /

bshad pa /

> 5.29 vikalpitārthaśūnyaṃ ca vijñānaṃ yadi sādhyate /
> akalpitārthasadbhāvān na syād arthanirākriyā //
>
> gal te rnam brtags [btags PG] don stong pas // rnam par shes pa sgrub byed na //
> brtags [btags PG] pa ma yin don yod phyir //yul med par ni mi 'gyur ro //

zhes bya ba ni rnam par shes pa la rnam par brtags [btags PG] pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid yin yang de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba'i chos nyid kyi gzugs kyi don yod pa'i phyir / sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa'i dngos po [D208b] gang yin pa de yod pas brtags [btags PG] pa ma yin pa'i don yod pa'i phyir yul yod pa kho na yin par rnam par shes pa thams cad du yul gyis [gyi P] stong pa yin par mi rigs so //

gzhan yang /

5.30ab svapnabuddhisvabhāvenākalpitabhāvasaṃśayaḥ[4] /

rmi lam la yang brtags min pa'i // ngo bo nyid blos ma nges 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni khams gsum pa ni sems tsam ste / gzugs la sogs pa'i don gyis stong pa'i phyir / rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no zhes bya ba de la 'di ltar / rmi lam la yang brtags [btags PG] pa ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi blo'i cha yod pa'i phyir des na ci re zhig rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no zhes bya ba de rmi lam gyi [G199a] rnam par shes pa brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi skyes bu la sogs pa'i don gyis stong par 'gyur ram / 'on te rang [gang PG] gi cha la dmigs pa brtags [btags PG] pa ma yin pa'i don gyis mi stong par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid du 'gyur ro //

5.30cd na nirālambanāpīṣṭā dṛṣṭāntasyāprasiddhitaḥ //

dmigs pa med par [pa D] mi 'dod de // dpe ni rab tu ma grub phyir //

zhes bya ba ni brtags [btags PG] pa'i don [P230b] gyis stong pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i dpe rmi lam blangs pa der yang brtags [btags PG] pa'i don sel bar byed kyi brtags [btags PG] pa ma yin pa'i don gyi cha sel bar mi byed pa [pas PG] des kyang sems tsam nyid du mi 'grub pa'i phyir / dmigs pa med par mi 'dod de / dpe bsgrub par bya ba'i phyogs gcig dang mi ldan par rab tu ma grub pa'i phyir ro // rmi lam gyi shes pa'i chos nyid kyi *gzugs kyi* [P om.] don la dmigs pa'i phyir dmigs pa med pa nyid ma yin no // 'di ltar rmi lam ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i phyir gtan la dbab par na de dpe nyid du mi rung ngo zhes bya bar bsams so //

'dir smras pa /

5.31 atha syād viṣayo hy ekaḥ samūho vā bhaved dhiyaḥ /
yuktyā parīkṣyamāṇas tu sa dvidhāpi na yujyate //

ci ste blo yul rnam pa gnyis // gcig dang 'dus pa yin snyam na //
rigs pas yongs su brtags pa na // de ni gnyi gar mi rigs so //

zhes bya ba ni pha rol po dag na re ci ste phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba dag blo'i yul rnam pa gnyis su 'dod de / rdul phra rab gcig pu 'ba' zhig yul du 'dod dam / 'on te rdul phra rab 'dus pa yul du 'dod do snyam na / gnyi ga yang rigs pas yongs su brtags pa na [G199b] [D209a] 'gal ba'i phyir de ni gnyi gar mi rigs te / bzang po ma yin no zhes zer ro

4 L svapnabuddhisvabhāvenākalpitābhāvasaṃśayaḥ.

// rigs [rig PG] pa de yang gang zhe na / de'i phyir smras pa /

> 5.32 tatrāṇurūpam[5] ekaṃ tu rūpabuddher na gocaraḥ /
> atadābhatayā yadvad akṣarūpaṃ na gocaraḥ //

> de la gzugs rdul gcig pu ni // gzugs blo'i spyod yul ma yin te //
> de snang nyid du mi 'gyur phyir // dbang gzugs spyod yul ma yin bzhin //

zhes bya ba la gzugs kyi phra ba nyid kyi mthar thug pa ni rdul phra rab po // gcig pu zhes bya ba ni 'ba' zhig zhes [ces D] bya ba'i tha tshig go // gzugs kyi rdul gcig pu ni zhes bya ba ni chos can yin la / de gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul ma yin te zhes bya ba ni de'i [P231a] chos te / chos can dang chos bsdus pa ni phyogs yin no // de snang nyid du mi 'gyur phyir // zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs te / de snang nyid du zhes bya ba ni yul gyi dngos po nyid du snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // de snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur // zhes bya ba ni de blo la // snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur zhing // yul gyi dngos po nyid du mi 'gyur ba ste / gtan tshigs kyi don gyi phyir zhes bya ba smos so // dbang gzugs spyod yul ma yin [D add bzhin] // zhes bya ba ni dpe ste / dbang po zhes bya ba ni dbang po lnga rnams te / de rnams kyi ngo bo nyid yul kha dog gzugs dang ba nyid du yod pa yin yang de snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir / dper na de gzugs kyi blo'i yul ma yin pa de bzhin du rdul phra rab kyang gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul ma yin no //

> 5.33 anekam api cittasya naiva tadgocaraṃ matam /
> rūpaṃ hi paramāṇūnām adravyatvād dvicandravat //

> phra rab gzugs ni du ma ste // sems kyi spyod yul yin mi 'dod //
> rdzas su yod pa ma yin phyir // dper na zla ba gnyis [G200a] bzhin no //

zhes bya ba ni rdul phra rab kyi gzugs du ma de dag 'dus pa de yang sems kyi spyod yul yin par mi 'dod de / ci'i phyir zhe na / rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar rdul phra rab kyi gzugs 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su 'dod la / de dag 'dus pa ni dmag [dmags P] dang nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du rdzas su yod pa ma yin pas de snang bar 'gyur du zin kyang sems kyi spyod yul yin par mi rigs te / dper na rab rib can gyi mig skyon gyis [PG add sems kyi spyod yul yin par mi rigs te dper na rab rib can gyi mig skyon gyis] nyams pas zla ba gnyis pa [D om.] la sogs pa yang dag pa ma yin par mthong ba bzhin no *zhe na* [D om.] //

'dir bshad pa /

> 5.34 tatrāsaṃcitarūpasya cittāgocaratā[6] yadi /

5 L tatrānurūpam.
6 L cittagocaratā.

prasādhyate pareṇāpi siddhir eva prasādhyate //

de la gal te pha [P231b] rol po // bsags pa [D209b] min [med D] pa'i gzugs sems kyi //
spyod yul min par sgrub byed na // der ni grub pa nyid grub [sgrub D] 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag bsags pa ma yin pa'i gzugs rdul phra rab gcig pu sems kyi spyod yul nyid ma yin par sgrub par byed na phyogs snga ma der grub pa nyid la sgrub par 'gyur te / kho bo cag kyang de ltar 'dod pa'i phyir ro //

5.35 atha saṃcitarūpasya hetor evam asiddhatā /
rūpāntarair upakṛtais tannirbhāsodayād dhiyaḥ //

ci ste bsags pa'i gzugs la ni // gtan tshigs ma grub nyid 'gyur te //
gzugs gzhan dag gi bsags [bsams PG] pa ni // der snang blo ni skye phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni ci ste rdul phra rab kyi rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i gzugs phyogs su byas nas de la rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa nyid gtan tshigs su brjod na ni / de [G200b] lta na gtan tshigs gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur te / ci'i phyir zhe na / 'di ltar rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i gzugs gzhan dag gis de la bsags shing kun nas sbyar ba na de yul gyi dngos por khas blangs shing der snang ba'i blo rdul phra rab 'dus pa'i rnam par skye ba'i phyir ro // kho bo cag ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i bsags pa bum pa la sogs pa nyid dang phra rab kyang kun rdzob pa'i rdzas su 'dod de / 'di ltar rdul phra rab ni rdzas brgyad 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas / de yang rdzas nyid yin par 'dod la / de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyang rdzas nyid yin te / 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su ma [mi PG] 'grub pa'i phyir ro //

5.36 tasyālambanatā ceṣṭā tadābhamatihetutaḥ /
rāgavad bādhyate tasmāt pratijñā te 'numānataḥ //

de ni dmigs nyid yin 'dod de // der snang blo yi rgyur 'gyur phyir //
'dod chags bzhin te de yi phyir // khyod dam bcas la rjes dpag gnod //

ces bya ba ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i [P232a] gzugs de ni dmigs pa nyid yin par 'dod de / ci'i phyir zhe na / 'di ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa de ni bsags pa'i gzugs der snang ba'i blo'i rgyu'i dngos po nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir te / gang dang gang der snang ba'i blo'i rgyur 'gyur ba de dang de ni bsags pa la dmigs pa yin te / dper na 'dod chags yul la chags pa'i mtshan nyid [D add de] ni bud med kyi gzugs la sogs pa bsags pa nyid la dmigs par 'dod pa bzhin te / de'i phyir khyod kyis bsags [D210a] pa'i gzugs ni dmigs pa ma yin no zhes dam bcas [G201a] pa de la rjes su dpag pa 'dis gnod par 'gyur ro

// rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga'i gnas dang / dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes gsungs pa'i lung [lus PG] dang yang 'gal lo //

'dir smras pa / blo ni dmigs pa med pa kho nar skye ste / rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i sa bon las skyes pa'i phyir yid kyi blo bzhin no zhe na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.37 yady anālambanā sādhyā svabījād udayād dhiyaḥ /
manodhīvad akalpatvāt syāt te sālambanā nanu //

gal te rang blo dmigs med de // rang gi sa bon las skye'i phyir //
yid blo bzhin 'dod btags min phyir // khyod kyi [kyis PG] dmigs bcas nyid du 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni yid kyi rnam par shes pa la'ang btags pa ma yin pa'i rang gi don du snang ba'i cha yod pa'i phyir khyod kyi blo dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ro

gzhan yang /

5.38 anālambānumānād vā taddhītvāsya nirākriyā[7] /
samūhasyāpratijñānāt tanniṣedho na bādhakaḥ //

dmigs pa med pa rjes dpog pas // de ni blo nyid ma yin 'gyur //
'dus pa dam ni ma bcas pas // de 'gog pa ni gnod pa med //

ces bya ba ni dmigs pa rtogs par byed pas blo zhes bya ba yin na dmigs pa med pa nyid rjes su dpog pas blor 'dod pa de blo ma yin pa nyid du gyur pas blo de ni blo nyid ma yin [P232b] par bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo log par bsgrubs pas dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro //

khyod kyis 'dus pa ni dmigs pa ma yin no zhes smras pa gang yin pa de la yang kho bos kyang 'dus pa dmigs pa yin par dam ma [D om.] bcas te / 'o na ji ltar dam bcas she na / rdul phra rab bsags pa ni dmigs pa [G201b] yin par dam bcas pas khyod kyis 'dus pa dmigs pa ma yin par de 'gog pa ni kho bo la gnod pa med do // bsags pa dang 'dus pa zhes bya ba gnyis la khyad par ci yod ce na / rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa dag gzhi gcig la brten pa ni tshogs pa zhes bya'o // glang po che dang / rta la sogs pa dang / skyer pa dang / seng ldeng la sogs pa'i rdzas rigs mi mthun pa gzhi tha dad pa 'dus pa la dmag [dmags P] dang nags tshal la sogs par gdags pa ni 'dus pa zhes bya'o //

'dir smras pa / 'o na kho bo cag gi dmigs pa brtag pa'i skabs su /

5.39abc asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe dvayam anyonyahetukam /

7 L na dhītvādinirākriyā.

śaktir viṣayarūpaṃ ca

phyi rol don ni med par yang // nus pa [P om.] dang ni [D210b] yul gyi dngos //
gnyis po phan tshun rgyur 'gyur bas //

thog ma med pa'i dus nas 'jug // ces bya bas phyogs 'di brtan [bstan PG] por bzhag zin to zhe na /

bshad pa / tshig le'ur byas pa de'i rtsa ba bzhi pa /

5.39d tannivṛttiḥ kuto matā //

ji ltar de ni ldog par 'dod //

ces bya ba 'dis rjes nas brgal zhing brtag par bya ste / phyi rol gyi don yod pa la ni yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba de'i dag pa 'tshol ba'i rnal 'byor pas yul ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs [rtog PG] par gzung [bzung PG] ba dang / 'dzin pa ldog pa'i phyir 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skye ba rigs [rig PG] pa kho nar 'gyur gyi / khyed yul med pa la ni dang po [P233a] nas kyang phyi rol gyi don med la / phyis kyang med pa bzhin du gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'jug par 'gyur ba de [de'i PG] phyis rgyu gang gis ldog [G202a] cing 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i thabs ci yang med do // yul med par smra ba la ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam skye ba'i thabs med pas nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid kyi rnam par shes pa thog ma med pa'i dus nas 'jug pa de ji ltar ldog pa'i rigs pa brjod par bya dgos so //

gal te khyod 'di snyam du /

5.40ab āryatvād avikalpatvād aheyā nirvikalpadhīḥ /

mi rtog blo ni spang min te // 'phags phyir rnam par mi rtog phyir //

zhes bya bar sems na zhes bya ba ni gal te 'khor bar 'jug pa'i rgyu gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa gnyis spangs su zin kyang rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo ni spang ba ma yin te / 'phags pa'i phyir dang / rnam par mi rtog pa'i phyir skye bar 'gyur ba nyid yin te / ldog par mi 'gyur bar sems na'o //

de lta na /

5.40cd tadutpādāt kuto mokṣas tadbījānupaghātataḥ //

de skye thar pa ga la yod // de yi sa bon ma bcom phyir //

zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar rnam par shes pa'i sa bon 'jug pas ni 'khor bar 'dod la / de bcom

pas ni thar par 'dod pa yin na ji srid du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'am / rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa de [D om.] skye ba yod pa de srid du thar pa ga la yod / de'i phyir sems tsam du smra ba khyod la thar pa yang mi 'thad par 'gyur ro //

ci ste 'di snyam du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa skye ba ni 'ching ba yin la / rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa skye ba ni thar pa yin [D211a] par sems te / [G202b] ci'i phyir zhe na / 'di *lta ste* [ltar D] /

5.41 dvayapravṛttau saṃjñāyā viśvābhāsaḥ[8] prajāyate /
viśvaṃ tadābhatā yāsyāḥ tadutpādāt[9] svabījataḥ //

gnyis kyi 'du shes 'jug pa na // sna tshogs snang ba rab tu skye // [P233b]
de yi sna tshogs snang gang dang // de rang sa bon las skye'i phyir //

zhes bya ba ste / gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis kyi rnam par shes pa 'jug pa na / gzugs la sogs pa yul sna tshogs kyi rnam par snang ba rab tu skye ste / de'i rnam pa sna tshogs snang ba de yang gang zhe na / rnam par shes pa yul gyi rnam par yongs su 'gyur ba gang yin pa'o // de dang rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de yang rang gi sa bon yul du snang ba'i rnam pa de las skye ba'i phyir ro //

5.42ab layaḥ śaktyarpaṇāt tasya svātmany evānyato 'pi vā /

zha ba de la nus phul dang // rang bdag nyid dang gzhan las so //

zhes bya ba ni 'jug pa'i rnam pa shes pa de dag 'gag cing bdag [bag DPG] la zha ba na yang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa de la 'jug par 'gyur te / gang gi nus pa phul ba'i ngo bo nyid du gnas pa yin no // rang gi cha la dmigs pa rang gi bdag nyid dang / yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan 'gag pa las kyang de la zha bar 'gyur ro zhes bya bar sbyar bar sems na /

'dir bshad pa / de ni 'jig rten yid ches par bya ba tsam la bden mod kyi / skyon 'di yod de /

5.42cd nanu vijñānaparyāyād ātmaivāyaṃ nirūpitaḥ //

rnam par ses pa'i ming gis ni // de la bdag tu btags par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni bdag tu smra ba dag kyang yul sna tshogs 'byin pa'i bdag gcig pu la thams cad kyi [kyis D] nus pa rab tu bsags par sems pas [dpas PG] khyod kyis kyang rnam par

8 L viśvābhāsaṃ.

9 L yāsya tadutpādaḥ.

shes pa zhes bya ba'i ming tsam gyi rgyu thabs kyis de nyid [G203a] la bdag tu btags par 'gyur te / des na bdag med pa nyid du smra ba yang nyams so //

khyed kyi rnam par grol bar btags pa yang 'khor ba las khyad par med pa nyid du 'gyur te / ji ltar [lta D] zhe na / 'di la sems tsam du smra ba'i rnal 'byor pa 'khor ba dang thar pa'i [P234a] sems tshul la sems pa na /

5.43 dvaitaṃ māyopamaṃ matvā kṣuṇṇam aśānty anātma ca /
advaitaṃ cākṣayaṃ bhūtam amṛtaṃ paramaṃ padam //

gnyis yod sgyu ma lta bu dang // zad can ma zhi *bdag med* [lta bu PG] dang //
gnyis med mi zad yang dag [yang DPG] dang // 'chi med go 'phang mchog rtogs nas //

5.44 sāmānyābhāvatas tatra kalpanāvinivṛttitaḥ /
nirvikalpadhiyālambyamuktyabhedo 'pi vidyate //

de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyir // rnam par rtog pa rnam ldog pas //
mi rtog blos ni dmigs byas [byed DPG] pa'i // grol ba [D211b] khyad par med par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ste / gnyis yod ces bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa rnam pa gnyis kyi dngos por gnas pa ste / de ni sgyu ma lta bu dang / zad pa can dang / ma zhi ba dang / bdag med par rtogs so zhes bya bar sbyar ro // sgyu ma lta bu zhes bya ba ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog [rtogs G] pas bskyed pa'i phyir ro // zad can zhes bya ba ni de la zad pa yod pas zad can no // ma zhi zhes bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa'i bya bas 'phangs pa'i phyir ro // bdag med ces bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs byed pa dag gis yongs su btags pa'i bdag med pa'i phyir dang / rang yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro // gnyis med ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa rnams sems las phyi rol las mi snang ba de'i tshe na / rang gi sems kyi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa'i sems [G203b] ni gnyis med ces bya ste / de ni mi zad pa dang / yang dag pa dang / 'chi ba med pa dang / go 'phang mchog yin par rtogs nas zhes bya bar sbyar ro // mi zad ces bya ba ni de la zad pa yod pa ma [la PG] yin pa'o // yang dag ces bya ba ni mi bslu ba'o // 'chi med ces bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa dang bral ba'o // go 'phang mchog ces bya ba ni mthar thug pa'i gnas so // rtogs nas zhes bya ba ni [P234b] gnyis yod pa dang / gnyis med pa dag tshul de ltar rtogs nas so //

de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyir // zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa de la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag ji ltar 'khor ba'i gnas skabs na med pa bzhin du thar pa'i gnas skabs na yang de dang 'dra bar ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro // rnam par rtog pa rnam ldog pas // zhes bya ba ni de la gnyis po 'dra bar med par rtogs pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa rnam par ldog pas so // mi rtog [ldog DPG] blos ni dmigs byas [bcas PG] pa'i // zhes bya ba mngon sum

gyi shes pas sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa dang / rnam par mi rtog pa'i blos kyang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dmigs par byas pa'i rnal 'byor pa la'o //

de la / grol ba khyad par med par 'gyur // zhes bya ba'i skyon 'dir 'gyur te / de la skye ba dang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid sngon dang [D212a] 'dra bar yod pa'i phyir sngon gyi shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa las thar par khyad par med pas bcings pa dang / thar pa gnyis khyad par med par 'gyur ro // [G204a]

gzhan yang /

5.45 cittamātraprasiddhyarthaṃ na cittād vyatirekiṇaḥ /
caittā vābhyupagantavyā na vā vijñaptimātratā //

yang na sems tsam bsgrub pa'i phyir // sems las byung rnams sems las ni //
tha dad med par khas blang bya // yang na rnam rig tsam mi 'grub //

ces bya ba ni yang na khyed sems tsam nyid du 'dod pas sems tsam nyid sgrub pa'i phyir sems las byung ba dmigs pa rnam pa sna tshogs tha dad rnams kyang sems las tha dad pa med par khas * blang bar* [blangs par PG] bya'o // yang na sems las byung ba rnams sems [P om.] las tha dad par rtog na ni sems las byung ba rnams mang ba'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du mi 'grub po //

5.46 vedanādisamūhe vā cittaprajñaptir iṣyatām /
tathā parānuvādaḥ syāt svanītityāgitāpi ca //

yang na tshor sogs 'dus pa la // [P235a] sems su gdags par 'dod par gyis //
des na gzhan gyi rjes smra dang // rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni yang na khyed kyis tshor ba dang / sems pa dang / reg pa dang / yid la byed pa la sogs pa 'dus pa mdung khyim lta bu dang / sa dang chu dang me dang rlung dang 'dus pa la sogs pa lta bu dang / gzugs dang dri dang ro dang reg pa dang ldan pa'i bum pa la sogs pa lta bu la sems su gdags par khas blang bar bya'o // gal te de lta bu nyid [PG om.] yin no zhe na / des na khyed gzhan dbu ma smra ba'i rjes su smra ba dang / rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur te / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa gcig pu kho na las rkyen ji lta ba las rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga 'byung ba dang / sems las byung ba rnams kyi yongs su 'gyur ba yang khas blangs pa'i phyir ro // [G204b]

gal te 'di snyam du 'di la tshor ba la sogs pa 'dus pa nyid la sems su brtags na sems rdzas su yod pa nyid [PG add rdzas su yod pa nyid] ma yin par 'gyur zhing des na kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba dag gi gzhi ci yang med par 'gyur bas tshor ba la sogs pa tha dad pa dag la ni re re las de rdzas su yod pa nyid yin pas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba dag gi gnas nyid du rigs te / ji skad du /

thog ma med pa'i dus ldan khams // [D212b] sa bon kun gyi gnas gyur pa //
de yod pas na 'gro kun dang // mya ngan 'das pa thob par 'gyur //

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o zhe na /
'dir bshad pa /

5.47 saṃkleśavyavadānāc ced dravyasac cittam iṣyate /
vedanāditathotpādāt tatprasiddher na bādhakam //

kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang las // gal te sems ni rdzas 'dod na //
tshor sogs de bzhin skye ba'i phyir // de grub pas na gnod pa med //

ces bya ba ni 'di ltar nyon mongs pa dang / [P235b] nye ba'i nyon mongs pa'i yid la byed pa dang bcas pa dag sems dang lhan cig 'byung ba nyid na bcings pa yin par 'dod la / nyon mongs pa dang bral ba [D om.] na shes rab mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas pa sems dang lhan cig nyid du grol bar 'dod pas sems nyid kyi gnas skabs gzhan dang / gzhan dag la sems las byung ba dag tu gdags pa yin gyi / gang gis [gi PG] sems 'ba' zhig pa yin na rdzas su yod pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i sems dang sems las byung ba phan tshun tha dad par gnas pa ni med do //

de'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa dag nyid bcings pa'i rnam pa dang / [G205a] thar pa'i rnam par de bzhin skye ba'i phyir tshogs pa las 'byung bas sems dang sems las [PG om.] byung ba dag 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid du yod pa de rab tu grub pas na khyed sems rdzas su yod pa nyid du rtog [rtogs D] pa des kho bo cag la gnod pa med do //

gal te de ltar sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su yod pa nyid ma yin na / ji ltar de las srid pa'i rgyun dang thar pa 'thob [thob PG] par 'gyur zhe na /

de'i phyir bshad pa /

5.48 yathā parṇādisantānaḥ śālūkabahuśaktitaḥ /
tathādravyasataś cittāc citrāḥ saṃtativṛttayaḥ //

u tpal rtsa ba nus mang las // lo ma la sogs rgyun 'byung ltar //
de bzhin sems rdzas med pa las // rgyun rnams sna tshogs 'byung bar 'gyur //

zhes bya ba la / u tpal rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni ut pa la'i rtsa ba la ste / de la rtsa ba'i 'brel pa gzhan med par yang nus pa mang po dang ldan pa las mtsho ci [ji PG] tsam du rgya che ba dag lo ma dang me tog la sogs pa'i rgyun gyis kun tu khyab pa 'byung bar 'gyur ba ltar de bzhin du sems rdzas su med pa las kyang sems can rnams kyi 'khor ba'i rgyun gyi bye brag khams dang / 'gro ba sna tshogs kyi rnam pa [PG add tha dad pas] tha dad pa dag 'byung bar 'gyur ro //

rgyun gyi bye brag [P236a] de dag kyang /

5.49ab pratipakṣād anutpattir utpattiḥ kāraṇe sati /

gnyen pos skye bar mi ’gyur zhing // [D213a] byed rgyu yod na skye bar ’gyur //

zhes bya ba la gnyen po zhes bya ba ni ’phags pa’i lam yan lag brgyad pa ste / de skyes pa na rgyun rnams skye bar mi ’gyur zhing / byed rgyu zag pa zhes bya ba dag yod na skye bar ’gyur ro //

yang na /

lnga po’i rtsa ba’i [G205b] rnam shes las // rkyen [rgyun DPG] bzhin du ni ’byung bar ’gyur //

zhes khyod kyis gang smras pa de la rtsa ba’i rnam par shes pa med par yang sems ’dus pa’i bdag nyid kyi rkyen gyi mi mthun pa’i phyogs kyi gnyen po yod pas ni skye bar mi ’gyur la / byed rgyu gzugs dang / snang ba dang / nam mkha’ dang / yid la byed pa la sogs pa’i rkyen yod na ni skye bar ’gyur ro //

5.49cd adravyatvān na cātreṣṭā citrotpādādikalpanā //

’di las [la PG] sna tshogs skyes la sogs // btags pa mi ’dod rdzas med phyir //

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyi rnam par shes pa yongs su gyur pa ’di las rnam par smin pa dang / ngar sems pa dang / rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba gsum po dag gi sna tshogs skye ba la sogs par btags pa ltar ni kho bo cag mi ’dod do // gang gi phyir zhe na / sems rdzas su med pa’i phyir ro // ’di ltar sems kyi gnas skabs kyi bye brag las de dag tu gdags par [pa PG] ni mi ’dod do //

gzhan yang /

5.50 na tad ālambya nirmokṣo nāpi noparatir dhiyaḥ /
saṃvṛtyā tattvato vāpi nātmavattulyatāsty[10] ataḥ //

de la dmigs pas mi ’grol te // blo ’gag [‘ga’ PG] med pa’ang ma yin pas //
de phyir kun rdzob don dam du’ang // bdag tu smra dang ’dra mi ’gyur //

zhes pa la de la dmigs pa zhes bya ba ni rang gi sems snang ba tsam nyid du rtogs [rtog P] pas so // mi grol te zhes bya ba ni srid pa’i rgyun las so // blo ’gag med pa’ang ma yin pas // zhes bya ba la / ’o na ci zhe na / blo ’gag par ’gyur ba’ang yod pa kho na yin [P236b] te / dngos po’i rang gi ngo bo yongs su ma grub pa nyid du rtogs pa’i phyir dang / kun gzhi

10 H L nātmavittulyatāsty.

rnam [G206a] par shes pa la mi rtog pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir kho bo cag sems rdzas su yod pa ma yin zhing 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par smra ba ni kun rdzob dang / don dam par yang bdag tu smra ba dang 'dra ba nyid du mi 'gyur gyi / de las bzlog pas khyed sems tsam du smra ba dag la ni skyon de dag 'byung ba nyid du 'gyur ro // khyed kyis [kyi PG]

> dmigs pa la ni brten byas nas // [D213b] mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye //
> mi dmigs pa la brten byas nas // mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye //

zhes gang smras pa de la yang kho bo cag mi dmigs pa goms par *bya ba* [byas pa D] nyid gzhan du mi 'dod de [do P] /

ji ltar [lta D] zhe na /

> 5.51 svabhāvato 'py ajātatvād adravyatvād vināśataḥ /
> rūpādi śūnyaṃ māyāvad ity abhyāsād asaṅgitā //

> gzugs la sogs pa stong pa ste // ngo bo nyid kyi [kyis D] ma skyes phyir //
> rdzas su med phyir 'jig pa'i phyir // sgyu ma bzhin goms chags med 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ste / gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rgyu dang rkyen du snang ba las byung ba yod pa kho na yin pa rnams ni stong pa ste / rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad pa dag la yod pa ma yin pas ngo bo nyid kyis ma skyes pa'i phyir 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su med pa'i phyir dang / yun ring du mi gnas pas 'jig pa'i phyir / dper na sgyu ma bzhin du dmigs su med par goms par byas pas chags pa med pa nyid du [DPG add mi] 'gyur ba yin gyi / phyi rol gyi yul rnam pa thams cad du med pa ni ma yin no //

gzhan yang /

> 5.52 sadbhāve 'pi ca rūpāder yathābhūtāvabodhataḥ /
> vyāvartate hy asadgrāhas tadabhāve na kiṃ tadā //

> gzugs la sogs pa yod kyang ni // yang dag ji bzhin rtogs gyur pa // [G206b]
> de yod ma yin de yi tshe // log 'dzin ci phyir mi ldog 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni dper na sngar sgyu ma byung ba las [la PG] skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid yod par btags [P237a] pa la phyis 'di ni sgyu ma byas pa yin te / 'di la ngo bo nyid ci yang med do zhes bya bar rtogs pa'i tshe na / skyes bu'i blo ldog par rigs kyi ri bong gi rva sngon dang phyis kyang gtan med pa la ni de lta bur 'gyur ba ni mi rigs so // de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yod kyang kun rdzob kyi shes pas gzugs la sogs pa 'di dag ni ngo bo nyid yod pa yin no snyam du btags pa la / phyis yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid med par yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin rtogs par gyur pas ngo bo nyid de [D om.] yod pa ma yin par shes pa de'i tshe log par 'dzin pa ci'i phyir ldog par mi 'gyur te / ldog pa kho nar 'gyur ba yin pas khyed

kyis [kyi PG] so so'i [so PG] skye bo de nyid shes pa ma skyes pa dag la dang po kho nar gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul med par btags pas don ci zhig 'grub par 'gyur /

de bzhin du /

5.53 naiva dvayavikalpaś ca cittacaitasagocaraḥ /
pratiṣedhe 'pi rūpādau na pravartitum arhati //

gnyis su rnam par rtog pa dag // sems dang sems byung [D214a] spyod yul na [ni PG] //
gzugs la sogs pa dgag byas kyang // 'jug par mi 'gyur mi rigs so //

zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis su rnam par rtog pa gang dag yin pa de dag khyed sems dang sems las byung ba'i spyod yul yin par 'dod cing gzugs la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang 'brel ba yin par mi 'dod na / de la [G207a] khyed kyis [kyi PG] gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam pa thams cad du dgag pa byas kyang gnyis su rnam par rtog pa de dag 'jug par mi 'gyur bar mi rigs so // 'o na ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / 'jug par 'gyur ba kho nar rigs te / sngon dang phyis kyang gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams la mi ltos [bltos PG] par khyad par med pa'i phyir ro //

gal te 'di skad ces [P237b] gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang ma 'brel ba'i rnam par rtog pa gnyis po dag spang ba kho na'i phyir kho bo cag gis rnam [rnams P] grangs gzhan gyis [gyi P] phyi [P om.] rol gyi [gyis G] yul rnams rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag ste / de'i 'og tu rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skyes pa na rang dang gzhan du snang ba'i cha bsal bas yul de dang de la 'dzin pa dag 'gag par 'gyur ro zhe na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.54 tannirāsāya ced iṣṭo vidhyantaraparigrahaḥ /
prakṣālaṇād dhi paṅkasya dūrād asparśanaṃ varam //

gal te de ni dgag pa'i phyir // sgrub gzhan yongs su 'dzin 'dod na //
'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa bas // ma reg par ni bsrings na bzang //

zhes bya ba ni gal te khyed snying nas phyi rol gyi yul med par 'dod na ni / de rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par btags pas kyang ci bya ste / gal te de [PG om.] rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag nas phyis de dgag pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa gzhan yongs su 'dzin par 'dod na ni / des na / 'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa bas // ma reg par ni bsrings pa bzang // zhes bya ba'i dpe 'di don mthun pa [G207b] nyid du 'gyur te / mi smyon pa blun po 'ga' zhig gis lam gtsang ma bor te / mi gtsang ba'i 'dam rdzab kyi klung du zhugs pa na gzhan dag gis de la dris pa / ci'i phyir khyod lam bor te 'dam rdzab tu zhugs [PG add pa] / des smras pa / yang bkru

bar bya'o // gzhan [D214b] gyis smras pa / glen pa gal te gdon mi za bar bkru bar bya dgos na snga nas 'dam rdzab kyis ma reg par [pa D] thag bsrings nas [na D] ches bzang ngo zhes bya ba lta bur 'gyur ro //

Imagined Identity

gzhan yang khyed kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid ni mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid *med pa nyid* [G om.] du smra zhing 'di skad ces kun brtags [btags P] pa'i ngo bo nyid ni mtshan nyid [P238a] ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin te / kun brtags [btags PG] pa yin pa'i phyir thag pa la sbrul gyi ngo bo nyid du brtags [btags PG] pa bzhin zhes gang smras pa de dag [PG om.] la yang /

5.55 neṣṭo bhujagavac cāsat kalpitaṃ[11] kalpitatvataḥ /
rajjvātmanā hy anekāntāt pratītir api bādhikā //

kun brtags [btags PG] yod pa ma yin te // brtags [btags PG] phyir sbrul dang 'drar mi 'dod //
thag pa'i dngos por ma nges phyir // yang na grags pas [pa D] gnod par 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni brtags [btags PG] pa yin pa'i phyir zhes bya bas ci re zhig sbrul bzhin du kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du 'gyur ram / 'on te rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir thag pa'i dngos po bzhin du kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid mtshan nyid yod par 'gyur ba ma nges pa'i phyir ro // gal te thag par yang rang gi ngo bo nyid du yod pa ma yin no zhe na / de lta na grags pas gnod par 'gyur te / 'di ltar 'jig rten na chu dang thag pa dang rgyu dang lag [G208a] pa dang mi'i rtsol bas bkal ba'i thag pa yod pa nyid du grags pa'i phyir ro //

don de nyid bsnan te sgrub pa'i phyir /

5.56ab tadaṃśadṛṣṭer na bhrāntir anekāṃśā hi sā yataḥ /

de ni 'khrul min gang gi [gis PG] phyir // du ma'i cha de mthong phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid de ni pha rol po dag gis brtags [btags PG] pa ltar gcig tu 'khrul pa nyid ma yin te / gang gi phyir zhe na / thag pa la sbrul du mthong ba bzhin no zhes bya ba'i dpe de la du ma'i cha yod pa de mthong ba'i phyir te / sngon 'khrul pas thag pa la 'di ni sbrul yin no snyam du nges pa la legs par brtags na 'di ni thag pa yin gyis / sbrul ma yin no snyam du thag pa'i rang gi ngo bo yang

11 L cāsan saṃkalpaḥ.

dag pa nyid la dmigs pa'i blo skyes pa na des sbrul gyi cha btang ste / thag pa'i rang gi ngo bo'i cha mthong ba'i phyir dpe la 'khrul pa dang [P238b] yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid kyi cha gnyi [gnyis G] ga yod pas gcig tu 'khrul pa nyid ma yin pa'i phyir / des mtshon pa'i don kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang [D215a] gcig tu 'khrul pa nyid yin par mi 'gyur la /

khyed ni kun brtags [btags PG] pa'i don rnam pa thams cad du 'khrul pa nyid yin par 'dod pa'i phyir ro // skyon chen po 'dir yang 'gyur te /

5.56cd sarvathārthaniṣedhāt te syāc ca vastvapavāditā //

khyod ni dngos la skur 'debs 'gyur // rnam pa kun tu yul 'gog phyir //

gal te sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa'i dngos po so so rang gis [PG om.] rig par bya ba de lta bu cung zhig yod do zhe na / de lta na yang kun rdzob kyi bden pa rnam par gzhag [bzhag PG] pa dang 'gal te / mdo sde las kun rdzob kyi chos med par don dam pa [D om.] rtogs par mi nus so zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro //

ci ste 'di snyam du [G208b] phyi rol gyi yul med pa yin yang ming dang brda las don gyi mtshan ma la rtog pa las kun nas nyon mongs pa skye bar sems na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.57ab tadasattve 'pi saṃkleśo na nāmno 'rthapravṛttitaḥ /

de [ming PG] med par yang kun nyon mongs // ming la don 'jug las byung min //

ci'i phyir zhe na /

5.57cd abhilāpaparokṣāṇāṃ[12] tiraścāṃ kleśadarśanāt //

smra mi shes pa'i dud 'gro yang // nyon mongs skye ba mthong phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni yi ge dang nges pa'i tshig dang ming dang brda [brda'ang PG] smra mi shes pa'i dud 'gro ri dvags [dags DPG] dang bya la sogs pa dag la yang 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug la sogs pa'i nyon mongs pa shas chen po skye ba mthong ba'i phyir / gang dag la brten nas nyon mongs pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul dag yod pa kho nar shes par bya'o //

'dir smras pa / gzugs la dmigs pa'i blo skye ba gang yin pa de ni yul yang dag par yod do snyam du rnam par brtags [btags P, brtag G] nas / gzugs [P239a] zhes mngon par brjod pa la ltos [bltos PG] pa dang bcas par skye'i / mngon par brjod pa med par mi skye

12 L abhilāpāparokṣāṇāṃ.

bas / de'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid ni stong la / mngon par brjod pa tsam la ni gzugs la sogs pa zhes bya'o zhe na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.58 rūpābhilāpasāpekṣarūpadhījanmato na ca /
rūpaṃ rūpasvabhāvena śūnyaṃ kalpayituṃ kṣamam //

gzugs ni gzugs kyi [kyis PG] ngo bos stong // gzugs zhes brjod la ltos [bltos PG] bcas par //
gzugs blo skye bar 'gyur phyir zhes // brtags [btags PG] par brjod par mi 'gyur ro //

ci'i phyir zhe na / smra mi shes pa'i dud 'gro dag la yang zas la sogs pa'i blo skye bar mthong ba'i phyir ro //

gzhan yang /

5.59 arūpātmavyavacchinnavastvābhamatigocaraḥ /
rūpasyātmā tadastitvād ayuktā rūpaśūnyatā //

gzugs ni [D215b] stong nyid mi [G209a] rigs te // gzugs min bdag nyid rnam bcad [bcas DPG] pa'i //
dngos por snang blo spyod yul gyi // gzugs kyi bdag nyid de yod phyir //

zhes bya ba ni mngon par brjod pa tsam la gzugs zhes bya zhing / gzugs ni rnam pa thams cad du stong pa nyid ces bya bar mi rigs te / ci'i phyir zhe na / gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag nyid rnam par bcad pa'i dngos por snang ba'i blo'i spyod yul gyi gzugs kyi bdag nyid de yod pa'i phyir ro // de la gzugs ma yin zhes bya ba ni gzugs las gzhan pa ste / sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg pa dag go // gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag nyid ces bya ba ni gzugs ma yin pa de dag gi bdag nyid de / rna ba la sogs pa'i yul zin pa dang zin pa ma yin pa dag [PG om.] la sogs pa dag go // rnam par bcad pa'i zhes bya ba ni gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag nyid de dag las rnam par bcad pa ste / mtshan nyid tha dad pa'o // de'i dngos po zhes bya ba ni mig gi yul te / kha dog dang [P om.] dbyibs kyi bdag nyid do // der snang ba zhes bya ba ni de'i rnam par snang ba'o // [P239b] blo'i zhes bya ba ni der snang ba blo de'i 'o // spyod yul zhes bya ba ni gzugs te / spyod pa zhes bya ba dbang po de / yul zhes bya ba gzugs de la spyod cing 'jug pas spyod yul lo // de lta bu'i gzugs kyi bdag nyid mngon sum gyi blo la snang ba brjod du med pa de kun rdzob tu yod de [do P] // de yod pa'i phyir ji ltar mngon par brjod pa tsam du zad de / [G209b] rnam pa thams cad du gzugs stong ngo zhes bya bar rigs par 'gyur /

gal te dngos po'i spyi ni mngon par brjod pa'i yul yin la / de [PG add la] yang mngon par brjod pa de nyid kyis stong ngo zhe na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.60 sāmānyam abhilāpyaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ na ca kiṃcana /
nābhilāpyātmaśūnyatvam evam apy upapadyate //

mngon par brjod bya spyi yin na // spyi ni ci yang yod min pas //
des na mngon brjod bdag nyid kyis // stong pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro //

zhes bya ba la khyed cag mngon par brjod par bya ba ni spyi yin la / spyi ni dper na ba lang ma yin pa rta la sogs pa gzhan dag gis ba lang sel ba ni ba lang gi spyi yin no zhes bya ba lta bur 'dod na / gzhan sel ba'i spyi ni ci yang yod pa ma yin pas de ni dngos por gyur pa ma yin no // dngos [D216a] po med na ci zhig mngon par brjod par bya / mngon par brjod par bya ba med na mngon par brjod par bya ba med pas des na mngon par brjod pa'i bdag nyid kyis [kyi PG] stong pa nyid ces bya ba de 'thad par mi 'gyur ro //

'o na spyi gang zhig mngon par brjod par bya ba nyid yin par rigs she na /

de'i phyir /

5.61 vācyaṃ sāmānyavadvastu tadābhamatihetutaḥ /
tasya tenātmanā sattvān na yuktānabhilāpyatā //

brjod bya spyi ldan dngos po ste // der snang blo yi rgyu yin phyir //
de ni de'i bdag nyid yod pas // brjod med nyid du mi rigs so //

zhes bya ba smras te / mngon par brjod par bya ba'i spyi dang ldan pa'i dngos po ste / gang la sngon po la sogs pa'i khyad par la ma ltos [bltos PG] par gzugs nyid kyi spyi yod pa [P240a] de ni spyi dang ldan pa'i dngos po ste / sngon po la sogs pa dang / [G210a]ring po la sogs pa'o // ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / der snang ba'i blo'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro // de ni spyi dang ldan pa'i gzugs de'i bdag nyid du yod pas mngon par brjod pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir ji ltar brjod du med pa nyid du rigs te / brjod du med pa nyid du mi rigs so //

gal te spyi zhes bya ba de gzhan sel ba ma yin na / 'o na spyi zhes bya ba gang yin zhe na /

de'i phyir /

5.62 vijātīyena śūnyatvaṃ tulyadhīvṛttihetutaḥ /
sāmānyāt tulyajātīye sāmānyam iti niścitam //

rigs mi mthun pas stong nyid de // blo mthun 'jug pa'i rgyu yin phyir //
rigs mthun pa la mthun pas na // spyi zhes bya bar nges pa yin //

zhes bya ba smras te / spyi zhes bya ba ni dper na rta la sogs pa rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid ni ba lang gi spyi yin pa lta bu'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / de ni ba lang du blo mthun par 'jug pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro [PG om.] // de yang dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i

phyir / rigs mthun pa lkog shal dang / mjug [‘jug G] ma dang / nog dang / rmig pa dang / rva dang ldan pa ’dus pa ’am [la P] tha dad pa ’am / sngon po dang / ser po la sogs par bcad pas tha dad pa la yang spyi mthun pa’i rnam pa mthun pas na / dbu ma smra ba dag gis spyi zhes bya ba [P add ni] yin par nges par bzung ba yin no //

gal te ba lang ma yin pa rta la sogs pa’i ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa nyid la / lkog shal la sogs pa ’dus pa’i chos su btags na ni / des na lkog shal la sogs pa ma bzung bar yang ba lang du bzung [gzung PG] ba yod par ’gyur te / dper na [D216b] gzugs la sogs pa [G210b] ma *bzung bar bum par* [D om.] bzung ba yod par ’gyur ba lta bur thal bar ’gyur ro // dbu ma pa la rta la sogs pa rigs mi mthun pa stong pa nyid [P240b] kyi ba lang gi ngo bo nyid la spyir ’dod pa la ni /

5.63 nāśrayasyāgrahe grāhyaṃ saṃkhyāvat tadgrahe grahāt /
tadvat kalpyam ato vastu vācyaṃ neṣṭaṃ pṛthag bhavet //

gzhi ma bzung na gzung [bzung PG] med de // de *bzung gzung* [gzung bzung PG] du yod pa’i phyir //
grangs bzhin brten na dngos de ni // brtag bya brjod par ’dod gzhan min //

zhes bya bar ’gyur te / rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid ces bya ba’i don ni rta la sogs pa rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid kyi ba lang gi ngo bo nyid lkog shal la sogs pa dang ldan pa *nyid yod do* [yod pa nyid do PG] // de ni lkog shal la sogs pa ’dus pa’i gzhi ma bzung na gzung [bzung G] du med de / ’o na ji lta bu zhe na / gzhi bzung [gzung PG] na [PG add yo] gzung du yod pa kho na yin no zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go // ci’i phyir zhe na / gzhi de bzung [gzung PG] na ba lang nyid la sogs pa’i spyi de yang gzung du yod pa’i phyir ro // dper na ji lta bu zhe na [bzhin te PG] / grangs bzhin te / dper na grangs gcig nyid dang / gnyis nyid dang / mang po nyid ces bya ba dag bum pa la sogs pa’i dngos po de bzung [gzung PG] na / bum pa gcig [G add pa] dang / bum pa gnyis dang / bum pa mang po zhes gzung du yod pa nyid yin te / gcig la sogs pa’i grangs dag dngos po las tha dad pa yang ma yin la dngos po ma bzung bar yang gzung [bzung PG] du med pa de bzhin du / ’dir yang lkog shal la sogs pa ’dus pa dang ’dus pa bzung na ba lang nyid kyang gzung du yod pa kho nar ’gyur ro [G211a] // des na spyi zhes bya ba’i dngos po de ni blo’i yul yin pa’i phyir brtag par bya ba yang yin la / blos nges par bzung ba’i dngos po la tshig ’jug pa’i phyir de nyid brjod par bya ba yang yin par ’dod kyi / ba lang nyid ces bya ba de lkog shal la sogs pa dag las gzhan pa ni ma yin te / ’o na ji lta bu zhe na / dngos po’i rang gi ngo bo nyid las tha mi dad pa yin no // [P241a]

yang bzhan yang /

5.64 abhedasattvādravyābhyām ekam anekavṛtty[13] api /

13 L ekato ’nekavṛtty.

tadvināśe 'vināśāc ca nānyasmin tanmatir na ca //

dbyer med phyir na gcig pa dang // rdzas med phyir na du mar ’jug //
de nyams na yang mi nyams phyir // gzhan la’ang de ’dod ma yin min //

zhes bya ba ni rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid de ni rnam pa rnams kyi spyi yin pas dbyer med pa’i phyir na gcig pa yin no // rdzas thams cad kyi khongs su gtogs pas [D217a] rdzas su med pa’i phyir na du mar ’jug pa yin no // dus gsum du ’jug pa’i rdzas thams cad la rnam par gnas pas rdzas de nyams na mi nyams pa’i phyir des na rdzas gcig nyams pa na rdzas gzhan la [D om.] yang de’i blo de ’jug par ’dod pa ma yin *pa min* [D om.] te / ’o na ji lta bu zhe na / gzhan la yang de’i blo de ’jug par ’dod pa kho na yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro //

de gcig pu nyid yin na ji ltar gzhi [bzhin D] du ma dag la spyi nyid yin par ’gyur zhe na /

de’i phyir /

5.65 anīlānutpalabhinnarūpeṇāvyavadhānataḥ[14] /
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ hi dvayor ekārthavṛttitaḥ //

sngon min ut pal ma yin pa // med pa’i dngos pos ma bsal bas //
gzhi mthun ldan pa nyid yin te // gnyi ga don gcig [cig PG] ’jug phyir ro //

zhes bya ba smras te / sngon min zhes bya ba ni dkar po la sogs [G211b] pa’o // ut pa la ma yin pa zhes bya ba ni padma la sogs pa’o // sngon po ma yin pa dkar po la sogs pa med pa’i dngos pos sngon po nyid yod pa [D add ma] yin la / ut pa la ma yin pa padma la sogs pa med pa’i dngos pos ni ut pa la nyid yod par gzung ngo // de bzhin du ’dir yang gzugs ma yin pa sgra la sogs pa med pa’i dngos pos ni gzugs nyid yod pa [DPG add ma] yin la / ba lang ma yin pa rta la sogs pa med pa’i dngos pos ni ba lang nyid yin par bzung ste / dper na sngon pos kyang ut pa la ma [P241b] bsal [gsal PG] la ut pa la las kyang sngon po ma bsal [gsal PG] te / de gnyis yon tan dang yon tan gyi ngo bo nyid du rdzas gcig la gcig gis ma bsal [gsal PG] bar brten pas gzhi mthun pa dang ldan pa nyid yin te / gang la gzhi mthun pa dang tha mi dad pa dang / thun *mong ba* [mongs pa P] yod pa de ni gzhi mthun pa dang ldan pa’o // de’i dngos po ni gzhi mthun pa dang ldan pa nyid do // ’di ltar sngon po ni sprin dang mig sman la sogs pa yang yod la / ut pa la ni dmar po la sogs pa yang yod pas de gnyis ni gzhi mthun pa dang ldan pa nyid ma yin gyi [gyis P] / ’di la ni sngon po dang ut pa la zhes bya ba gnyis rdzas kyi don gcig [cig P] la ’jug pa’i phyir des na gzhi mthun pa dang ldan pa nyid yin no // de bzhin du gzugs ma yin pa’i bdag nyid rnam par bcad pa ni gzugs la sogs pa’i spyi yin no zhes bya bar bsams te /

14 L anīlānutpalābhinnarūpeṇāvyavadhānataḥ.

dngos po snang ba'i blo'i rgyu yin [G212a] pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de ltar [D217b] rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid ni spyi yin par bsgrub po //

gzhan sel ba ni spyi nyid yin par mi 'thad pa kho na ste / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na /

5.66 nānyāpoho 'nyasāmānyam anyadharmād viśeṣavat /
nābhāvasyāviśeṣatvād dhībhedaḥ kambalādiṣu //

gzhan sel gzhan gyi spyi ma yin // chos gzhan yin phyir khyad par bzhin //
lkog shal la sogs blo dbye med // med la khyad par med phyir ro //

zhes bya ba la gzhan sel ba zhes bya ba ni gzhan dag gis sel bar byed cing tha dad par [pa PG] byed pa ste / rta la sogs pa gzhan dag gis [gi PG] ba lang nyid sel ba bzhin no // de ni gzhan gyi spyi ma yin no // ci'i phyir zhe na / chos gzhan yin pa'i phyir ro // dper na ji lta bu zhe na / khyad par bzhin te [no P] / dper na ba lang gi rva la sogs pa'i khyad par gzhan gyis rta'i rngog ma la sogs pa'i khyad par sel bar byed kyang de dag de'i spyi ma yin pa [P242a] de bzhin du ba lang ma yin pa rta la sogs pa gzhan dag gis ba lang nyid sel bar byed kyang / de dag ba lang gi spyi ma yin no // gzhan sel ba de lkog shal dang / mjug ['jug G] ma dang / nog dang / rmig pa la sogs pa dag la blo tha dad par dbye ba med par yang 'gyur te / ci'i phyir zhe na / gzhan sel ba ni ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas med pa la ni khyad par med pa'i phyir ro //

med pa kho na'i phyir /

5.67ab vastvagrahe grahāc cāsya neṣṭe kalpyatvavācyatve[15] /

dngos ma bzung bar der 'dzin phyir // brtag bya brjod bya [min DPG] yin mi 'dod //

ces bya ba ni 'di ltar gal te gzhan sel ba'i bdag nyid spyi gang yin pa de dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo nyid yin par brjod cing dngos po [G212b] med par mi brjod na ni des na blo des brtag par bya ba nyid dang / tshig gis brjod par bya ba nyid yin par rigs par 'gyur ba zhig na / khyed cag dngos po ma bzung bar yang [PG om.] gzhan sel ba'i de 'dzin pa'i phyir gzhan sel ba de dngos po las gzhan sel bar rtogs pas / brtag par bya ba dang brjod par bya ba yin par mi 'dod de / de dag yin par sgrub [bsgrub G] par dka'o //

'dir kha cig 'di skad ces gzhan sel ba de'i sgo nas dngos po brtag par bya ba dang / brjod par bya ba nyid yin par 'gyur ro zhe na /

de la bshad pa /

5.67cd taddvāreṇānyavācyatve tadvācyatvādi hīyate //

15 L kalpyatvavācyate.

de yi [de'i P] sgo nas gzhan brjod na // de ni brjod bya nyid sogs nyams //

zhes bya ba ni gzhan sel ba de'i sgo nas spyi dang ldan pa'i dngos po cig car 'dzin na [D218a] dngos po nyid brtag par bya ba dang / brjod par bya ba nyid yin par 'gyur gyi / gzhan sel ba'i spyi de ni brjod par bya ba nyid dang / brtag [rtag PG] par bya ba nyid [D add ma] yin par [pa P] nyams pas khyed kyi rjes su dpag pa'i dam bcas pa ma grub po /

gzhan yang /

5.68 tadanyabhinnarūpasya vastuno 'nabhilāpyatā /
na yuktaivam ato 'yuktā yogācāranayoditiḥ[16] //

de ni gzhan gyi ngo bo na // des na brjod med nyid mi rigs //
de phyir rnal 'byor spyod pa yi // tshul [P242b] gyis [gyi D] smra ba mi rigs so //

zhes bya ba ni gzhan sel ba de dngos po las gzhan pa'i ngo bo nyid yin na gang dngos po las gzhan pa de la ni de bzhin du blo yang tha dad pa la / mngon par brjod pa yang tha dad par 'gyur bas des na gzhan sel ba de brjod du med pa nyid yin par mi rigs so // de ltar ji skad bstan pa'i rigs pa dag gis yongs su brtags [btags PG] pa de'i [G213a] phyir rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul gyis smras pa'i gzhan sel ba spyi yin par 'dod pa la sogs pa dag ma grub pas de dag gi grub pa'i mthas brtags [btags PG] pa de dag ni rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin pas mi rigs so //

Dependent Identity

'dir smras pa / kho bo cag gi tshul ni mi rigs pa ma yin te / rigs pa dang mi 'gal ba'i phyir ro // ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / kho bo cag ni dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med de / ming du mngon par brjod pa'i bdag nyid kyis stong pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod de / mngon par brjod pa'i bdag nyid de nyid ma skyes pa yin la / skye ba med pa de [PG om.] kho na'i phyir ma 'gags pa yang yin no // mngon par brjod pa dang ldan pa'i dngos po gang yin pa de yang rnam pa gang gis mngon par brjod pa'i rnam pa de ltar yod pa ma yin te / brda tsam du zad pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar gal te dngos po de mngon par brjod pa'i spyod yul du 'gyur du zin na me [mes PG] zhes brjod pa kha tshig pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro // de bzhin du /

kun brtags [btags PG] dngos po yod ma yin // gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa yin //

zhes bya bas gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyir ro *zhe na* [PG om.] /

'dir bshad pa /

16 L yuktyaiva manoyuktā yogācāranayād iti.

5.69 abhilāpātmaśūnyatvād bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatā /
tenaiva cāpy anutpādād anutpannāniruddhatā //

dngos rnams ngo bo nyid med de // mngon brjod bdag nyid stong phyir ro //
de nyid kyis de skye med phyir // ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags [D218b] nyid //

5.70 yato 'bhilāpavadvastu na tathā kathyate yathā /
avastukatvaṃ dharmāṇām ityādi bahu coditam //

gang phyir [P243a] mngon brjod ldan dngos ni // ji ltar brjod pa de ltar med //
de phyir chos rnams dngos med [G213b] nyid // ces bya la sogs mang smras dang //

5.71 paratantrāstitoktau ca saṃvṛtyā siddhasādhanam /
tattvataś cen na dṛṣṭānto hetoś cāpi viruddhatā //

gzhan dbang yod pa nyid smras pa // kun rdzob tu ni grub pa sgrub //
gal te don dam dpe med cing // gtan tshigs [tshig PG] 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur //

zhes bya ba ni de dag thams cad kun rdzob kun [tu G] sgrub [bsgrub PG] na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te / kho bo cag kyang de dag thams cad kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i tshul du 'dod pa'i phyir ro // gal te de don dam par sgrub [bsgrub PG] na ni don dam par gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du sgrub [bsgrub PG] pa la dpe med de / de yang ngo bo nyid kyis [PG om.] stong pa'i phyir ro // de bzhin nyid [PG om.] du mngon par brjod pa'i bdag nyid kyis [kyi PG] stong pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'gal ba nyid du yang 'gyur te / mngon par brjod pa'i bdag nyid kyis [kyi PG] stong pa nyid du rjes su dpog pas brjod du med pa'i dngos po yod pa nyid kyis dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo log par bsgrubs pa'i phyir ro //

ci ste yang 'di snyam du kho bo cag gi gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa yin te / yod par gyur pa las ma skyes pa'i phyir sgyu ma bzhin te / de yang ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] stong pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don 'gal ba nyid du mi 'gyur bar sems na /

'dir bshad pa /

5.72 utpattiniḥsvabhāvatvaṃ sadbhūtājātito yadi /
nānutpādanirodhādipratiṣedhasamarthanam[17] //

gal te gzhan dbang ngo bo nyid // skye ba ngo bo nyid med de //

17 H nanūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhasamarthanam.

yod par gyur las ma skyes na // skye ’gag la sogs ’gal sgrub yin //

zhes bya ba ni de lta na kho bo cag gi ’dod pa nyid bsgrubs pa yin te / kho bo cag kyang rgyu dang rkyen rigs [ris D] mthun pa’i [G214a] bdag nyid las skyes pa rnams ni rang gi bdag nyid las ma skyes pas ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa dang / skye ba [P om.] dang ’gag pa la sogs [P243b] pa med par ’dod pa’i phyir ro //

tshul ’di ni lung dang yang mi ’gal te / ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na /

5.73ab pratyayair jāyate yo hi tam ajātaṃ jagau muniḥ /

rkyen rnams las ni gang skyes pa // de skye med par thub pas gsungs //

zhes bya ba’i phyir ro // rigs pa gang gis zhe na /

5.73cd svabhāvatas tadutpādaniṣedhāt paramārthataḥ //

don dam du na dngos nyid las // de yi skye ba dgag phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ste / gang rkyen rnams las skyes pa de ni don dam par na skye ba med pa nyid yin par thub pas gsungs te / [D219a] rgyu dang rkyen gyi [gyis P] tshogs tha dad pa’i dngos po dag la de’i ngo bo nyid dmigs su med pa’i phyir ro // de ltar yang ’di skad du /

gang zhig rkyen las skyes pa de ma skyes // de la skye ba’i ngo bo nyid med de // gang zhig rkyen las ltos [bltos PG] pa des stong gsungs // gang gis stong nyid shes de bag yod yin //

zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o [bu P] //

gzhan yang /

5.74 abhūtatvāc ca dharmāṇāṃ te[18] svasāmānyagocarāḥ /
saṃvṛtyā na virudhyante citradhīśabdavṛttayaḥ //

chos rnams yang dag nyid min phyir // de dag kun rdzob blo dang sgra [‘dra DPG] //
sna tshogs rang spyi’i spyod yul du // ’gyur ba la ni ’gal ba med //

ces bya ba ni gang kho na’i phyir chos rnams yang dag pa nyid ma yin pa de kho na’i phyir / de dag kun rdzob tu blo dang sgra sna tshogs kyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyi spyod

18 L tat.

yul dang / spyi'i mtshan nyid kyi spyod yul sngon po la sogs pa dang / gzugs la sogs pa dang / bum pa dang / snam bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa dag tu 'gyur ba la 'gal ba med do // gal te dngos [G214a] po rnams yang dag pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na nam mkha' la sogs pa bzhin du ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho nar [bor D] gyur pas blo sna tshogs dang / sgra sna tshogs kyi yul du mi 'gyur ba zhig na de lta ma yin no //

de la gzhung lugs gnyi ga la grags pa'i lung yang yod de / gang zhe na /

5.75 yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo 'bhilapyate /
na sa saṃvidyate tatra dharmāṇāṃ sā ca dharmatā //

ming ni gang dang gang dag gis [gi PG] // chos rnams gang dang gang brjod pa //
[P244a] de la de ni yod min pa // de ni chos rnams chos nyid do //

zhes bya ba yin te / ming ni gang dang gang dag gis // zhes bya ba ni rang dang spyi'i brjod pa'i ming dang / yi ge sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid dag gis so // chos rnams gang dang gang brjod pa // zhes bya ba ni [PG om.] gzugs la sogs pa mngon par brjod par bya ba dag gi tshig [tshigs P] gi brjod pa'o // de la de ni yod min pa // zhes bya ba ni chos de la ming du mngon par brjod pa de yod pa ma yin pa ste / chos rnams ni yi ge med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar yul gyi skad dang / nges pa'i tshig sna tshogs dag gis dngos po gcig kho na la rnam pa du mar mngon par brjod pa dper na chu la pa ni ya dang / a pa dang / sa ni la dang / ni ra zhes bya ba la sogs pa dag tu brjod pa [D219b] de la gal te de sgra gcig gis mngon par brjod pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par gyur na ni de la sgra gzhan dag 'jug par mi 'gyur zhing / sgra de dag gis mngon par brjod par yang mi nus pa zhig na de lta ma yin no // de ni chos rnams chos nyid do // zhes bya ba ni [G215a] mngon par brjod du med pa de ni chos rnams kyi don dam pa nyid yin pa'o // kun rdzob tu ni ngo shes par bya ba'i phyir ming du 'dogs pa dang / brda dag byed de / de dag gis kyang dngos po de'i khyad par las 'di ni ba lang yin gyi [gyis PG]/ rta dang mi ma yin no zhes bya ba la sogs par yongs su shes par byed do // ngo bo nyid de ni blo'i yul yin te / gang gi phyir zhe na / lkugs pa dang / 'on pa la sogs pa yi ge dang brda mi shes pa de dag gis kyang bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos po ngo shes pa dang ba lang la sogs pas kyang dri dang mig gis rang dang gzhan gyi [P244b] be'u la sogs pa ngo shes pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na don ni rnam pa thams cad du ming gis [gi PG] stong pa nyid yin pas des dngos po'i ngo bo nyid mngon par rjod [brjod PG] par mi byed pa ni yu bu cag gnyi ga la yang 'dra'o //

5.76 atha pratyayasaṃbhūtasvabhāveneṣṭasādhanam /
utpattiḥ pāratantryāc cen māyāvan nanv[19] abhūtatā //

19 H māyā yadvad.

ci ste rkyen byung ngo bo yis [yi PG] // gzhan gyi dbang las skye 'dod na //
sgyu bzhin yang dag nyid min pas // 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yin //

zhes bya ba ni ci ste gzhan gyi dbang gi rkyen 'dus pa las byung ba'i ngo bos ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin te / de ni gzhan gyi dbang las skye ba yin pas don dam pa ni ma yin par 'dod na / 'dir bshad pa / 'o na de ltar de gzhan gyi dbang las skye bar 'dod na sgyu ma bzhin yang dag pa nyid ma yin pas de la ngo bo nyid ga la yod de / de ltar na khyed kho bo cag gi 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yin no //

de ltar sgrub pa ji skad [G215b] bstan pa des na /

5.77ab paratantrāgrahaś cāpi svabhāvājātito mataḥ /

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pa // ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] ma skyes 'dod //

ji lta [ltar PG] zhe na / 'di ltar /

5.77cd jātasya paramārthena mithyākhyānaṃ na yujyate //

don dam du ni skyes pa la // log par snang ba mi rigs phyir //

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyis gzhan gyi dbang ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid dang bral ba nyid kyi phyir / gzung du med par smras pa de yang gal te ngo bo nyid kyis skyes par gyur na ni log par snang bar 'gyur ba mi rigs pa'i phyir te / gang gi phyir de'i ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi G, P om.] ma skyes [D220a] pa de kho na'i phyir te / de log par snang bar 'gyur ro //

gzhan yang /

5.78 yathā khyānti tathā santi tadābhāsātmanā yataḥ /
yathā khyānti tathā sattvād dharmā māyopamāḥ katham //

gal te ji ltar snang ba ltar // der snang bdag nyid yod gyur na //
ji ltar snang ba de yod phyir [spyod PG] // chos rnams ji ltar sgyu ma bzhin //

zhes bya ba ni gal te dngos po [P add la] 'di dag rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid las ji ltar dbang po'i yul nyid du snang ba ltar der snang ba'i bdag nyid yod par gyur na ji [P245a] ltar snang ba der yod pa'i phyir chos rnams ji ltar sgyu ma lta bu nyid yin par 'gyur te / 'di ltar sgyu ma ni skyes bu la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du snang yang de'i ngo bo nyid dmigs su med de / sgyu ma ni skyes bu la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] stong pa'i phyir ro // de ltar gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par rtog [rtogs D]

pa yang rigs [rig G] pa dang ldan pa ma yin no //

> de nyid kyis de skye med phyir // ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags nyid //

ces gang smras pa de yang 'di ltar ches rigs par snang ste /

> 5.79 sadbhūtenātmanājāter anutpannāniruddhatā /
> avastutvāsvabhāvatve tathāpy[20] adravyasattvataḥ //

> ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags dang // dngos med ngo bo nyid med [D om.] pa'ang //
> yod pa nyid [G216a] las ma skyes dang // rdzas su yod pa ma yin phyir //

zhes bya ba ni dngos po 'di dag ni rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa'i bdag nyid las skye ba yin gyi / yod pa nyid las [la D] skye ba ni ma yin te / rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad pa'i dngos po gnas pa'i dus na [nas D] ngo bo nyid du [P om.] rdul phran tsam yang dmigs su med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa nyid dang / dngos po med pa nyid dang / ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yod pa nyid las ma skyes pa'i phyir ro // dngos po 'di dag gi ngo bo nyid dang / rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa'i bdag nyid las snang bar dmigs par snang ba gang yin pa de yang sa dang / chu dang / me dang / rlung dang / gzugs dang / dri dang / ro dang / reg pa zhes bya ba'i rdzas brgyad 'dus pa yin te / de yang dmag dang / nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa nyid dang / dngos po med pa nyid dang / ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin par khong du chud par bya'o // zhes bya ba'i tshig gi [P om.] don to //

'dir gal te 'di [P245b] snyam du khyed la dngos po med [D220b] pa'i phyir chos gdags pa dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro zhes bya bar sems na

'dir bshad pa /

> 5.80ab vijñaptimātratulyatvāt prajñapter nāsti duṣṭatā /

> gdags la skyon chags nyid med de // rnam rig [rigs PG] tsam du mtshungs phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi rtog pa dang bral ba'i rnam par rig pa tsam du yang kho bo cag dang khyed du mtshungs pa nyid [PG om.] yin la / phyi rol gyi don rnam par shes pas bskyed pa'i las kyis [kyi PG] mngon par 'dus byas pa rdzas su [G216b] med pa la yang phyi nang gi chos 'dogs pa'i phyir kho bo cag gi phyogs la nyes pa med do //

khyod kyi phyogs la ni /

20 H dṛṣṭasya.

5.80cd heyaprahātryasadbhāvāt kasyeṣṭaṃ nirvidādi sat //

spang ba dang spong byed yod pa'i phyir // yongs shes sogs yod gang gir 'dod //

ces bya ba ni gal te sdug bsngal la sogs pa spang ba dang / spong bar byed pa lam skyes pa bsgom pa goms par byed pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs dag rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid gzhan gyi dbang gi cha nyid du yod pa nyid yin na / ngo bo nyid la ni gzhan du 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir dang / gnas 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir sdug bsngal yongs su shes pa la sogs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rkyen gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod pa de gang gi yin par 'dod de / 'jig rten pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i gnas skabs la 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir gang la ji ltar 'byung bar 'gyur zhes bya bar tshig khong nas drang ngo //

gal te 'di skad ces 'o na khyed la yang rdzas su med pa'i phyir thar pa med par mi 'gyur ram zhe na /

de'i phyir bshad pa /

5.81 vikalpoparamān muktir adravyatve 'pi sā yataḥ /
dravyasattve 'py ajātatvān nāto 'nyā kalpaneṣyate //

de ni gang phyir rdzas med kyang // rnam rtog bral bas thar par 'gyur //
rdzas yod nyid na'ang skye med phyir // 'di las gzhan du brtag [rtag DPG] mi 'dod //

ces bya ba ni dngos po rnams rdzas su yod pa ma [P246a] yin pa kho na yin pas 'jig rten pa'i shes pa rnam par rtog [rtogs PG] pa dang bcas pa'i mjug thogs su 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa 'phags pa skye bas thar par rigs kyi / rdzas su yod pa [G217a] ngo bo nyid mi 'gyur ba rnams la mi rigs pas thar pa de ni gang gi phyir dngos po rnams rdzas su med kyang / rnam par rtog pa dang bral bas thar par 'gyur ba nyid do // gal te rnam pa 'ga' zhig [D221a] gis de dag rdzas su yod pa nyid du [PG add yang] 'gyur yang / de lta na'ang ngo bo nyid kyis [kyi PG] skye ba med pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba kho nas thar par rigs so // de'i phyir tshul 'di las gzhan du yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la dmigs pa'i ye shes yod par brtags [rtag G] pas ci bya ste / sngar yang /

ngo bo nyid la dmigs yin na // ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dang //
dmigs pa can du 'gyur ba dang // rnam par mi rtog blor mi 'gyur //

zhes bstan zin pas de ni mi 'dod do //

'dir pha rol pos rang gi tshul nyes par smras pa'i gnad du bsnun pas shin tu 'khams [khams PG] nas gtum tshig rtsub mo smras pa /

5.82 prajñapter apy asadbhāvo vastvabhāve bhavet sati /

taddṛṣṭir nāstiko 'kathyaḥ sa hy asaṃvāsya eva ca //

dngos rnams ngo bo nyid med na // gdags pa'ang yod par mi 'gyur bas //
de ni med par lta [blta PG] ba dag // mi gleng bstan [brtan PG] par bya min dang //

5.83ab svayam āpāyikatve 'sau pareṣāṃś ca vipādakaḥ /

rang yang ngan song gzhol ba dang // gzhan yang phung bar byed pa yin //

zhes bya ba ni / de dag na re / kho bo cag rnal 'byor spyod pa pa la ni phyi rol gyi yul med du zin kyang rnam par shes pa tsam nyid [ni PG] re zhig yod pas rnam par shes pa yongs su gyur pa'i rnam par phyi rol gyi yul yang dmigs su yod la / yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba yang yod kyi / dbu ma [G217b] smra ba la ni re zhig kun rdzob tu yang sgyu ma lta bu nyid du 'dogs pas [P246b] 'jig rten pa'i chos rnams la skur pa 'debs pa dang / don dam par yang rnam par shes pa yang med la / rnam par shes par [pa PG] bya ba yang med pas ci yang med de / dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med par skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir chos gdags pa yang yod par mi 'gyur bas de med pa'i phyir de med par lta ba nyid dang mthun pa dang / sus kyang mi gleng mi brjod pa dang / lhan cig 'grogs pa'i dngos pos brten par mi bya ba yin te / de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang dge slon dag khyed kyis deng phyin chad 'jig rten rgyang pan pa gsang tshig sna tshogs kyi spobs pa can dang bsten par mi bya bsnyen par mi bya / bsnyen bkur mi bya'o zhes gsungs pas khyed ni dam pa ma yin pas [pa PG] yongs su spang bar bya de'i [D221b] gnas su shin tu gyur pa dang / dam pa'i chos spong [slong D] ba'i phyir rang yang ngan song la gzhol ba dang / lta ba 'dzin pa'i chu srin 'dzin khri la mngon par zhen pa la mos par byed pa'i phyir gzhan yang phung bar byed pa yin no zhes zer ro //

de la slob dpon gyis [gyi PG] bshad pa /

5.83cd iti dveṣāmiṣodgāro 'bhimānājīrṇasūcakaḥ //

zhe sdang sha rul sgregs pa de // nga rgyal ma zhu ston pa yin //

zhes bya ba ni khyod kyi khro tshig de ni dper na sha rul gyi sgregs pas ma zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa de bzhin du zhe sdang gi tshig gis mngon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid du ston par byed pa yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // de la zhe sdang nyid sha rul yin te [G218a] / de'i sgregs pa lta bu ni khyod kyi tshig de yin no // mngon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid ma zhu ba lta bu yin te / sha rul gyi [gyis PG] sgregs pas ma zhu ba nyid du [D om.] ston par byed pa de bzhin du / zhe sdang gi tshig kyang khyod nyid mngon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid du ston pa yin gyi kho bo'i lta ba ni skyon ci yang med pa kho na yin no //

[P247a] zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa des bdag nyid mngon pa'i nga rgyal ma

zhu ba nyid du ston par zad kyi / dbu ma pa la de lta bu'i skyon yang dag pa med par [pa PG] ji ltar nges par bya zhe na / de'i phyir /

5.84 asadbhūtasvabhāvatvād bālasaṃmohahetutaḥ /
abhūtvā bhavanād[21] vāpi dharmā māyopamā matāḥ //

chos rnams sgyu ma bzhin 'dod de // ngo bo nyid ni med phyir dang //
byis pa rmongs pa'i rgyu phyir dang // ma byung ba las 'byung phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni kho bos dngos po rnams rnam pa thams cad du med pa nyid yin no zhes ma smras te / 'di ltar kho bo cag ni [G om.] kun rdzob tu chos rnams rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa las 'byung [byung PG] ba sgyu ma bzhin du yod pa nyid du 'dod de ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir dang / skye bo byis pa lta bur rmongs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dang / sngon ma byung ba las byung ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa de'i tshe ji ltar gdags pa yod par [pa P] mi 'gyur te / gdags pa yod pa kho na'i phyir kho bo la khyod kyis smras pa'i skyon gyis gnas mi [ma PG] thod do // chos rnams ngo bo nyid med pa gang yin pa de ni [nyid PG] don dam pa yin par yod ['dod PG] pa dang / med pa'i mtha' gnyis spongs [spangs PG] pa'i phyir kho bo cag med par lta ba nyid dang mthun par ga la 'gyur te / de'i phyir [G218b] khyod kyi [kyis PG] tshig de ni zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa nyid yin no //

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khyod [khyed PG] kyi [PG om.] chos kyi de nyid ni nam mkha' dang mtshungs [D222a] pa nyid kyis [kyi PG] rnam par mi rtog pa nyid du 'dod pa de yang mi rigs te / ji ltar [lta D] zhe na /

5.85 nākāśasamatā yuktā nirvikalpasya vastunaḥ /
nānāsaṃjñāvikalpānām avakāśaprabhāvanāt //

rnam par [pa PG] mi rtog dngos po ni // mkha' dang mtshungs pa nyid mi rigs //
rnam rtog 'du shes sna tshogs kyi // go skabs rab tu 'byed phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni nam mkha' ni rnam par mi rtog [rtogs professional] pa dang ldan pa yin du zin kyang sngon po dang yangs pa dang / dag pa dang ma dag pa la sogs par rnam par rtog pa'i 'du shes sna tshogs [P247b] kyi go skabs rab tu 'byed par byed do // gal te chos rnams kyi de nyid kyang de dang 'dra bar gyur na ni de yang dag pa dang ma dag pa la sogs par rnam par rtog pa'i 'du shes sna tshogs kyi spyod yul yin pa'i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa nyid nyams par 'gyur ro //

21 H bhāvatvād.

gzhan yang khyed cag yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid brjod du med pa nyid yin par 'dod ces grags pa de la yang /

5.86 jāte nānabhilāpyatvaṃ[22] pratikṣepāt puroditāt /
saty apy anabhilāpyatve[23] saṃvṛtau tattvavibhramaḥ //

skyes pa brjod med nyid mi rigs // dgag pa gong du bstan phyir ro //
brjod du med nyid yin gyur na'ang // kun rdzob la ni de nyid nor //

zhes [ces PG] bya ba ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la ni brjod du med pa nyid mi rigs te / de'i dgag pa ni [G om.] /

brjod bya spyi ldan dngos po ste // der snang blo yi rgyu yin phyir //
de ni de'i bdag nyid yod pas // brjod med nyid du mi rigs so //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gong du bstan pa'i phyir ro // ci ste yang rnam pa 'ga' zhig gis brjod du med [G219a] pa nyid yin par gyur na yang de lta na yang de kun rdzob pa yin pas kun rdzob pa de la de nyid yin par nor bar mi bya'o //

gzhan yang /

5.87 tattve 'nyatattvāsadbhāvād[24] yadīṣṭaṃ tattvadarśanam /
ghaṭe 'pi dvighaṭābhāvāt kiṃ neṣṭaṃ tattvadarśanam //

de la de nyid gzhan med phyir // gal te de nyid mthong 'dod na //
bum la'ang bum pa gzhan med pas // ci phyir de nyid mthong mi 'dod //

ces bya ba ni gal te don dam pa de la don dam pa'i de nyid gnyis pa gzhan med pa'i phyir gal te don dam pa stong pa nyid des de nyid mthong bar 'dod na de lta na bum pa la 'ang bum pa gnyis pa gzhan med pas de mthong bas kyang ci'i phyir don dam pa'i de nyid mthong bar brtag par mi 'dod [PG add de] /

ci ste yang 'di snyam du rnam par mi rtog pa ni brjod du med pa nyid yin yang chos kyi [D222b] dbyings ni chu'i khams dang / gser dang nam mkha' [P248a] dag pa bzhin du dag par 'dod pas de dag pas sems la yang dag pa yod pa kho nar sems na

de la kho bos dgag pa bshad par bya ste /

5.88 na nīticchidraguptyarthaṃ tatsaṃkleśaviśuddhite /

22 L nānabhilapyatvaṃ.

23 L anabhilāpitve.

24 L 'nyatattvasadbhāvād.

syātāṃ te kanakādīnāṃ pratyayānuvidhānataḥ //

khyod kyi [kyis PG] tshul skyon sba phyir [gyi D] te // de ni nyon mongs byang mi 'gyur //
gser la sogs pa rkyen rnams kyi // rjes su 'gyur ba yin phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni chu'i khams dang / gser dang / nam mkha' dag la sa rdul dang g.ya' dang sprin la sogs pa rkyen dag yod na dri ma dang bcas pa dag tu snang la / rkyen de dag med na dag pa dag tu snang zhing yang dri ma can du 'gyur ba dang / de nas yang dag pa dag tu 'gyur ba bzhin du gal te chos kyi dbyings kyang de kho na bzhin na lan 'ga' rnam par dag pa dang / [G219b] lan 'ga' dri ma dang bcas par 'gyur bas de ni khyod kyi [kyis PG] tshul gyi skyon de sba ba tsam de kho na'i phyir smras par zad kyi chos kyi dbyings de ni kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang bar mi 'gyur la / gser la sogs pa ni rkyen rnams kyi rjes su 'gyur ba yin pa'i phyir / gser la sogs pa'i dpe de dag gis chos kyi dbyings mtshon pa'i don mi 'grub po //

'di ltar na ni rigs pa dang ldan pa nyid du 'gyur te /

5.89 yathākṣaśuddhyaśuddhibhyāṃ khyāti khaṃ samalāmalam /
viśuddhaṃ ca sadākāśaṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā tathā //

nam mkha' rtag tu rnam dag ste // mig ni dag dang ma dag pas //
dri bcas dri med mkha' 'dod dang // chos rnams chos nyid de bzhin no //

zhes bya ba ni ji ltar rab rib can dbang po nyams pas nam mkha' kun tu skra shad [bshad PG] dang / sbrang ma dang / sbrang bu yang dag pa ma yin pa'i dra ba dag gis dkrigs pa mthong zhing / de nyid kyis kyang rab rib sel ba'i mig sman bsten pas mig dag pas [pa PG] na nam mkha' skra shad [bshad PG] dang / sbrang ma dang / sbrang bu dang bral bar kun tu mthong yang dbang po nyams pa dang ma nyams pas nam mkha' de ma dag pa dang dag par mthong ba'i tshe nam mkha' la ni 'gyur ba med pa de bzhin du chos [P248b] nyid rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa la yang byis pa blo gros kyi mig yongs su ma dag pa rnams kyis [kyi PG] dri ma dang bcas par mthong zhing / 'phags pa stong pa nyid la lta [blta PG] ba'i mig sman bsten pa blo gros kyi [kyis P] mig rnam par dag pa rnams kyis ni dri ma med pa nyid [D223a] du rtogs kyang blo dri ma dang bcas pa dang / dri ma med pas chos nyid ma dag pa dang dag par [G220a] mthong ba'i tshe na / chos nyid la ni 'gyur ba 'ga' yang med do zhe na /

de'i phyir bshad pa /

5.90ab tatkliṣṭatvādidhībhrāntiḥ kartṛdharmo[25] na karmaṇaḥ /

25 H kartur dharmo.

ma dag la sogs blo ’khrul te // byed pa’i chos yin las kyi min //

zhes bya ba ni dper na nam mkha’ ma dag pa dang dag par snang bas blo ’khrul pa de ni byed pa po lus dang dbang po rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa’i blo’i tshogs kyi chos yin gyi / nam mkha’ la sogs pa rnam par shes par bya ba’i las kyi chos ma yin pa [G add de] de bzhin du chos kyi dbyings ma dag pa dang dag pa zhes bya ba ni yang byed pa po log pa’i shes pa dang / yang dag pa’i shes pa dang ldan pa’i chos yin gyi / chos kyi dbyings rnam par shes par bya ba’i chos ma yin pas khyed kyis / de ni dri bcas dri ma med // ces smras pa de ni mi rigs so //

gzhan yang /

5.90cd na tadālambanā śuddhis tattvaṃ nālambyam iṣyate //

de la dmigs pa dag ma yin // de nyid dmigs byar mi ’dod do //

zhes bya ba de ni chos kyi dbyings de la dmigs pa’i ye shes ni dag *pa yin* [P om.] par mi rigs te / de la dmigs na ye shes de rnam par mi rtog pa nyid du mi ’grub pa’i phyir ro // chos kyi dbyings de nyid kyang dmigs par bya ba yin par mi ’dod de / don dam par chos kyi dbyings zhes bya ba de nyid dmigs su med pa’i phyir ro //

gzhan yang /

5.91 dravyasattve ca tattvasya pūrvavad doṣasaṃplavaḥ /
lokottarāvikalpā ca tadbuddhir na matā vyayāt //

de nyid rdzas su yod yin na // skyon ni snga ma bzhin du ’gyur //
’jig rten ’das pa rnam [rnams D] mi rtog // de blor mi ’dod ’jig phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni chos kyi [G220b] dbyings de nyid rdzas su yod pa nyid du rtog na de la skyon /

[P249a] kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang las // gal te sems ni rdzas ’dod na //
tshor sogs de bzhin skye bya’i phyir // de grub pas na gnod pa med //

ces bya ba dag ’dir yang snga ma bzhin du ’byung bar ’gyur ro // ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi tshe na yang gang chos nyid la dmigs pa rnam par mi rtog pa de skye’o zhe na / de lta bu’i blo skye ba yod par mi ’dod de / de skyes ma thag tu ’jig pa’i phyir ro // des na ’jig rten las ’das pa’i blo de ji ltar ’jig par mi ’gyur zhes bya bar [D223b] shes par bya’o //

gzhan yang /

5.92ab tāvat satimirā buddhir yāvaj jñeyānukāriṇī /

ji srid shes bya'i rjes 'jug pa // de srid blo ni rab rib can //

gal te des skyon cir 'gyur zhe na /

5.92cd yāvad utpadyate jñānaṃ tāvaj jñeyānukāritā //

ji srid shes pa dmigs yod pa // de srid shes bya'i rjes 'jug nyid //

ces bya bar 'gyur te / des na yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la dmigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i blo yang rab rib can nyid du yin par 'gyur te / shes bya'i rnam par shes pa'i rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir ro // 'o na ji ltar rigs par 'gyur zhe na / blo rab rib dang bcas pa de nyid shes bya'i rnam pa'i rjes su 'jug pas ni 'khor ba 'byung bar 'gyur la / des gang gi tshe shes bya'i ngo bo nyid yongs su ma grub par shes pas dmigs pa med pa de'i tshe na ni / 'khor bar mi 'gyur bas de ni chos rnams kyi de nyid yin par bsams [sems PG] so //

khyed rang byung gi [G221a] ye shes skad cig gcig dang ldan pa nyid du 'dod pa gang yin pa de yang 'di ltar mi 'thad de /

5.93 svātmanīvāsidhārāyāḥ jñānavṛtter asaṃbhavāt /
svasaṃvittiniṣedhāc ca na syāt sarvajñatā sakṛt //

thams cad mkhyen nyid cig [gcig PG] car min // shes pa rang la 'jug pa ni //
med phyir ral gri so bzhin dang // rang rig 'gog par byed phyir ro //

zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar shes bya rnam pa tha dad pa du mas tha dad pa yin yang chos nyid ngo bo nyid gcig pa'i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa des skad cig gcig [P249b] gis dbyer med pa'i sgo nas mkhyen par rung gi / gang la ye shes skad cig ma yin pa de la ni thams cad mkhyen pa nyid des shes bya rnam pa tha dad pa dag cig [gcig PG] car yongs su mkhyen par mi rung ste / shes pa rang la 'jug pa 'gal ba'i skyon du 'gyur bas de lta bu med pa'i phyir te / dper na ral gri rang gi so gang yin pa de nyid kyis de nyid la gcod par mi byed pa la sogs pa bzhin no // de'i phyir gal te de ye shes skad cig ma don dam par yod pa nyid yin na shes pa'i skad cig ma snga ma yongs su shes par bya ba'i phyir shes pa'i skad cig ma gnyis pa la ltos [bltos PG] dgos so //

gzhan yang chos nyid ni ci yang ma yin pa'i phyir / dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo nges par mi 'dzin pas rang rig pa yang 'gog par byed pa'i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa nyid skad cig gcig dang ldan pa nyid du mi 'grub po *zhe na* [D om.] /

kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar na de yang 'grub ste / [D224a] ji ltar [lta D] zhe na /

5.94 prāgvaj jātipratikṣepād ajātādravyasattvataḥ /
nirvikalpāryadhīgrāhyo 'nabhilāpyaś ca sarvathā //

rnam par mi rtog ’phags blo’i gzung // rnam pa [G221b] kun tu brjod med nyid //
sngar bzhin skye ba bkag pa’i phyir // skye med rdzas su yod min phyir //

zhes bya ba ni rnam par mi rtog pa ’phags pa’i blo’i gzung ba ni ’dzin pa med pa’i tshul gyis gzung ba yin te / sngar de nyid shes pa ’tshol ba’i rab tu byed par bstan pa bzhin skye ba bkag pa’i phyir skye ba med pa’i phyir dang / kun rdzob tu rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa las ’byung ba’i phyir bdag nyid rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro // de ni rnam pa kun tu brjod du med pa nyid kyang yin te / ngo bo nyid stong pa’i phyir ro // de lta bu’i ngo bo nyid ni don dam pa pa yin par sbyar ro //

gzhan yang khyed ’dod pa ltar /

5.95 bhāvābhāvasya bhāvo ‘pi svabhāvaḥ pāramārthikaḥ /
samāropāpavādāntamuktis te vidyate katham //

yod dang med pa’i dngos nyid kyi // ngo bo don dam nyid yin na //
sgro ’dogs pa dang skur mtha’ las // grol ba khyod la ji ltar yod //

ces bya ni ’di ltar sgro ’dogs pa [P250a] dang / skur pa ’debs pa’i mtha’ gnyis las grol bar ’dod pas ni yod pa dang med pa’i mtha’ gnyis yongs su spang bar bya ba yin na khyod ni yod pa dang med pa’i dngos po nyid kyi ngo bo ni yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid kyi don dam pa nyid yin par ’dod pas de la yod pa nyid yin na sgro ’dogs pa’i mtha’ las mi ’grol la med pa nyid yin na skur pa ’debs pa’i mtha’ las mi ’grol bas mtha’ gnyis [‘dra PG] spangs pa’i phyir grol ba khyod la ji ltar yod /

kho bo ’dod pa ltar /

5.96 na bhāvas tattvato ‘jater nābhāvas tadabhāvataḥ /
bhāvābhāvadvayāpetam iṣṭaṃ tattvam ato ’dvayam //

yod min de nyid skye med phyir // med min de yod ma yin phyir //
yod dang med pa gnyis spangs pas // der [G222a] ’dod de phyir gnyis su med //

ces bya ba ni yod pa ma yin te / don dam pa’i de nyid du dngos po thams cad skye ba med pa’i phyir ro // med pa ma yin te / yod pa de yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir te / yod pa yod na de las bzlog pas med par ’gyur ba yin na yod pa de yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir med par yang mi ’gyur ba’i phyir ro // de ltar yod pa dang med pa gnyis spangs pas [P add gnyis pas] gnyis su med pa ni de nyid yin par ’dod pas de’i phyir gnyis su med pa de ni rigs pa dang mi ’gal ba yin no //

khyod ’dod pa ltar na skyon chen po gzhan ’dir yang ’gyur te /

5.97 nirālambo na śāstā syāt tathatālambanatvataḥ /

na cāpi samatā bodhis[26] tattvasvābhāsabhedataḥ //

ston pa dmigs med mi 'gyur te // de [D224b] bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i phyir //
byang chub mnyam nyid mi 'gyur te // de nyid rang snang tha dad phyir //

zhes bya ba ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi de bzhin nyid ces bya ba la dmigs pa yod na ston pa sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das dmigs pa med pa nyid du mi 'gyur te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i phyir ro // des na lung las /

sangs rgyas nam mkha'i mtshan nyid de // nam mkha' la yang mtshan nyid med //
mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid nges grol ba // dmigs med [P250b] khyod la phyag 'tshal lo //

zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa dang 'gal lo // ston pa de'i byang chub kyang mnyam pa nyid du mi 'gyur te / gang gi phyir zhe na / yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i de nyid gcig dang rab tu [PG om.] snang ba'i ye shes gnyis tha dad pa'i [G222b] phyir te / de ltar gnyis yod na ngo bo nyid gnyis mngon par rtogs pa de ji ltar [srid D] mnyam pa nyid du 'gyur /

gzhan yang /

5.98 tathatālambanā yā dhīḥ kuto 'nāhitaśaktikā /
na khapuṣpābhā dhīr yuktā yathānāhitaśaktikā //

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i blo // nus pa ma bzhag ga las 'byung //
nam mkha'i me tog snang ba'i blo // nus pa ma bzhag mi rigs bzhin //

zhes bya ba ni khyed cag kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni thog ma med pa'i dus dang ldan pa yin pa'i mig la sogs pa 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad skye ba dang 'gag pa na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yang nas yang du rang rang gi nus pa 'jog par byed cing / nus pa de dag yul dang dbang po dang rnam par shes pa sna tshogs pas yongs su smin par gyur pa ni khor ba ji srid pa'i bar du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las mngon par grub pa [par PG] 'dod ces grags pas des na so so'i skye bo de nyid ma [PG om.] mthong ba la de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i blo nam yang ma skyes pa la de yang skye ba med pa'i phyir / ma skyes pa la 'gag pa yang med na mi 'gag pa gang gis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nus pa gang bzhag pa yongs su smin par gyur pas de bzhin nyid mthong ba'i blor 'gyur ba'i nus pa gzhog pa yang med do // de ltar nus pa ma bzhag par de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i blo rgyu med pa de dag ga las 'byung bar 'gyur te / dper na nam mkha'i me tog tu [bzhin du PG] snang ba'i blo la nus pa skyes pa med pa'i phyir sngon nam yang [D225a]

26 H bodhes.

kun gzhi rnam par [G223a] shes pa la nus pa ma bzhag pa des phyis kyang nam mkha'i me tog mthong ba'i blo skye bar mi rigs pa bzhin no //

gzhan yang /

5.99ab naikatvānyatvamuktaṃ vas tattvaṃ svanayaguptitaḥ /

rang tshul sbed pas khyod kyis ni // [P251a] de nyid gcig nyid gzhan mi 'grol //

zhes bya ba ni khyod yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dang / gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod cing / de gnyis gcig pa nyid kyang ma yin la / tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin par brjod pa yang rang gi tshul sbed pa tsam du zad pas des kyang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi de nyid ces bya ba de gcig pa nyid dang gzhan nyid las mi 'grol lo //

dbu ma shes pa'i tshul gyis [gyi PG] rjes su 'brang ba la ni /

5.99cd adravyānupalabhyatvād yuktaṃ nas tad yathoditam //

rdzas med dmigs su med pa'i phyir // nged la ji skad smras de rigs //

zhes bya ba ni rdzas su med pa kho nas ngo bo nyid las dmigs su med pa'i phyir nged la ni sngar ji skad smras pa'i gcig pa nyid kyang ma yin la / tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin par de [D om.] rigs pa kho na'o //

kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar nam mkha' la sogs pa'i dpe yang 'thad de / ji lta zhe na /

5.100 ajāter nirviśeṣatvāt khatulyaṃ cāpy alipyataḥ /
atyantānabhilāpyaṃ ca sarvathāpy agrahād dhiyā //

nam mkha' dra ba'ang skye med pas // khyad par med phyir ma gos phyir //
shin tu brjod du med nyid kyang // blos ni rnam kun gzung med phyir //

zhes bya ba'i don dam pa'i de nyid ni nam mkha' dang 'dra ste / de'ang 'di ltar dngos po skyes pa la ni rnam pa'i khyad par las sna tshogs nyid du dmigs par 'gyur gyi / dngos po ma skyes pa la ni skye ba med pas khyad par med pa'i phyir dang / spros pa'i [G223b] rtog pa thams cad kyis gos pa med pas ma gos pa'i phyir nam mkha' dang 'dra'o // de ni shin tu brjod du med pa nyid kyang yin te / 'di ltar blos gzung ba'i dngos po la ni mngon par brjod pa 'jug par 'gyur gyi [gyis PG] / de ni blos rnam pa kun tu gzung du med pa'i phyir shin tu brjod du med pa nyid du rigs so //

gal te de shin tu gcig tu ma skyes pa nyid yin na de ji ltar 'jig rten las 'das pa'i [pa PG] zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i tha snyad du 'gyur zhe na /

de'i phyir bshad pa / [P251b]

5.101 vigatotpādatimirā matir lokottarā matā /
lokād uttāraṇārthena lokātikramato 'pi vā //

skye ba rab rib bral ba'i blo // 'jig rten 'das pa yin par 'dod //
'jig rten las sgrol don phyir dang // 'jig rten shin tu 'da' phyir ro //

[D225b] zhes bya ba ni skye ba nyid rab rib ste / de dang bral ba'i [PG om.] blo gang la yod pa de ni skye ba rab rib dang bral ba'i blo 'jig rten las 'das [P om.] pa yin par 'dod de / ci'i phyir zhe na / 'jig rten las sgrol ba'i don gyi phyir dang 'jig rten las shin tu 'da' ba'i phyir te [dang PG] / ji skad du de ni 'jig rten la [las D] g.yo ba dang bskyod pa dang 'da' ba'i phyir 'jig rten las 'das pa zhes bya'o zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //

gzhan yang /

5.102 nirvikalpā nirālambā nirnimittā ca sā tayā /
abodhasamatābodhāt svānyadharmatayā sakṛt //

de ni mi rtog dmigs med dang // mtshan ma med cing de yis ni //
rang gzhan chos nyid cig car du // rtogs [rtog D] med tshul gyis [gyi P]
mnyam nyid rtogs //

zhes bya ba la blo de ni rnam par mi rtog [rtogs PG] pa yin te / ma skyes pa kho nas rnam par rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir ro // dmigs pa med pa yang yin te / dngos po thams cad mi [G224a] dmigs pa'i phyir ro // mtshan ma med pa yang yin te / yul la mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro // blo des [de'i PG] shes pa rang gi chos nyid dang shes bya gzhan gyi chos nyid cig [gcig G] car du rtogs [rtog D] pa med pa'i tshul gyis mnyam pa nyid du rtogs pa yang yin te / kho bo cag ni skad cig gcig gis mngon par rdzogs par byang chub par rnam par 'jog pa'i phyir ro //

'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi shes bya brtag pa'i phyir /

5.103 anutpādo hi dharmāṇāṃ dharmanairātmyam ucyate /
na kalpanākalaṅkāṅkasaṃbhavas tatra pūrvavat //

chos rnams skye ba med pa ni // chos bdag med pa nyid ces bya //
de la rtog dri'i mtshan ma dag // 'byung ba med pa snga ma bzhin //

zhes bya ba smras te / chos rnams skye ba med pa nyid gang yin pa de nyid chos bdag med pa nyid ces bya ste / de la rtog pa'i dri ma'i mtshan ma dag 'byung ba med pa ni de nyid shes pa 'tshol ba'i le'ur bstan pa snga ma [P252a] bzhin te / rtog pa nyid dri ma yin te snang ba'o // de nyid mtshan ma de [ste PG] mngon rtags [rtogs D] so // de la de dag rnam pa thams cad du 'byung ba med do //

'dir smras pa / mdo sde las / don dam pa ni *brtag mi nus* [rtag tu med DPG] pa dang / rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin no zhes gsungs pas mngon sum gyi yul yin par gsungs pa yin na khyed kyis ni don dam par rtogs par bya ba ma yin par bstan pas rtog ge'i spyod yul yin te / mtho ris la sogs pa bzhin no zhes smras pas lung dang 'gal lo zhe na /

pha [G224b] rol po dag gi bsam pa de [D226a] bzlog pa'i phyir bshad pa /

5.104 tattvasyātarkagamyatvāt tadbodho nānumānataḥ /
nātas tarkeṇa dharmāṇāṃ gamyate dharmateti cet //

gal te de nyid rtog ge yi // spyod yul min phyir rjes dpag pas //
de mi rtogs [rtog PG] pa de yi phyir // chos rnams chos nyid brtag min na //

zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag de ltar sems na'o //

5.105 ihānumānān nirdoṣād āgamānuvidhāyinaḥ /
kalpitāśeṣavividhavikalpaughanirākṛteḥ //

'di la rjes dpag skyon med pa [pa'o PG] // lung gi rjes su sgrub byed pas //
brtags [brtag PG] pa'i rnam rtog chu bo dag // sna tshogs ma lus bsal mdzad nas //

zhes bya ba ni 'di la bcom ldan 'das kyis dang por rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa skyon med pa lung gi rjes su sgrub par byed pas rang dang gzhan gyi gzhung lugs kyis yongs su brtags [brtag PG] pa'i rnam par rtog pa'i chu bo sna tshogs ma lus pa dag bsal bar [ba PG] mdzad nas de'i 'og tu /

5.106 akalajñeyayāthātmyam ākāśasamacetasaḥ /
jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt //

sangs rgyas rnam rtog mi mnga' ba // dgongs pa mkha' mnyam ye shes kyis //
shes bya [P add ba] mtha' dag ji bzhin du // chos rnams gzhag [bzhag PG] pa nyid rtogs shing //

ming la sogs pa thob pa nyid / 'das pa dang / ma 'ongs pa dang / da ltar byung ba dang / brjod par bya ba ma yin pa dang / 'dus ma byas zhes bya ba shes bya rnam pa lnga po mi dmigs pa ni nam mkha' mnyam pa'i sems so // rnam par mi rtog pa'i mngon sum [P252b] gyi ye shes kyi skad cig ma'o // nye bar brtags nas gzigs pa zhes bya ste / gzigs pa med pa'i tshul gyis so //

5.107 ato 'numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvaṃ pratipadyate /
tattvajñānavipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //

des na rjes su dpag pa'i [G225a] yul // de nyid yin par sgrub mi nus //
de nyid shes pa'i mi mthun phyogs // gang yin de ni des zlog [bzlog PG] byed //

rnam par mi [P om.] rtog pa'i de kho na nyid kyi shes pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs brtags [brtag PG] pa zhes bya ba de ni rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa 'dis zlog [bzlog PG] par byed pa yin gyi / rjes su dpag pa'i spyod yul du de kho na nyid sgrub par byed pa ni ma yin no zhes sbyar bar bya'o //

yang gal te rjes su dpag pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs ji ltar bzlog par bya zhe na / smras pa /

5.108 āgamāntarabhedena bhedāyātāsu buddhiṣu /
abhede 'py āgamasyānyaḥ kaḥ parīkṣākṣamo vidhiḥ //

lung gi khyad par tha dad pas // tha dad gyur pa'i blo la ci //
lung gi dbye ba med pa la // rtogs par gyur pas gzhan ci yod //

lung las gzhan pa'i lung ni lung gi khyad par ste / de ni rgol ba sum brgya drug cu rtsa gsum gyi dbye bas shes [D226b] pa'i bye brag skye bar 'gyur ba'o // gang dag tha mi dad par 'dod pa de dag la ni thabs gzhan gyis brtag par rigs [rig PG] pa ma yin gyi / gzhan du phyogs dang gtan tshigs dang dpe dang ldan pa'i rjes su dpag pas yin no // ci'i phyir zhe na / gang gi phyir /

5.109 pratijñāmātrakā neṣṭā pratipakṣanirākriyā /
aniṣiddhe vipakṣe ca nirvikalpā matiḥ kutaḥ //

mi mthun phyogs ni spang bya ba // dam bcas tsam gyis ji ltar 'dod //
rnam par rtog pa ma spangs par // rnam par mi rtog blo ji ltar //

rnam par rtog pa thams cad 'gegs par byed pa na dam bca' ba 'ba' zhig gis byed par nus pa ma yin te / mi mthun pa'i phyogs brtags [brtag P, btags G] pa zhes bya ba ma spangs kyi bar du rnam [G225b] par mi rtog pa'i blo 'byung bar 'gyur ba ma yin pas dam bca' ba smras nas gtan tshigs brjod par bya'o // dpe yang brjod par bya'o // mngon par 'dod pa'i don sgrub pa ni sgrub par byed pa'i rjes su [P253a] dpag pa tshang ba yin pas so //

5.110 satyadvayam ataś coktaṃ muninā tattvadarśinā /
vyavahāraṃ samāśritya tattvārthādhigamo yataḥ //

thub pa bden pa gzigs pa yis // 'di ltar bden pa gnyis su gsungs //
tha snyad la ni brten nas su // de nyid don ni rtogs 'gyur phyir //

rjes su dpag pa gang gis rnam par brtags [brtag P, btags G] pa 'gog par byed pa de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu tha snyad kyi bden pa *zhes bya ba la brten nas byed pa yin no // tha snyad kyi bden pa* [PG om.] de la brten nas de [PG om.] ni rim gyis rnam par mi rtog pa brjod du med pa'i don dam pa rtogs par 'gyur te / ji ltar kun rdzob kyi chos la ma brten par don dam pa rtogs par mi nus so zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //

dbu ma pa'i lugs la rab tu grags pa'i de kho na nyid rnam par bzhag cing rnal 'byor spyod pa pa'i de kho na nyid la skyon dang bcas pa nyid du smras pa /

5.111 sālambanatvād vitathā tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ /
svapnādidhīvat tadgrāhyaṃ nātas tattvaṃ ca yujyate //

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i blo // dmigs dang bcas phyir brdzun yin te //
rmi lam sogs yin de shes bya // des na de nyid yin mi rigs //

de kho na nyid la dmigs pa'i blo zhes bya ba ni chos can no // de ni brdzun pa yin te zhes bya ba ni de'i chos te bsgrub par bya ba'o // chos dang chos can bsdoms pa ni phyogs so // dmigs pa dang bcas pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs te / gang dang gang dmigs pa dang bcas pa yin pa de dang de ni brdzun pa yin te / dper na [D227a] rmi lam [G226a] gyi shes pa bzhin zhes bya ba ni dpe'o // gang gi phyir de brdzun yin pa de'i phyir des gzung [bzung PG] ba de ni de kho na nyid do zhes bya bar rigs pa ma yin te / de yang brdzun nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

gzhan yang /

5.112 agrāhyo 'nabhilāpyaś ca dhīpracāravivarjitaḥ /
dharma ukto munīndreṇa sa caivaṃ sati bādhyate //

gzung du med pa brjod med pa // shes pa'i spyod pa rnam spangs pa //
thub pa'i dbang pos gsungs pa'i chos // de yis 'di ltar 'di la gnod //

blo'i [blo yi PG] yul nyid yin pa'i phyir gzung du med pa nyid dang / [G add brjod du med pa nyid dang] brjod du med pa nyid yin par mi rigs [P253b] te / 'di ltar chos nyid [PG om.] de ni gzung du med pa dang brjod du med pa'o zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du don dam pa'i bden pa ni gang la shes pa 'jug pa med pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro //

rab tu byed pa yongs su rdzogs nas shin tu spangs pa'i don dang reg par bya ba'i phyir /

5.113 ato yuktyāgamopetaṃ tattvaṃ yat prāgudāhṛtam /
parīkṣyamāṇaṃ yuktyaivaṃ tad evāvyāhataṃ sthitam //

de ltar lung rigs ldan pa yi // de nyid gang zhig sngar bstan pa //

rigs pas yongs su brtags na yang // de las nyams pa med par gnas //

gang rnal 'byor spyod pa pas yongs su brtags pa'i de kho na nyid ni rnam par brtags pa na dpyad bzod pa ma yin no //

5.114 [*Sanskrit missing*]

kha cig phung po'i ljon shing chags [chag D] // kha cig rnam shes rgya la thogs //
yang dag mtha' yi g.yang sar yang // ma lhung rgyal ba'i thugs sras rol //

de ltar na / de kho na nyid gang de nyid shes pa 'tshol ba'i rab tu byed par lung dang [PG om.] rigs pa dang ldan par bdag gis 'di skad du /

shes bya [pa P] rnam kun ma [G226b] grub phyir // gang la rnam par mi rtog [rtogs PG] pa'i //
blo yang skye bar mi 'gyur la // de nyid mnyam med de mkhyen gsung //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gzhung gis bdag dang gzhan gyi rtog ge pa rnams kyi rjes su dpag pas kyang bskyod [bskyed PG] par nus pa ma yin par yang dag par rab tu gnas pa yin no //

dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba las / rnal 'byor dpyod pa pa'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pa ste le'u lnga pa'o //

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Texts Named or Quoted in the Commentary

Texts are divided into two categories—canonical sources and śāstras—and are listed in order of their appearance. The titles are given according to the best available Sanskrit equivalents of the Tibetan names as quoted in Bhāviveka's text. When the equivalent is in doubt, the uncertainty is noted with a question mark. When a text is quoted more than once under an alternate or abbreviated title, the alternate titles are listed beneath the original. When Bhāviveka does not identify the text but the title is known from other sources, the title is listed in brackets.

Śāstras

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